Cash for Clunkers though? I'd very much like to see those figures, and the figures for the following quarter. Programs like that are just borrowing against future sales, and never work well.
Yes, and no. "Borrowing against future sales" is exactly what CfC was designed to do, and it worked well. It prevented a very very bad quarter from causing businesses to close, which meant that they were able to take advantage of "future sales" from which to borrow. In other terms, it smoothed out the fluctuations in the cash flow enough to keep the businesses open.
If you're in a barely-profitable business (as most companies are), and you suffer a 75% drop in revenue in Q2, it doesn't really matter what your Q3 numbers are expected to be; the odds are very good that you won't be in business in Q3. (Obviously, this applies to non-cyclical businesses; if your business is renting Santa Claus suits or jet skis, things would be a bit different). Almost any businessman would rather have 1% Q2 growth followed by 1% Q3 growth rather than (-75%) Q2 growth (loss) followed by 500% Q3 growth. The negative quarter hurts more than the positive quarter helps.
We're seeing something like that now in the chip market (check the recent NYT article). Chip demand has been way down for the past year -- it's picking up now, slightly, but the chip manufacturers aren't able to keep up with the demand. More accurately, the chip manufacturers aren't
willing to keep up with the demand, because they shut down a lot of their lines over the past year (to cut costs) and it's an expensive and time-consuming process to start them up again. So for the foreseeable future, chip production will be at only 50% or so of nominal capacity, because half the capacity is in mothballs and can't be quickly restored.
There's an argument to be made that what was needed was a Cash-for-Chips stimulus; artificially stimulate demand to the level that keeping all the lines running was profitable, so that we don't have the costs, delays, and shortages associated with re-starting lines. I don't think we need go that far -- after all, few if any of the chip manufacturers have actually closed or left the business. But the parts suppliers to the various auto manufacturers would have been in much the same situation, and many of them were expected to close (they were hit a lot harder than Intel by the slowdown).
So GM, as well, would rather borrow sales from Q4 into Q3 in order to make sure that it will still have a supplier of brake drums. If the brake drum company closes its business, GM not be able to make cars in Q4... and you can't sell what you can't make.
So, "programs like that are just borrowing against future sales, and never work well" isn't a very good representation of the actual effectiveness of the program.
Having said that,
you can see the numbers here. Q3 2009 -- 1.6% GDP growth (first positive quarter in a year, revised downward from 3.5%) -- that's the relevant quarter. According to the BEA, CfC accounted for about 1.7% of the growth as a whole -- i.e., we were looking at another negative quarter without it.
Q4 2009, a whopping 5% GDP growth, so things were actually
better for the economy as a whole, despite the fears of "borrowing sales." Things have dropped since then... not coincidentally, as the Republican obstructionism started to really take effect; Q3 2010 is probably going to put us in the toilet again due to the mess in June/July with unemployment payments, as consumer spending drops when people realize they can't spend income they no longer have.
I stand by my statement. CfC was a good idea and demonstrably worked.