The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[rocketdodger]

"You" is defined as a singular pronoun. Logically, "you" cannot refer to two persons. There may be "somebody else exactly like me" in another universe. That does not mean I am that person.

Why not?

I don't think you understand what is being discussed here. We don't mean "exactly like you, except not exactly like you, so Malerin can erect a strawman." We mean exactly like you.

If there is another Malerin in another universe, or even this universe, that is exactly like you, then how is it not you?

 

[rocketdodger]

How can I tell if that person is me or not? There are lots of techniques we can use. I think of a number between one and a thousand. Does he know what it is? I stick a pin in him. Does it hurt both of us? Is he occupying the same space that I occupy?

If there are two bodies, and they behave identically, then what would you call it?

If every thought you think is being thought by the other -- every single one -- then how are you not the same person? If I prick one of you with a pin, and both of you feel it, then how is it not actually a single you? What else could you possibly call it? Two yous?

Please don't respond with some stupid strawman post like the one above. Answer the actual question.

 

[marplots]

Here's a conundrum... imagine half your brain got squashed... but it so happened that someone had an artificial hemisphere ready to plug into the remaining organic part of your brain. For the sake of argument let's suppose it can perfectly duplicate the functions of your brain, including the current memory state supported by that side.

Would you consider yourself to still be yourself?

I think I would have to do the experiment to find out. I'm free next Thursday.

 

[bencg]

I started this thread thinking I was a materialist who would press the button - but I have actually been convinced that I am a materialist who would no way press the button, because it would effectively be committing suicide.

Why not?

I don't think you understand what is being discussed here. We don't mean "exactly like you, except not exactly like you, so Malerin can erect a strawman." We mean exactly like you.

If there is another Malerin in another universe, or even this universe, that is exactly like you, then how is it not you?

If there are two bodies, and they behave identically, then what would you call it?

If every thought you think is being thought by the other -- every single one -- then how are you not the same person? If I prick one of you with a pin, and both of you feel it, then how is it not actually a single you? What else could you possibly call it? Two yous?

Please don't respond with some stupid strawman post like the one above. Answer the actual question.

Why do you keep saying "somebody else?"

How can it be somebody else if it is the same instance as before?

I agree that both the original and copy are identical but they are still seperate entities. There is no reason to think that both would feel one pin prick; surely materialism says as only one of them is being pricked only one body will react - the other would know nothing of it.


The way I see it is this: Imagine a magical perfect duplicating machine (a transporter with no auto-destruct, and for this purpose we will ignore all considerations of relativity and reality).

To start with there is just you; you == your emergent and continuing sense of self.

Now you get yourself copied, and you are standing next to your copy. Now we have two 'you's ; the original you and a new you.

From the POV of You1 you are still in your original body and standing in the same place, but a copy of you has appeared next to you.

From the POV of You2 you were You1 and then you were copied and you appeared next to a copy of yourself.

So from the point of view of the original you you are still only experiencing the world from the eyes of You1, your continuing sense of self stays there, a new entity that has all your memories and an exact copy of your body is standing next to you but I can think of no reason to suppose that your conciousness leaps to the other body.

I mean You2 will have a seperate and distinct sense of self that started the moment it was created, but there is no magic link between You1 and You2.

Now its true that from the POV of you2 its like you have teleported to a new location... but that isnt your 'self', thats someone else (who happens to be an exact copy with your memories up to the point of copying).

I doubt you (as in You1) would agree to kill yourself at this point, but please let me know if I have made a mistake in my reasoning.

 

[bencg]

To elucidate slightly more,

I actually agree philosophically that the two you's are both you (and are identical in identity so to speak)...

BUT that is only from an external perspective, so while as an observer I might agree that You2 is the same person as You1 that doesnt change the fact that from You1's perspective he is still You1 and You2 is a different (if identical) person.

Therefore if You1 is destroyed his sense of self dies with him. You2 can carry on and from You2's perspective he was You1 and his sense of self has been continuous into You2, and he may feel fine about it... but if you were You1 you were copied then you died, the end.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

It makes no sense to talk about the "real" or "original" you if we treat you simply as a feature of brain processing. Thus, there cannot be 'my brain processing'; there can only be brain processing of which the sense of me/you are a processing product – i.e. there’s nothing inherently unique about you (or "you-ness"), it’s like any other brain processing. The subject-object distinction is wrong; everything in that set-up is ultimately object. The reason this seems counterintuitive is because, well, it feels counterintuitive – but it’s a necessary conclusion if we’re to stick with a physical framework. I can only guess why this seems so weird. One issue would be language itself, which sort of creates a distinction between subject and object (i.e. "my sense of self").

