The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[Aepervius]

No, for sure it doesn't. One set is gone, kaput, no longer around.

But this is not the question. The question is "Would you travel?" It's more personal. And, if you claim to be a materialist and you answer "No" then how do you justify the apparent disparity? What is it that concerns you? What is it that you believe would be lost?

Nick

I think there is a fundemental things you cannot grasp. It is the equivalent to have a magic bullet which duplicate yourself somewhere else if you blow your brain. The duplicate will continue with your memory up to the point where the bullet start penetrating your brain.

From any materislist point of view, you KILLED yourself. A new copy was made, but it ain#t the same individual. The same way duplicating a thermometer, and crushing the initial one to keep only one would not be the same.

To put it in plain word: *YOU* kill yourself. Somebody else with the same memory as you continue somewhere else. Does it matter for you ? Sure it does. The only way it would not matter to you , would be if you imagine a NON MATERIAL entity transporting you magically onto the new body. And *that* is not a materialist point of view. To see it better, imagine that we destroy you, killing you with an overdose of potassium, snapshot all memory and synapse connection somehow, keep it in freezer, then painstakefully over 10 years construct a brain with the same synapse and memory. Then implant it in another human. *YOUR* theory is that it would be the same person. Our theory is that it is an identical person with identical memory, but not *you* the emerging property of the body left in the freezer.

The only other way it would not bother you, is that if you think it does not matter if you die , as long as somehow some copy goes to live somewhere else.
I prefer the usual method of producing imperfect copy. You go into the teletransporter, and I go find a willing woman.

 

[Nick227]

Udner materislism, the consciousness *is* an emerging property of the matter.

Yes.

Once you destroy that matter , all the same emerging property are destroyed with it.

Yes.

It does not matter if 1 nanosecond or 1 billion year later you reconstruct an identical subset of matter with an indetical set of property. It won't be the *same* person, only an identical copy.

That depends on how you define "person." If you consider person to simply mean "body" then you are correct. But usually "person" includes personality. It includes subjective constructs which will be identically replicated and so not lost. Like I say, it depends on how you define terms. And, for sure, these terms weren't created with the idea that replication might exist.

But the guts of it for me is... why won't you personally travel? Because we can debate terminology all day, it doesn't necessarily go anywhere.
If you won't travel, is it because you believe that there is an experiencing self that will cease experiencing when you push the Teleport button?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

To put it in plain word: *YOU* kill yourself. Somebody else with the same memory as you continue somewhere else. Does it matter for you ? Sure it does.

You're saying that things matter to you when you're dead? I put it to you that this is not so.

The only way it would not matter to you , would be if you imagine a NON MATERIAL entity transporting you magically onto the new body. And *that* is not a materialist point of view.

That's partially correct. As many have pointed out in the past, dualists usually are quite happy to travel by Transporter, because they believe that their soul will continue to experience through their new body.

However, a true materialist also will be happy to travel. Because under materialism it is clear that nothing is subjectively lost, in reality. It merely appears to be lost in our usual day-to-day viewpoint.

Nick

 

[blobru]

No, it means that objectively it belongs to that system, as a property of that system.

Yes.

And the replication of the "notion" works fine under idealism, where ideas, notions, descriptions, algorithms are at least as real as the things they are notions of. Not so good under materialism, however. (I haven't used the phrase "subjectivity", whatever its social functions, that I'm aware of).

But because consciousness emerges from a physical process, replication of the physical will replicate consciousness. That is the whole point. It has nothing to do with idealism that I can see.

Replication of the physical will replicate the contents of the original's consciousness. If the original was conscious of [X], the copy will be conscious of [X]. So we have two separate consciousnesses with the same contents. Twins who happen to be thinking of the same thing.

Because each consciousness is not separate from its material instance, destroying a material instance will also destroy the consciousness that depended on it. Or so I would argue, under materialism.

Under idealism, consciousness need no longer be tied to matter. As an "idea", as a descriptive class, it might exist on its own, independent of any material body; disembodied, as it were, And that is all that's being transferred in the teleporter scenario, the "idea", the description of a certain consciousness, to be reembodied somewhere, somewhen else.

