Is God necessary for (objective) morality?

Detonating a stick of dynamite may cause differing amount of damage depending on where it is located. In some situations, such as in the mining industry, detonating a stick of dynamite may even be beneficial.

This does not make the damage from detonating a stick of dynamite subjective. It only makes it situation dependent.

Likewise with morality. Some people may greatly enjoy being bound in leather and lightly whipped, others may find it a traumatic experience. Whether or not the subject of this experience finds it pleasurable or traumatic can, in theory, be determined objectively through a brain scan while being subjected to this treatment. So the outcome, pleasure or suffering, is an objective result of this action, regardless of whether or not you actually know which outcome is being achieved.

So if we define morality as choosing to act in a manner intended to minimize the harm to or suffering of others, then binding people in leather and lightly whipping them without their consent is not moral because, while some people may find it pleasurable, others will find it traumatic, and you are, by any objective standard, acting in a manner likely to cause suffering to others.

Whether or not an action is likely to cause harm or suffering in any given situation can be objectively determined by empirical experimentation. For example, you could punch a thousand random people in the face and record the result to empirically determine whether or not punching someone in the face causes harm or suffering. The outcome of such an experiment would yield objective results, and even if a small number of people actually enjoy being punched in the face, this would not change the fact that it has been proven that punching someone in the face is an action likely to cause harm and suffering, and therefore someone attempting to act in a manner intended to minimize harm and suffering would not generally go around punching random people in the face.

Some people might set the standard for measuring the height of a mountain as the distance from it's highest point to the center of the earth and conclude that Chimborazo is the tallest mountain, while others might set the standard for measuring the height of a mountain as the distance from it's highest point to sea level and conclude that Everest is the tallest mountain.

These standards exists only in people minds, and do not exist independently of thought or an observer.

But using the standard of distance from the center of the earth, Chimborazo is objectively the tallest mountain. Using the standard of from seal level, Everest is objectively the tallest mountain.

Morality may simply be an abstract concept, but that does not mean that action cannot be objectively moral or immoral. Deciding on which standard to use to measure morality is like deciding on which standard to use to measure the height of a mountain. Different standards may yield different results, but the results yielded by those standards can still be objective.

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Some people might set the standard for measuring the height of a mountain as the distance from it's highest point to the center of the earth and conclude that Chimborazo is the tallest mountain, while others might set the standard for measuring the height of a mountain as the distance from it's highest point to sea level and conclude that Everest is the tallest mountain.

These standards exists only in people minds, and do not exist independently of thought or an observer.

But using the standard of distance from the center of the earth, Chimborazo is objectively the tallest mountain. Using the standard of from seal level, Everest is objectively the tallest mountain.

Morality may simply be an abstract concept, but that does not mean that action cannot be objectively moral or immoral. Deciding on which standard to use to measure morality is like deciding on which standard to use to measure the height of a mountain. Different standards may yield different results, but the results yielded by those standards can still be objective.

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You're confusing frames of reference with standards. If there is not a way to integrate the differences and resolve them then either the results in question quantify different things, or somebody made a mistake.

In a way you are simply reinforcing the point that many "standards" are arbitrary conventions.
 
We may reason about it, but mostly we come up with post hoc rationalizations about why we make the (emotionally, empathetically, and bias driven) moral choices we do.

Perhaps in everyday life, but there certainly is an extensive literature of well reasoned ethical philosophies. Our common perception of physics is often poorly reasoned as well.

Heck, it is trivial to demonstrate that some of our snap moral judgments are at odds with what we fondly imagine a rationally worked out moral judgment would be -- the iterations of the Trolley Problem and the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment provide plenty of grist for that mill, not to mention What Makes People Vote Republican.

Joshua Greene is doing some interesting work in this field, including fMRI studies.

But I'm not talking about our snap moral judgments. I definitely wouldn't call those reasonable or objective.


The tricky thing about reason is that it is only as good as one's premises. The even trickier thing about human reasoning is that we are chock full of biases that we are mostly not aware of.

They can be controlled for though.

For starters, how wold you tell if morality was objective or not? The only moral agents we are aware of all have a behavior that makes constructing tests tricky -- the can deceive and/or confabulate, intentionally and unintentionally.

I don't think we can tell that well right now, but thanks to cognitive neuroscience we have a much better understanding, as far as how to tell who/what has moral agency, than we have ever had before, and this understanding is rapidly growing.


The Universe does not deceive us -- if we see an unexpected replicatable observation or result, we can be confident that we are wrong, not that the Universe is messing with us for unknown reasons.

But we use reason, the very thing you say is too flawed to understand morality, to do the science that enables us to better understand the universe.
 
The males of several species of duck are avid rapists. Are they morally wrong?

