The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[rocketdodger]

In your description, Set 2 is merely information about Set 1. That doesn't make them the same.

Great, because I never said they were.

 

[rocketdodger]

The materialist will just look at a situation where there are two objects. They may appear to be the same, but they aren't - because the essential property of location is different.

So if there was another body somewhere, and you felt what it felt, and what it saw you saw, and what it's cells did your cells did, and vice versa, so that for example your visual field was at any given time just a superposition of two scenes at once, and if one body was destroyed so would the other, and you had no way to discern which body was more "you" than the other since both bodies reacted to your every thought ...

... you honestly claim that one of those bodies is not you? And don't you realize that the other body would be doing the same?

Don't you think the idea of two bodies with the same mind simultaneously vocalizing that th other body doesn't in fact share that mind is kind of stupidly ironic?

 

[Aepervius]

So if there was another body somewhere, and you felt what it felt, and what it saw you saw, and what it's cells did your cells did, and vice versa, so that for example your visual field was at any given time just a superposition of two scenes at once, and if one body was destroyed so would the other, and you had no way to discern which body was more "you" than the other since both bodies reacted to your every thought ...

... you honestly claim that one of those bodies is not you? And don't you realize that the other body would be doing the same?

Don't you think the idea of two bodies with the same mind simultaneously vocalizing that th other body doesn't in fact share that mind is kind of stupidly ironic?

Emphasis mine. The problem rocket, is that you don't want to recognize that even if they are identical in memory and reaction, they are NOT the same mind. You simply have a blockage on that. They are actually not. And if the original was left to live, they would immediately start to differ, even in identical environment.

 

[soylent]

Italics in the original. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle all by itself says that it is impossible to create an exact duplicate because you can't make the original measurement (position) exactly.

This is subtly wrong. The uncertainty is not just in your measurement, with the particle having a welldefined position and momentum in reality that you just cannot measure. The wavefunction for position and the wavefunction for momentum are related through a fourier transform; it is from this that the uncertainty principle results(for the same reason that a noise that is welldefined in time must contain many frequencies in order to start and stop so quickly, and a note that is welldefined in frequency must extend over a great period of time).

The position is actually uncertain in the real world, not just unknowable. It cannot be a requirement to know the position and momentum to greater accuracy than the uncertainty principle will allow in order to faithfully reproduce a copy of you, or you would not be a faithful representation of yourself.

 

[Thunder]

from what I understand, at the smallest level, atoms are simply bits of energy.

so if this transporter simply tranports this energy to another location, you really haven't been destroyed.

 

[Chris L]

you honestly claim that one of those bodies is not you? And don't you realize that the other body would be doing the same?

Yes. The "me" that I experience is a product of the brain that is part of my body. It is an artifact of the physiology and chemistry of that brain. Another me (a clone for instance) would not be me. He would be him. He would look like me, act like me, and could even have my memories, but that doesn't make him me. We would not be connected by some silly magical plot device, so he would not feel what I feel when I feel it.

The transporter is just a device to create exact copies of someone at a distance, while destroying the original in the process. The outside world reacts to the copy as if it is the same, because for their purposes (and the purposes of the story) they are. That doesn't mean they really are though. The original body that was scanned was destroyed. The atoms that made it up no longer exist in that configuration. So no, they are not the same.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Oh how Interesting Ian would love to be here.

~~ Paul

 

[blobru]

Oh how Interesting Ian would love to be here.

~~ Paul

Maybe he'll teleport in. (Was he a 'porter supporter? (or a 'puter disputer?))

 

[westprog]

As it has been explained to you many times before, "location" has no meaning above and beyond "behavior."

The only thing that needs to be justified in this context is your own assertion that "location" is somehow more fundamental than any other behavior. I think you will have trouble with that, given how location is nothing more than a behavior to begin with.

Again, "more fundamental" is a red herring. I never said that location was "more fundamental". I'm just denying that it can be entirely ignored.

