The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[rocketdodger]

Two separate bodies behaving exactly the same. Each body would have a separate sense of self (a by product of how the brain works) and each would consider themselves separate people. You can not "magically" link their central nervous systems.

Well, actually, we can link them, because that is the whole premise of the teleporter. Whether or not you think it is actually technically possible is irrelevant.

The issue is whether or not there is something inherent about a consciousness that prevents linking in the first place, not whether the magic exists to do it.

So I will ask again -- if you prick one body with a pin, and both bodies exhibit the behavior we label as expressing pain, what do you call it? Do the two bodies still have a separate sense of self? How can it be "separate" if the exact same stimulus affects both of them?

BTW, can you explain this algorithm == the instance idea? Is that like the class == the instance? Because if it is, you are quite wrong.

I already explained that it is just a confusion of terms. But thank you for using the shady debate tactic of suggesting I mean something that is wrong, and the stating how wrong it is, before I even answer. Whatever you can do to win votes, eh?

A better way to explain the difference is to look at things from a purely A.I. or cognitive science point of view: Assuming everything is particles, for all collections of particles X, you can partition the universe into three sets: 1) the set containing only the particles of X, 2) the set containing any collections of particles that link X to other collections, 3) collections that have nothing to do with X.

In other words, if your brain is X, your brain is part of partition 1. It is an actual instance.

If I studied your brain, the particles in my brain that are involved in the memory/thought of the study of your brain, E.G. the description of the algorithm being instanced by your brain, would be part of set 2. Those particles in my brain are a logical potential instance, to use your terms. And the similar thoughts of other humans or aliens, or in a written record of that study, or descriptions in copies of some book made about the study, etc, would also be part of set 2.

The rock on the side of the road that neither of us have seen or thought about would be part of set 3.

 

[rocketdodger]

But I don't see any reason to think there would be a material link... and I find it hard to even imagine this scenario. I mean unless the two bodies are both in identical environments (as in all stimuli) why would they behave identically?

What happens when one has to turn left and the other has to turn right? Which stimuli do the two bodies respond to?

If you are stipulating that we have two bodies controlled by one mind then I think thats a different question (and an uninteresting one) to the teleporter parardox posed in the OP. The question as posed says your body is rebuilt exactly at the other end with only the information being actually sent anywhere. To suppose a magic link is illogical.

The magic link is just a response to the questions posed by individuals like westprog. I know it is illogical. That is the point -- to illustrate that the challenges to the teleporter raised by individuals like westprog are trivially correct and thus obviously challenges to a strawman.

If westprog thinks that the hypotheses of teleporter proponents can be thwarted with a stupid test like 'prick one body with a pin -- does the other cry out in pain?' then he clearly doesn't understand the issues at hand. Nobody who is sane is claiming that after teleportation both bodies will respond to the same pin prick. That is utterly stupid. So why would westprog even presume to think that speaking of such a test adds anything to the conversation?

Let me clarify the issue for you, since you seem like you might actually care.

If, at a certain time t your brain is in state S, and one planck time later (t + 1) your brain is in state S+1, one can say that the transition from state S to state S+1 was determined by the laws of physics.

This is a fact.

The question is this: is it important that state S and S+1 are states of the same system? Or is the important factor only that S determines S+1?

See, transporter proponents say the latter: what is essential to the identity of a consciousness is only that each state is determined by a prior state -- where each state *occurs* in the universe is irrelevant.

We say this because there is no mathematical reason why states S and S+1 need to occur on the same system for the behavior of the consciousness to remain functionally identical. So when asked to provide such a reason (none exists) people like westprog and Malerin instead respond with attacks on strawmen.

 

[marplots]

If, at a certain time t your brain is in state S, and one planck time later (t + 1) your brain is in state S+1, one can say that the transition from state S to state S+1 was determined by the laws of physics.

This is a fact.

The question is this: is it important that state S and S+1 are states of the same system? Or is the important factor only that S determines S+1?

