What is your excuse for killing animals?

[Marcus]

This is at the core of the argument and it's no coincidence that we keep going back at this issue over and over and over and over again.

Basically, if the argument is: "Killing animals is wrong, because they suffer. The ones that don't suffer don't count", then all is settled as long as we make sure we kill the animal fast enough so that they don't suffer.

And following this same line of reasoning, killing humans would be ok too as long as we do it in a way that they don't suffer.

So the whole "It's only wrong because they suffer" argument is simply plain bull.

I agree. I pointed out to Frank Merton that there would be no point to having kids using his logic, after all, they are bound to suffer at some point. Since the animals may suffer at some point, he would prefer that they never get to live.

 

[BTMO]

Can't talk - packing back for duck shooting. Got two deer last weekend. Fishing next weekend.

 

[Mirrorglass]

This is at the core of the argument and it's no coincidence that we keep going back at this issue over and over and over and over again.

Basically, if the argument is: "Killing animals is wrong, because they suffer. The ones that don't suffer don't count", then all is settled as long as we make sure we kill the animal fast enough so that they don't suffer.

And following this same line of reasoning, killing humans would be ok too as long as we do it in a way that they don't suffer.

So the whole "It's only wrong because they suffer" argument is simply plain bull.

Bolding mine.


See, this is where I have a problem. This line of reasoning is simply fallacious. Let me try and see if I can explain why.

The line of reasoning is basically as follows:

Premise 1: Making animals suffer is wrong.
Premise 2: If an animal is killed quickly, it doesn't suffer.
Conclusion 1: Killing animals quickly isn't morally wrong.

Now that's all well and good. But then you strap on another conclusion:

Conclusion 2: Killing humans quickly isn't morally wrong either.

That's total non-sequitur. It doesn't follow from the premises at all. This conclusion can only be drawn if we also assume a third premise:

Premise 3: Moral considerations involving humans are identical to those involving animals.

No meat-eater accepts this third premise. We've stated repeatedly that we believe killing humans is wrong because they're humans. There have been more complex explanations, but that's always the gist of the idea. Humans are special. As such, it's simply wrong to draw the conclusion that killing humans painlessly is okay.


What you should realize is the "it's only wrong because they suffer" argument is never presented as a reason for eating meat. It only comes up when the vegan side claims a meat-eater has to also accept animal torture for no reason or his views are morally inconsistent. The point about suffering illustrates why this is not the case.

Basically: I don't care about a farm animal's right to live. I do care about a human's right to live. I also care about the suffering of a farm animal, although it's for mostly selfish reasons. The conclusions drawn from that make me a normal member of society, kind to humans and animals (to a degree), but with no aversion to eating meat.

And no, you can't draw an additional conclusion like "I must also condone bullfighting" or "I should also eat retarded babies" without assuming a new premise, and a false one at that.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Bolding mine.


See, this is where I have a problem. This line of reasoning is simply fallacious. Let me try and see if I can explain why.

The line of reasoning is basically as follows:

Premise 1: Making animals suffer is wrong.
Premise 2: If an animal is killed quickly, it doesn't suffer.
Conclusion 1: Killing animals quickly isn't morally wrong.

Now that's all well and good. But then you strap on another conclusion:

Conclusion 2: Killing humans quickly isn't morally wrong either.

That's total non-sequitur. It doesn't follow from the premises at all. This conclusion can only be drawn if we also assume a third premise:

Premise 3: Moral considerations involving humans are identical to those involving animals.

No meat-eater accepts this third premise. We've stated repeatedly that we believe killing humans is wrong because they're humans. There have been more complex explanations, but that's always the gist of the idea. Humans are special. As such, it's simply wrong to draw the conclusion that killing humans painlessly is okay.


What you should realize is the "it's only wrong because they suffer" argument is never presented as a reason for eating meat. It only comes up when the vegan side claims a meat-eater has to also accept animal torture for no reason or his views are morally inconsistent. The point about suffering illustrates why this is not the case.

