Obama's Katrina!

[eeyore1954]

Has 300 years of scienctific research supported the fact that additional information in an impact report will neccesarily give a different conclusion.

Additional information in any research does not always lead to different conclusions.

because you clearly don't want to.
In order to make your statement, you would have to think that knowing more about the well to be drilled, the exact location, the materials to be used, the construction strategy to be implemented wouldn't aide the person who writes an impact statement.

Do you actually believe this data adds no value to the impact assessment?

i believe it may aide the writer/writers but they still may come to the same conclusion.

 

[trvlr2]

That's a belief unsupported by 300 years of scientific research.

Now, wait a minute!

One thousand years of scientific research, would not make BAC change his conclusions!

Just sayin'

 

[joobz]

Has 300 years of scienctific research supported the fact that additional information in an impact report will neccesarily give a different conclusion.

Additional information in any research does not always lead to different conclusions.


i believe it may aide the writer/writers but they still may come to the same conclusion.

You are free to believe however you wish. As you haven't offered any reason to support your beliefs, my argument stands unchallenged.

 

[thaiboxerken]

Which is why Obama (and his supporters) used this perfectly reasonable "it's all Bush's fault" excuse 3,448 times so far in his presidency. That just shows you what reasonable men they are.

Facts are still facts, no matter how many times they are stated. This is not ALL Bush's fault, but the blueprint for this disaster was authored by his administration.

 

[AlBell]

please explain in the current instance of the oil spill how you can have less regulation and not result in poor regulation.

The reason for the impact waiver was a result of the 2007 report which claimed minimal shore impact from deep sea wells. A MORE regulated environment would have required further impact studies. A LESS regulated environment (the one we currently enacted) didn't require these studies.

if you really want to know the types of individuals who would be able to write impact statements?
Hydrogeologists
Oceanographers
environmental scientists
environmental engineers
Petroleum engineers

No geologists or geophysicists?

... you would have to think that knowing more about the well to be drilled, the exact location, the materials to be used, the construction strategy to be implemented wouldn't aide the person who writes an impact statement.

Do you actually believe this data adds no value to the impact assessment?

Unfortunately, when actually drilling, the well dictates both materials and construction strategy. Do I think BP did a professional job here? No.

A set of regulations that addessed this problem would be interesting to see.

You can't say that it is no longer low probability, but rather that it is unlikely to be low probability.

Any impact statement that contained all the foulups in a chain of events that led to the current situation would have concluded low probability. And the chance of this happening again is even lower, added regulations or not.

What do you consider "low"? How many wells need to be drilled without incident such that one occurence is still considered low?

That's a question for those who wrote the impact statement. Low to me would mean if a spill was to happen and weather patterns were normal, we wouldn't see the spill hit land. That isn't the case here.

The chain of events include:
Chance of a billion bbl + recoverable reserve with multiple payzones and capable of 100,000 + bopd production; slight chance.
Casing program failure; slight chance.
Cement failure; medium chance.
Cement bond log not run; won't be happening again.
Bad cement plugs; fair chance.
Personnel ignoring pressure test results; won't be happening again.
Offloading mud pits simultaneously with displacing riser with seawater; in the future inconceivable.
BOP failure; medium chance; BOPs will be redesigned, no govt regulations needed.

As to hitting land; how many scenarios do you want to see, and once you see them, then what?

 

[joobz]

No geologists or geophysicists?

Of course, them too.. Like I said, not sure your point here.

Unfortunately, when actually drilling, the well dictates both materials and construction strategy. Do I think BP did a professional job here? No.

A set of regulations that addessed this problem would be interesting to see.

I agree. I would like to see an actual capture and contain plan implemented, for starters.

Any impact statement that contained all the foulups in a chain of events that led to the current situation would have concluded low probability. And the chance of this happening again is even lower, added regulations or not.


The chain of events include:
Chance of a billion bbl + recoverable reserve with multiple payzones and capable of 100,000 + bopd production; slight chance.
Casing program failure; slight chance.
Cement failure; medium chance.
Cement bond log not run; won't be happening again.
Bad cement plugs; fair chance.
Personnel ignoring pressure test results; won't be happening again.
Offloading mud pits simultaneously with displacing riser with seawater; in the future inconceivable.
BOP failure; medium chance; BOPs will be redesigned, no govt regulations needed.

