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Biology of free will

Her Dark Star

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Feb 16, 2010
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Split from the thread - is free will an illusion, yet necessary for ethics.

I would like a discussion, evidence for/against, suggested reading etc on whether free will is physically possible. Is the brain capable of producing a choice that isn't predetermined?


To give some context - I'm not asking about philosophy or theological arguments but the mechanics of the brain/mind. I believe in limited free will (purely based on my own experience) that although we are limited by all kinds of constraints and have all kind of influences upon us within those boundaries we have the power to make a choice. However I'm not a neurologist.

The counter point was brought up (I hope that I summarise it accurately) that the brain is a set of deterministic principles based on physics/chemistry and that every 'choice' is the result of those principles - that at the moment of choice it is in fact already made for you.

Lastly whether or not the brain is capable of producing a free choice what kind of experiment could there be to evidence it?
Many thanks.
 
Split from the thread - is free will an illusion, yet necessary for ethics.

I would like a discussion, evidence for/against, suggested reading etc on whether free will is physically possible. Is the brain capable of producing a choice that isn't predetermined?


To give some context - I'm not asking about philosophy or theological arguments but the mechanics of the brain/mind. I believe in limited free will (purely based on my own experience) that although we are limited by all kinds of constraints and have all kind of influences upon us within those boundaries we have the power to make a choice. However I'm not a neurologist.

The counter point was brought up (I hope that I summarise it accurately) that the brain is a set of deterministic principles based on physics/chemistry and that every 'choice' is the result of those principles - that at the moment of choice it is in fact already made for you.

Lastly whether or not the brain is capable of producing a free choice what kind of experiment could there be to evidence it?
Many thanks.

I'll take a swing.

Any discussion that speaks of the brain as a 'set of deterministic principles' is philosophical, not neurological. It is a discussion of things 'in principle'--which is the only perspective from which our behaviour looks completely determined in advance.

The brain/body is a complex self-observing system, and it is capable of modifying its behaviour based on observing its past behaviour, and based on beliefs or personal principles.

Dennett, in Elbow Room, the Varieties of Free Will Worth Having makes the point that philosophical determinism is a bogey-man based on images of machine-like, doll-like, or Sphex-like (insect-like) behaviour. In other words, we fear a caricature that is always smuggled into the discussion.

In reality, most of us have (some degree of) agency and the ability to modify our own behaviour--barring outside coercion or brain injury or abnormality.

We may have a tic, but we can do something about it--suppress it, conceal it, walk away, etc.

We may lose a degree of self-control because of lust or intoxication, but we can regain it.

We may be coerced, imprisoned, threatened, impoverished, compelled by hunger or pain.

Those are the areas where degrees of free will are living issues, not abstractions like the theoretically determinate action of matter--which is a philosophical determinism.

The observation that rationalization and confabulation seems like agency to the rationalizer--but not to the researcher--says something about neurology, but nothing about determinism. It only speaks to whether things are the way they seem to us. They're not, mostly.

After all, we could, in principle, be acting freely or randomly or arbitrarily or chaotically, but confabulating afterwards.

It's obvious that motivation, effort, belief-in-oneself can play a role in a kind of self-mastery, even if that self-mastery isn't total.

So--in the ways worth caring about--we have some 'free will'--even if from a detached perspective, we are just a bundle of competing drives, as Nietzsche seemed to think.

Those competing drives feed back in a (somewhat) self-aware system. We can become what we are, and try to become what we're not.

(The frontal lobes seem to be crucial.)

I have to try to practice now. No choice, really.
 
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Thank you for that post - this is an area where I struggle, and that made a lot of sense.
 
The observation that rationalization and confabulation seems like agency to the rationalizer--but not to the researcher--says something about neurology, but nothing about determinism. It only speaks to whether things are the way they seem to us. They're not, mostly.
I find this paragraph too confusing. I had started out interpreting it one way, but on rereading it, it appears it could have the exact opposite interpretation. Could you clarify what you mean?

In particular, "rationalization and confabulation seem like agency to the rationalizer" does not make sense to me, and is ambiguous. Do people rationalize that rationalization seems like agency? And do they rationalize that confabulation seem like agency? (Both of these seem quite odd).