 

[westprog]

So if there was another body somewhere, and you felt what it felt, and what it saw you saw, and what it's cells did your cells did, and vice versa, so that for example your visual field was at any given time just a superposition of two scenes at once, and if one body was destroyed so would the other, and you had no way to discern which body was more "you" than the other since both bodies reacted to your every thought ...

... you honestly claim that one of those bodies is not you? And don't you realize that the other body would be doing the same?

Don't you think the idea of two bodies with the same mind simultaneously vocalizing that th other body doesn't in fact share that mind is kind of stupidly ironic?

I have two arms, both of which are controlled by the same mind. I have no problem differentiating between my arms, and they are not equivalent or exchangeable.

The concept of "two bodies sharing the same mind" is an example of the kind of ill-defined thinking that pervades this question. Assume that two bodies are physically identical, and have identical brain processes going on. This means what?

This line of reasoning is only applied to people. Imagine two identical cars driving at the same speed. They are exactly the same in every detail. How many cars are there? It's fairly obvious. And saying "But but but they are travelling at the same speed " doesn't make any difference. There are still two cars. Count 'em. You can go on about them sharing the same velocity all you want, but that doesn't change their essential nature.

 

[rocketdodger]

I have two arms, both of which are controlled by the same mind. I have no problem differentiating between my arms, and they are not equivalent or exchangeable.

The concept of "two bodies sharing the same mind" is an example of the kind of ill-defined thinking that pervades this question. Assume that two bodies are physically identical, and have identical brain processes going on. This means what?

This line of reasoning is only applied to people. Imagine two identical cars driving at the same speed. They are exactly the same in every detail. How many cars are there? It's fairly obvious. And saying "But but but they are travelling at the same speed " doesn't make any difference. There are still two cars. Count 'em. You can go on about them sharing the same velocity all you want, but that doesn't change their essential nature.

Why do you ignore what I say?

Clearly, if there were two identical cars traveling at the same speed, and one ran into a tree but both were deformed and wrecked in exactly the same way, as if there was an unobservable tree that the second one ran into, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR ASSERTION THAT THEY WERE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT DIFFERENT CARS WOULD YOU NOT?

And clearly, if there were two identical bodies standing in front of you, and you pricked one with a pin but both displayed a pain reaction in exactly the same way as if the other was pricked with an unobservable pin, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR ASSERTION THAT THEY DO NOT FEATURE A COMMON MIND WOULD YOU NOT?

And clearly, if instead of getting input from one body, you realized that your mind was getting sensory data from two bodies, and that when you moved your arm the arm of both bodies moved because you couldn't choose one or the other, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR POSITION WOULD YOU NOT?

I am not saying any of that is possible -- I just want you to admit that if the above were to happen then you wouldn't be so smugly confident in your viewpoint. I am not "ill-defining" anything, from day one I have been very clear about what I am speaking of. You only think it is "ill-defined" because you refuse to acknowledge that I am speaking of hypotheticals. Why?

 

[rocketdodger]

Again, "more fundamental" is a red herring. I never said that location was "more fundamental". I'm just denying that it can be entirely ignored.

And I am saying that the notion of "location" is dependent upon the notion of "behavior." It is in fact defined in terms of behavior. So clearly if one says X behaves exactly the same as Y, from the viewpoint of X or Y, it implies that from the viewpoint of X and Y they share the same location.

What is so hard to understand about this? Obviously, if someone used the teleporter and was supposed to behave the same as the original, THEY WOULDN'T SEE THEIR DOPPLEGANGER, OR ANYTHING ELSE THAT WOULD LET THEM KNOW THEIR LOCATION CHANGED, BECAUSE THEN THEY WOULD BE BEHAVING DIFFERENTLY

 

[rocketdodger]

Emphasis mine. The problem rocket, is that you don't want to recognize that even if they are identical in memory and reaction, they are NOT the same mind. You simply have a blockage on that. They are actually not. And if the original was left to live, they would immediately start to differ, even in identical environment.