That's idealism, the transfer of the "idea" suffices to transfer the particular material instance. Under materialism, nothing that depended on a particular material instance survives its destruction. The description, the idea, the information about the paticular material instance, including the information about the consciousness, survives, but that information, that idea, is not the particular instance of material process it describes.

Under materialism, identical instances are still distinct, because their identity is simply a description. Under idealism, identical instances are not distinct, in the sense that their identity derives from a deeper reality where they are the class that they share. That's a fundamental difference between idealism and materialism, which it seems to me gets lost in these myriad teleporter threads. Under materialism, the material instance precedes our ideas about it, including its being "conscious"; under idealism, the material instance derives from ideas which determine its attributes, including its being conscious. Consciousness is identical with the information about consciousness, and can survive the destruction of any or all arbitrary instances, and be easily transferred as the information, as the idea which it is.

Whew. Sorry, Nick. That was much longer than I'd planned; but it's a difficult point, hard to get across without a specialized vocabulary, so hopefully worth the attempts at making in different ways. (And to be clear, I'm not arguing the teleporter is impossible, necessarily; just trying to clarify what the arguments for and against are based on, in terms of traditional philosophy).

"The experiencing entity", the "self", etc., are just convenient labels.

Well, "the experiencing entity" is a social construct, created by ancilliary processing. It has virtually nothing to do with science or philosophy, aside of fields concerned with social antropology and similar.

In differentiating idealism and materialism as they apply to the teleporter scenario, t's the "material instance" I'm concerned with, which isn't a social construct, as far as I can see (though I suppose everything, including logic's terminology for class membership and existence, is a "social construct" at some level).

I'm asserting that the material instance (and its attendant processes), distinct in time and/or space if nothing else, is lost. "Blobru#2" may not care, but blobru#1 is plenty worried, until persuaded otherwise.

The material instance is lost. And this creates concern when one considers that there is some self which is experiencing and which is going to cease its experiencing when the Teleport button is pushed. But this so-called experiencing entity cannot actually exist under materialism. There is only subjectivity - immediate, in the moment, and containg within it all notions of an experiencing self. And this will all be replicated.

As above, I would argue under materialism that it's a distinct material instance with an identical notion of "self" or "experiencing entity", whatever, that is created in the teleporter's "out box".

Imagine you were to get up from your computer and walk with eyes closed into an adjacent room. You turn around a few times, like in a child's game, and then open your eyes to be confronted with your copy. But is it the copy? It claims to be the original and you the copy. How would you be able to decide which body has been in existence for all those years and which came into existence only a few seconds previous?

Nick

Even without the child's game, I wouldn't. But I would be able to determine that we are distinct, and neither of us wants to be destroyed, which is the salient point for the teleporter scenario.

So the question remains: if one material thing and all its attributes are destroyed at one place, does replacing it with another materially identical thing with identical attributes somewhere else mean the original and all its attributes, including consciousness, have somehow been "undestroyed", and survived the journey?

No, for sure it doesn't. One set is gone, kaput, no longer around.

But this is not the question. The question is "Would you travel?" It's more personal. And, if you claim to be a materialist and you answer "No" then how do you justify the apparent disparity? What is it that concerns you? What is it that you believe would be lost?

Nick

The original: the separate material instance that is me, and not an identical copy, with identical but separate attributes under materialism, including being conscious.

 

[Nick227]

Replication of the physical will replicate the contents of the original's consciousness. If the original was conscious of [X], the copy will be conscious of [X]. So we have two separate consciousnesses with the same contents. Twins who happen to be thinking of the same thing.

Yup.

Because each consciousness is not separate from its material instance, destroying a material instance will also destroy the consciousness that depended on it. Or so I would argue, under materialism.

Yup. One version is destroyed.

Under idealism, consciousness need no longer be tied to matter. As an "idea", as a descriptive class, it might exist on its own, independent of any material body; disembodied, as it were, And that is all that's being transferred in the teleporter scenario, the "idea", the description of a certain consciousness, to be reembodied somewhere, somewhen else.

That's idealism, the transfer of the "idea" suffices to transfer the particular material instance. Under materialism, nothing that depended on a particular material instance survives its destruction. The description, the idea, the information about the paticular material instance, including the information about the consciousness, survives, but that information, that idea, is not the particular instance of material process it describes.

