The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[Jack by the hedge]

I am less comfortable with being disintegrated AFTER the copy has been made. Usually in this thought experiment the copy of you is made after you are disintegrated, and it is a copy of you the instant before you were destroyed.

If the copy is made before I am destroyed, then by the time I am destroyed it has already had different experiences and memories than me, and is not an exact copy anymore.

OK then: if we revise the thought experiment slightly so that both identical copies are frozen in some kind of stasis for a while, then the original is destroyed and the new one released, how would you feel about volunteering to be the original?

Essentially it seems to me that Nick227's view of a materialist position boils down to answering the question "If I step into this giant photocopier, do I die?" by saying "Yes you do, but it doesn't matter if you die, because from moment to moment you die anyway".

 

[Aepervius]

Exactly. Neither of you will have any way of telling which of you is the original!

Nick

True, because by definition both will have the same memory. They are identical. But they are not the same: if you destroy ONE of the entity in the room (which is the transporter case) then either the original or the copy is destroyed. This is the transporter by excellence ! There might be a CONTINUITY of subjectivity or consciousness for the copy, but the otehr one the destroyed, the consciousness will be stopped. game over.

And this is materialism by excellence. What you are in essence pretending is that it does not matter if the original is destroyed.

No it does indeed matter. Case in point if you let BOTH copy in your room experiment live, they will soon diverge in their life and subjective experience.

Thinking that the original do not matter and can be destroyed , is only valid if you ignore the viewpoint of the original.

There is no incompatibility with materialism with the destroying transporter as soon as you recognize that even if we can make interchangeable copy, they are DISTINCT individuals.

And that is where your acid test completely and utterly fail.

 

[Aepervius]

OK then: if we revise the thought experiment slightly so that both identical copies are frozen in some kind of stasis for a while, then the original is destroyed and the new one released, how would you feel about volunteering to be the original?

Essentially it seems to me that Nick227's view of a materialist position boils down to answering the question "If I step into this giant photocopier, do I die?" by saying "Yes you do, but it doesn't matter if you die, because from moment to moment you die anyway".

Except that it is an exaggeration to say that from moment to moment you die. That would involve an asymptote or discontinuity. But it is not the case.

I think in his point of view, if I understood correctly , if a copy of the person is made and the original destroyed, it should not matter to the original or copy as long as one is maintained. Whereas it is quite obvious that for the individual level, it matters even for a materialist. He is confusing materialism with something else IMHO.

 

[Aepervius]

The crux is that your grasp of materialism enables you to see that, no matter how it seems, there can be no disruption in subjective continuity in the Transporter (assuming immediate reassembly). Thus, as an individual, you can have no objection to travel on the grounds that something is going to be lost. There is not a persisting self anyway, so how can it die? This is materialist logic, as I see it.

Nick

Hum. No. All I can say is see above. You are again confusing a non differentiable set of entity (the copies) with the existence or non existence of a *particular* copy. Wanting to have a particular copy of oneself continue to exist and NOT being destroyed even if another totally identical copy is started somewhere else is not "pseudo materialism".

Again from the point of view of the whole universe except the copy, it does not matter. We are in fully agreement. But because the individual copy are not *the same*, from the point of view of each individual copy even not knowing WHO was the original, there is a difference.

 

[Hellbound]

So you base your argument on continuity of consciousness?

So you agree that when we wake up in the morning, we are not the same person that laid down to sleep the night before?

That when you come out of anesthesia, the person you are when you wake up is not the person you were when you went to sleep?

Hum. No. All I can say is see above. You are again confusing a non differentiable set of entity (the copies) with the existence or non existence of a *particular* copy. Wanting to have a particular copy of oneself continue to exist and NOT being destroyed even if another totally identical copy is started somewhere else is not "pseudo materialism".

Yes, you might want a particular copy to continue, I can agree with that. But the point of materialism is that "you" are simply a product of the matter you are made of. Thus, your "copy" is an much "you" as you are...both of you have the exact same right and claim to be "you". You aren't special just because you're the original, or the first copy, or the second copy, etc. What most of us are arguing against was your insistence on an imaginary difference between "same" and "copy".

In the example where the copy is "hidden" (you can't see the process), then how do you decide which is the original and which the copy? Both have the same memories, both believe themselves to be the original, both have a vested interest in continuing. But one has to be removed (for the sake of this thought experiment). So, what detectible, measureable, or meaningful difference can be found to differentiate the coy from the original?

 

[Jack by the hedge]

...In the example where the copy is "hidden" (you can't see the process), then how do you decide which is the original and which the copy?

How do I decide? Well I'm still standing here. Business as usual.

How does everyone else decide? Well, if they didn't watch the other me being created (or watch me not being created) then they can't. Not that it matters which one is the original in any case, unless you now intend to kill one of us, in which case it matters a very great deal to me.

