The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[Nick227]

Can I try to clarify what I think you're saying here? Are you saying that it doesn't matter if the original consciousness is destroyed, because from moment to moment consciousness is created from brain activity and each person's sense of a continuous experiencing self is an illusion? In other words, are you saying that it doesn't matter if the original "me" dies and a copy carries on, because from moment to moment that's what happens anyway (despite our sensation of continuous awareness)?

That's pretty much how I see materialism interpreting consciousness, yes. This prevailing sense of there being a continuous experiencing self is just another aspect of consciousness itself, not an actual entity experiencing consciousness.

Nick

 

[Belz...]

One is not "really" a materialist/physicalist if they honestly think there is something essential to their identity (or as Nick said their "experiencing self") that would be lost if they stepped into the machine.

The only thing that is lost is the original, and that's all that matters to me. Me.

 

[Beerina]

Let's suppose that the fictional Star Trek transporter works like this:

A computer records the identity and position of every particle of your body as the transporter disassembles it, and the particles are stored locally in some sort of storage space, or perhaps annihilated by conversion to energy.

Simultaneously, it recreates those particles at a remote location, or perhaps harvests them from existing matter at that location, and reassembles your body to form an exact duplicate of what it disassembled. The important point here is that the only thing actually transferred to the destination is information; no actual particles of matter travel across the gap. Thus, you've been transported.

Or have you?

Objectively, it seems so to everyone, including you. After you've been transported, you seem to be the same person with the same memories that you had before, but are you?

Or did the "you" that stood on the transporter actually get killed? Does the transporter actually execute people and replace them with duplicates? Is it suicide to step on a transporter platform?

This seems more like a philosophical than a scientific question, so I'm posting it here. Some might argue that the Star trek transporter must be forever impossible because of the difficulty of resolving the paradox. Some might argue for the existence of a soul. What do you think?

By the way, a similar puzzle is a situation like the one that occurred in the movie The 6th Day, where the original "you" isn't annihilated but survives while another "you" is created. Which one is you? How do you divide the property?

IIRC, the Trek transporter actually beams your particles down and reassembles them. I'd be fine with it, even though it makes no sense, I admit, over the "use local particles" model.

TNG and beyond are "quantum" particle transporters, where TOS (and massive cargo transporters in TNG) are either atomic or large subatomic (protons and neutrons), don't recall.

And yes, if you stood there and had 1 molecule in your brain replaced, you'd still be you. And another. And another. And eventually you'd be 100% replaced.

But...what if someone saved all those molecules and then reassembled you, putting each back exactly where it was? Which would be the "real" you?

Even the contiguous-consciousness standard chokes on that one.



The best analogy I've come up with so far is that your consciousness is similar to a lit candle. The flame is your conscious mind, and the candle, your brain, and the wax, your stored memories (already a stretched analogy, I admit.)

Candle goes out, you lose consciousness. You don't exist. You're just stored wax memory, unconscious. Re-light the candle, you now exist again. Consciousness is a transient, dynamic phenomenon. In this sense, when you awaken, you're a brand new consciousness whose only connection to yesterday's are the stored memories.

Is today's flame the "same flame" as yesterday's?

 

[Towlie]

And yes, if you stood there and had 1 molecule in your brain replaced, you'd still be you. And another. And another. And eventually you'd be 100% replaced.

That kind of reminds me of homeopathy.


Relevant SMBC cartoon just brought up by P. Z. Myers

 

[Aepervius]

It will absolutely recreate *ME*. As you have just affirmed *ME* is merely a process emerging from brain activity.

Now the body will be a different instance of the same body - a copy. But the *ME* will be identical.

The whole subjective field, including the notion that there exists a self which is experiencing it, will be perfectly recreated.

Nick

No, the emerging property will be identical , but then entity will NOT be the same. To take over the metal cube example, you could recreate the identical cube of metal ad infinitum. All their emerging property will be identical. Nobody is contesting that. But the original cube has been destroyed and is lost forever.

To the materialist point of view yes indeed those cube are interchangeable. Fully. But no one of the initial cube is the *same* as the original cube continuing its existence onward. They are all different cube.