I think some of the difficulty revolves around the word 'system' in this. To say that running a consciousness program on a computer is the same system as my head, or that even a system here is the same as a system there is jumping over some stuff. There's a bias towards uniqueness that isn't being addressed.

When you write it as S and S+1, you take away some of the bias I have toward my own consciousness being unique and replace it with a letter which I have been trained to think of as completely substitutable. So, I am not disputing your formulation so much as pointing out it misses their argument -- If I accept your way of looking at it, I've already agreed to the premise that multiple copies are the same in the sense that this 'S' is the same as that 'S'.

 

[Chris L]

If I studied your brain, the particles in my brain that are involved in the memory/thought of the study of your brain, E.G. the description of the algorithm being instanced by your brain, would be part of set 2. Those particles in my brain are a logical potential instance, to use your terms. And the similar thoughts of other humans or aliens, or in a written record of that study, or descriptions in copies of some book made about the study, etc, would also be part of set 2.

In your description, Set 2 is merely information about Set 1. That doesn't make them the same.

 

[westprog]

I think this is wrong, having identical identity does not equate to a shared consciousness; not from a materialist point of view anyway. If self is an emergent property of brain activity then you simply have two selves that are identical. And identical objects in different places behave differently, that seems self evident. Or would you suggest if we put a gallon of petrol through the copier and then burnt one copy that the other would spontaneously combust? I don't understand the logic for that scenario.

The reasoning used doesn't really have anything to do with materialism at all. It just assumes some undefined quality called consciousness, and assumes that it's something shared in some way that makes one object "disposable" in some way.

The materialist will just look at a situation where there are two objects. They may appear to be the same, but they aren't - because the essential property of location is different.

Take out all the unscientific language from the discussion and it becomes very simple. Put the unscientific language in if you wish, but don't then complain if someone comes along and talks about souls and spiritual essence. He's not being any more unscientific than people who talk about "identity" and "experiencing self".

In scientific terms, it doesn't matter if one of the copies is destroyed. The trouble is, in scientific terms, it doesn't matter if both of the copies is destroyed.

 

[westprog]

Two separate bodies behaving exactly the same. Each body would have a separate sense of self (a by product of how the brain works) and each would consider themselves separate people. You can not "magically" link their central nervous systems.

BTW, can you explain this algorithm == the instance idea? Is that like the class == the instance? Because if it is, you are quite wrong.

Two separate bodies cannot, by definition, be identical. They cannot behave identically. They are at different locations. There is no essential link between them whatsoever.

The way that we make sense of the universe is to describe different objects having similar properties. We don't make the mistake of assuming that because two different objects share some property, that they are the same object, in any sense at all. Individual protons might be identical in mass, velocity, spin etc - but they aren't considered to be instances of the same proton.

 

[westprog]

The magic link is just a response to the questions posed by individuals like westprog. I know it is illogical. That is the point -- to illustrate that the challenges to the teleporter raised by individuals like westprog are trivially correct and thus obviously challenges to a strawman.

If westprog thinks that the hypotheses of teleporter proponents can be thwarted with a stupid test like 'prick one body with a pin -- does the other cry out in pain?' then he clearly doesn't understand the issues at hand. Nobody who is sane is claiming that after teleportation both bodies will respond to the same pin prick. That is utterly stupid. So why would westprog even presume to think that speaking of such a test adds anything to the conversation?

Let me clarify the issue for you, since you seem like you might actually care.

If, at a certain time t your brain is in state S, and one planck time later (t + 1) your brain is in state S+1, one can say that the transition from state S to state S+1 was determined by the laws of physics.

This is a fact.

The question is this: is it important that state S and S+1 are states of the same system? Or is the important factor only that S determines S+1?

See, transporter proponents say the latter: what is essential to the identity of a consciousness is only that each state is determined by a prior state -- where each state *occurs* in the universe is irrelevant.