Of course the copy completely believes he's me too, but he's not, because I'm still over here, looking out at the world through these eyes, while he's just found himself on the Enterprise or wherever. And no I don't volunteer to be killed now, thanks very much.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

But one has to be removed (for the sake of this thought experiment). So, what detectible, measureable, or meaningful difference can be found to differentiate the coy from the original?

I think this is beside the point. It's not a matter of which version of me is everyone else's favourite. You started with one of me and now you've made two. A really impressively identical twin. You have no more right to kill either of us than anyone else.

The bottom line for me is that if someone invents an interstellar transporter system and says "Do you want to jump over and see what the Alpha Centauri system looks like? I've done it, and it's way cool." Then you need to realise that you can't. Step into the booth and you die. Someone exactly like you gets to see Alpha Centauri, then they step into a booth and they die too. Some other guy exactly like him steps out of the booth on Earth, and he's the lucky one who remembers what visiting Alpha Centauri was like.

 

[Hellbound]

How do I decide? Well I'm still standing here. Business as usual.

But that's the point. For both the original and the copy, this statement will be true.

How does everyone else decide? Well, if they didn't watch the other me being created (or watch me not being created) then they can't. Not that it matters which one is the original in any case, unless you now intend to kill one of us, in which case it matters a very great deal to me.

Of course the copy completely believes he's me too, but he's not, because I'm still over here, looking out at the world through these eyes, while he's just found himself on the Enterprise or wherever. And no I don't volunteer to be killed now, thanks very much.

So the only difference is subjective, and emotional, then. Which is pretty much the point of this thought exercise Both you and the copy have a valid claim to be "you".

I think this is beside the point. It's not a matter of which version of me is everyone else's favourite. You started with one of me and now you've made two. A really impressively identical twin. You have no more right to kill either of us than anyone else.

Well, I'd agree with that, but for the sake of the thought experiment one of you has to die

The bottom line for me is that if someone invents an interstellar transporter system and says "Do you want to jump over and see what the Alpha Centauri system looks like? I've done it, and it's way cool." Then you need to realise that you can't. Step into the booth and you die. Someone exactly like you gets to see Alpha Centauri, then they step into a booth and they die too. Some other guy exactly like him steps out of the booth on Earth, and he's the lucky one who remembers what visiting Alpha Centauri was like.

But all of them are as much "you" as the original, that's the point. This view that the copies are not "you" as much as the original ascribes some sort of independent existence to the consciousness, which is not true. You're making the claim that a discontinuity in consciousness makes the copy no longer "you". So what about my earlier statements on temporal discontinuity? Are you still the same you after sleep? After anesthesia? After being knocked unconscious? All of these things casue a break in your consciousness, a break in your continual perception of the world. For the time you are out, there is no you to percieve the world. Yet we don't regard this in the same light.

What difference is there between a temporal dicontinuity and a spatial one?

 

[Jack by the hedge]

But all of them are as much "you" as the original, that's the point. This view that the copies are not "you" as much as the original ascribes some sort of independent existence to the consciousness, which is not true. You're making the claim that a discontinuity in consciousness makes the copy no longer "you". So what about my earlier statements on temporal discontinuity? Are you still the same you after sleep? After anesthesia? After being knocked unconscious? All of these things casue a break in your consciousness, a break in your continual perception of the world. For the time you are out, there is no you to percieve the world. Yet we don't regard this in the same light.

What difference is there between a temporal dicontinuity and a spatial one?

You walk into the booth on Earth, shut your eyes and press the button. An exact copy of you pops into existence in another booth on Mars. Due to a glitch, you (the original) fail to disappear. So now there are 2 of you.

When you open your eyes again, will you see a) Earth, b) Mars or c) both?

I'm not claiming that a discontinuity in consciousness makes the copy no longer "you". I'm claiming that the thought experiment of dismantling you and constructing an identical copy somewhere else is not the same thing as moving you to that place (which is demonstrated by missing out the step of dismantling you).

 

[Hellbound]

You walk into the booth on Earth, shut your eyes and press the button. An exact copy of you pops into existence in another booth on Mars. Due to a glitch, you (the original) fail to disappear. So now there are 2 of you.

When you open your eyes again, will you see a) Earth, b) Mars or c) both?

Both, but only one of me at a time Both copies are "me", for all intents and purposes...althoguh as soon as they differ (within microseconds after whatever force ensures they are identical stops) they each begin to diverge, and become a seperate entity.

I'm not claiming that a discontinuity in consciousness makes the copy no longer "you". I'm claiming that the thought experiment of dismantling you and constructing an identical copy somewhere else is not the same thing as moving you to that place (which is demonstrated by missing out the step of dismantling you).