Yes, but they wouldn't be accountable because they don't have the capacity for moral reasoning.

2 + 2 = 4 is either undefined (if your mathematical system is not powerful enough to define natural numbers), or true by definition. If someone can point me at a mathematical system that is consistent, can define natural numbers (1,2, 3, etc.)and in which 2 + 2 != 4, I will be quite shocked.

Yes, it's true by definition because the numbers are defined. Similarly, right and wrong could be true by definition if you define the terms for morality.
 
Perhaps in everyday life, but there certainly is an extensive literature of well reasoned ethical philosophies.
There is also extensive literature of well-reasoned theology. It is very easy to mislead yourself and others with reason.

Our common perception of physics is often poorly reasoned as well.
Indeed.

But I'm not talking about our snap moral judgments. I definitely wouldn't call those reasonable or objective.
Why not? They have been honed by millions of years of evolution to become what they are, and are much more enduring than the layer of rationality we spread on top of them.

They can be controlled for though.
Yes, they could. How would you go about doing so, what do you think it would prove, and why?

I don't think we can tell that well right now, but thanks to cognitive neuroscience we have a much better understanding, as far as how to tell who/what has moral agency, than we have ever had before, and this understanding is rapidly growing.
Right. How much of it demonstrates that morality is objective and not merely an accident of history?

But we use reason, the very thing you say is too flawed to understand morality, to do the science that enables us to better understand the universe.
I never said that reason was too flawed to understand morality, I said that reason alone is not sufficient to determine if morality is objective. There is a slight difference.
 
Yes, but they wouldn't be accountable because they don't have the capacity for moral reasoning.
That does not seem like a very consistent position to take.

Yes, it's true by definition because the numbers are defined. Similarly, right and wrong could be true by definition if you define the terms for morality.
Indeed. However, morality simply does not appear to be an axiomatic system like mathematics. If it were, then snap moral judgments and reasoned moral positions would always be consistent.
 
That's an epistemological question. Really, how can we certain we know anything about the universe objectively?

Actually, we can't, not absolutely certain. But that's a different question that concerns mostly physical, empirical objects. I was suggesting, in a typically muddled way, that the objective correctness of a code of morality is by definition unknowable. That we lack the means of recognizing, measuring such a thing. The fact that we can define something does not mean that it exists or that we could know that it exists. Whether this means that there is no such thing as objective morality is left open by this approach, though I'm inclined to think that it is quite likely that there is no "objective morality". So, the practical difference, in this respect, between the various existing codes of morality is the individual's declaration: "my code of morality is objective" - or the lack of such declaration (this can also be built in the particular code itself). It is then fundamentally a question of attitude towards one's code of morality, on the practical level of our daily human interaction. Of course one could say that it is intellectually suspicious to claim a thing that is not provable. Anyway, it has been persuasively argued here that a lack of objective morality does not lead to relativism - that you still have means to evaluate actions objectively (depending on for example how much you value, say, individual freedom etc.)
 
There seems to be a bit of confusion here over terms which has led to some posts arguing past each other.

We can come at morality from a descriptive perspective and ask questions such as, 'how do moral systems function?' and 'how do people come by their moral convictions?'

We can also approach morality from a proscriptive (or normative if you prefer) perspective and ask questions such as, 'what should one do in a particular situation?', 'what is the best moral system?' and 'Are there such things as objective moral standards?'

Here is a definition of morality from a descriptive perspective. I have taken it from Wiki as it is as good as any other:

In its "descriptive" sense, morality refers to personal or cultural values, codes of conduct or social mores that distinguish between right and wrong in the human society. Describing morality in this way is not making a claim about what is objectively right or wrong, but only referring to what is considered right or wrong by people.

Note that a descriptive definition of morality does not say what right and wrong actions are or what the ideal moral system should be.

If we accept this descriptive definition, then it may be useful to clearly state whether we are proposing a normative definition of morality, i.e. what we believe moral values should be. I have seen a few posts, on this forum and others, that refer to morality is this or that system, that seem to conflate a descriptive perspective of what morality is, with a normative view of what it should be. This generally leads to confusion.

For example, it is interesting to discuss evolutionary bases for morality, but this kind of discussion is more of the descriptive type (how do people come to get moral values?). That people get their moral systems from a book, or by evolutionary processes, or by the powers of reason and empathy, does not in itself answer normative questions, such as the one posed here, 'Is God necessary for objective morality?'.