All of your "won't be happening again" statements are worthless unless you have proper oversight by a proper regulatory agency.

Sorry if I have less faith in the industry to correct its mistakes than you do.

As to hitting land; how many scenarios do you want to see, and once you see them, then what?

Depends. I would start by reassessing the models used to predict spill flows. clearly they were faulty.(assuming they did much to begin with).

 

[leftysergeant]

Unfortunately, when actually drilling, the well dictates both materials and construction strategy. Do I think BP did a professional job here? No.

This is exactly the problem that government regulations are supposed to address.

Cement bond log not run; won't be happening again.
Bad cement plugs; fair chance.
Personnel ignoring pressure test results; won't be happening again.
Offloading mud pits simultaneously with displacing riser with seawater; in the future inconceivable.
BOP failure; medium chance; BOPs will be redesigned, no govt regulations needed.

Given the typical behabvior of multi-national corporations and greedy schmuck CEOs, I find your positions here hard to defend.

 

[AlBell]

No geologists or geophysicists?

Of course, them too.. Like I said, not sure your point here.

That goes to estimating probable reserve size, reservoir characteristics and production rates.

Unfortunately, when actually drilling, the well dictates both materials and construction strategy. Do I think BP did a professional job here? No.

A set of regulations that addessed this problem would be interesting to see.

I agree. I would like to see an actual capture and contain plan implemented, for starters.

Having seen this scenario on paper, your choices would be "drill anyway" or "no more deepwater drilling". Would you have said "no drill" unless the probability of this occurence was greater than "low"?

Any impact statement that contained all the foulups in a chain of events that led to the current situation would have concluded low probability. And the chance of this happening again is even lower, added regulations or not.


The chain of events include:
Chance of a billion bbl + recoverable reserve with multiple payzones and capable of 100,000 + bopd production; slight chance.
Casing program failure; slight chance.
Cement failure; medium chance.
Cement bond log not run; won't be happening again.
Bad cement plugs; fair chance.
Personnel ignoring pressure test results; won't be happening again.
Offloading mud pits simultaneously with displacing riser with seawater; in the future inconceivable.
BOP failure; medium chance; BOPs will be redesigned, no govt regulations needed.

All of your "won't be happening again" statements are worthless unless you have proper oversight by a proper regulatory agency.

The proper regulatory agency depends in entirety on the workers betting their lives on the rig floor, and following good operating practice. It appears more and more likely good operating practice was ignored at several keys steps in this instance.

Sorry if I have less faith in the industry to correct its mistakes than you do.

We can agree to disagree. Would you have set up a NASA overview agency after the Challenger disaster? Experts were then, and are being now, tasked to understand the causes, yet NASA was the group capable of effecting needed changes, as is Big Oil in this case.

As to hitting land; how many scenarios do you want to see, and once you see them, then what?

Depends. I would start by reassessing the models used to predict spill flows. clearly they were faulty.(assuming they did much to begin with).

And I repeat: Having seen this scenario on paper, your choices would be "drill anyway" or "no more deepwater drilling". Would you have said "no drill" unless the probability of this occurence was greater than "low"?

 

[joobz]

That goes to estimating probable reserve size, reservoir characteristics and production rates.

I understand that. What I don't understand is why the list is important.

Having seen this scenario on paper, your choices would be "drill anyway" or "no more deepwater drilling". Would you have said "no drill" unless the probability of this occurence was greater than "low"?

false dichotomy. The third and forth choices are to get better data, or require evidence of existing clean up technologies for deep water drilling. There are always other choices.

The proper regulatory agency depends in entirety on the workers betting their lives on the rig floor, and following good operating practice. It appears more and more likely good operating practice was ignored at several keys steps in this instance.

Such was the culture that was allowed to develop.

We can agree to disagree. Would you have set up a NASA overview agency after the Challenger disaster? Experts were then, and are being now, tasked to understand the causes, yet NASA was the group capable of effecting needed changes, as is Big Oil in this case.

Difference is priorities. BP priorities are to profit. There is no reason to suspect that BP's priorities would change as a result of this accident. Unless, of course, there is a challenge to their profits.