Basically: I don't care about a farm animal's right to live. I do care about a human's right to live. I also care about the suffering of a farm animal, although it's for mostly selfish reasons. The conclusions drawn from that make me a normal member of society, kind to humans and animals (to a degree), but with no aversion to eating meat.

And no, you can't draw an additional conclusion like "I must also condone bullfighting" or "I should also eat retarded babies" without assuming a new premise, and a false one at that.

Hold it, hooold it. You forget I'm speaking as a Devil's Advocate of the Vegan's Argument. Hold your horses there.

The only reason I jump to the third premise is because that's what Vegans do whenever meat eaters present their excuse for killing animals. Basically it goes like this:

Vegan: What's your excuse for killing animals?
Meat eater: I'm hungry
Vegan: So what if I was hungry and decided to kill you and eat you? Would that be ok?
Meat eater: Oh I see. You're assuming that the "moral rights" we humans created apply equally to animals and humans. Fair enough, then let me ask you this: If the reason killing animals is wrong is because they suffer, and moral rights apply equally to animals and humans (since you've jumped to the conclusion that killing a cow is the same as killing a human), then as long as the creature in question doesn't suffer, we can kill ANYTHING. Animal or human.


That's the argument I'm putting forward.

Let me restate once again: Moral rights apply to the humans who created them. We do not project them unto nature and claim that we speak in its name (unless we happen to be extremely arrogant).

 

[Mirrorglass]

Hold it, hooold it. You forget I'm speaking as a Devil's Advocate of the Vegan's Argument. Hold your horses there.

The only reason I jump to the third premise is because that's what Vegans do whenever meat eaters present their excuse for killing animals. Basically it goes like this:

Vegan: What's your excuse for killing animals?
Meat eater: I'm hungry
Vegan: So what if I was hungry and decided to kill you and eat you? Would that be ok?
Meat eater: Oh I see. You're assuming that the "moral rights" we humans created apply equally to animals and humans. Fair enough, then let me ask you this: If the reason killing animals is wrong is because they suffer, and moral rights apply equally to animals and humans (since you've jumped to the conclusion that killing a cow is the same as killing a human), then as long as the creature in question doesn't suffer, we can kill ANYTHING. Animal or human.


That's the argument I'm putting forward.

Let me restate once again: Moral rights apply to the humans who created them. We do not project them unto nature and claim that we speak in its name (unless we happen to be extremely arrogant).

Oh, sorry about that. The thread has been going on so long, I forget who was making what point. Carry on.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Vegan: What's your excuse for killing animals?
Meat eater: I'm hungry
Vegan: So what if I was hungry and decided to kill you and eat you? Would that be ok?
Meat eater: Oh I see. You're assuming that the "moral rights" we humans created apply equally to animals and humans. Fair enough, then let me ask you this: If the reason killing animals is wrong is because they suffer, and moral rights apply equally to animals and humans (since you've jumped to the conclusion that killing a cow is the same as killing a human), then as long as the creature in question doesn't suffer, we can kill ANYTHING. Animal or human.

This is a false dichotomy with a bonus straw man.

You're trying to present us with a choice between two theses:

1. Humans and animals are exactly the same. Morally, humans and animals must be treated identically. (This is your straw man version of veganism).
2. Humans and animals are different. Morally, this means that there is no possible inconsistency in treating animals differently to humans, no matter what we do to animals. As long as we treat humans consistently and animals consistently, we cannot be morally criticised.

The actual utilitarian animal rights position is neither of the above. It is:

3. You should have a consistent set of objective and morally relevant criteria for what makes an entity morally important, and apply them to all entities regardless of species.

Thesis 3 is not by itself a moral panacea, by any means. For example a person who adhered to Thesis 3 could consistently hunt deer for sport and hunt mentally disabled people for sport - or "to prevent them from suffering, because preventing them from suffering by other means is too difficult". Peter Singer holds that it's more moral to be nice to animals and the mentally disabled, but that doesn't immediately follow from (3) above.