But if I assume that's not what you mean, it still sounds odd (or at least off). Are you saying that to a researcher, rationalization and confabulation look like how agency works?
 
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"Any discussion that speaks of the brain as a 'set of deterministic principles' is philosophical, not neurological. It is a discussion of things 'in principle'--which is the only perspective from which our behaviour looks completely determined in advance."

I am sorry, but neurologically, there is *nothing* going on beyond physical and chemical reaction. To say the contrary is an article of faith. that a system is complex , self modifying, and learning, do not make it less based on physical and chemical property.

If you start to pretend there is something beyond the chemical reaction , well pelase tell us what it is and propose an experiment to falsify it.

The brain system is not fully deterministic since there is always some sort of fluctuation (temperature distribution of motion, or QM fluctuation) which even if starting with the iniatial state MIGHT make a few difference if neuron are near a trigger level, but beyond such random fluctuation the brain is as deterministic as it goes.

If you chose (haha) to call those random fluctuation free will , it is up to you. But it certainly is not what people define as free will.

So really, let us cut the chase, and let me ask you WHAT is the entity which make the "choice", you say we have, and WHERE is it located, and WHAT is its mode of function.

I can't bear philosophy. So spare it to me.
 
Thank you indeed and that seems to fit with what I understand and is kind of what I mean by limited free will.

The brain/body is a complex self-observing system, and it is capable of modifying its behaviour based on observing its past behaviour, and based on beliefs or personal principles.

You make reference here to the systems of the mind that allow us to change and modify, crucial to making a new choice. However I think there's a question over where the principles/comparisons used for such a process would come from, if these principles aren't the result of free will then any choices/modifications based on them would be tainted? Hmm possibly turtles all the way down territory but I'm hoping that there's an end point to this with the physical brain itself.

You mention the competing drives, where I believe its referenced that all conscious thought is simply the surface result of underlying systems - like bubbles on the top of boiling water. In the other thread I tried to give an example whereby you're faced with a choice in which these drives aren't taking part - Completely alone, throw a ball into the air. Decide to catch it or not. There are no consequences good or bad, no other people involved, no need for food, shelter etc involved. Will your decision to catch it or not be a free one? With all consequences removed I think that there still might be some psychological pressures, internal values, social conventions to catch balls etc in play and its very difficult to come up with a scenario where you can say a decision is truly free.

Of course as you said, not all of the degrees of freedom matter:D As long as you are aware of these influences you have some choice over their effect. Maybe. Argh, I'm going to tie myself in knots.

The other answer I think is that I need to go and do some reading on neurobiology and the latest ideas for how consciousness is formed from the brain at all....
 
I find this paragraph too confusing. I had started out interpreting it one way, but on rereading it, it appears it could have the exact opposite interpretation. Could you clarify what you mean?

In particular, "rationalization and confabulation seem like agency to the rationalizer" does not make sense to me, and is ambiguous. Do people rationalize that rationalization seems like agency? And do they rationalize that confabulation seem like agency? (Both of these seem quite odd).

But if I assume that's not what you mean, it still sounds odd (or at least off). Are you saying that to a researcher, rationalization and confabulation look like how agency works?

Yeah, my writing sucked there.

I meant to refer to this:

http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2008/04/14-03.html

Which shows, I think, that people make a decision before they are aware that they've made a decision.

My sucky sentence was trying to say that this doesn't have ramifications for the issue of Free Will as such, it only disproves that we know what we're thinking before we think it consciously.

Just because there's a machinery we're not aware of doesn't mean that we're robots--robots in the sense of limited machines with no self-modifying ability.

Rather, we're complicated self-modifying machines.

In principle, machines could be 'free' this way too--but they wouldn't be much like the simple machines we now think of.

Calling Pixy Misa.

You were right to challenge that. I was in a hurry.
 
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I don't think it's meaningful to even discuss free will outside of an abstract philosophical context. Our brain chemistry comes from a combination of genetics and experience modified by some physical factors such as nutrition as it affects neural development. It's a feedback loop of nature and nurture.

Can you usefully separate "you" from your brain chemistry? Speaking simply, your choices, your aversions, your identity, etc., flow from predilections based on the dynamic contents of your skull case. You are born with a personality and a basic set of biases, and this determines how you react to the world around you from day one.
 
