Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

Pixy, precisely what "established fact" do you believe you know about how consciousness is created?

Of course.

I'm still waiting for you to post your iron-clad definition (which, btw, I can't find on this thread) in response to my request.

It's been posted several hundred times, but here it is again:

Consciousness is self-referential information processing.

You yourself have admitted that we haven't yet mapped consciousness to the brain.

Actually, no.

We are mapping the details of the processes of the mind to specific neurological processes.

We have absolutely mapped consciousness to the brain. You have pointed this out many times yourself.

What that means is this:
* We know the brain creates consciousness somehow;

Certainly.

* We don't know the complete circuitry involved or how it's interconnected.

Not in every detail, no.

• We know what it is
• We know how it works
• We know it produces consciousness and under what circumstances it does this
• We know under what circumstances it does not produce consciousness

Most importantly:

• We know how a huge number of changes to brain function produces changes to consciousness, including physical damage, disease, chemical influences, and electrical stimulation

Which means "We don't know how the brain produces consciousness".

Nope.

If you really do know how the brain creates consciousness, you need to let the world know (and, of course, claim your Nobel).

Nope. Because all neuroscientists know the same thing. It's certainly not original with me. It's not profound at this point either, though it was decades ago when it was first understood.

And it won't do to simply toss out terms like "feedback loops" and "self-referential processing". That's hand waving.

No it isn't. If consciousness has all the properties and only the properties of information processing - then it is information processing.

Since no-one has ever both (a) posited a property or function of consciousness that is other than informational in nature and (b) established that this property or function actually exists.

There are plenty of people here that have done (a) and failed at (b). You seem to be doing (b) but failing at (a).

 

[PixyMisa]

PixyMisa, thank you for the extended reply.

Now let me say up front that I fully admit I may be wrong.

In fact, if I am wrong, it makes for a much more fascinating universe than if I am right!

But instead of us debating various points as they come up in discussion, haphazardly, let me propose this....

How about we walk through it step by step, in a logical fashion?

Okay, sure.

Furthermore, let's try to use everyday language as much as possible. That will help you to communicate effectively with me, and will also help anyone who might be following along.

Sure.

I'd like to propose that we begin with 2 points in particular which, it seems to me, form the basis of the argument. (If you have a different preference, however, I'm open to that.)

One of these is the claim that it has been proven that the brain is a computer -- in everything it does, without exception, including consciousness. (For the sake of argument, we'll classify a monitor, a printer, and a CD tray as non-computers.)

I'm not sure if this is precisely equivalent to the claim that everything the brain does can be done by a Turing machine. I suspect it is, but I'll leave that to you to clarify.

Everything that everything does can be done in simulation by a Turing machine. No exceptions, unless you can actually establish that quantum randomness is (a) significant and (b) distinguishable from a pseudo-random sequence of arbitrary length (which is impossible).

Now, matter in a simulation is not matter in the real world. Okay. But information in a simulation is information in the real world.

And consciousness is an informational process. There is nothing, literally nothing, that we ascribe to consciousness (and that actually exists) that is other than informational in nature.

Therefore, it is mathematically established that Turing machines can produce consciousness.

Now, beyond that, the brain is actually a computer. We can observe its behaviour, and it's a packet-switching pulse-coded chemical-biased network processor. And it produces consciousness.

The other is a statement of yours which I can't quote because you seem to have deleted in on edit, but it went something like this:

All physical processes can be simulated on a Turing machine.

Sorry, I went back and trimmed down that post because it ran rather long. But I've reiterated it in more detail above.

I propose we start with the latter. If you'd rather begin somewhere else, we'll table the point.

No, that's fine, and it's an important point.

But here goes....

First, it's extremely important that we distinguish between simulation (in the common sense of the word) and production (what I would call instantiation and what, iirc, you might call identity).

No. This is a false distinction.

In other words, you can simulate all sorts of stuff on a computer without actually producing those things.

No. This is a false distinction.

You can simulate a rocket flying to Mars, or a car driving down a road.

But in doing so, no actual rocket flies to Mars, no actual car drives down any actual road.

Sorry, this is still a false distinction.

It's the inverse of reification, which doesn't appear to have a name. It's a kind of category error, and unfortunately a common misunderstanding.

If a rocket flies to Mars in the simulation, an actual rocket flies to actual Mars in the simulation.

You'll see why this is important in a moment.

So the fact that computer X can simulate a rocket flying to Mars does not mean that the computer can fly to Mars.

Of course not.

But if computer X can simulate a composer writing a symphony, the computer can write a symphony.

Similarly, the fact that we can simulate -- that is, model -- on a computer what the brain does during conscious events does not necessarily imply that the computer can produce conscious events (iow, actually be conscious).