 

[volatile]

The actual utilitarian animal rights position is neither of the above.

Which you, and I, and Cain, and Mimblethrax, have explained time and time again.

Which is why I gave up.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

This is a false dichotomy with a bonus straw man.

You're trying to present us with a choice between two theses:

1. Humans and animals are exactly the same. Morally, humans and animals must be treated identically. (This is your straw man version of veganism).
2. Humans and animals are different. Morally, this means that there is no possible inconsistency in treating animals differently to humans, no matter what we do to animals. As long as we treat humans consistently and animals consistently, we cannot be morally criticised.

The actual utilitarian animal rights position is neither of the above. It is:

3. You should have a consistent set of objective and morally relevant criteria for what makes an entity morally important, and apply them to all entities regardless of species.

I don't get it Kevin, and I'm seriously trying here. You see, Number 3 sounds basically like number 1, specifically the "and apply them to all entities regardless of species" part. That's basically saying that the moral treatment should apply to ALL LIVING CREATURES. In other words, what Number 1 is claiming: That Humans and Animals are identically the same.

Thesis 3 is not by itself a moral panacea, by any means. For example a person who adhered to Thesis 3 could consistently hunt deer for sport and hunt mentally disabled people for sport - or "to prevent them from suffering, because preventing them from suffering by other means is too difficult". Peter Singer holds that it's more moral to be nice to animals and the mentally disabled, but that doesn't immediately follow from (3) above.

That was just confusing, sorry. What the hell does "being nice to animals" mean? How do you measure that? And how is that relevant? What about treating them nice while killing them? Does that count?


All I know is that your justification for killing some animals, such as insects, is that "they don't suffer". If your only concern about the killing of animals is their suffering, then everything should be ok as long as we kill them in a quick painless way. If I'm wrong, then surely your criteria doesn't limit itself to "it's immoral because they suffer", right? What is it then? What's your criteria for determining when it is ok to kill some living entities and when it isn't? And I sure hope it's not just because you like the cute ones and don't care about the ugly ones.

 

[Cavemonster]

The actual utilitarian animal rights position is neither of the above. It is:

3. You should have a consistent set of objective and morally relevant criteria for what makes an entity morally important, and apply them to all entities regardless of species.

Okay, here are my relevant criteria

1) The ability to react to my behavior, both positively and negatively, both in the long or short term and by doing so be a significant help or hindrance to my personal goals and safety.

2) The active protection of entities with the above quality (driven by emotional attachment or utility).

3) My visceral sympathy, by which i mean that harming them would be emotionally harmful to me.

Any thing that possesses one of these qualities, i have reason to refrain from harming. It includes all humans, pets, and some inanimate objects like cars and plants.

If I harm a human, they can remember that harm and seek me out for punishment, either directly or through an intermediary, like the law. If I help a human, they can reward me or cooperate with me and greatly increase my ability to acheive my aims.

Babies don't have that agency, nor do the severely mentally handicapped, but they do have the second quality, the empathy of their family members and communities, the protection of the law, and ultimately, the third quality, a visceral emotional response from me. Some animals have these protections, so does some inanimate property for that matter.

If I kill the neighbor's dog, I harm my own place in the community because that dog has the protection of a human agent. If I order a steak, I don't risk significant negative reactions from agents with quality #1. The cow's family won't come to get me, the farmer who raised the cow won't call the cops. I'm not missing out on the cow offering me a job, or introducing me to his hot cousin.

A society is possible where animals broadly have the protection of human agents, in that case, it would be very disadvantageous, for instance to eat a steak in certain parts of India. As long as humans around me don't offer animals that protection though, I have no reason to accord them rights, unless i felt emotionally driven to and it would harm me emotionally to see them harmed.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don't get it Kevin, and I'm seriously trying here. You see, Number 3 sounds basically like number 1, specifically the "and apply them to all entities regardless of species" part. That's basically saying that the moral treatment should apply to ALL LIVING CREATURES. In other words, what Number 1 is claiming: That Humans and Animals are identically the same.