How can you possibly say that if they are identical in reaction -- CAUSAL reaction -- that they don't share the same mind?

I just don't get it. You are honestly saying that if you ask one a question and across the universe the other replies as well, they are still two different minds? That if you pricked one with a pin and both displayed the pain?

What definition of "same mind" are you using, then?

 

[westprog]

Why do you ignore what I say?

Clearly, if there were two identical cars traveling at the same speed, and one ran into a tree but both were deformed and wrecked in exactly the same way, as if there was an unobservable tree that the second one ran into, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR ASSERTION THAT THEY WERE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT DIFFERENT CARS WOULD YOU NOT?

And clearly, if there were two identical bodies standing in front of you, and you pricked one with a pin but both displayed a pain reaction in exactly the same way as if the other was pricked with an unobservable pin, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR ASSERTION THAT THEY DO NOT FEATURE A COMMON MIND WOULD YOU NOT?

And clearly, if instead of getting input from one body, you realized that your mind was getting sensory data from two bodies, and that when you moved your arm the arm of both bodies moved because you couldn't choose one or the other, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO RETHINK YOUR POSITION WOULD YOU NOT?

I am not saying any of that is possible -- I just want you to admit that if the above were to happen then you wouldn't be so smugly confident in your viewpoint. I am not "ill-defining" anything, from day one I have been very clear about what I am speaking of. You only think it is "ill-defined" because you refuse to acknowledge that I am speaking of hypotheticals. Why?

I've been perfectly clear about what I'm talking about, and what I'm describing.

If a stimulus to one object manifested itself in an effect on another object, without any physical connection, then I would assume that the laws of physics as we understand them did not apply, and that magic was real. I don't know what is gained by considering such a concept - since unlike the transporter, we know it to be impossible. Let me make it clear - I've no particular interest in this particular hypothetical. I can't see what it illustrates, beyond the absurdity and impossibility of a "common mind" operating at a distance.

This has nothing to do with the question of the possible - what if two different objects with similar initial conditions were behaving in a similar way? That's what was described in the OP and that's what I'm interested in. If two objects at separate locations respond in the same way to the same stimuli, that's merely what we expect.

 

[westprog]

And I am saying that the notion of "location" is dependent upon the notion of "behavior." It is in fact defined in terms of behavior. So clearly if one says X behaves exactly the same as Y, from the viewpoint of X or Y, it implies that from the viewpoint of X and Y they share the same location.

What is so hard to understand about this? Obviously, if someone used the teleporter and was supposed to behave the same as the original, THEY WOULDN'T SEE THEIR DOPPLEGANGER, OR ANYTHING ELSE THAT WOULD LET THEM KNOW THEIR LOCATION CHANGED, BECAUSE THEN THEY WOULD BE BEHAVING DIFFERENTLY

The fact remains that they would be different objects at different locations. Any single observer could see this. We could provide two different observers that would be in the same relationship as the two copies - but that would not mean that they wouldn't be different copies.

 

[westprog]

How can you possibly say that if they are identical in reaction -- CAUSAL reaction -- that they don't share the same mind?

I just don't get it. You are honestly saying that if you ask one a question and across the universe the other replies as well, they are still two different minds? That if you pricked one with a pin and both displayed the pain?

What definition of "same mind" are you using, then?

Nobody is considering this hypothesis, because it is impossible. Do we need to put that in bold or bold and italics, or a bigger font?

 

[Tinfoil Hater]

If transporter technology were possible, I think the outcome would be like what you saw in 'The Fly'- it would turn into a gene splicer.

 

[blobru]

How can you possibly say that if they are identical in reaction -- CAUSAL reaction -- that they don't share the same mind?

I just don't get it. You are honestly saying that if you ask one a question and across the universe the other replies as well, they are still two different minds? That if you pricked one with a pin and both displayed the pain?

What definition of "same mind" are you using, then?