Note, I do not think this is bad, it is the nature of business and is what it is.

And I repeat: Having seen this scenario on paper, your choices would be "drill anyway" or "no more deepwater drilling". Would you have said "no drill" unless the probability of this occurence was greater than "low"?

Asked and answered. Your false dichotomy is simply fallacious reasoning.

 

[AlBell]

I understand that. What I don't understand is why the list is important.

I thought you were interested in acquiring and analyzing data.

false dichotomy. The third and forth choices are to get better data,

i.e. don't drill

or require evidence of existing clean up technologies for deep water drilling.

i.e. don't drill

There are always other choices.

Nope. "Partial drilling" is like "slightly pregnant".

 

[trvlr2]

No geologists or geophysicists?

*snip*


The chain of events include:
Chance of a billion bbl + recoverable reserve with multiple payzones and capable of 100,000 + bopd production; slight chance.
Casing program failure; slight chance.
Cement failure; medium chance.
Cement bond log not run; won't be happening again.
Bad cement plugs; fair chance.
Personnel ignoring pressure test results; won't be happening again.
Offloading mud pits simultaneously with displacing riser with seawater; in the future inconceivable.
BOP failure; medium chance; BOPs will be redesigned, no govt regulations needed.

As to hitting land; how many scenarios do you want to see, and once you see them, then what?

I don't think your safety chain is composed correctly.
Breaking any link in a properly organized safety chain will negate the outcome. For instance, wire-logging in itself would have taken out a couple of your links. which would make that item a link(missing link).

Enforcing existing regulations is more important than drawing up a bunch of new, as the new will be hampered by the same lack of enforcement. And I don't mean fining the companies-withdrawing the work permits, stopping the work is much more effective, IMO. Unless you just want to be punitive.



As far as deep water spill containment is concerned, the most important part is where the oil hits the shoreline, and that is shallow water. Work in improving that area is necessary.

 

[joobz]

I thought you were interested in acquiring and analyzing data.

Follow the thread back. I kept asking over and over again why a list of experts matters to the discussion at hand. You have avoided this question.

i.e. don't drill

i.e. don't drill

Nope. "Partial drilling" is like "slightly pregnant".

I never said "partial drilling" did I? Indeed, you expose your inherent bias and unfoertunate dishonesty by trying to reframe my argument into something it isn't.


A better analogy is with biological safety levels used in lab research. When working with live cells/bacteria, you vary the protocols based upon the potentials risks involved.
WE have classifications for safety which vary from BSL1 to BSL4, with different protocols that are required within each level depending on what is to be done. None of those protocols prevents the work being done, they just mitigate the risk involved if needed. Impact assessments are there to define what level of safety needs to be met. the greater the risk, the greater safety precautions used. The impact assessment failed because clearly it was wrong. And that is what gave BP credence to work with protocols that were suboptimum. Coupled this with the fact that the crews were operating at even less safe conditions than what was expected is even more of a problem. Being in charge of a lab, I know for a fact that my lab only works as safe as I expect them to. If I do not enforce protocols, they will not be done. The responsibility lies on my shoulders.

 

[jnelso99]

i.e. don't drill

i.e. don't drill

Nope. "Partial drilling" is like "slightly pregnant".

You seem to be conflating "don't drill ever" with "don't drill yet".

 

[BeAChooser]

http://www.mms.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS/Chapter4A-BImpactsProposedAction.pdf

LOL!

First, that document doesn't dispute any of the concerns or facts that were noted in the summary (from an MMS employee, btw) that I linked.

Second, the portions of the report you quoted all reflect the environmental consequences from "routine" operations and very minor spill scenarios. The volume of the spills resulting from the "accident" categories mentioned … rather than the event that actually occurred … are tiny in comparison. It's no wonder the report would conclude that those spills would be unlikely to cause serious problems or even reach land.