We say this because there is no mathematical reason why states S and S+1 need to occur on the same system for the behavior of the consciousness to remain functionally identical. So when asked to provide such a reason (none exists) people like westprog and Malerin instead respond with attacks on strawmen.

As always with this discussion, the question at issue - whether consciousness is equivalent to a very particular mathematical expression of the state. When saying that consciousness is "functionally identical" that is begging the question - assuming precisely that which remains to be demonstrated.

When dealing with two seperate bodies in two seperate locations, they clearly are not in the same state. Their location is different. This is trivial. They may possibly have certain properties in common. Saying that "where a state occurs" is irrelevant is meaningless, because physical location is an irreducible part of the state of a system. Any claim that location is not an important part of a physical system needs to be justified.

 

[westprog]

I think some of the difficulty revolves around the word 'system' in this. To say that running a consciousness program on a computer is the same system as my head, or that even a system here is the same as a system there is jumping over some stuff. There's a bias towards uniqueness that isn't being addressed.

When you write it as S and S+1, you take away some of the bias I have toward my own consciousness being unique and replace it with a letter which I have been trained to think of as completely substitutable. So, I am not disputing your formulation so much as pointing out it misses their argument -- If I accept your way of looking at it, I've already agreed to the premise that multiple copies are the same in the sense that this 'S' is the same as that 'S'.

The claim is that certain aspects of the system aren't important, and can be disregarded - one of these being location. But this cannot be demonstrated simply by assertion.

 

[ttoyooka]

If I accept your way of looking at it, I've already agreed to the premise that multiple copies are the same in the sense that this 'S' is the same as that 'S'.

That's interesting; I would argue this a different way, because I would say that using the transporter is an action that cannot take zero time, and seeing as we are talking about ultra-strict notions of identical-ness and planck times, it's not possible for the transporter to produce another 'S'.

After the transporter has done its thing, the original 'S' (assuming the transporter action doesn't necessitate its destruction) is now an 'S+1', and the transporter has actually produced another 'S+1', but the question is whether the copy is the same 'S+1' as the original 'S+1'. I think this is impossible to say for sure.

Now, if this technology becomes a reality, we might simply conclude that it's "close enough" and be happy with it. However, we would all have to agree that, at some point in the future, at S+N (for some large N), the two individuals will have lived separate lives and should be considered two different people. I'm not sure it's possible to decide where N falls, regardless of your philosophical position. If a "hard-liner" says N=1, is there any real argument against it?

Edit: I should add that I'm not disagreeing with marplots here; also, it's likely (as I think about it further) that rocketdodger probably takes it as a premise that the transporter is capable of producing another 'S', and while I'd contest the reasonableness of that premise, my argument falls down if we are indeed taking that to be true.

Tak

 

[Chris L]

However, we would all have to agree that, at some point in the future, at S+N (for some large N), the two individuals will have lived separate lives and should be considered two different people.

That is the premise of the Will and Thomas Riker story lines. One was effectively in stasis for a number of years, while the other went on to fame and glory. The drama revolving around how the choices one makes really affects what happens to us.

 

[bencg]

Nobody who is sane is claiming that after teleportation both bodies will respond to the same pin prick. That is utterly stupid.

Okay... good! I didn't get that from your previous posts, mea culpa.

If, at a certain time t your brain is in state S, and one planck time later (t + 1) your brain is in state S+1, one can say that the transition from state S to state S+1 was determined by the laws of physics.

This is a fact.

The question is this: is it important that state S and S+1 are states of the same system? Or is the important factor only that S determines S+1?

See, transporter proponents say the latter: what is essential to the identity of a consciousness is only that each state is determined by a prior state -- where each state *occurs* in the universe is irrelevant.

I agree that 'the important factor is only that S determines S+1', although in practical terms I don't think you can ignore the environmental stimuli factor. The +1 is where S is affected by stuff, unless that stuff is the same S+1 will be different at each location.

We say this because there is no mathematical reason why states S and S+1 need to occur on the same system for the behavior of the consciousness to remain functionally identical.

