Consciousness is thermodynamically acausal

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I need some help understanding the idea that consciousness could be thermodynamically acausal. Check out this video of Gerald Edelman:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lp3LEGcHsPo

At 4:38 he talks about consciousness being a process and thus thermodynamically acausal, an epiphenomenon. He places the causality with the neural clusters. Elsewhere he has compared consciousness to the whistle of a train.

Could the physicists here help me understand this?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here is Edelman writing on the subject. Back up to the beginning of the chapter.

http://books.google.com/books?id=-j...&resnum=2&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false

~~ Paul

 

[Ziggurat]

I need some help understanding the idea that consciousness could be thermodynamically acausal.

I need help understanding what the hell this term means. He seems to be using the term "causal" to mean something different than what I'm used to it meaning in the context of physics (particularly his comment about hemoglobin's color and "causes" versus "entails", around the 6:00 mark).

 

[blobru]

Not a physicist, but I understand him to be saying that consciousness can't be modeled thermodynamically. Though the wave_length of light that produces an experience of red isn't irrelevant to thermodynamics, the experience is; that is, the experience of red is strictly an effect, a so-called "epiphenomenon^WP", and irrelevant, as a cause, within any thermodynamic system, any cluster of neurophysiological events, one might map it to.

Standard claim made by epiphenomenalists [such as Edelman?], I think.

 

[Dancing David]

Sounds like philosophy and magic words.

 

[sol invictus]

I need some help understanding the idea that consciousness could be thermodynamically acausal. Check out this video of Gerald Edelman:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lp3LEGcHsPo

At 4:38 he talks about consciousness being a process and thus thermodynamically acausal, an epiphenomenon. He places the causality with the neural clusters. Elsewhere he has compared consciousness to the whistle of a train.

Could the physicists here help me understand this?

~~ Paul

Defecation is also "thermodynamically acasual".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, defecation warms up the toilet bowl water.

It has something to do with consciousness being a process, but I really don't understand it.

~~ Paul

 

[Alferd_Packer]

Q: Is Heidegger's cat conscious or unconscious?

A: Neither, as long as Schrodinger's cat exists in limbo.

 

[Bikewer]

So "consciousness" is a process which should therefore cause some sort of thermodynamic effect but which doesn't therefore it doesn't exist? Or something like that?

Perhaps a biology text would be in order. The body's various processes produce heat which is expended by the body's thermal regulation systems which are amazingly efficient...

I'm inclined to agree with the "philosophy and magic words" ....

 

[Psi Baba]

I wonder if it's along the lines of:
If I decide to have a thought about something, what is the cause of that thought? Is it the decision to have it? What is the cause of the decision? Is it a desire to make the decision? What is the cause of the desire? And so on.

 

[Alferd_Packer]

Let me try this once again.

Consciousness is not a thermodynamic process. It is quantum mechanical.

As long as Heidegger’s cat is unconscious, Schrödinger’s cat exists in limbo, neither alive or dead. But, once Heidegger’s cat wakes up and decides to check in on Schrodie, he will find either a dead cat or a live cat. Even if Hiedie ignored the box in which Schrödinger’s cat is imprisoned, the mere fact that he is conscious has decided his fate.

But, you say, what if Heidegger’s cat didn’t exist? Is there a consciousness present? (well, yes, Schrödinger’s cat, that is the basic flaw in the argument, since the cat is able to observe whether he is alive or dead) Ignoring Schrödinger’s cat, is there a consciousness that would collapse the wave form into actuality? Yes, the electron. The electron choses it’s path, thus it is conscious.

Or something like that.

 

[sol invictus]

No, defecation warms up the toilet bowl water.

Consciousness warms up your skull. What's your point?

It has something to do with consciousness being a process, but I really don't understand it.

Defecation is a process.

Look - "thermodynamically acausal" is not standard physics terminology. The most reasonable meaning I can assign to it is that it means that consciousness cannot be predicted thermodynamically - that is, that one could not conclude from the laws of thermodynamics that a given being is conscious, or that consciousness would evolve. That's probably true, because consciousness isn't an equilibrium process, and thermodynamics isn't very useful for non-equilibrium processes. But exactly the same holds for life in general, stellar dynamics (over long time scales at least), rain.... and defecation.

 

[sol invictus]

Let me try this once again.

Consciousness is not a thermodynamic process. It is quantum mechanical.

As long as Heidegger’s cat is unconscious, Schrödinger’s cat exists in limbo, neither alive or dead. But, once Heidegger’s cat wakes up and decides to check in on Schrodie, he will find either a dead cat or a live cat. Even if Hiedie ignored the box in which Schrödinger’s cat is imprisoned, the mere fact that he is conscious has decided his fate.

But, you say, what if Heidegger’s cat didn’t exist? Is there a consciousness present? (well, yes, Schrödinger’s cat, that is the basic flaw in the argument, since the cat is able to observe whether he is alive or dead) Ignoring Schrödinger’s cat, is there a consciousness that would collapse the wave form into actuality? Yes, the electron. The electron choses it’s path, thus it is conscious.