Yes, there's a difference between moving something and copying it...but the question is which one is "really" you. Both copies are still you. The only way either of you can detect any difference is by history, essentially. There's no physical difference (except your position). Assume (for the sake of argument) you don't know exactly how a transporter works. You don't know if it destroys you, moves you, or whatever. After it runs there's a copy of you in both places. How do you tell which one is the original? How do you determine the one on the other end is a copy, and the one on this end is the original? There's no physical, detectable difference except in position.

The reason to restrict historical knowledge is to show that the distinction between the "real" you and the "copy" is entirely arbitrary. It rests on a distinction of spatial coordinates, which makes as much sense as assuming you are a different person when you walk across the room.

Imagine a transporter that moves one particle at a time to the new location, and replaces that particle in you with one pulled from a stock of basic elements (ignore the physics limitation of the uncertainty principle...it's a thought experiment after all). At what point do you stop being you and start being a copy?

The whole point is that "you", as an entity seperate from your physical form, is a myth. All of this about "but I won't see anythign there" is a red herring that assumes you are something more than the product of your physical makeup. IF the original is destroyed, it's no longer "you"...there's no "you" there anymore. But the exact copy is "you" as much as the original is "you". The orignal no longer exists. If neither are destroyed, each is just as much "you" as the other, with the same thoughts, memories, likes, dislikes, and so forth. Destorying the original and reconstructing it, assuming exact copies, is exactly identical to mvoing you. There's no functional, practical, or detectable difference involved. The orignal "you" wouldn't detect anything, either (there is no "original" you after the destruction). But "you" have been recreated in the copy, with the exact same everything. So "you" still live on.

I really don't like the transporter thought experiments, they seem too prone to spiral off into details and side issues. I prefer thinking about it in terms of the robotics experiment:

Imagine that you can replace part of your body or brain with an idetnical cybermetic copy. This cybernetic piece exactly replicates the functions of the part of the brain or body it replaces. You can replace pieces in as large or small a chunk as you like.

SO, questions related to this:
1. If you replace the body, but leave the brain alone, are you still you?
2. If you replace the brain, but leave the body alone, are you still you?
3. IF you replace a part of the brain, say 1%, are you still you? If yes, what if you replace 10%? 50%? at what point do you stop being you?
4. Same as 3, but the body.
5. If you replace your brain a piece at a time, say 1% per week, does that change the answer to 3? Same for 4?

YOu can apply these same questions to a transporter, or a transporter-like idea. Assume the transporter works by creating the exact copy of you on the other side of the room from available materials, then over time slowly swaps out a small portion of the original you with a small portion of the second you. At what percentage of swapping out are you no longer you? Do you ever move to the second location?

Personally, there's no functional difference between moving me, and deconstructing and reconstructing me at the end location. There's no possible physical way to determine the difference (assuming no glitches). Either one is "me", and I continue on as long as at least one copy exists. If both copies exist, they are both as much me as anything else, with neither having more right to the claim of me than the other (except by arbitrary standards).

 

[Nick227]

What you are in essence pretending is that it does not matter if the original is destroyed.

No it does indeed matter.

To whom?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Again from the point of view of the whole universe except the copy, it does not matter.

Why does it matter to the copy? For all you know, some fiendish alien, hovering in some space-craft above the earth, might have replaced you 17 times whilst you are reading this sentence. So what? It's meaningless.

For you, perhaps, as a copy, it would matter. But this is only because it mattered to you as an original!

We are in fully agreement. But because the individual copy are not *the same*, from the point of view of each individual copy even not knowing WHO was the original, there is a difference.

There is no actual point of view. There is merely subjectivity. And this subjectivity includes the notion of an observer, the notion of a point of view. These things will be perfectly replicated.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You walk into the booth on Earth, shut your eyes and press the button. An exact copy of you pops into existence in another booth on Mars. Due to a glitch, you (the original) fail to disappear. So now there are 2 of you.

When you open your eyes again, will you see a) Earth, b) Mars or c) both?

The one on Mars will see Mars, the one on Earth will see Earth. What would you expect?

I'm not claiming that a discontinuity in consciousness makes the copy no longer "you". I'm claiming that the thought experiment of dismantling you and constructing an identical copy somewhere else is not the same thing as moving you to that place (which is demonstrated by missing out the step of dismantling you).

No, you're right. It's not.

Nick

 

[Jack by the hedge]

Imagine a transporter that moves one particle at a time to the new location, and replaces that particle in you with one pulled from a stock of basic elements (ignore the physics limitation of the uncertainty principle...it's a thought experiment after all). At what point do you stop being you and start being a copy?

Interesting question and I'd like to know what your view is. Assuming you remained awake throughout this process, would you expect to have any sensation of your atoms being gradually replaced? I'd expect not. At the end of the process would you as the experiencing individual expect to find yourself somewhere else, or still where you started? I'd expect the latter.