Okay. Look, read (1) and (3) again. Can you conceive of any circumstances in which the behaviour of someone who follows (1) would be different to the behaviour of someone who follows (3)?

Or to put it another way, can you conceive of any morally relevant criteria for moral importance, under which a mouse might score lower than a human?

If you can't, I don't know what's wrong with you but I don't think I can fix it. If you can, you should be able to work out from there what the difference between (1) and (3) is.

That was just confusing, sorry. What the hell does "being nice to animals" mean? How do you measure that? And how is that relevant? What about treating them nice while killing them? Does that count?

Once again I struggle to see how you can be having difficulty grasping this after repeated explanations.

Peter Singer would have us spend time and money to see that seriously intellectually disabled people are well-treated, and thinks they should not be killed for sport or raised in inhumane conditions for meat. Peter Singer would have us spend time and money to see that animals are well-treated, and thinks they should not be killed for sport or raised in inhumane conditions for meat. He sees the two cases as morally identical, assuming that the intellectually disabled persons in question have mental lives roughly comparable to that of a deer.

All I know is that your justification for killing some animals, such as insects, is that "they don't suffer". If your only concern about the killing of animals is their suffering, then everything should be ok as long as we kill them in a quick painless way. If I'm wrong, then surely your criteria doesn't limit itself to "it's immoral because they suffer", right? What is it then? What's your criteria for determining when it is ok to kill some living entities and when it isn't?

Suffering is a big part of the issue, certainly, and if you acknowledge that as being a significant issue then there are immediately questions to be answered about the morality of eating meat that comes from feedlots and battery farms. If you wanted to call yourself a moral being you'd be in immediate need of an answer the question of what your excuse for eating such produce was.

If you could completely eliminate suffering from the meat production process that would completely eliminate one source of moral concern.

Another source of concern is whether there are moral reasons not to end lives lightly, or for trivial reasons like taste preference. You seem to have the idea that it's not okay to go around killing adult humans for trivial reasons as long as you do it painlessly, and it's a very popular idea to be sure. So there must be more to the moral question of life and death than just the suffering caused by killing - otherwise it would be silly to punish someone more harshly for painlessly murdering someone than you would punish them for breaking someone's arm (without anaesthetic).

Possibly relevant, depending on your point of view, is whether it's a moral use of our global luxury budget to raise animals and then kill them for meat, when there are other luxuries we could have instead that don't involve directly killing things.

And I sure hope it's not just because you like the cute ones and don't care about the ugly ones.

Interesting you should say that, because here comes Cavemonster...

Okay, here are my relevant criteria

1) The ability to react to my behavior, both positively and negatively, both in the long or short term and by doing so be a significant help or hindrance to my personal goals and safety.

2) The active protection of entities with the above quality (driven by emotional attachment or utility).

3) My visceral sympathy, by which i mean that harming them would be emotionally harmful to me.

...with some irrelevant criteria including the cuteness provision.

(1) is not morally relevant. Suppose I was a God-like being who was so powerful that humanity could not ever be a significant help or hindrance to my personal goals and safety: Does it seem immediately obvious that there is nothing to say from a moral perspective about my actions? If I tortured kids to death for fun with my God-like powers would that be a morally neutral act just because I'm really powerful?

(2) is not morally relevant. A bear might quite happily eat a human, just because it's hungry and it's a bear. Does it seem immediately obvious that there is nothing to say from a moral perspective about torturing bears?

(3) is not morally relevant. People are averse to harming cute things and less averse to harming ugly things, whether those things are humans or animals, but that is pure prejudice and not a morally relevant consideration. Ron's got that figured out, so it's not like this is a loonie vegetarian position.

 

[bruto]

This is a false dichotomy with a bonus straw man.

You're trying to present us with a choice between two theses:

1. Humans and animals are exactly the same. Morally, humans and animals must be treated identically. (This is your straw man version of veganism).
2. Humans and animals are different. Morally, this means that there is no possible inconsistency in treating animals differently to humans, no matter what we do to animals. As long as we treat humans consistently and animals consistently, we cannot be morally criticised.

