Is God necessary for (objective) morality?

Plumjam, if you're not going to define what objective morality is, then how do you expect anyone to take seriously your claims on the subject? You repeatedly accuse others of requiring objective morality in order to make value judgments on morality (which I don't buy for a second), but until you define it, your criticism has no meaning and no logical basis.

Bluskool has defined objective morality, but your arguments have absolutely nothing to do with his.
 
I'll do my best to paraphrase. He basically defines right action as not hurting people and helping people, and he defines wrong action as hurting people and not helping.

That sounds good on its face, but put into practice it fails. Let say you fall out of love with the person you're with. Breaking up with them will hurt them, but help you. Which is the "moral" choice?

Morality exists, ideas about what is "right" and "wrong" exist because we live in a world of limited resources, imperfect perception, and conflicting values. If these didn't apply, "right action" would truly be objective and we wouldn't need morality.
 
Yep. Gravity affects everyone the same way. If I give a sealed tin of sardines to anyone in the world, the number of fish in the tin isn't going to change depending on who I give it to.

Contrariwise, not everyone will be equally happy receiving a tin of sardines. the same event can make some people suffer, and at the same time please others. Someone on vacation can be happy when the sun shines, but a farmer with a parched field standing right next to him might suffer for it. This is because science and math deals with what things are, but morality deals with what things mean.

Then it would be wrong to give the tin can of sardines to those that wouldn't be happy with it. You're applying the idea to an action (giving a tin can of sardines) rather than the outcome (doing what helps and doesn't harm), and the outcome is what we are essentialy interested in when it comes to morality (I think:boggled:). I am sure you can think of counter examples, but this is true of any theory describing physical reality, no? Otherwise, we would have a TOE.
I am not so sure that "what things mean" doesn't ultimately boil down to "what things are." After all, there is nothing more to us than physics, right?
 
How much less bandwidth would it have required to post something resembling a definition of the term, instead of the analogies and evasions thus far?
 
Then it would be wrong to give the tin can of sardines to those that wouldn't be happy with it.
Not necessarily. Kids might not be happy to eat vegetables, but they need vitamins. "Giving the kids vegetables" is an objective action- it applies to any kid, any parent, any vegetable equally. However, the meaning of the action, to the kid (vegetables taste yucky) is it is "wrong", and the meaning of the action to the parent (my kid is getting the vitamins he needs) is that it is "right".

You're applying the idea to an action (giving a tin can of sardines) rather than the outcome (doing what helps and doesn't harm), and the outcome is what we are essentialy interested in when it comes to morality (I think:boggled:).
Exactly, morality concerns the outcome of an action- and while the action is objective, the outcome is not.

I am sure you can think of counter examples, but this is true of any theory describing physical reality, no? Otherwise, we would have a TOE.
That's where limited perception comes in. And yes, it hampers moral objectivity as well.

I am not so sure that "what things mean" doesn't ultimately boil down to "what things are." After all, there is nothing more to us than physics, right?
Ultimately, yes. But since we do not have full and perfect perception of those physics, we do not think in terms of pure physics. Our brains are wired to think in terms of metaphor and meaning and bound to a limited perspective. The sun "is" shining on a clear day, but that "means" both "a good vacation" and "ruined crops" at the same time.
 
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Plumjam, you're still not giving a definition. I'll be even more generous. I'm going to tell you what Bluskool's definition is, and why it doesn't apply to what you're saying.

Bluskool's first post was in regards to the fact that things cause suffering, and this is objectively true. This might seem subjective at first, as pain, for example, is a subjective experience. But the statement "Bob is feeling pain" is an objective claim. From this, we can determine that there are certain things that cause suffering, and other things that prevent it. We can call those causes "bad," and the preventions "good." We have an objective moral system in play, here.

But then you go off on a tangent with stuff like, "just like the moral law in this here Universe." The moral law? What is that? You're not making sense, here.

Furthermore, you attempt to establish that value judgments require some sort of "objective measuring stick" upon which to base said judgments. This is obviously false. I can take two subjective statements, and come to an objective conclusion on them.

1. Hamburgers taste great.
2. Steaks taste horrible.
C. Hamburgers taste better than steaks.

So I don't know where you're coming from when you appeal to a necessary objectivity in regards to the subjective judgments of others.

I'm trying to be as fair as I possibly can, here. All I'm asking you to do is define a term that you have used repeatedly throughout this discussion. Am I asking too much?
 
Bluskool's first post was in regards to the fact that things cause suffering, and this is objectively true. This might seem subjective at first, as pain, for example, is a subjective experience. But the statement "Bob is feeling pain" is an objective claim. From this, we can determine that there are certain things that cause suffering, and other things that prevent it. We can call those causes "bad," and the preventions "good." We have an objective moral system in play, here.

No, "we" don't. Bob has what looks like one, from his POV. But what causes Bob pain, might not bother Carol, and might actually feel good to Ted. Therefore, the "objective" moral system built around "Bob is feeling pain" that works for Bob will fail for the others.
 
No, "we" don't. Bob has what looks like one, from his POV. But what causes Bob pain, might not bother Carol, and might actually feel good to Ted. Therefore, the "objective" moral system built around "Bob is feeling pain" that works for Bob will fail for the others.

Undeniably. I never said it was easy. Even though you have listed plenty of subjective issues that complicate matters, we can still weigh those factors, and come to objective conclusions on them.
 