Or something like that.

Before I demolish it mercilessly - is that a summary of Edelman's argument, or your own view?

 

[quarky]

I'll admit:

I was pulled in by the thread title, and obligated to make an appearance.

In quarky's single quark hypothesis, (not "even wrong; now go away" Complexity), this can be explained by the singularity's exemption from the laws that were developed after it had its little "hissy fit".

Hopefully, no further explanation will be desired or required.
Going "on and on" is not one of my most endearing features.

 

[Alferd_Packer]

Before I demolish it mercilessly - is that a summary of Edelman's argument, or your own view?

Just something I made up while wasting time.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Consciousness warms up your skull. What's your point?

That's not what Edelman is proposing. Neural processing warms up the skull. He thinks that phenomenal experience is an epiphenomenon of that processing.

Look - "thermodynamically acausal" is not standard physics terminology. The most reasonable meaning I can assign to it is that it means that consciousness cannot be predicted thermodynamically - that is, that one could not conclude from the laws of thermodynamics that a given being is conscious, or that consciousness would evolve. That's probably true, because consciousness isn't an equilibrium process, and thermodynamics isn't very useful for non-equilibrium processes. But exactly the same holds for life in general, stellar dynamics (over long time scales at least), rain.... and defecation.

Check out the chapter I linked in my second post. In there he doesn't refer to thermodynamics. He just says "... I would not designate any mental event as directly causal, for it is a relationship and cannot exert a physical force." I don't know what it means for an event to be a relationship, nor do I know what "directly causal" means.

However, I would not blow this guy off just because of our confusions. At least not so far.

Perhaps a biology text would be in order. The body's various processes produce heat which is expended by the body's thermal regulation systems which are amazingly efficient...

You have to understand what he's referring to as phenomenal experience. He's not arguing with the biology of neurons.

~~ Paul

 

[Wudang]

He just says "... I would not designate any mental event as directly causal, for it is a relationship and cannot exert a physical force."

Is that not just a restatement of Cartesian dualism? No point of contact between the extended and unextended?

(and so hard not to slip in the Python reference)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not a physicist, but I understand him to be saying that consciousness can't be modeled thermodynamically. Though the wave_length of light that produces an experience of red isn't irrelevant to thermodynamics, the experience is; that is, the experience of red is strictly an effect, a so-called "epiphenomenonWP", and irrelevant, as a cause, within any thermodynamic system, any cluster of neurophysiological events, one might map it to.

This is how I understand him, too.

Which brings up the interesting question: How did we evolve to speak of phenomenal experience when the experience itself is epiphenomenal? This requires some very interesting speculation about the evolutionary purpose of the brain's representations of self, non-self, knowledge of self-representation, emotion, etc. All these things had to evolve zombie-like to allow us to speak of phenomenal experience without it having any effect on the content of our speech.

For example, we evolved to say:

My experience of the redness quale is indirectly related to the wavelength of red light.

Without the experience of redness having any selective advantage whatsoever, nor having any effect on the content of the statement.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: So there must be some evolutionary advantage to representing the "experience of red" even without the experience being causal.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Is that not just a restatement of Cartesian dualism? No point of contact between the extended and unextended?

It's not substance dualism. If he is really talking about philosophical epiphenomenalism, then that's property dualism. But maybe he's really talking about a form of predicate dualism (mental events can't be described in terms of physical predicates).

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Here is a description of his neurophysiological ideas. The writer thinks this makes him a property dualist:

http://consciousness2007.tripod.com/gerald_edelman.htm

 

[sol invictus]

That's not what Edelman is proposing. Neural processing warms up the skull. He thinks that phenomenal experience is an epiphenomenon of that processing.

That sounds like empty semantics to me. And if it's an "epiphenomenon" (whatever that is), why would one expect to be able to apply physics to it?

Check out the chapter I linked in my second post. In there he doesn't refer to thermodynamics. He just says "... I would not designate any mental event as directly causal, for it is a relationship and cannot exert a physical force."

That just sounds wrong. Why can't mental events exert physical forces? They involve electrical and chemical impulses, both of which can exert forces. And if it's again a question of philosophical semantics - if "mental event" is supposed to be something separate from the physical process it corresponds to - why would you expect to be able to apply thermodynamics to it? Is justice thermodynamically acausal too?

ETA:

Edited to add: Here is a description of his neurophysiological ideas. The writer thinks this makes him a property dualist:

http://consciousness2007.tripod.com/gerald_edelman.htm

According to that link: "Edelman argues that mind and consciousness are wholly material and purely biological phenomena which occur as highly complex cellular processes within the brain."

If so, one should be able to apply standard physics to it, and then I think my objections are quite pertinent.

What makes consciousness inherently different from defecation, apart from its complexity?