And this is the point where you are absolutely flat-out wrong.

If the computer can simulate a composer writing a symphony, the computer can produce an actual symphony. There is no distinction.

If the computer can simulate a poet writing a sonnet, the computer can produce an actual sonnet. There is no distinction.

If the computer can simulate a physicist formulating and testing a hypothesis, the computer can carry out scientific research. There is no distinction.

Of course, at the moment, we can't actually run any such simulation because we don't know how the brain does consciousness, but that's beside the point.

I disagree, of course.

We both accept that, once we know what's going on in there, we'll be able to simulate it on some sort of computer.

Yes.

So that's where I'd like to begin.

Are you saying that it has been proven that computers can produce -- not simply model -- consciousness?

Yes. Absolutely. Because the distinction here is false.

If so, what is that proof?

Consciousness is an informational process, just like composing a symphony or writing a sonnet or conducting scientific research. Any physical activity involved is secondary, provably so, because in every case it can be abstracted out.

 

[westprog]

Um, how does that change the result?

I mean seriously, I understand it takes the brain to interpret but a seismology station results don't change, regardless of who looks at them or not. Lake sediments still sort, settle and be come shale, etc...

So the point you are making is?

The universe will carry on regardless, but the only way that we can understand it - that we can do physics - is to have a measurement impinge on our consciousness. Until we do that, the electrons might be there, but we can never know about them.

 

[westprog]

It might be possible, I have suggested ways the matrix manipulation could be used to create a model for it.
If you want to have a trillion possible matrix positions in variable states of association and connection.

It's important to distinguish between what a Turing machine can do (very little, really) and what it can emulate (almost anything).

 

[westprog]

Well, in computer terms 'information processing' means something very specific, in biology the way that the brain handles information is very sloppy (closer to analog than digital), it is fuzzy as in fuzzy logic and it is very messy and often plastic, there are not queues the way that there are in a processor or other data handling system, or data arrays of specified size or with pointers, things do not have convenient little labels that say where they should go and in what order to be rearranged that there are in internet transmission, there are not the neat little algorithms of pop, push, fetch and all the fine things that are done in the computer areas of information processing. (Sorry pop and push are rather dated, I know.)

In IT the data is handled with predetermined protocols and systems, in biology they seem to develop and self adjust to some extent.

It is messy in that it appears a process can have impacts on multiple pathways and be influenced by multiple pathways at the same time.

If we look at the definition of information in computing terms, it's very different to the definition in physical terms. If the brain is a Turing machine, that involves discarding almost all the information content that's physically present.

 

[westprog]

So Piggy, you are basically stating that consciousness is a product of brain activity but how it does is it, has yet to be explained? Is it possible that consciousness is not reducible to the brain?

It's certainly possible, but in investigating consciousness, it seems sensible to rule out the more exotic possibilities. The simplest explanation is that consciousness is produced by the operation of the brain, or possibly the interaction of the brain with its environment.

How much of consciousness do you think has been explained?

As has been pointed out several times, we can't even define properly what it is. Dancing David thinks it's a number of different things. As to what goes on in the brain, and what the processes involved do, we know a considerable amount. Not what produces consciousness, though.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's important to distinguish between what a Turing machine can do (very little, really) and what it can emulate (almost anything).

What's the difference, please?

 

[!Kaggen]

What's the difference, please?

Quality

 

[kowtaaia]

Of course.

Consciousness is self-referential information processing.

The thinking process.

 

[!Kaggen]

What standards are those? How have I lowered them? What does it even mean to lower them? In what way is my definition narrow? After all, the most common complaint, indeed your own complaint, is that it is overly broad.


Then yes, it would be conscious by definition.

So, I ask again, what standards have I lowered? How does it follow that thermostats are our equals? What do you mean when you say that thermostats are our equals? Why do you think that this is valid? Why would it be a bad thing? Even if it were a bad thing, do you think this would make the definition incorrect? If so, why? If not, why did you raise it as an argument?


I didn't ask that. I asked why we would need to lower our standards.


What is it you claim we do not understand, and why? And why do you ascribe that particular motive to me, or indeed, to anyone?


What evidence do you have to support this rather curious claim? Please take into consideration the Church-Turing Thesis, which establishes that this is a mathematical impossibility.


Evidence for any of that, and your reasons for believing that it is in any way relevant to the discussion, please?

Be precise.

Pixy Misa, history is full of circumstances where people like yourself believed they had the answers because they had lowered their standards to fit the current paradigm, in your case the Turing-Church Hypothesis.

You are correct that within the information age paradigm we find ourselves it is the best current model to date for consciousness, but what makes me strive for a more satisfactory model is my belief that consciousness is more beautiful than a computer program.