So yes indeed for all the other human might care, in our teleporter destroyer/recreator an identical human non distinguishable from the original one has been created. But from the point of view of the original, existence stopped, and do not "magically" restart with the reconstruction of the new body. It will be a new body which did not exists before , but has been imprinted with the property (binding, energy level, kinetic energy, spin etc...) of the old one.

If one hold the proposal that it does not matter whether it is the same or identical, it is fine. It is an acceptable point of view. But to hold the point of view that from the moment the original is destroyed and a copy is recreated and it will be the same person, is to hold the point of view that something immaterial magically went from the original and was recreated afterward for the copy and that they are indeed the same as opposed to be identical. That is in no way a materialist viewpoint. And accusing people of pseudo materislism, isn't a justification of tat viewpoint, it is at best an ad hom. The nearer I saw in this thread justifying it is earthborn.

 

[Aepervius]

SNIPPED

And yes, if you stood there and had 1 molecule in your brain replaced, you'd still be you. And another. And another. And eventually you'd be 100% replaced.

That is the nearest I see as an analogy, but to push the analogy further, what is you melt the candle memory, decompose it under singular atom+position, and then reconstitute it later painstakingly atom by atom ?

Sure the brain is being replaced piece by piece at a time. But as far as I can tell, it is only protein by protein, not full neurone replacement. That is where the "we are being continuously different" break down. The emerging property are being slowly changed, but they are mostly continuous. Even in the case of people going into coma/Obe/whatever the cells and brain continue to work or are in a state where the emerging property is still there, even if that work is minimal.

Here we are speaking of two asymptote with a full 100% non same molecule in original and copy.

 

[Nick227]

No, the emerging property will be identical , but then entity will NOT be the same. To take over the metal cube example, you could recreate the identical cube of metal ad infinitum. All their emerging property will be identical. Nobody is contesting that. But the original cube has been destroyed and is lost forever.

To the materialist point of view yes indeed those cube are interchangeable. Fully. But no one of the initial cube is the *same* as the original cube continuing its existence onward. They are all different cube.

Yes, in numerical terms they are distinct.

But we are not talking about cubes, we are talking about humans. Cubes do not noticeably have personalities, or inner lives, subjectivity, at least as far as a non-cube can tell.

If one hold the proposal that it does not matter whether it is the same or identical, it is fine. It is an acceptable point of view. But to hold the point of view that from the moment the original is destroyed and a copy is recreated and it will be the same person, is to hold the point of view that something immaterial magically went from the original and was recreated afterward for the copy and that they are indeed the same as opposed to be identical.

No. That depends on what you consider to be "a person." Person does not automatically mean Body. One body is destroyed. That is indisputable. But not necessarily one person. There is psychological continuity, if not physical continuity. There is, under materialism, full subjective continuity.

That is in no way a materialist viewpoint. And accusing people of pseudo materislism, isn't a justification of tat viewpoint, it is at best an ad hom. The nearer I saw in this thread justifying it is earthborn.

If you won't travel, to me you are not a materialist. It's an acid test. Do you believe what you preach? OK, let's see! This is how I see the Transporter.

The crux is that your grasp of materialism enables you to see that, no matter how it seems, there can be no disruption in subjective continuity in the Transporter (assuming immediate reassembly). Thus, as an individual, you can have no objection to travel on the grounds that something is going to be lost. There is not a persisting self anyway, so how can it die? This is materialist logic, as I see it.

Nick

 

[Hellbound]

The point is that there's no way to tell any difference between the original or the transported one without knowing the history. Thus, they are identical.

To make it even more fun, and to illuminate the silliness of the distinction between identical and same, imagine that the two "ends" of the transporter are in the same room. That when the transporter runs, it does not destroy the original, but makes a copy. And, just for fun, the entire room goes 100% dark when it operates.

So you run the transporter, the room goes dark, the lights come up, and two "yous" are in the room.

Which one is you? How can you tell?

As others have stated, if there's no difference then they are identical.