This is true... but only where +1 is functionally identical.

For the sake of argument lets agree that we could create 2 functionally identical environments, I'll agree that we now have 2 (functionally) identical people.

Still, from the point of view of either of these people I would not agree to be killed.

What happens if you go in the transporter and appear at your destination, and then the transporter tech says 'sorry theres been a hitch, your body wasn't destroyed at the departure point... just step into this room here for a moment and let us destroy you.' - Would you go into the room?

At the heart of it knowing that there is another 'me'; identical in all ways does not make me (this instance me) happy to die, even if I know that the other instance me has my exact same thoughts and sense of self and will go in my place.

 

[bencg]

As always with this discussion, the question at issue - whether consciousness is equivalent to a very particular mathematical expression of the state. When saying that consciousness is "functionally identical" that is begging the question - assuming precisely that which remains to be demonstrated.

When dealing with two seperate bodies in two seperate locations, they clearly are not in the same state. Their location is different. This is trivial. They may possibly have certain properties in common. Saying that "where a state occurs" is irrelevant is meaningless, because physical location is an irreducible part of the state of a system. Any claim that location is not an important part of a physical system needs to be justified.

I pretty much agree but perhaps we could create two locations that are exactly identical as far as the senses of humans go. Difficult, but (possibly, I am not totally confident) not impossible.

One could postulate the person being sent back in time to materialise in an identical chamber - so that the experience of Mr A1 was identical to that of Mr A2. Would Mr A1 be willing to shoot himself in such a situation? Would he regard the existence of Mr A2 being even relevant?

Suppose the two identical copies were presented with identical guns that would allow them to shoot themselves in the head - but due to some clever quantum device (details left as an exercise for the class) only one of them will go off. Will both of them attempt to kill themselves, certain that if one dies, the other will survive?

Personally, I think that the fact that I belong to a class which has other members is a totally inadequate reason to end my existence, because I'm not conscious as a class, I'm conscious as a class instance. The fact that other members of the class exist is meaningless. There are plenty of other instances of the class Human, or Mammal, or Physical Object around. That doesn't mean that I regard my own unique existence as being redundant. My existence will still be unique, because I'm the only person at this location at this time. Somebody else is at a different location. He might be like me, but if he was me he'd be where I was. I find I'm always in one place at a time.

Yeah I totally agree with this.

Language slightly fails us in this strange scenario because another instance of me is by definition not me, it is someone else (even if they are functionally identical to me).

 

[Chris L]

At the heart of it knowing that there is another 'me'; identical in all ways does not make me (this instance me) happy to die, even if I know that the other instance me has my exact same thoughts and sense of self and will go in my place.

That is the very big logic hole in the whole transporter idea.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

If a transporter works perfectly then at the moment of rematerialization there are two identical bodies, which means that the set of particles of one body is equivalent to the set of particles in the other body and the relative locations of the the particles in the two sets are exactly the same. Also, the conscience, personality, mind, memory, etc. contained within the brains of the two bodies are exactly the same.
But also at the moment of rematerialization the two (of everything) begin to diverge and are instantaneously different.
Even if everything else is the same, a different location means a different effect by gravitational forces.

The case was made that the laws of physics determine the transition between states of a system. However, if this refers to the philosophical idea of determinism then it is not a fact that one state is absolutely determined by a prior state. There is no evidence that perfection exists within the laws of physics. Nor is there evidence that the laws of physics are necessary and sufficient for every state transition in the universe.

 

[westprog]

Okay... good! I didn't get that from your previous posts, mea culpa.



I agree that 'the important factor is only that S determines S+1', although in practical terms I don't think you can ignore the environmental stimuli factor. The +1 is where S is affected by stuff, unless that stuff is the same S+1 will be different at each location.



This is true... but only where +1 is functionally identical.

For the sake of argument lets agree that we could create 2 functionally identical environments, I'll agree that we now have 2 (functionally) identical people.

Still, from the point of view of either of these people I would not agree to be killed.