I still fail to see how any of this has any relevance to idealism.

Whew. Sorry, Nick. That was much longer than I'd planned; but it's a difficult point, hard to get across without a specialized vocabulary, so hopefully worth the attempts at making in different ways. (And to be clear, I'm not arguing the teleporter is impossible, necessarily; just trying to clarify what the arguments for and against are based on, in terms of traditional philosophy).

But the core of the Transporter is the question - would you travel? To me all this reference to constructs, fascinating as it might be, also has with it something of a means to avoid the question. Blobru#2 will continue to have all of these issues with the device. Nothing will have changed.

In differentiating idealism and materialism as they apply to the teleporter scenario, t's the "material instance" I'm concerned with, which isn't a social construct, as far as I can see (though I suppose everything, including logic's terminology for class membership and existence, is a "social construct" at some level).

Well, that's not what I mean. What I'm saying is that the notion of an experiencer is a social construct. And, usually when you rip it all apart it comes down to the individual believing that there is an experiencing self and that this experiencing self will no longer experience when he/she pushes the Teleport button. This is why I put this in. Because IME this is usually the base belief of the psyche... that this is what will be lost. So for me I would love to learn if this is what you are actually concerned with... that you get in the box push the button and that this supposed self should cease to experience. Is it?

Even without the child's game, I wouldn't. But I would be able to determine that we are distinct, and neither of us wants to be destroyed, which is the salient point for the teleporter scenario.

Not really, as I see it. In the scenario only the copy continues. What I would consider more salient here is that you cannot know whether you have been alive for decades or whether you only came into existence 2 seconds ago. Given this truism, under materialism, does it matter whether you are destroyed and a copy takes your place?

Nick

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I confess I've only skimmed this thread, so I apologize if I'm duplicating points already made.

First, isn't it impossible for us to do what the OP suggests? (I don't mean just technically, but logically impossible to know everything about every particle in our bodies. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.)

Second, if we suspend disbelief and say it's possible, for those who are arguing that it's not the same person, wouldn't you make the same argument that "I" am not the same person "I" was a moment ago, or yesterday or 10 years ago? (I'm exchanging gases with my environment constantly, and adding new material and discarding old material very nearly non-stop.)

Again, sorry for repeating points that I have to assume have already been mentioned.

 

[Earthborn]

You're introducing occupational concerns into a hypothetical. There is no reason, hypothetically, that two places can't be assumed to have identical temperatures.

I think in order to have a meaningful thought experiment, you have to try to keep it as realistic as possible and not introduce things that make no sense at all. The teleporter is hypothetical enough as it is, without introducing that conditions in Cairo and Honolulu are identical.

that we care at all about the someone, about their uniquely situated consciousness, is enough to invalidate the claim that nothing is lost via teleportation.

It is you who argued that the consciousness and the recording are equivalent. Since the recording is sent along with the rest, it is not lost. Only transferred.

You (your material body and its consciousness) ceasing to exist for any length of time, under materialism, sounds an awful like like death.

Being reconstructed in all your detail sounds an awful lot like resurrection.

My copy wouldn't know the difference. And I wouldn't be around to know the difference.

That's the point. There will be no one who notices the difference, because materially there is no difference. That's materialism for you.

 

[Elind]

Forgive me for not replying to, or reading, every post on this matter; but talk about being pedantic and this thread takes the cake.

Duplicate someone elsewhere and that entity is magically transported to lala land or wherever, and continues its existence there and diverges from the original in sentience from there on.

It is no different from having a divergence of one timeline from another (call it fate if you will) and one entity goes one way and the other another, while sharing a commonality of experience before.

Why is this so ****** complicated?

Identical twins do this all the time. They just start earlier.

 

[Elind]

Funny, I wrote e f f i n g and the computer wrote ******.

Ain't technology just peachy?

 

[blobru]

Replication of the physical will replicate the contents of the original's consciousness. If the original was conscious of [X], the copy will be conscious of [X]. So we have two separate consciousnesses with the same contents. Twins who happen to be thinking of the same thing.

Yup.

Because each consciousness is not separate from its material instance, destroying a material instance will also destroy the consciousness that depended on it. Or so I would argue, under materialism.