Third, the statement you quoted and emphasized as "MOST IMPORTANT", namely

The likelihood of a large spill resulting in heavy oiling of a barrier beach area is expected to be low, however, because 75 percent of the development associated with the 2007-2012 program is assumed to occur far from the coast in deep and ultradeep water.

should never have been taken as a blanket waiver of environmental effects. Because there are no calculations or sources given to support the claim. None whatsoever. What do they mean by a "low" likelihood, joobz? Is it 0.1% probability per year? 1%? 10%? You don't know. And it's important to properly assess the risk and consequences. And what accident scenario and spill size is being assumed? They don't say and it makes a huge difference in the outcome and seriousness of even very low probability accidents. The truth is that they weren't talking about the type of accident that occurred. They didn't look at it even though it's admitted the such accidents have occurred over the years. Even though in another section of the report they noted that

A given oil spill may be a relatively low-probability event, but the long run probability of at least one spill occurring is quite high.

And if the consequences of that spill are high (as in the current scenario), it's prudent to prepare accordingly. To have the resources available to deal with the eventuality. Especially after having experienced something like the Exxon Valdez. But Obama did not. His MMS was derelict.

And fourth, the website where the full report is posted starts off by stating

http://www.mms.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS.htm

This final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) analyzes potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts associated with the 2007-2012 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program. The analyses in this programmatic EIS adopt a broad regional perspective; more detailed and geographically focused analyses will be done as the Program progresses from the planning to the leasing to the exploration and development stages.

So here's a question for you, joobz. Did more detailed analyses occur? If so, what did they assume and conclude (and please link them)? And if not, why didn't they occur?

And note the qualifications from one of the preamble documents in the report you cite:

http://www.mms.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS/Intro.pdf

Major advancements in drilling and production technology have been made in recent years, reducing the risk of oil spills from OCS operations. Nevertheless, concerns remain that OCS oil spills will occur and result in unacceptable impacts on the environment. We cannot predict with certainty whether oil spills will occur, where they may occur, or how severe they may be.

… snip …

Although the likelihood of oil-spill occurrence can be estimated using oil production estimates and observed spill rates, predicting the degree to which a particular environmental resource would be affected by spilled oil requires a knowledge of where, when, and under what environmental conditions spills might occur. The potential consequences of an oil spill depend on many variable circumstances that are unpredictable. However, if a large oil spill were to occur and contact sensitive resources, significant impacts could result.

… snip …

While this analysis provides the Secretary of the USDOI with information about the potential impacts if spills were to occur and contact environmental resources, we are not predicting whether, when, or where specific oil spills will occur or whether they will contact environmental resources.

How one could decide this document was enough for a blanket waiver, given the above caveats, is simply astounding. Especially when the same document contains the statement:

As the program progresses, EIS’s or environmental assessments (EA’s) will be done for lease sales in specific planning areas. Should leasing lead to exploration and development, MMS will prepare additional site-specific NEPA analyses for offshore activities including exploration, development, pipeline installation, and platform decommissioning. As the program moves through its initial planning phase into leasing and then exploration and production, the geographic scope of the NEPA analyses will become more focused and detailed.

So again I ask, joobz? Did such more detailed analyses ever occur? Or did Obama's MMS just waive them?

And what specific consideration of blowout scenarios did the 2007 report (or later more detailed studies) have? Hmmmmmm? Especially considering that the MMS was warned in September of 2009 about the environmental danger posed by a deepwater blowout. Especially considering the fact that there had already been 38 deepwater blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico during the period from 1992 to 2006. How could any responsible organization have dismissed this major threat to the environment to quickly? Hmmmmmm?

 

[joobz]

So again I ask, joobz? Did such more detailed analyses ever occur? Or did Obama's MMS just waive them?

I haven't seen more detailed reports. and it seems the MMS waived them.

I'm glad to see, though, that you agree more regulation was needed and that substandard regulation results in problems.

Indeed, it seems you now believe that the free market isn't capable of self-regulating. It's a good sign that you are aligning yourself with reality.



What is interesting is Obama has even stated what was obvious to me and anyone aware of the issue:
ttp://www.politico.com/news/satories/0610/38447.html

“I think it’s fair to say, if six months ago, before this spill had happened, I had gone up to Congress and I had said we need to crack down a lot harder on oil companies and we need to spend more money on technology to respond in case of a catastrophic spill, there are folks up there, who will not be named, who would have said this is classic, big-government overregulation and wasteful spending.”

and

“Some of the same folks who have been hollering and saying ‘do something’ are the same folks who, just two or three months ago, were suggesting that government needs to stop doing so much,” Obama said. “Some of the same people who are saying the president needs to show leadership and solve this problem are some of the same folks who, just a few months ago, were saying this guy is trying to engineer a takeover of our society through the federal government that is going to restrict our freedoms.”