The entier conept of this being "not you" is based simply on a dislocation in space. As others have jokingly stated, you might as well assume you die if you move.

What happens to "you" while you sleep? While unconscious? Anethetized? These are all temporal dislocations instead of spatial, but time is just another dimension. Why are these not killign you and starting a new you at the other end? What's different about these "yous" and the you that's spatially dislocated?

 

[Nick227]

To make it even more fun, and to illuminate the silliness of the distinction between identical and same, imagine that the two "ends" of the transporter are in the same room. That when the transporter runs, it does not destroy the original, but makes a copy. And, just for fun, the entire room goes 100% dark when it operates.

So you run the transporter, the room goes dark, the lights come up, and two "yous" are in the room.

Which one is you? How can you tell?

Exactly. Neither of you will have any way of telling which of you is the original!

Nick

 

[Earthborn]

But from the point of view of the original, existence stopped

Again: after the machine did its thing, there is no point of view of the original. There is no point in pretending that there is. It is as meaningless as pretending that from the point of view of the copy, there was no existence until someone started the machine. It's certainly not how the copy perceives it; according to his/her point of view s/he was standing in the sender at one moment and in the receiver in the next. From no one's point of view did anything else happen.

 

[marplots]

The point is that there's no way to tell any difference between the original or the transported one without knowing the history. Thus, they are identical.

This is the root of the paradox, the notion of history. I have two quill pens in front of me. They are made of turkey feathers and appear quite identical. One was made in 1856 and used by an accountant. The other was used by John Hancock to sign the Declaration of Independence. Are they materially different?

One of the quills has a static electric charge (maybe both quills, I didn't check) made up of loose electrons. There is a pair of electrons close to each other, one of which used to be part of the planet Mars. The other was just created yesterday when a cosmic ray hit that quill. Are the two electrons different?

Is history a real property or an illusion? Can historicity be lost?

 

[Nick227]

This is the root of the paradox, the notion of history. I have two quill pens in front of me. They are made of turkey feathers and appear quite identical. One was made in 1856 and used by an accountant. The other was used by John Hancock to sign the Declaration of Independence. Are they materially different?

One of the quills has a static electric charge (maybe both quills, I didn't check) made up of loose electrons. There is a pair of electrons close to each other, one of which used to be part of the planet Mars. The other was just created yesterday when a cosmic ray hit that quill. Are the two electrons different?

Is history a real property or an illusion? Can historicity be lost?

I don't think it's really about historicity. There is not physical continuity. It's clear. But does anyone care? Marplots#2 will be just as intrigued by the pens as Marplots#1. For most individuals life itself is more important than history.

You have no way of knowing if you have the same body now as when you started reading this paragraph. You have no way of knowing if some fiendish little alien somewhere above the earth has replaced your body 34 times since you began reading this post. So why care? All you have is this moment now.

Nick

 

[marplots]

I agree, the right now is. But that's not how it seems.

It seems like I carry with me my past. That my past belongs to me and in a sense is part of the present. So, it seems like what I have done and how I got to this point matters.

I think that is why some people have problems with the whole copy thing. As if it were inauthentic. I claim the right to my own memories not just because they are memories in my head, but because they actually happened.

How, I wonder, would I feel if some trusted authority informed me I was a copy of some other 'me' that was dead. Would it feel like being informed I was adopted? Would it feel any way at all?

I am reminded of the sci-fi plot where the cyborg has to be convinced they are machine and not what they believed themselves to be.

 

[Third Eye Open]

In which case a new brain implies a new identity. That new identity might behave exactly the same as the old one, but unless you want to argue for the existence of a soul, I don't see how it could be the same individual.

Umm.. unless you want to argue for a soul I don't see how it could be a different individual.

If it behaves exactly the same as the old one, has the same memories and experiences as the old one, and indeed believes it is the old one, then it IS the old one. How else are we defined?

Unless there is some invisible property (soul) that goes away when we die, and doesn't come back when all other physical parts are brought back, then everything in the copy is the same, including the consciousness.