Yup. One version is destroyed.

I think I prefer one "material instance" [of the non-material class that uniquely describes either of the twins] is destroyed. Is one "version" (one description) veering into idealism? In any event, the destruction of either twin should be a concern for everybody who knows them, including the twins.

But I take it the destruction of a twin is irrelevant to you, on your model?

Under idealism, consciousness need no longer be tied to matter. As an "idea", as a descriptive class, it might exist on its own, independent of any material body; disembodied, as it were, And that is all that's being transferred in the teleporter scenario, the "idea", the description of a certain consciousness, to be reembodied somewhere, somewhen else.

That's idealism, the transfer of the "idea" suffices to transfer the particular material instance. Under materialism, nothing that depended on a particular material instance survives its destruction. The description, the idea, the information about the paticular material instance, including the information about the consciousness, survives, but that information, that idea, is not the particular instance of material process it describes.

I still fail to see how any of this has any relevance to idealism.

The assumption that "active consciousness", that is, the state of being conscious, persists as long as its description does is idealism (the idea of something is more than just a description: it is something that exists as much or more than matter, whose instantiations are pale copies of eternal copies: classic idealism). Active consciousness, according to materialism, ceases the moment the material activity we describe as "consciousness" does.

What's being called a logical consequence of Materialism actually requires Idealism.

Whew. Sorry, Nick. That was much longer than I'd planned; but it's a difficult point, hard to get across without a specialized vocabulary, so hopefully worth the attempts at making in different ways. (And to be clear, I'm not arguing the teleporter is impossible, necessarily; just trying to clarify what the arguments for and against are based on, in terms of traditional philosophy).

But the core of the Transporter is the question - would you travel? To me all this reference to constructs, fascinating as it might be, also has with it something of a means to avoid the question. Blobru#2 will continue to have all of these issues with the device. Nothing will have changed.

The question is: "Is a particular consciousness limited to blobru#1, or can it be transferred to blobru#2, to continue as the same active consciousness?" It's a fascinating question, which I'm trying to explore from as many semantic angles as I can muster, at least those that seem relevant to me to understanding the question. It's terribly pedantic, and I apologize, but certainly not intended as a means to avoid the question, just my own stumblebum means to grapple with and try to pin it down. As with any philosophical question, a lot if not all of it comes down to arriving at common clear definitions for notoriously hard-to-define words, such as "consciousness" and "materialism". Flat out: if I could, I wouldn't get in the teleporter right now, based on my understanding, which is as fallible as anyone's (with the possible exception of Bubblefish's).

In differentiating idealism and materialism as they apply to the teleporter scenario, [i)-t's the "material instance" I'm concerned with, which isn't a social construct, as far as I can see (though I suppose everything, including logic's terminology for class membership and existence, is a "social construct" at some level).

Well, that's not what I mean. What I'm saying is that the notion of an experiencer is a social construct. And, usually when you rip it all apart it comes down to the individual believing that there is an experiencing self and that this experiencing self will no longer experience when he/she pushes the Teleport button. This is why I put this in. Because IME this is usually the base belief of the psyche... that this is what will be lost. So for me I would love to learn if this is what you are actually concerned with... that you get in the box push the button and that this supposed self should cease to experience. Is it?

It's the discontinuation/destruction of the uniquely-situated, active material process which gives rise to what we call "consciousness" (my activity, my being actively consciousness) that I'm actually concerned with, whether the "self" of "experiencer" is a grammatical or phenomenological fiction produced by that active process or not.

More plainly, a person is being destroyed at the entry-point of the teleporter; what's worse, it's me (apparently).

Even without the child's game, I wouldn't. But I would be able to determine that we are distinct, and neither of us wants to be destroyed, which is the salient point for the teleporter scenario.

Not really, as I see it. In the scenario only the copy continues. What I would consider more salient here is that you cannot know whether you have been alive for decades or whether you only came into existence 2 seconds ago. Given this truism, under materialism, does it matter whether you are destroyed and a copy takes your place?