For me, the answer to the question is that objective morality does not exist, whether or not God exists. I do not agree with Craig that objective morality exists and is a reflection of facts about God's nature. I think that the Euthyphro dilemma roundly skewers this idea and Craig seems to duck this challenge. God is a mind and is therefore a subjective entity. It could be said that I abhor torture and that therefore my abhorrence of torture is an objective fact about my nature. It still remains my subjective value that torture is wrong, however, and it is not objectively true that torture is wrong, simply because it is objectively true that I believe it is wrong. The same goes with God, no matter what rhetorical tricks Craig employs here.

On the other side of the argument, the attempt to suggest that there is an objective morality 'out there' somewhere, is no less coherent or convincing. For this to be true one would presumably have to suppose that there are certain moral facts that are objectively accessible to scientific investigation, or that statements such as, 'Hurting people is wrong', express propositions that are either true or false (and not just true for me or for you, or sometimes, or mostly, or in these situations and not others). I am not convinced that the arguments presented thus far in this thread have established either of these cases.
 
Addressing the question, though, yes. God is absolutely necessary for an objective morality.

Since there is no such thing as an objective morality (due to the whole "being a cultural construct of human culture" thingie), the only thing that could justify a moral code being objective is if there actually existed such thing as a creator of the Universe. If indeed, everything that is, existed because some higher being created it, then he of course would be in charge of the rules. In the same way that the creator of a videogame is the one who decides who are the good guys, who are the bad guys and what is the moral code under which everything is taking place; a Creator of the Universe would be the ultimate authority to decide if there is a moral code at all and what that code is.

Therefore, determining whether or not there is a God, would be the utlimate and only way to determine an "objective" morality of the Universe.

However, since there is absolutely no evidence nor a need of a "creator" to explain the existence of life as it is, there is no reason to believe that there is such thing as an objective moral code. What we have is different moral codes created by different human entities and encoded under different constitutions and moral agreements that are inherent to each human culture. And there is nothing objective about that, no more than there's anything objective about art appreciation values or fashion trends.
 
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Yes, it's true by definition because the numbers are defined. Similarly, right and wrong could be true by definition if you define the terms for morality.

I can come up with a normative definition of what morality is that would no doubt differ, perhaps only slightly, from yours. Yet the fact that you or I have a definition, does not make what we believe to be right or wrong either true or false.

You would need to discover objective moral facts in order to have objective moral terms. What are they? Where are they? How do we know that we have found one?
 
> Mutual agreement is what creates or removes the concept of "evil".
How so?
Well not universally, there are exceptions. Violently assaulting a stranger on the street is considered criminal, while doing the same to an opponent in kickboxing ring is not. Mutual agreement is the key difference between these.

Also taking money from someone is not stealing if the person voluntarily gives it to you. Voluntarity of the apparent victim removes criminal nature of what might technically seem criminal, if you only witness what happens and don't know what the persons involved have agreed.

Technically similar action can be classified to numerous locations on the "cube" at my website, depending on what the persons involved have agreed:
http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_04.html

We can be more precise than just saying that streetfighting is "right or wrong", we can classify its statistical harmfulness, compared to neutral and less risky hobbies, so we get a factor that I call "moral weight" at my afore mentioned website: how important thing we are discussing. In case of violence, the moral weight is potentially 100% of a human life.

Then we can assess the "moral status" of the activity: in case of illegal assault, it would be criminal. In case of a mutually agreed match, it would be "free competition", which is further "up" the scale (which can be taken as an objective fact, but you can subjectively decide whether you value "up" or "down" the scale as more desirable).

Then we can assess the "moral responsibility" of the persons involved: if they are free and mature adults, they carry 100% of the moral responsibility. If they are soldiers obeying a command given from above, they carry not much more than 0% of the moral responsilibity (while the person giving the order carries the rest of it). In varying circumstances, the moral responsibility can vary from 0% to 100% and be shared between numerous persons.

Finally we can make various statistical calculations such as "moral impact" etc. as explained at my website.
 
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Can someone provide an example of something that would be right or wrong in a universe with no life?
The way I see it, ethics is all about emotions of living creatures, and/or about the circumstances supporting the existence of these.
 
Addressing the question, though, yes. God is absolutely necessary for an objective morality.

Since there is no such thing as an objective morality (due to the whole "being a cultural construct of human culture" thingie), the only thing that could justify a moral code being objective is if there actually existed such thing as a creator of the Universe. If indeed, everything that is, existed because some higher being created it, then he of course would be in charge of the rules. In the same way that the creator of a videogame is the one who decides who are the good guys, who are the bad guys and what is the moral code under which everything is taking place; a Creator of the Universe would be the ultimate authority to decide if there is a moral code at all and what that code is.

Well, I guess if we define objective morality to mean whatever the moral code of the (possible) creator of the universe is. Even though it might be a truly shady character who casually orders the extermination of whole cities and nations. All I can say, that even so, I would reserve my judgment about his/her/its code of morality however objective it is said to be. Might does not equal right.
 