So at the end of the process where each of my atoms has been removed to another location and replaced with another, I'd expect not to have moved and to have a continuous recollection of remaining exactly where I was. Of course I'd have no way of proving that this recollection wasn't an illusion, and there would also be another "me" at the other location insisting that, no, I had in fact suddenly teleported over there. But I'd be interested to hear if anyone thinks to the contrary - that they as the experiencing individual who walked into the booth would find themselves transported to the new location.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

The one on Mars will see Mars, the one on Earth will see Earth. What would you expect?

I'd expect the same as you. That makes me think that if I want to see Mars, I'm going to have to fly there in a rocket. If I use a transporter instead it'll be my identical twin who sees it, not me.

 

[marplots]

I think you can get at the root of it by answering the following question:

Matma Doom kills the President of the United Federation and is recorded doing so on holo-vision. He is thoroughly guilty. But, to make an escape, Matma Doom uses a transporter to go to another planet, JREF-7.

Now, the person who is caught on JREF-7, are they guilty of the assassination?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Let's suppose that the fictional Star Trek transporter works like this:

A computer records the identity and position of every particle of your body as the transporter disassembles it, and the particles are stored locally in some sort of storage space, or perhaps annihilated by conversion to energy.

Simultaneously, it recreates those particles at a remote location, or perhaps harvests them from existing matter at that location, and reassembles your body to form an exact duplicate of what it disassembled. The important point here is that the only thing actually transferred to the destination is information; no actual particles of matter travel across the gap. Thus, you've been transported.

Or have you?

Objectively, it seems so to everyone, including you. After you've been transported, you seem to be the same person with the same memories that you had before, but are you?

Or did the "you" that stood on the transporter actually get killed? Does the transporter actually execute people and replace them with duplicates? Is it suicide to step on a transporter platform?

This seems more like a philosophical than a scientific question, so I'm posting it here. Some might argue that the Star trek transporter must be forever impossible because of the difficulty of resolving the paradox. Some might argue for the existence of a soul. What do you think?

By the way, a similar puzzle is a situation like the one that occurred in the movie The 6th Day, where the original "you" isn't annihilated but survives while another "you" is created. Which one is you? How do you divide the property?

There is no paradox, only speculative science fiction.

There is an episode ("Turnabout Intruder") where only the mind is transported, but the mind of neither Dr. Lester or Captain Kirk dies.

All the cells in the human body are replaced several times over during the course of a normal lifetime. For an adult being transported there is no original "you" to begin with.

There is an episode ("Second Chances") where Lt. Ryker is split into two Rykers, but at that moment the two begin to diverge as separate identities, so that two identical Rykers never actually exist simultaneously.

The identity of "you" is separate from the flesh of "you".

 

[Tinfoil Hater]

Let's suppose that the fictional Star Trek transporter works like this:

A computer records the identity and position of every particle of your body as the transporter disassembles it, and the particles are stored locally in some sort of storage space, or perhaps annihilated by conversion to energy.

Simultaneously, it recreates those particles at a remote location, or perhaps harvests them from existing matter at that location, and reassembles your body to form an exact duplicate of what it disassembled. The important point here is that the only thing actually transferred to the destination is information; no actual particles of matter travel across the gap. Thus, you've been transported.

Or have you?



Objectively, it seems so to everyone, including you. After you've been transported, you seem to be the same person with the same memories that you had before, but are you?

Or did the "you" that stood on the transporter actually get killed? Does the transporter actually execute people and replace them with duplicates? Is it suicide to step on a transporter platform?

This seems more like a philosophical than a scientific question, so I'm posting it here. Some might argue that the Star trek transporter must be forever impossible because of the difficulty of resolving the paradox. Some might argue for the existence of a soul. What do you think?

By the way, a similar puzzle is a situation like the one that occurred in the movie The 6th Day, where the original "you" isn't annihilated but survives while another "you" is created. Which one is you? How do you divide the property?

There was an episode of the recent remake of 'The Outer Limits' sci fi show that covered this- the original body of the person transported was scanned, then destroyed. In this episode the moonbase worker did not destroy the original person-

 

[The Fool]

I always usee to get quite angry and emotional when three regular series stars and someone you have never seen before would line up to be beamed down to the planet. I would yell out to the unknown person that they were highly likely to get eaten by something.....but did anyone ever listen???

 

[Third Eye Open]

I think you can get at the root of it by answering the following question:

Matma Doom kills the President of the United Federation and is recorded doing so on holo-vision. He is thoroughly guilty. But, to make an escape, Matma Doom uses a transporter to go to another planet, JREF-7.

Now, the person who is caught on JREF-7, are they guilty of the assassination?

This is a great question! People who wouldn't use the transporter should be satisfied that he is dead and gone, and that the copy is a new person who had no choice in being created, and can continue on his way, right? It's not his fault he's stuck with memories of murdering the president, right?