The actual utilitarian animal rights position is neither of the above. It is:

3. You should have a consistent set of objective and morally relevant criteria for what makes an entity morally important, and apply them to all entities regardless of species.
Thesis 3 is not by itself a moral panacea, by any means. For example a person who adhered to Thesis 3 could consistently hunt deer for sport and hunt mentally disabled people for sport - or "to prevent them from suffering, because preventing them from suffering by other means is too difficult". Peter Singer holds that it's more moral to be nice to animals and the mentally disabled, but that doesn't immediately follow from (3) above.

I think that's the part that gives me trouble. You can call me a nihilist or whatever you want for this, but I think that it is important to consider context. If a species is not "morally important" does this mean that we can not only kill it but torture it? If not, why not? I would contend that even though we view flies as pests and swat them without much thought, it's more morally reprehensible to pull the legs off a fly for amusement than it is to kill a deer and eat it, but I see no place for that kind of relativism in your expression here.

 

[HonestConman]

I don't feel the need to justify my animal eating because, while I understand that the rationalist under pinings of the world we live in, I also accept that my actions will mostly be irrational and driven by self interest.

In other words, I know my meat eating has ramifications but I just ignore those ramifications for my own self interest.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I think that's the part that gives me trouble. You can call me a nihilist or whatever you want for this, but I think that it is important to consider context. If a species is not "morally important" does this mean that we can not only kill it but torture it? If not, why not? I would contend that even though we view flies as pests and swat them without much thought, it's more morally reprehensible to pull the legs off a fly for amusement than it is to kill a deer and eat it, but I see no place for that kind of relativism in your expression here.

I don't see anything morally reprehensible about killing bacteria, or smashing a rock. As I stated earlier I think it's quite plausible that insects have no consciousness, and as such can't suffer in the morally important sense, but since we don't really understand consciousness I could be wrong and for that reason alone I wouldn't torture an insect unless there was some good reason.

Personally I think pulling the legs off a fly is yucky but probably not immoral (but I acknowledge that I could be wrong), because a fly is probably not conscious of it happening. Whereas I am as sure as I am of anything that deer have consciousness and can suffer and I would consider killing a deer for sport a far more serious thing than pulling the legs off a fly for sport.

Mind you, the option of not torturing flies and not killing deer for sport is also available and seems on the face of it to be morally preferable.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Okay. Look, read (1) and (3) again. Can you conceive of any circumstances in which the behaviour of someone who follows (1) would be different to the behaviour of someone who follows (3)?

Or to put it another way, can you conceive of any morally relevant criteria for moral importance, under which a mouse might score lower than a human?

The only difference I see in 1 and 3 is that in 1 you're referring to animals and humans (Then again, by animals, we would be referring to every single living thing). Claim 1 says that animals and humans are the same. Since the word "animals" involves every all species, then that means "all species are the same".

Number 3 says: apply a consistent criteria for what makes a creature morally important and apply it to "all species". Once again "all species are the same".

Seems then, that 1 and 3 are essentially the same. Just phrased differently.

If I'm wrong, please clarify, instead of addressing me in a condescending way such as this:

If you can't, I don't know what's wrong with you but I don't think I can fix it.

Hey, thanks for the subtle ad hom, but I believe the way you can "fix it" is by trying to explain yourself better and not suggesting that there's something wrong with me. You do acknowledge that there is the possibility that you're communicating in a rather cryptic way (even if you're not doing it intentionally)

Peter Singer would have us spend time and money to see that seriously intellectually disabled people are well-treated, and thinks they should not be killed for sport or raised in inhumane conditions for meat. Peter Singer would have us spend time and money to see that animals are well-treated, and thinks they should not be killed for sport or raised in inhumane conditions for meat. He sees the two cases as morally identical, assuming that the intellectually disabled persons in question have mental lives roughly comparable to that of a deer.

