Next day message to Japanese negotiators that deadline had postponed for 4 days (November 29) but that after that events would folloow automatically. Msg again intercepted by Americans. November 25 Japanese naval units coursed for Pearl Harbor. November 25, meeting in the White House between Roosevelt, Hull, Stark, Marshall, Stimson. All knew that November 29 was the dead line. Stimson wrote in his diary that Roosevelt had said that the US probably would be attacked, maybe already next Monday. The Japanese are notorious for surprise attacks. The question was how we could manouver them in a position that they shoot first, without endangering ourselves too much. Hull was in favor of halting the negotiations. The pressure from British and Chinese was decisive. It was Hull who answered the Japanese negotiators the same day that the Japanese should withdraw all troops from entire China, including Manchuria, recognition of the Chiang-Kai-shek regime and public cancelling Tripartite Pact. This was unacceptable for Japan. Everybody understood war was now immanent (6:10). Next day Stimson called Hull, who literally said that from now on it was a matter of navy and army.
13 Feb 1932 admiral
Harry Yarnell had demonstrated the possibility to surprise attack Pearl Harbor from aircraft carriers. The leadership of the Navy realised the vulnerable position of it’s fleet. On 8 October 1940 had admiral Richardson already advised Roosevelt not to permanently station the Pacific fleet in PH.
On that same meeting
Richardson had asked the president when he thought that the US would enter the war. Roosevelt had answered that at some point the Japanese would make a mistake and at that moment would the US enter the war (8:33). Feb 1 1941, Richardson was replaced by admiral
Kimmel.
Jan 1941 Yamamoto started to draw the first plans for a surprise attack on PH. PH was only part of a larger strategic plan. The July 1941 oil embarbo forced the Japanese to capture the Dutch East Indies. US and UK diplomats had already told the Japanese that such a move would mean war. A Japanese assault would be threatened in the flank by the Pacific fleet. Hence the decision to attack PH.
Kimmel and Short were hardly informed about the political situation by Washington. They knew nothing about Magic. They got no warning. Instead they were summoned to send away 2 aircraft carriers Enterprise and Lexington on November 27 to the islands of Wake and Midway, with the task of transporting airplanes to those locations. In this way the rest of the fleet was deprived of it’s strongest means of protection. December 7 was planned as the date of attack.
October 1940 Americans had also succeeded in breaking the code of Kaigun. Despite that Yamamoto had ordered strict radio silence several Japanese ships communicated encrypted their positions. This data was captured in Hawaii, Seatlle and other American locations (4:10). The American leadership was complete aware of what was coming.