This does not mean I accept other suggestion, but certainly means I try to understand them and see whether they have any value in adjusting my thinking.

What you do on the other hand is simply dismiss them as they are not built on the platform of your information paradigm.

You want vendor lock-in.

 

[Piggy]

Of course.

It's been posted several hundred times, but here it is again:

Consciousness is self-referential information processing.

This definition is insufficient, since it cannot distinguish between self-referential information processing which produces instances of conscious awareness, and self-referential information processing which does not produce instances of conscious awareness.

That definition is about as useful as this one:

Consciousness is an activity of the brain.

I'm sorry, but that definition explains nothing.

 

[Piggy]

So Piggy, you are basically stating that consciousness is a product of brain activity but how it does is it, has yet to be explained? Is it possible that consciousness is not reducible to the brain?

How much of consciousness do you think has been explained?

Yes, it's a product of brain activity.

No, it is not possible that consciousness is not reducible to the brain, short of a fundamental revolution in science overturning essentially everything we believe we know about reality.

Very little about consciousness has been explained. We know some things about it. For instance, it's an activity of the brain. It's not unitary (as it once was thought to be). There are particular regions of the brain involved. It's resource-intensive.

 

[Piggy]

And consciousness is an informational process. There is nothing, literally nothing, that we ascribe to consciousness (and that actually exists) that is other than informational in nature.

This, it seems to me, is your fundamental mistake. (Or one of them.)

You might as well say that kicking is entirely information in nature, or that breathing is entirely informational in nature.

The problem is, you insist on viewing the brain only through your IP lens. And when you do that, the unique qualities of consciousness -- which, to save my fingers, I'll abbreviate as Sofia from here on out (sense of felt individual awareness) -- fall off the radar.

You look at the radar, see blips, and insist that there's no difference between any of the objects represented by those blips, even when direct observation contradicts that conclusion.

To cite a more direct example, suppose I propose an Atomic Theory of Mind (ATOM) which states that everything that happens in the brain, without exception, is the action of atoms.

Which, of course, is true.

But if I insist on viewing the brain only thru the lens of ATOM, I become unable to distinguish between any of the various things the brain is doing -- the kinds of things that matter to biologists who study the brain -- because from an ATOM viewpoint, they all look the same.

But it would make no sense for me, on that basis, to insist that there really is no difference among the various functions of the brain on a macro level, or that we had somehow explained all of these functions by noting that they are the result of the activity of atoms.

Same for your IP lens.

When you use it, the differences between those processes which give rise to conscious awarenss of events, and those processes which allow us to perceive, respond, and even learn from events without being consciously aware of them, simply drop off the radar.

Doesn't mean they're not real.

And of course, direct experience and observation demonstrates clearly that they are real.

What's the difference between responding to events we are aware of and those we aren't? Between learning from events we are aware of and those we aren't? Sofia -- the very real sensation of felt experience.

That's a real-world phenomenon. It's a behavior. It's an event.

And it's qualitatively different from brain processes which dont produce Sofia.

Ok, someone's here, gotta go.

Will pick up the thread later.

 

[Dancing David]

The universe will carry on regardless, but the only way that we can understand it - that we can do physics - is to have a measurement impinge on our consciousness. Until we do that, the electrons might be there, but we can never know about them.

I agree with that, yet the universe seems to be persistent and consistent, even when we aren't looking.

 

[Dancing David]

If we look at the definition of information in computing terms, it's very different to the definition in physical terms. If the brain is a Turing machine, that involves discarding almost all the information content that's physically present.

I am not sure of your meaning, please elaborate. The data is there..., discarded no, something else?

 

[PixyMisa]

This definition is insufficient, since it cannot distinguish between self-referential information processing which produces instances of conscious awareness, and self-referential information processing which does not produce instances of conscious awareness.

It's no insufficient - or at leat, that is not an argument against its sufficiency - because by definition, there are no instances of self-referential information processing that do not produce instances of conscious awareness, because, by definition, they are the same thing.

Now, you could say: Here is something that we mean when we say "consciousness" that cannot be accounted for by self-referential information processing. Then we could say: Does this something really happen? Is it really part of what we call consciousness? Is it really not accounted for by this definition?

And if all of those are true, then the definition is insufficient for the way we use the term, and we need to find a better definition.

But you have to actually establish all three parts. You haven't done so.

 

[PixyMisa]

Quality

Expand, if you would be so kind. Expand and precisify.

 

[!Kaggen]

Perhaps Pixy Misa you could answer these questions now.

Yes. The details of how the brain works are something we're still piecing together, though we know a great deal.

Consciousness is the easy bit.