I don't have a problem with saying that "objective" morality is a social convention, in that it is a humanistic morality, and therefore still does not require god. In the rest of the natural world, morality does not apply. Animals do not act based on a moral code.
The ignorant assertiveness of atheism is just appalling, but it doesn't come as a surprise. Is there any chance that some animals do show a behavior that can be attributed to morality?

Before you shoot, look around . . .

Prof Bekoff, who presents his case in a new book Wild Justice, said: "The belief that humans have morality and animals don't is a long-standing assumption, but there is a growing amount of evidence that is showing us that this simply cannot be the case.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife/5373379/Animals-can-tell-right-from-wrong.html
 
Addressing the question, though, yes. God is absolutely necessary for an objective morality.

Since there is no such thing as an objective morality (due to the whole "being a cultural construct of human culture" thingie), the only thing that could justify a moral code being objective is if there actually existed such thing as a creator of the Universe. If indeed, everything that is, existed because some higher being created it, then he of course would be in charge of the rules.

I kinda half-agree with you on this point. If God exists there still would not be objective morality, for the reasons I put in my previous post.

However, we may want to consider that if God exists, then God would be the best source of authority for moral values, given that God would presumably be omniscient and of perfect reason, that we were created for a purpose and that to act in accordance with God's moral code would lead to the ultimate fulfillment of this purpose. Of course we would be free to refuse and rebel and question this authority, The Devil being the prime example of this rejection.
 
However, we may want to consider that if God exists, then God would be the best source of authority for moral values, given that God would presumably be omniscient and of perfect reason, that we were created for a purpose and that to act in accordance with God's moral code would lead to the ultimate fulfillment of this purpose.

How would we know that - this very powerful being might still be malevolent, notwithstanding our own definitions for the assorted creators of universes. I think in the end we will always have to rely on our own reason and judgment. Of course this is very hypothetical - this being, honest card carrying God or an evil trickster, will always be easily able to manipulate our states of mind (though wouldn't that be cheating?) But in principle it is ourselves who will have to judge.
 
How would we know that - this very powerful being might still be malevolent, notwithstanding our own definitions for the assorted creators of universes. I think in the end we will always have to rely on our own reason and judgment. Of course this is very hypothetical - this being, honest card carrying God or an evil trickster, will always be easily able to manipulate our states of mind (though wouldn't that be cheating?) But in principle it is ourselves who will have to judge.

Yes it is tricky and wandering into theology. I suppose it would depend upon one's beliefs about God if God were revealed and what the content of that revelation was. I suppose one has to judge a person's credentials. Using an analogy, if I believed that a person was from Brazil, I would trust them to tell me about things that happen in Brazil, better than I currently know them. They would be a better authority on Brazil than I would be. Of course I could be wrong, or deceived in entrusting them with this authority. This is the judgement that one has to make.

The same goes with God; if I trust that he is what he says he is, then I have to trust that he is a better authority on moral matters than I am. Similarly, I could be deceived or wrong, but that is the essence of trust and faith, I suppose. Additionally, does God choose us or vice-versa? There has been plenty of theological heat generated about this one down the ages.
 
You're confusing frames of reference with standards. If there is not a way to integrate the differences and resolve them then either the results in question quantify different things, or somebody made a mistake.

In a way you are simply reinforcing the point that many "standards" are arbitrary conventions.

Indeed, he simply demonstrated that ONCE CHOSEN, the standard is objectively self consistent, but the *choosing* of the standard is subjective.

When people says morality is not objective, they are not only hinting at situation chaning the outcome of a moral evaluation (the leather strapping one for example) but also that the standard changes with human culture ! And this is that last part which usually break the camel back for any objective morality.

The bottom line, if you can chose your measuring stick, then your measuring stick is not an objective standard, it is one only by convention of a group. That's right for imeprial unit and USI, that is also right for any attempt at defining objective morality.
 
Indeed, he simply demonstrated that ONCE CHOSEN, the standard is objectively self consistent, but the *choosing* of the standard is subjective.

This is indeed so, but I fail to see why that would be catastrophically relativist in terms of morality. I can easily admit that my own standards are not in any inherent way privilegded, and people can naturally choose instead of my liberal-humanist values for example fundamentalist Muslim or Christian standards. But that does not stop me from being able to evaluate and judge others' and my own behaviour objectively based on my criteria. It is up to my own code how I negotiate these differences between different points of valuation. Isn't this what morality fundamentally is about? That's the way, we, as conscious beings, exist in the world: we navigate by reason and personal judgement - and take responsibility for our judgment and actions. To my mind this is a moral view of the world and our experience of it, notwithstanding that the concept of "objective morality" is not in play.
 

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