Nick

My ignorance of whether I am an original or copy doesn't determine whether I'm an original or copy. There is a matter of fact separate from the matter of the knowledge. And it's the matter of fact that determines whether the consciousness is a property of the original, or of a copy. My current lack of knowledge of whether "my" refers to an original or copy is just that: a lack of knowledge of the facts. From the point of view of skepticism (incomplete knowledge), I could be either. From the point of view of materialism (as 'matter' of fact), I am one, or the other.

You're introducing occupational concerns into a hypothetical. There is no reason, hypothetically, that two places can't be assumed to have identical temperatures.

I think in order to have a meaningful thought experiment, you have to try to keep it as realistic as possible and not introduce things that make no sense at all. The teleporter is hypothetical enough as it is, without introducing that conditions in Cairo and Honolulu are identical.

I admit I'm somewhat baffled by this objection.

Hypotheticals are always based on ideal conditions. In laboratory experiments, we control conditions as best we can, make them as ideal as possible, to isolate a property. The nice thing about thought-experiments is it's much easier to control conditions. Saying there are two different places with identical temperatures to deduce a consequence is just establishing a hypothetical, in order to isolate a property (the distinct, material instances of the thermometers, in this case). Isolation of a relevant property is the whole point of any hypothetical. Those ideal conditions make the hypothetical meaningful, not meaningless. The assumption that two things can be materially identical is the whole point of the teleporter hypothetical. The assumption that two places can have identical temperatures furthers the hypothetical by attempting to isolate the requested property ("what is lost when we destroy one of the copies?"). Any additional relevant assumption makes the hypothetical more meaningful again. That's a large chunk of how philosophy and science are done (not to mention mathematics, which is nothing but giant idealized hypotheticals).

So I think this objection is based on a misunderstanding of what hypotheticals are, and we can ignore it.

that we care at all about the someone, about their uniquely situated consciousness, is enough to invalidate the claim that nothing is lost via teleportation.

It is you who argued that the consciousness and the recording are equivalent. Since the recording is sent along with the rest, it is not lost. Only transferred.

The recording is an active process, not equivalent to its algorithm and the data it accumulates. Otherwise, nothing is lost if we preserve one and a destroy a million recording instruments in a million and one environments which have been registering identically up to the moment of the mass destruction. It seems to me something is lost: a million instruments in a million separate environments, the ability to monitor those million separate environments, on the flawed assumption that it's irrelevant where each instrument is.

The same for human as for instrumental "consciousness".

You (your material body and its consciousness) ceasing to exist for any length of time, under materialism, sounds an awful like like death.

Being reconstructed in all your detail sounds an awful lot like resurrection.

Then I am as unconvinced by the teleporter as the crucifixion.

My copy wouldn't know the difference. And I wouldn't be around to know the difference.

That's the point. There will be no one who notices the difference, because materially there is no difference. That's materialism for you.

That's not materialism, though (or only of the most eliminative, dismissive kind). As argued above, not noticing a difference is not the same as there being no difference. Wholesale ignorance doesn't determine matters of fact. And as a matter of fact, there is a difference, in the time(s) and/or place(s) of the separate, actively conscious material instance(s): which exist, and which have been destroyed.

I confess I've only skimmed this thread, so I apologize if I'm duplicating points already made.

First, isn't it impossible for us to do what the OP suggests? (I don't mean just technically, but logically impossible to know everything about every particle in our bodies. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.)

Second, if we suspend disbelief and say it's possible, for those who are arguing that it's not the same person, wouldn't you make the same argument that "I" am not the same person "I" was a moment ago, or yesterday or 10 years ago? (I'm exchanging gases with my environment constantly, and adding new material and discarding old material very nearly non-stop.)

Again, sorry for repeating points that I have to assume have already been mentioned.

Hey, Joe. Not sure if you're repeating a point either, but since I haven't responded to this one anyway: the gradual replacement of bits of a person isn't equivalent to the destruction of a person. With gradual replacement, the active process of consciousness isn't being destroyed; with teleportation which destroys an original (and its attendant consciousness), it seems to be. So, if we make uninterrupted/intact/undestroyed consciousness our criterion for remaining the "same person", in your gradual replacement case, it makes sense to say you are the same person; in the case of teleportation (near-instantaneous destruction and replacement), it doesn't.