Are you someone that believes theoretically that consciousness can be downloaded onto a computer?
Are you a supporter of the idea of "Technological Singularity" as defined by Ray Kurzweil (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity)?

 

[PixyMisa]

This, it seems to me, is your fundamental mistake. (Or one of them.)

Okay. Why?

You might as well say that kicking is entirely information in nature, or that breathing is entirely informational in nature.

Except that they aren't, and consciousness is.

Kicking is described in terms of force and motion. Breathing is defined in terms of muscle function, gas exchange, and metabolism.

Consciousness is defined in terms of information.

The problem is, you insist on viewing the brain only through your IP lens.

Why exactly is this a problem? You have never provided an example of anything that conflicts with this viewpoint. (Interesting Ian, for example, has; unfortunately his examples contradict reality and don't teach us very much.)

And when you do that, the unique qualities of consciousness

What unique qualities?

-- which, to save my fingers, I'll abbreviate as Sofia from here on out (sense of felt individual awareness) -- fall off the radar.

What is this "sense of felt individual awareness"? What does it do? What radar is it on - that is, why do you think it exists - and why do you claim it is not accounted for by information processing?

You look at the radar, see blips, and insist that there's no difference between any of the objects represented by those blips, even when direct observation contradicts that conclusion.

What observation is this? How does it contradict my point of view?

To cite a more direct example, suppose I propose an Atomic Theory of Mind (ATOM) which states that everything that happens in the brain, without exception, is the action of atoms.

That's true, of course, but doesn't tell us much.

But if I insist on viewing the brain only thru the lens of ATOM, I become unable to distinguish between any of the various things the brain is doing -- the kinds of things that matter to biologists who study the brain -- because from an ATOM viewpoint, they all look the same.

No.

You can of course model the brain at the atomic level, and if you do it correctly, you will come up with the exact same things that biologists see when they study the brain.

Scientists do this all the time. In fact, the entire structure of science works this way. Any biological theory is based in chemistry which is in turn based in physics. You can model any system at any level and get the same results. It's just that some levels are more appropriate for answering some questions.

But it would make no sense for me, on that basis, to insist that there really is no difference among the various functions of the brain on a macro level, or that we had somehow explained all of these functions by noting that they are the result of the activity of atoms.

You don't explain all those functions merely by noting that they are the result of atomic interactions.

But you can explain all those functions by modeling the brain at the atomic level. (Or, more practically, at the molecular level.)

Same for your IP lens.

Yes, it's the same. But not at all in the way you mean.

Since what the brain does is process information, information processing is a perfectly valid way to model the activity of the brain, and if done correctly, gives the exact same answers as biologists observe directly and the atomic modelers see in their models.

When you use it, the differences between those processes which give rise to conscious awarenss of events, and those processes which allow us to perceive, respond, and even learn from events without being consciously aware of them, simply drop off the radar.

No. Because all of that is information processing.

Doesn't mean they're not real.

No, of course not. But they are information processing.

And of course, direct experience and observation demonstrates clearly that they are real.

Sure. And they are information processing.

Perception? That's information processing.
Response? Information processing.
Learning? Obviously information processing.

What's the difference between responding to events we are aware of and those we aren't?

You mean consciously aware? Because you can't respond to an event you're not aware of at some level.

The difference is self-reference.

That is, you have a sensory input that activates a particular neuronal complex. That's what we call awareness. But you don't become conscious of that sensory input unless your brain also has a self-referential loop, a loop that says: Here is this sensory data, and here is data from the neural network that is processing that data. This network takes input not just from the senses, but from itself. What Hofstadter terms a strange loop.

There's your verb, by the way. Consciousness is not an object but a process; it's information chasing itself round and round a loop and reflectively modifying itself.

This certainly happens in the brain, on multiple scales. And it accounts for everything we observe in relation to consciousness.

And, again, it's all information processing, and the same trick is commonly found in moderately sophisticated computer programs.

Between learning from events we are aware of and those we aren't?

Same answer.

Sofia -- the very real sensation of felt experience.

Which is what, exactly?

That's a real-world phenomenon.

Is it? Okay, fine. What is it, then, what does it do, and why do you think it cannot be accounted for by information processing?

It's a behavior.

That does what?

It's an event.

That does what?

Information processing is a behaviour, a sequence of events. Merely stating that something is a behaviour or an event certainly doesn't place it beyond the bounds of information processing. You'll have to give me more than that to go on.

And it's qualitatively different from brain processes which dont produce Sofia.

Qualitatively different how?

 

[westprog]

I agree with that, yet the universe seems to be persistent and consistent, even when we aren't looking.

Yes, there seems to be a consistent real world of some sort. The reason we believe this is because of a consistent model which explains the sensory impressions we receive via our consciousness.