Not sure what you're driving at. Physical laws are limitations? Well, yeah, but in order to produce anything of value in this kind of systemic thinking there need to be limitations.
Watching Federer play Nadal would be much less interesting if there was no net. Limitations are necessary to provide a framework for the development of excellence. Thus all sports have rules.

And thus the Universe has rules. Moral rules included.

You seem to be assuming that just because the Universe can be described in terms of a relatively small and elegant set of rules that it has a purpose, or that it has some sort of intrinsic value. You will need to justify that assumption before assuming that moral rules are an intrinsic feature of the Universe rather than an accident of our evolutionary history.
 
For the sake of argument, I'm defining morally bad things are defined as things which cause suffering and decrease well-being. From that, rape is objectively bad. Now, you could argue that the rapist takes pleasure in it, and it's a value judgment on whether the victim's pain outweighs the attackers pleasure, and that's a fair point. But I don't value the rapist's pleasure at all. I do value the well-being of the victim. From that, I objectively place more importance on the negative side of this action, so it's still bad.

When I say objective conclusion, I mean that provided the supporting premises are true, there can be no other conclusion.
 
For the sake of argument, I'm defining morally bad things are defined as things which cause suffering and decrease well-being.

But since those "things" are not the same for everyone, they are not objective.

From that, rape is objectively bad. Now, you could argue that the rapist takes pleasure in it, and it's a value judgment on whether the victim's pain outweighs the attackers pleasure, and that's a fair point. But I don't value the rapist's pleasure at all. I do value the well-being of the victim. From that, I objectively place more importance on the negative side of this action, so it's still bad.
No, you don't. You subjectively place more importance. You're calling your subjective value judgements "objective", but that doesn't make them so.

When I say objective conclusion, I mean that provided the supporting premises are true, there can be no other conclusion.
One of those (unstated) supporting premises has to be that your values apply universally to everyone else. That's also not so.
 
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objective morality can exist without God
(...)
Craig responds by saying that the person has no basis for saying that something is right or wrong because it's just a social convention and not "really" right or wrong.
You can always play with words, objective science or objective anything can be claimed to be only a social convention. We can measure that the temperature is X degrees Celsius / Fahrenheit, it is objective in one way, but also subjective in the way how we decided to name and number the various degrees of temperature.

Ethics can be measured with similar objectivity, we can create a scale (not much unlike Fahrenheit etc.) and assess where on the scale each ethical action falls. That would be as objective as measuring the temperature. More difficult is to say what the temperature, or nature of ethical action, should be (allowed to be). Reciprocity is a good thumb rule (and a social convention): people should have the right to act with each other by any rules that they mutually agree to. Mutual agreement is what creates or removes the concept of "evil".

http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_04.html

Saying that objective morality exists and being able to provide a decent defense for it, on the other hand, seems to open up a lot of arguments against God that would have an emotional appeal to an audience (For example, if God exists he seems indifferent to a great deal of needless suffering).
This is true, the vague modern public opinion already finds many laws in the Bible morally abhorrent. The more objectively we think, the more clear this becomes.

A third possibility would be to say that objective morality cannot be based on God even if it does exist (Euthyphro dilemma).
God is a subject (in the best case), so if what God says were objective morality, it would not be objective because God says it, it would be objective because it is found to be objective. Which is hardly the case in the, ahem, quite wild laws of the OT, for example.
 
But since those "things" are not the same for everyone, they are not objective.
"Bob feels pain" is true no matter who you are.


No, you don't. You subjectively place more importance. You're calling your subjective value judgements "objective", but that doesn't make them so.
Then you're totally misunderstanding me, because I never said my value judgments are objective. I've argued quite the opposite, actually.


One of those (unstated) supporting premises has to be that your values apply universally to everyone else. That's also not so.
My values do not have to apply to everyone in order for me to use my values to obtain objective conclusions. If you value money, is it objectively true that you ought not throw your cash in the fireplace? Maybe if you were dying of exposure you wouldn't, but at that time, you are valuing your body temperature more than you are valuing your money, which would also prove my point.
 
"Bob feels pain" is true no matter who you are.
Yes, but if I don't know Bob, it's probably irrelevant to me. If I don't like Bob, I might even be happy because of it. If Bob is recovering from a life-saving surgery, Bob might be happy about it.

Facts are objective, but meanings are not.

Then you're totally misunderstanding me, because I never said my value judgments are objective. I've argued quite the opposite, actually.
You said "I objectively place more importance...". "Placing importance" is an inherently subjective value judgement.

My values do not have to apply to everyone in order for me to use my values to obtain objective conclusions.
You seem to be confusing "objective" with "logical". They do not mean the same thing.

If you value money, is it objectively true that you ought not throw your cash in the fireplace?
No. You explain why just below.

Maybe if you were dying of exposure you wouldn't, but at that time, you are valuing your body temperature more than you are valuing your money, which would also prove my point.

I don't think you are using "objective" correctly. Try replacing it with the defintion you are using, and see if it still makes sense. The definition I'm using is "existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality". In the case of throwing the money on the fire, the "truth" of that "ought not" depends on an observer- the person who's value of money changes to be subordinate to his survival.
 
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If there were an objective morality - then how would we know what it was?
 
.If there is no objective meaning to the Universe then there's absolutely no moral power behind anyone who... for example... argues it's wrong to hire out newborn orphan babies to media magnates, to be anonymously raped and then buried in the deserts of the Sudan.
Why would there be moral power behind someone who argued that if there was an objective morality?

What if someone disagreed and said that there is an objective morality and it is OK to do these things?

How would you settle the dispute?
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