I'd like to hear stimulus critics respond to this. Japan went into deficit spending right away, recovery was swift and profound, transforming the Japanese economy in a positive way.
See post #375. And I'm a little shocked that you would call gearing up to invade an innocent neighboring country for economic gain "positive".
The Netherlands insisted against deficit spending and was hit brutally by a long depression.
Once again, you are missing the forest due to ideological trees.
As pointed out here,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression_in_the_Netherlands
the Netherland's refusal to drop the gold standard "plays a central role" in the length of their depression. As it states:
This subjected the Dutch economy to fierce foreign competition, forcing Dutch firms to strongly cut their costs in order to survive this situation. In the process wages and employment were cut, and the depression deepened. While the economic situation gradually improved in most industrialised countries around 1933-1934, the Great Depression was still getting worse in the Netherlands.
… snip …
When France finally decided to accept devaluation in 1936 the Netherlands had no choice but to follow. While the Netherlands had been so reluctant to drop the Gold Standard, it quickly brought an economic boost after years of decline. In 1936 the Dutch stock market started climbing again, trade slowly recovered and unemployment stopped growing [1].
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2005/12/the_gold_standa.html
Ben Bernanke and Harold James, in a paper called "The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison" published in 1991 … snip … noted that 13 other countries besides the U.K. had decided to abandon their currencies' gold parity in 1931. Bernanke and James' data for the average growth rate of industrial production for these countries (plotted in the top panel above) was positive in every year from 1932 on. Countries that stayed on gold, by contrast, experienced an average output decline of 15% in 1932. The U.S. abandoned gold in 1933, after which its dramatic recovery immediately began. The same happened after Italy dropped the gold standard in 1934, and for Belgium when it went off in 1935. On the other hand, the three countries that stuck with gold through 1936 (France, Netherlands, and Poland) saw a 6% drop in industrial production in 1935, while the rest of the world was experiencing solid growth.
So you see, maybe it had very little to do with stimulus spending. Maybe recovery had more to do with eliminating the gold standard? But how does that help us now? We aren't on a gold standard now, so why aren't we seeing any improvement in our economy after over a trillion dollars in porkulus? Could it be wrong headed and misguided Keynesian, socialist spending? Do you think?
Chile attempted austerity measures and is veiwed as one of the countries hardest hit by the depression.
Yes, Chile got hit hard by the depression. Because it's markets dried up. About 80 percent of government revenue came from exports of copper and nitrates, which simply weren't in demand during the recession. In fact, nitrate and copper production fell to about 12% of the 1929 levels. And no amount of stimulus spending was going to fix that so why bother trying it? Nor is any amount of devaluation of currency going to fix that (so even though Chile went off the gold standard in 1931, that didn't help).
A second reason it got hit hard by the Great Depression are the protectionist policies the government enacted during the depression. According to
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0717-68212003012100053&script=sci_arttext , the government, instead of letting the market work freely, intervened to a large and significant way. It created a rationing system for the limited availability of foreign exchange that became "a very inefficient and discretionary form of protectionism." As that source puts it, "These new instruments eventually acquired a life of their own, raising without consistency of any kind, effective protection and de-protection rates to extremely high levels and thereby distorting relative prices completely. As a result, the country was not able to take advantage of the significant exchange opportunities offered by the rest of the world … ."
And since you've decided to bring Chile into this debate, here's what a Chilean researcher has to say:
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/SR421.pdf
The Current Financial Crisis: What Should We Learn from the Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century?
… snip …
Studying the experience of countries that have experienced great depressions during the twentieth century teaches us that massive public interventions in the economy to maintain employment and investment during a financial crisis can, if they distort incentives enough, lead to a great depression. Those who try to justify the sorts of Keynesian policies implemented by the Mexican government in the 1980s and the Japanese government in the 1990s often quote Keynes’s dictum from A Tract on Monetary Reform: “The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.” Studying past great depressions turns this dictum on its head: “If we do not consider the consequences of policy for productivity, in the long run we could all be in a great depression.”
Look at Australia and New Zealand. Australia chucked out the strongest proponents of stimulus spending and had an agonizingly slow recovery.
Australia was another country that was extremely dependent on exports, so it's recovery was highly dependent on the rest of the world recovering first. That's again why going off the gold standard in 1931 didn't help whereas it helped other countries. Neither were the cuts in government spending that they tried in 1930 going to help because the root problem was no markets. But neither would increased government spending and debt really help. The country was already on the verge of defaulting on it's foreign debt. Even Obama is not recommending we stimulate to the point we default. Much of 1931 and 1932 in fact was spent in political chaos as various political factions vied for dominance. Being highly dependent on exports of wool, wheat and meat, and the government creating an uncertain climate internally, is the root reason why Australia didn't recover sooner than it did. Not lack of a stimulus. In fact, it began to recover (in 1933) as soon as the export market also began to recover and no sooner.
New Zealand voted in a labor Government in 1935 that heavily increased spending and raced to recovery while Australia still stagnated.
Finally, New Zealand, like Australia was also dependant on exports. And like Australia, it's economy also began to recover in 1933
as exports increased. There is nothing necessarily to suggest that a stimulus applied in 1935 speeded up that recovery. One could just as easily claim that it hindered what would have been and even better recovery.
Here, I'll let some New Zealanders speak:
http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/economic-history/7
During the depression there was much criticism of economic policy, which restricted government spending, devalued the currency, cut nominal wages and reduced interest rates and the value of mortgages. Subsequent assessments view these measures as broadly necessary, but suggest that the burden of adjustment could have been more fairly shared. The government was unable to prime the economy through deficit financing because monetary conditions were determined offshore.
… snip …
While the Labour government elected in 1935 was thought to have saved New Zealand from the great depression, the domestic and world recovery was under way before it took office.
See?