Forgive me for not replying to, or reading, every post on this matter; but talk about being pedantic and this thread takes the cake. ...

My ****** fault, I fear. Bad case of the cartesians this weekend.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

The conscious mind, even if only composed of brain cells, is the location of identity and choice and is responsible for the acts of the body.
Suppose the transporter malfunctions and the original is left on the pad but a dozen clones are generated from the pattern buffer. Each of those clones would have the same conscious mind and therefore would be responsible for whatever acts that mind ordered the body to perform.

 

[Aepervius]

I confess I've only skimmed this thread, so I apologize if I'm duplicating points already made.

First, isn't it impossible for us to do what the OP suggests? (I don't mean just technically, but logically impossible to know everything about every particle in our bodies. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.)

Second, if we suspend disbelief and say it's possible, for those who are arguing that it's not the same person, wouldn't you make the same argument that "I" am not the same person "I" was a moment ago, or yesterday or 10 years ago? (I'm exchanging gases with my environment constantly, and adding new material and discarding old material very nearly non-stop.)

Again, sorry for repeating points that I have to assume have already been mentioned.

There is a slight difference. We are indeed ever changing but there is a continuity in that change. The neuron only exchange part of material at a time. So no, it ain't the same as saying I am not the same person I was 20 years ago or yesterday.
In otehr word the emerging property of the block of material change over time but it is the same instance that was started.

In the transporter case it is not the same instance, only a copy of it (thx blobru for the term).

Nick idea is that if you are a materialist it does not matter which instance keep going on living. The opposing opinion is that it is not true, as even a materialist would recognize for the different instance it would matter which continue to live and which not, even if for the rest of the universe the difference is not knowable.

@Nick, saying that it would matter to me if I die, does not mean I believe anything survive death, it means *because* nothing survive destruction/death I certainly would not want to push a button if it kills me, no matter if a clone of me somehow is created.

let me replace your transporter paradox with another one. Now the transporter do not transport you. It first kill you when you push the button (the potatium injection), THEN atom by atom copy you somewhere, and discard the corpse , by for example burning it. The copy has all memory up to the point you push the button.

Would you push the button ?

 

[Nick227]

The question is: "Is a particular consciousness limited to blobru#1, or can it be transferred to blobru#2, to continue as the same active consciousness?"

Well, the usual question in Transporter debates is, "Would you travel?" It's direct and it's personal, I guess to cut out excessive philosophical discussion.

Answering the question you pose above I would say that it is not possible to transfer consciousness, though arguably it could be done, neuron by neuron, with some information transfer system, I guess.

Flat out: if I could, I wouldn't get in the teleporter right now, based on my understanding, which is as fallible as anyone's (with the possible exception of Bubblefish's).

OK. Fair enough.

More plainly, a person is being destroyed at the entry-point of the teleporter; what's worse, it's me (apparently).

Yes, it's you. And another person, a replica, is being created at a different point, a point where you would like to travel to. What's the big deal?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

@Nick, saying that it would matter to me if I die, does not mean I believe anything survive death, it means *because* nothing survive destruction/death I certainly would not want to push a button if it kills me, no matter if a clone of me somehow is created.

I'm trying to point out to you that if you are dead you will not be concerned that you are dead.

let me replace your transporter paradox with another one. Now the transporter do not transport you. It first kill you when you push the button (the potatium injection), THEN atom by atom copy you somewhere, and discard the corpse , by for example burning it. The copy has all memory up to the point you push the button.

Would you push the button ?

No problem. Along as the death is instant and painless. And the "somewhere" is a place I want to go!

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

If I am that material instance, that destruction concerns me a lot, as a materialist.

But this is not necessarily true.

If you are clever, you can take an instance at location A and an instance at location B and mathematically prove that they are the same instance, given suitable criteria for "instance."

If it turns out that this criteria for "instance" is in fact exactly what we think of when we envision our consciousness anyway, then what is the problem?

 

[Hellbound]

Let me try a differnt approach on this.