"Any discussion that speaks of the brain as a 'set of deterministic principles' is philosophical, not neurological. It is a discussion of things 'in principle'--which is the only perspective from which our behaviour looks completely determined in advance."

I am sorry, but neurologically, there is *nothing* going on beyond physical and chemical reaction. To say the contrary is an article of faith. that a system is complex , self modifying, and learning, do not make it less based on physical and chemical property.

If you start to pretend there is something beyond the chemical reaction , well pelase tell us what it is and propose an experiment to falsify it.

The brain system is not fully deterministic since there is always some sort of fluctuation (temperature distribution of motion, or QM fluctuation) which even if starting with the iniatial state MIGHT make a few difference if neuron are near a trigger level, but beyond such random fluctuation the brain is as deterministic as it goes.

If you chose (haha) to call those random fluctuation free will , it is up to you. But it certainly is not what people define as free will.

So really, let us cut the chase, and let me ask you WHAT is the entity which make the "choice", you say we have, and WHERE is it located, and WHAT is its mode of function.

I meant to say that Dennett seems persuasive to me. That is, what we care about when we talk about free will is not the ultimate basis in physics and chemistry--which I don't dispute--but that we don't act like dolls or simple machines that are not aware of themselves. They seem absurd and incapable of modifying their own behaviour.

The confusion about 'what people define as free will' is precisely the point.

What people fear is being 'less free' in the mundane, non-philosophical sense.

That is, they fear coercion, pain, injury, brain damage, poverty, being beholden to others. They fear loss of 'autonomy' in the ordinary-language sense, not in some sense of ultimate principle.

I suck at philosophy, but Dennett makes sense to me. Up to a point. Beyond that, it gets too technical.

The entity that chooses is a whole brain-body operating in a culture, and its 'choices' are limited but real.
 
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I am sorry, but neurologically, there is *nothing* going on beyond physical and chemical reaction. To say the contrary is an article of faith. that a system is complex , self modifying, and learning, do not make it less based on physical and chemical property.
I agree that what happens in the brain is purely a set of chemical and physical interactions, however it does seem to me that the system that arises from these interactions is capable of incredibly complex things. You cannot change how a neuron works but what causes that particular neuron to spark as opposed to another? (I don't actually expect an answer to that) You can trace many thought processes backwards through competing values, previous experience etc I guess the gaps in understanding of that process might be where the sensation of making a choice resides. Free will as the god of gaps.

The brain system is not fully deterministic since there is always some sort of fluctuation (temperature distribution of motion, or QM fluctuation) which even if starting with the iniatial state MIGHT make a few difference if neuron are near a trigger level, but beyond such random fluctuation the brain is as deterministic as it goes.
Interesting, obviously I'm aware of how the brain is a physical process and is therefore influenced by physical process but I'd always thought of it in terms or nutrition, brain damage etc rather than such random effects but indeed there's no reason why they shouldn't (not sure how you'd prove quantum foam interference in the brain but an interesting thought!)

So really, let us cut the chase, and let me ask you WHAT is the entity which make the "choice", you say we have, and WHERE is it located, and WHAT is its mode of function.
My mind, in my skull as the sum of my brain, the last is perhaps harder, I'll think about that for a moment.
 
I don't think it's meaningful to even discuss free will outside of an abstract philosophical context. Our brain chemistry comes from a combination of genetics and experience modified by some physical factors such as nutrition as it affects neural development. It's a feedback loop of nature and nurture.

Can you usefully separate "you" from your brain chemistry? Speaking simply, your choices, your aversions, your identity, etc., flow from predilections based on the dynamic contents of your skull case. You are born with a personality and a basic set of biases, and this determines how you react to the world around you from day one.

I agree, mostly.

However, confusion or intermingling of philosophical, technical, psychological, and ordinary-language sense of our words is so common that we might as well address it.

Hello, I must be going. I cannot stay I came to say I must be going.
 
It's worth understanding that lack of determinism in no way leads to contra-causal free will, which after all is the kind of free will most people, who have not thought about it much, think they have, and want to have.