Yup. This is a classic example of what goes wrong when one government gives business to much freedom. The fact that Obama had a part in the problem doesn't diminish this fact. Indeed, it contradicts the entire "Obama is evil socialist" matra of so many liberals.

He gave Big oil a chance to do right by the american people, and they failed.
Imagine that.

 

[BeAChooser]

Evacuate a whole city on school buses? Right.

No one suggested that. But using school buses to evacuate those with no cars isn't at all unreasonable. This

http://911review.org/Hurricane_Katrina/img/Flooded_New_Orleans_school_buses.jpg

was criminal negligence on Nagin's part, lefty.

Blanco says she submitted requests long before landfall.

You are wrong. Landfall was on August 29th. Blanco declared a state of emergency on August 26th. Following that declaration, federal troops were deployed to coordinate with FEMA. On August 27th Blanco sent Bush a letter asking him to declare Louisiana a disaster area. He immediately did. That night the National Hurricane Center briefed Bush, Blanco, Barbour and Nagin on what they could expect. Blanco and Nagin were aware as early as August 27th that thousands of people in New Orleans had no way to evacuate. So when on August 28th, Nagin declared a mandatory evacuation, they should have addressed this. Following that declaration, Blanco stated that Bush called before Nagin's press conference and asked her to insure there would be a mandatory evacuation. But there wasn't. Instead, they let people with no cars simply overwhelm the supplies that FEMA delivered to the Superdome. Finally, in the afternoon of August 29th (after landfall), Blanco ordered 68 school buses to New Orleans from surrounding areas to evacuate survivors. Too little too late. On August 30, seeing that the levees could not be plugged, Blanco ordered a total evacuation, including the Superdome, sending in hundreds of buses from outside New Orleans. Those buses successfully evacuated everyone in the Superdome by September 1st. Too bad she and Nagin didn't do that in the days BEFORE landfall, after they'd already been told that collapse of the levees and major flooding was likely to occur.

Just make BP do a good environmental impact analysis (as required by law), have an emergency response plan in place to handle the eventualities (and the material needed to impliment it), properly test the equipment that was to be used, and follow proven standards as far as materials instead of cost cutting. And most likely this oil disaster would never have happened. … snip …

You assume that these things had not been signed off on by MMS before Obama took office.

I don't "assume" anything, lefty. It's a FACT that they weren't. The decisions were made and signed off by the director Obama appointed. (Which, by the way, is why she's now gone.)

With everything else he has had to deal with, he had hardly had time to investigate whether the people at MMS could find their butts with both hands and a flashlight.

Where does the buck stop, lefty?

 

[BeAChooser]

This is not ALL Bush's fault, but the blueprint for this disaster was authored by his administration.

Katrina was even less Bush's fault, yet democrats were quick to assign him all the blame and even call for his impeachment over it.

Which is why it's entirely appropriate to label this Obama's Katrina.

 

[joobz]

Katrina was even less Bush's fault, yet democrats were quick to assign him all the blame and even call for his impeachment over it.

Which is why it's entirely appropriate to label this Obama's Katrina.

This is why Bush's Katrina is Bush's fault.

To claim that FEMA was doing "heck of a job" when it clearly wasn't is a sign of being 100% detached from reality.

 

[BeAChooser]

more regulation was needed and that substandard regulation results in problems.

That's false. More regulation wasn't needed. Obama and the government only needed to enforce the regulations that were already inplace to have avoided this catastrophe. They only needed to show a modicum of competence in their own analysis. No amount of additional regulation would have mattered if all the Obama administration was going to do was waive it like they did over and over.

 

[BeAChooser]

To claim that FEMA was doing "heck of a job" when it clearly wasn't is a sign of being 100% detached from reality.

For Obama loyalists to claim that the current catastrophe is all Bush's and BP's fault, and that Obama deserves none of the blame, is what is 100% detached from reality.