You are absolutely right, bencg, when you say: "Therefore if You1 is destroyed his sense of self dies with him." But a clearer statement would be something like this: When a particular set of brain processing stops, so will one particular sense of self cease to exist.

I also agree with you about the needle: if only one body is pricked, then the sensation can only occur in one body. The example itself is however completely irrelevant. So, who would it hurt? It would hurt one body, which also happens to produce an identical sense of self to that of an another identical body. After the prick, they will however start on a slightly different path.

 

[westprog]

It makes no sense to talk about the "real" or "original" you if we treat you simply as a feature of brain processing. Thus, there cannot be 'my brain processing'; there can only be brain processing of which the sense of me/you are a processing product – i.e. there’s nothing inherently unique about you (or "you-ness"), it’s like any other brain processing. The subject-object distinction is wrong; everything in that set-up is ultimately object. The reason this seems counterintuitive is because, well, it feels counterintuitive – but it’s a necessary conclusion if we’re to stick with a physical framework. I can only guess why this seems so weird. One issue would be language itself, which sort of creates a distinction between subject and object (i.e. "my sense of self").

You are absolutely right, bencg, when you say: "Therefore if You1 is destroyed his sense of self dies with him." But a clearer statement would be something like this: When a particular set of brain processing stops, so will one particular sense of self cease to exist.

I also agree with you about the needle: if only one body is pricked, then the sensation can only occur in one body. The example itself is however completely irrelevant. So, who would it hurt? It would hurt one body, which also happens to produce an identical sense of self to that of an another identical body. After the prick, they will however start on a slightly different path.

The problem we have is that something like "sense of self" is totally outside the realm of scientific thinking. We don't even have a definition for it. Scientifically speaking, it doesn't matter if neither, either or both bodies are destroyed. Concepts of value are individual and personal. From the point of view of an observer a billion miles away, the Earth is of equal value whether or not there is a smear of living tissue on the surface or not.

From the physical, scientific point of view, there's simply no issue. There is one person - and then there are two people. They are in different places, made out of different atoms. One has to delve into some very convoluted philosophical thinking to try to find some sense in which they are the same, adding in a lot of ill-defined, badly understood, unscientific concepts. From a scientific point of view there's simply no issue.

 

[marplots]

Just for the record, there are legal issues. I am trademarked and any attempt to duplicate me will infringe my intellectual property rights. If you attempt to download me or put me on a peer-to-peer network, you can expect to receive a harsh letter from my attorneys.

Side question: Were there any attorneys in the Star Trek milieu?

 

[I Ratant]

It's fiction.
Anything that works, and doesn't even have to be internally consistent, that carries the story forward is permissible.
What happens "if" such and such -can- be possible.... in the frikkin' story...YES! and it need not be possible.

 

[Senex]

Transporter Shmanspoter -- don't get between me and the holodeck

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

The problem we have is that something like "sense of self" is totally outside the realm of scientific thinking. We don't even have a definition for it. Scientifically speaking, it doesn't matter if neither, either or both bodies are destroyed. Concepts of value are individual and personal. From the point of view of an observer a billion miles away, the Earth is of equal value whether or not there is a smear of living tissue on the surface or not.

From the physical, scientific point of view, there's simply no issue. There is one person - and then there are two people. They are in different places, made out of different atoms. One has to delve into some very convoluted philosophical thinking to try to find some sense in which they are the same, adding in a lot of ill-defined, badly understood, unscientific concepts. From a scientific point of view there's simply no issue.

I don’t see the problem you’re asserting. In fact there’s already quite a few researchers who’s work encompass the question of “the sense of self”.

What we see from a billion miles away is one thing, what we see when a powerful microscope is turned at the living critter is another. Nowhere can any essence of being be found, yet we find that in our imagination, and now science is slowly starting to look into how that might take place.

 

[westprog]

I don’t see the problem you’re asserting. In fact there’s already quite a few researchers who’s work encompass the question of “the sense of self”.

And what is their consensus?

What we see from a billion miles away is one thing, what we see when a powerful microscope is turned at the living critter is another. Nowhere can any essence of being be found, yet we find that in our imagination, and now science is slowly starting to look into how that might take place.

My italics.

So far there's not even a properly formulated theory that deals with "sense of self".