How are you defining "mind" here? As activity (or potential activity -- acquired skills, habits, behaviors in memory)? Like happiness (acting happy), or running? Treating an activity as separate from the things whose state it describes, i.e, which are doing it, is reification (fallacy)^WP: a fallacy, that is, unless "mind" were somehow a special class of activity.

In your one-question-two-replies scenario, I'm also unclear how the question is input to the second respondent across the universe. Are you assuming a universal program that recognizes the two systems have identical "minds"; that is, are acting the same way, but is unable to discriminate between them on the basis of position, so that asking either a question will elicit the same reply; prick one with a pin and both say "ouch"? Does it matter when the second says "ouch"? (That is, without a universal program to link identical minds, according to special relativity, there is always a necessary time-lag for the transmission of information between them. Whether they are separated by the diameter of the universe, which is estimated at close to 100 billion light-years, or only by the diameter of the solar system, a cricket pitch, a grapefruit, the head of a pin, is it possible to speak of them as having the same mind, without artificially privileging some intermediate reference frame for making that determination? Where does that intermediate 'universal' reference frame come from? Without it, there seems no way of even establishing identity, let alone propagating whatever consequences that is supposed to have for the mind of those identified as such.)

 

[westprog]

In your one-question-two-replies scenario, I'm also unclear how the question is input to the second respondent across the universe. Are you assuming a universal program that recognizes the two systems have identical "minds"; that is, are acting the same way, but is unable to discriminate between them on the basis of position, so that asking either a question will elicit the same reply; prick one with a pin and both say "ouch"? Does it matter when the second says "ouch"? (That is, without a universal program to link identical minds, according to special relativity, there is always a necessary time-lag for the transmission of information between them. Whether they are separated by the diameter of the universe, which is estimated at close to 100 billion light-years, or only by the diameter of the solar system, a cricket pitch, a grapefruit, the head of a pin, is it possible to speak of them as having the same mind, without artificially privileging some intermediate reference frame for making that determination? Where does that intermediate 'universal' reference frame come from? Without it, there seems no way of even establishing identity, let alone propagating whatever consequences that is supposed to have for the mind of those identified as such.)

Special relativity also tells us that it's impossible to have simultaneous events that are spatially separated. They are only simultaneous from the point of view of a given observer, and no particular observer is privileged. There's no universal clock.

I don't know what the "magic" hypothesis is supposed to address. If two seperated individuals did share a mind without a physical link, that wouldn't just affect our view of how the brain works - it would demolish everything we know about physics and the way the universe works.

The interesting thought experiment is to consider two unlinked but identical minds, and to consider whether we're dealing with two people, or one person in two places. In this scenario, their behaviour will only be synchronised while they are subject to the same stimuli.

 

[blobru]

Special relativity also tells us that it's impossible to have simultaneous events that are spatially separated. They are only simultaneous from the point of view of a given observer, and no particular observer is privileged. There's no universal clock.

Yes. That's what I just said, I think.

I don't know what the "magic" hypothesis is supposed to address. If two seperated individuals did share a mind without a physical link, that wouldn't just affect our view of how the brain works - it would demolish everything we know about physics and the way the universe works.

I'm wondering if rocketdodger is assuming something beyond physics as we understand it -- something like Bostrom's simulation hypothesis^WP, where we exist inside a computer program (which might have the simultaneous, universal [privileged] access to its simulated agents required to establish mental identity -- though why the simulaters would code it so the agents were sharing a single instance of a particular mind rather than instantiating two of the class 'mind' with temporarily identical attributes still doesn't make sense, even from a programming pov).

The interesting thought experiment is to consider two unlinked but identical minds, and to consider whether we're dealing with two people, or one person in two places. In this scenario, their behaviour will only be synchronised while they are subject to the same stimuli.

That's what I am considering. My point is, without assuming something like the simulation hypothesis, whether two separate systems are identical or not has no meaning within physics beyond the description they are identical: it does not mean they aren't separate, and all that entails.