What happens if you go in the transporter and appear at your destination, and then the transporter tech says 'sorry theres been a hitch, your body wasn't destroyed at the departure point... just step into this room here for a moment and let us destroy you.' - Would you go into the room?

At the heart of it knowing that there is another 'me'; identical in all ways does not make me (this instance me) happy to die, even if I know that the other instance me has my exact same thoughts and sense of self and will go in my place.

It's fairly obvious that S+1 and S+1' are different in the sense that S+1' has been transported somewhere, and S+1 is left where it is. They are not the same state. Different physical actions have been carried out on the two objects.

S -assorted mental processes -> S+1

S -assorted mental processes and being transported -> S+1'

Even if the two people were to be kept in functionally identical environments indefinitely (assuming such a thing were possible) they would not be the same object.

 

[Tinfoil Hater]

Wasn't Piccard beamed out into a Nebula after he morphed into some alien being- and was recreated from an earlier transporter imprint?

The Piccard after that episode was no different than Thomas Riker, Will Riker's transporter induced clone.

The transporter can aparently cure illness, and restore youth- Piccard, ensign Ro and Guinnan were somehow reverted to children in a transporter mishap- why Piccard opted to be turned back into an old man is beyond me..

 

[Tinfoil Hater]

Does the transporter somehow stop the motion of an object in motion? I've seen episodes of Star Trek where person in motion was transported- but somehow froze in place as they were transported- and in other episodes, people in motion were transported- yet arrived on the transporter pad perfectly still...


I assume the the transmat on Doctor Who had the same principles of the transporter on Star Trek

 

[rocketdodger]

When dealing with two seperate bodies in two seperate locations, they clearly are not in the same state. Their location is different. This is trivial. They may possibly have certain properties in common. Saying that "where a state occurs" is irrelevant is meaningless, because physical location is an irreducible part of the state of a system. Any claim that location is not an important part of a physical system needs to be justified.

As it has been explained to you many times before, "location" has no meaning above and beyond "behavior."

The only thing that needs to be justified in this context is your own assertion that "location" is somehow more fundamental than any other behavior. I think you will have trouble with that, given how location is nothing more than a behavior to begin with.

 

[rocketdodger]

I agree that 'the important factor is only that S determines S+1', although in practical terms I don't think you can ignore the environmental stimuli factor. The +1 is where S is affected by stuff, unless that stuff is the same S+1 will be different at each location.

First, the environment only affects the next state, not the current one. So S at the source combined with the environment at the source lead to S + 1 -- identical at both ends. If the destination has a different environment then it won't be until S + 2 that states diverge.

Second, it is irrelevant, because I am saying that S + 1 only exists at the destination end. How that happens is irrelevant -- just assume it does. It probably isn't possible, but we aren't concerned with what is possible here, we are only concerned trying to figure out the essence of consciousness.

Still, from the point of view of either of these people I would not agree to be killed.

What happens if you go in the transporter and appear at your destination, and then the transporter tech says 'sorry theres been a hitch, your body wasn't destroyed at the departure point... just step into this room here for a moment and let us destroy you.' - Would you go into the room?

At the heart of it knowing that there is another 'me'; identical in all ways does not make me (this instance me) happy to die, even if I know that the other instance me has my exact same thoughts and sense of self and will go in my place.

This is just a red herring. There is no reason you would need to die in such a scenario -- if there was some "rule" prohibiting two instances of the same person then that is merely societal and has literally nothing to do with the teleporter.

The only thing of concern is whether there is something essential to consciousness that would be "lost" were the substrate to change from one set of particles to another. I say no, there isn't, because there is not a single behavior of the system -- including westprog's precious "location" -- that changes from the system's frame of reference. If you or anyone else can think of one, I would love to hear it. But I haven't heard one yet.

 

[rocketdodger]

That is the very big logic hole in the whole transporter idea.

Well, certain "holes" seem much bigger when one's understanding is much smaller.