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

And what is their consensus?

At least one kind of consensus seems to be self evident (through the simple fact that people are doing encompassing research). Maybe they’re still only scratching the surface, but it’s being done. That is to say: it seems to be within the realm of scientific scrutiny just fine.

So far there's not even a properly formulated theory that deals with "sense of self".

At least something is being done: Metzinger appears to do some work in this area; Baars’ and Gazzaniga´s work seems to come close too (from philosophy to neuroscience). Here’s one example: The self-model theory of subjectivity.


***
But we don’t actually need to dig into the current research when it comes to speculation about the transporter – it’s a philosophical question. And to draw conclusions within this context, one simply has to follow where a physical framework appears to take us.

 

[gnome]

I think I would have to do the experiment to find out. I'm free next Thursday.

Since nobody went for the bait... I was expecting a lot of "Yes" answers, and then proposing a situation where a fully functional brain was divided, with the halves set up to coordinate with each other at a slight distance via remote transmitters.

Then I was going to propose swapping in an artificial half-brain for each simultaneously and see what people thought.

 

[I Ratant]

The technology to do anything relative to the brain doesn't exist yet.
It can exist in any novel, but don't volunteer for a brain operation at this time.

 

[gnome]

Right, obviously. Just philosophically speaking.

 

[rocketdodger]

From the physical, scientific point of view, there's simply no issue. There is one person - and then there are two people. They are in different places, made out of different atoms. One has to delve into some very convoluted philosophical thinking to try to find some sense in which they are the same, adding in a lot of ill-defined, badly understood, unscientific concepts. From a scientific point of view there's simply no issue.

Ah, so you don't reply with a strawman, you reply with a dodge.

I guess I am the stupid one, westprog, for thinking once again that I could have anything resembling a productive conversation with you.

 

[rocketdodger]

I agree that both the original and copy are identical but they are still seperate entities. There is no reason to think that both would feel one pin prick; surely materialism says as only one of them is being pricked only one body will react - the other would know nothing of it.

No, materialism in fact does not say that. You can just assume there is an unknown material link between the original and copy that insures they behave exactly the same.

So, again, back to the question -- what would you call it if two bodies behaved exactly the same?

 

[Chris L]

what would you call it if two bodies behaved exactly the same?

Two separate bodies behaving exactly the same. Each body would have a separate sense of self (a by product of how the brain works) and each would consider themselves separate people. You can not "magically" link their central nervous systems.

BTW, can you explain this algorithm == the instance idea? Is that like the class == the instance? Because if it is, you are quite wrong.

 

[bencg]

No, materialism in fact does not say that. You can just assume there is an unknown material link between the original and copy that insures they behave exactly the same.

But I don't see any reason to think there would be a material link... and I find it hard to even imagine this scenario. I mean unless the two bodies are both in identical environments (as in all stimuli) why would they behave identically?

What happens when one has to turn left and the other has to turn right? Which stimuli do the two bodies respond to?

If you are stipulating that we have two bodies controlled by one mind then I think thats a different question (and an uninteresting one) to the teleporter parardox posed in the OP. The question as posed says your body is rebuilt exactly at the other end with only the information being actually sent anywhere. To suppose a magic link is illogical.

Your fist post in this thread was;

No.

One is not "really" a materialist/physicalist if they honestly think there is something essential to their identity (or as Nick said their "experiencing self") that would be lost if they stepped into the machine.

This has been flushed out in the zillion other threads on this issue.

There are many genuine materialists/physicalists on these forums that feel like something may be missing, but they don't put their finger on it and try to explain it in logical terms because they admit that it is probably just an emotional thing. There is nothing wrong with this. The only error is to say for sure.

I'll agree that saying for sure is imprudent - this is only a thought experiment after all, but I think you have made a mistake in your assumptions.
You assume that because you have logically deduced that both copies share an identical identity (which I would argue they ony share exactly for as long as their environments are identical) that pressing the button is correct.

I think this is wrong, having identical identity does not equate to a shared consciousness; not from a materialist point of view anyway. If self is an emergent property of brain activity then you simply have two selves that are identical. And identical objects in different places behave differently, that seems self evident. Or would you suggest if we put a gallon of petrol through the copier and then burnt one copy that the other would spontaneously combust? I don't understand the logic for that scenario.

So, again, back to the question -- what would you call it if two bodies behaved exactly the same?

Your question is not related to the topic, but I guess I would call it spooky action at a distance.