 

[Jack by the hedge]

If it behaves exactly the same as the old one, has the same memories and experiences as the old one, and indeed believes it is the old one, then it IS the old one. How else are we defined?

If I was a perfect replica of you, I would absolutely believe myself to be you. There would be no way at all in which I was not you, except that you would still be looking at the world out of your eyes, and I out of mine. Why would either of us agree to be vapourised on the reassurance that "you" exist elsewhere?

 

[Third Eye Open]

If I was a perfect replica of you, I would absolutely believe myself to be you. There would be no way at all in which I was not you, except that you would still be looking at the world out of your eyes, and I out of mine. Why would either of us agree to be vapourised on the reassurance that "you" exist elsewhere?

I am less comfortable with being disintegrated AFTER the copy has been made. Usually in this thought experiment the copy of you is made after you are disintegrated, and it is a copy of you the instant before you were destroyed.

If the copy is made before I am destroyed, then by the time I am destroyed it has already had different experiences and memories than me, and is not an exact copy anymore.

 

[brantc]

Let's suppose that the fictional Star Trek transporter works like this:

A computer records the identity and position of every particle of your body as the transporter disassembles it, and the particles are stored locally in some sort of storage space, or perhaps annihilated by conversion to energy.

Simultaneously, it recreates those particles at a remote location, or perhaps harvests them from existing matter at that location, and reassembles your body to form an exact duplicate of what it disassembled. The important point here is that the only thing actually transferred to the destination is information; no actual particles of matter travel across the gap. Thus, you've been transported.

Or have you?

Objectively, it seems so to everyone, including you. After you've been transported, you seem to be the same person with the same memories that you had before, but are you?

Or did the "you" that stood on the transporter actually get killed? Does the transporter actually execute people and replace them with duplicates? Is it suicide to step on a transporter platform?

This seems more like a philosophical than a scientific question, so I'm posting it here. Some might argue that the Star trek transporter must be forever impossible because of the difficulty of resolving the paradox. Some might argue for the existence of a soul. What do you think?

By the way, a similar puzzle is a situation like the one that occurred in the movie The 6th Day, where the original "you" isn't annihilated but survives while another "you" is created. Which one is you? How do you divide the property?

If you consider that atoms are just energy, you are just making a transfer of patterned energy. People are still alive in the transporter "pattern buffer". This of course leads to certain assumptions about the nature of life and consciousness.

You use warp technology to get the energy there "faster than light" or not, depending on the Space Opera civilization.....

No paradox unless you make one up like turning a transporter into a copy machine..


Only human misunderstanding causes paradoxes. The universe still works fine.

 

[brantc]

This is the root of the paradox, the notion of history. I have two quill pens in front of me. They are made of turkey feathers and appear quite identical. One was made in 1856 and used by an accountant. The other was used by John Hancock to sign the Declaration of Independence. Are they materially different?

One of the quills has a static electric charge (maybe both quills, I didn't check) made up of loose electrons. There is a pair of electrons close to each other, one of which used to be part of the planet Mars. The other was just created yesterday when a cosmic ray hit that quill. Are the two electrons different?

Is history a real property or an illusion? Can historicity be lost?

Every electron has its own "vibration frequency.".. The difference between electrons is way smaller than we can measure.

 

[Brainache]

If I was a perfect replica of you, I would absolutely believe myself to be you. There would be no way at all in which I was not you, except that you would still be looking at the world out of your eyes, and I out of mine. Why would either of us agree to be vapourised on the reassurance that "you" exist elsewhere?

I am less comfortable with being disintegrated AFTER the copy has been made. Usually in this thought experiment the copy of you is made after you are disintegrated, and it is a copy of you the instant before you were destroyed.

If the copy is made before I am destroyed, then by the time I am destroyed it has already had different experiences and memories than me, and is not an exact copy anymore.

So, the order of events makes a big difference then? I don't think it matters, because whichever way it happens, someone is being destroyed (even if only for an instant).

 

[Jack by the hedge]

(a) Every electron has its own "vibration frequency.".. (b) The difference between electrons is way smaller than we can measure.

My bold.

Given (b), how did you determine (a)?