This interview is a pretty good introduction to the subject:

http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=9458

The guys @ Reasonable Doubts podcast have a couple of new shows on determinism and free will:

http://doubtreligion.blogspot.com/2010/06/rd-extra-jeremy-on-don-johnson-radio.html

http://doubtreligion.blogspot.com/2010/06/episode-69-determinator-4-rise-of.html

This is a great audio lecture precisely on the subject:

http://www.teach12.com/ttcx/coursedesclong2.aspx?cid=4235

The homepage of The Center for Naturalism:

http://www.centerfornaturalism.org/

And:

http://www.naturalism.org/

:)
 
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"but that we don't act like dolls or simple machines that are not aware of themselves. They seem absurd and incapable of modifying there own behaviour."

We are very complex machine. But only machine. Self aware machine. But still machine.
 
"but that we don't act like dolls or simple machines that are not aware of themselves. They seem absurd and incapable of modifying there own behaviour."

We are very complex machine. But only machine. Self aware machine. But still machine.

Agreed.

'Machines' used to mean something like looms, now it could mean computers of the future capable of passing a Turing test.

But they can't, as of 2010.
 
Thanks for the links Kuko 4000.
Aepervius - yep we are a machine but does being a machine preclude us from free will or does that self awareness provide us with an opportunity to to decide something apart from our programming?
 
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Here's an interesting article that attempts to dig into the "taxonomy" and mechanisms underlying the various feelings we have related to the topic of free will, which may be of assistance in getting a feel at what we're doing:
Pacherie [pdf]
I think simple digging into the mechanics of agency as Pacherie does is much more productive in terms of figuring out what's going on, than trying to chase down naive implications such as the pseudo-problem of "how the brain overcomes predeterminism".
 
Aepervius - yep we are a machine but does being a machine preclude us from free will or does that self awareness provide us with an opportunity to to decide something apart from our programming?


I realise this was not aimed at me, but we, as a whole, do make choices all the time, it's just that, all things equal, you couldn't have chosen differently at any point.

This means that the kind of free will many, if not most, people think they have, is an illusion.

This has serious implications on humanity and how we treat each other. I for one can't wait until we start using this understanding more and more for the benefit of our societies.
 
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Thanks for the reading material, working my way through it and those lectures do sound interesting once I can afford to get them. I've always understood that free will is far more limited than many think but I also (perhaps irrationally) cling to an ego based belief that we do have some free will. To not have any type of functional free will I have to admit is a highly disturbing idea to me, I may well be wrong of course and I'll just have to get used to the idea! Interesting stuff but I'm not yet convinced, I'll have to keep reading.
 
Aepervius - yep we are a machine but does being a machine preclude us from free will or does that self awareness provide us with an opportunity to to decide something apart from our programming?


How would we be able to tell which was the case?

If we look at the brain as being a machine for making decisions, governed by chemical reactions, then the laws of thermodynamics might imply that whatever decision is most energetically favoured will result, and that identical circumstances will give rise to identical decisions. But it isn't testable because the same circumstances cannot happen twice - quite apart from anything else, on a second occasion the results of the decision taken on the first occasion can be known.

We have no way of knowing whether we are compelled to make particular decisions. We're dealing with incredibly complicated sets of facts for any decision, including several decades of experience. My decision about whether to go to the pub this afternoon will depend on a number of conscious factors, such as what the weather is like, whether or not I fancy watching the Arsenal match that will be on the telly there (which will in turn partly depend on whether or not the test match I'm watching at home has finished), and the fact that they ran out of my favorite beer the other day and so may not have it on again yet. But it will also depend on all sorts of unconscious factors such as all of my conscious and unconscious memories relating to my home, the pub, and the journey between the two, or perhaps even whether a slight and undetected wrinkle in my underwear is making my chair marginally less comfortable to sit in and therefore making me less inclined to stay in it. If we're considering the thermodynamics of the chemical reactions in my brain, it will also depend on exactly what state my metabolism is in - we're dealing with a highly complex set of reactions that can be influenced by all sorts of factors. There is no way all of the factors involved in even the simplest decision could be controlled for.

Sorry if this has gone into the sorts of areas your O/P said you wanted to avoid in this thread, but your question had already gone there.
 
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