Can anyone answer the followign question:

Is there any way, theoretical or actual, to determine the difference between a (correctly functioning) transporter that actually transports you (or your particles), and a (correctly functioning) transporter that destroys the original and creates an exact copy? And no, you aren't allowed to look under the hood

 

[ttoyooka]

Is there any way, theoretical or actual, to determine the difference between a (correctly functioning) transporter that actually transports you (or your particles), and a (correctly functioning) transporter that destroys the original and creates an exact copy? And no, you aren't allowed to look under the hood

Depends on whether you're hiding the dead body under the hood.

 

[rocketdodger]

Let me try a differnt approach on this.

Can anyone answer the followign question:

Is there any way, theoretical or actual, to determine the difference between a (correctly functioning) transporter that actually transports you (or your particles), and a (correctly functioning) transporter that destroys the original and creates an exact copy? And no, you aren't allowed to look under the hood

If you are saying that in the interval of a single planck time the move is made or the copy is made and original destroyed then no, there is no possible way -- one planck time the particles are at location A, in the next planck time identical particles are at location B.

But that itself seems pretty impossible, so I would be pretty confident that there was some way to monitor the particles and see whether they were being moved or copied and destroyed.

 

[Hellbound]

If you are saying that in the interval of a single planck time the move is made or the copy is made and original destroyed then no, there is no possible way -- one planck time the particles are at location A, in the next planck time identical particles are at location B.

But that itself seems pretty impossible, so I would be pretty confident that there was some way to monitor the particles and see whether they were being moved or copied and destroyed.

Yah dang bunch of <gumble-grumble> sceptics

You're making your measurements after the transfer process has already finished (not during). Some people have made the argument that if it's the same particles as you, then it's still you, so I'm working on addressing that idea.

 

[blobru]

If I am that material instance, that destruction concerns me a lot, as a materialist.

But this is not necessarily true.

If you are clever, you can take an instance at location A and an instance at location B and mathematically prove that they are the same instance, given suitable criteria for "instance."

Two instances of the same class. If that class is restricted to have only one member (an "identity class"), then all instances will be copies of each other (where "member" refers to potential instances).

If it turns out that this criteria for "instance" is in fact exactly what we think of when we envision our consciousness anyway, then what is the problem?

If it turns out it isn't. As far as I'm able to determine from slogging through the morass of JREF teleportation threads, those who have a problem with getting in the teleporter are arguing that consciousness is an active material process of a material instance of "a person", and that destroying that person destroys that process; those who don't have a problem are arguing that consciousness is the description of the material instance of "a person" and his or her active material processes (consciousness included), iow, the class or idea of this person, and this person's consciousness, which many think of and may be nothing more than the active material process, persists somehow in its static, symbolic description.

On one side, it seems to me, speaking philosophically, is an emergent materialism which identifies the process of consciousness with its separate material instance; on the other, a pythagorean idealism which identifies consciousness with its unique descriptive class. So whether you get in the teleporter or not depends on your metaphysics. (I incline to emergent materialism; though of all the idealisms, pythagorean is the most tempting: by far the least silly).

The question is: "Is a particular consciousness limited to blobru#1, or can it be transferred to blobru#2, to continue as the same active consciousness?"

Well, the usual question in Transporter debates is, "Would you travel?" It's direct and it's personal, I guess to cut out excessive philosophical discussion.

Answering the question you pose above I would say that it is not possible to transfer consciousness, though arguably it could be done, neuron by neuron, with some information transfer system, I guess.

So is your argument based on Parfit's -- as I understand it: that even though blobru#1's consciousness can't be transferred in the sense we normally think of someone's consciousness, that it should be enough for blobru#1 to be destroyed knowing an exact duplicate, his namesake, blobru#2, will carry on his legacy, in his stead (iow, what's required is a more extensive definition of "person")?

Flat out: if I could, I wouldn't get in the teleporter right now, based on my understanding, which is as fallible as anyone's (with the possible exception of Bubblefish's).

OK. Fair enough.

I wonder if Bubblefish would? (I suppose if there were enough ayahuasca soup at the other end... or at both ends...)

More plainly, a person is being destroyed at the entry-point of the teleporter; what's worse, it's me (apparently).

Yes, it's you. And another person, a replica, is being created at a different point, a point where you would like to travel to. What's the big deal?

Nick

If I adopt an emergent materialist pov, the destruction (deactivation) of that separate active material process called consciousness that gave rise to the notion of "me".