So are we or are we not putting animals and humans in the same moral criteria? Because this paragraph pretty much sounds like that's exactly what Peter Singer is doing.

If you could completely eliminate suffering from the meat production process that would completely eliminate one source of moral concern.

And yet, we can't. What is your take on what other people here mentioned regarding farming vegetables and how it's impossible to do this without still killing some animals?

You seem to have the idea that it's not okay to go around killing adult humans for trivial reasons as long as you do it painlessly, and it's a very popular idea to be sure.

Do you really think that that's what I actually believe? No offense, but for someone who accuses me of not paying attention to the thread, you have just displayed a complete lack of awareness of the context in which I used those words. I even clarified to Cavemonster that I was being the Devil's Advocate.

Do you see why I feel it's worthless having an argument with you? when even the most basic notions of what my actual argument is, fly over your head, and you continue believing and claiming that I actually stand for things like that.

Possibly relevant, depending on your point of view, is whether it's a moral use of our global luxury budget to raise animals and then kill them for meat, when there are other luxuries we could have instead that don't involve directly killing things.

As I and others have mentioned, your idea of a world where we don't kill anything is an Utopia. Even if you follow a strict vegan diet, you're gonna end up killing millions of things. And the animals you don't kill so that you remain "moral", begin accumulating on the surface of earth and sooner or later it's either them or us.

 

[Cavemonster]

(1) is not morally relevant. Suppose I was a God-like being who was so powerful that humanity could not ever be a significant help or hindrance to my personal goals and safety: Does it seem immediately obvious that there is nothing to say from a moral perspective about my actions? If I tortured kids to death for fun with my God-like powers would that be a morally neutral act just because I'm really powerful?

(2) is not morally relevant. A bear might quite happily eat a human, just because it's hungry and it's a bear. Does it seem immediately obvious that there is nothing to say from a moral perspective about torturing bears?

(3) is not morally relevant. People are averse to harming cute things and less averse to harming ugly things, whether those things are humans or animals, but that is pure prejudice and not a morally relevant consideration. Ron's got that figured out, so it's not like this is a loonie vegetarian position.

So we have an outcome you don't like for #1
A non sequitur for #2 that I can't for the life of me figure out how it flows from my condition.
And for #3 a straw man.

Nice.

Kevin, does "morally relevant" to you mean "sounds about right to kevin"? because I can't imagine another meaning from the way you're using the phrase. And if that's one of your central criteria, then discussion is pretty clearly no going to be productive.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The only difference I see in 1 and 3 is that in 1 you're referring to animals and humans (Then again, by animals, we would be referring to every single living thing). Claim 1 says that animals and humans are the same. Since the word "animals" involves every all species, then that means "all species are the same".

Number 3 says: apply a consistent criteria for what makes a creature morally important and apply it to "all species". Once again "all species are the same".

Seems then, that 1 and 3 are essentially the same. Just phrased differently.

If I'm wrong, please clarify, instead of addressing me in a condescending way such as this:

[/quote]

I feel like I'm endlessly repeating myself.

Humans and other species of animals exist on a continuum of mental capabilities. The smartest humans are as far up the continuum as anything we know of, but there could easily be much more mentally capable beings in the universe. Chimps, parrots, dolphins, whales, orangutans and similarly capable entities are lower down, deer lower down still and so on.

(1) says "What I'm going to do is draw a line just below the humans. Everything above that line gets treated like a human, and any subnormal humans who fall below that line get treated like humans too, just because I don't see the problem with speciesism. Everything below that line is fair game to be killed for sport, killed because it's tasty or whatever, it's just an animal, it's life means nothing compared to my preference not to eat tofu".

(3) says "What I'm going to do is have a consistent set of criteria and every entity gets treated in proportion to how far up the continuum it is. Its species doesn't matter, nor do metaphysical notions like potential, only its actual characteristics matter. That means that smart non-human animals are more important than dumb human animals, and it means that the way we treat chimps cannot be all that different from the way we treat humans".

And yet, we can't. What is your take on what other people here mentioned regarding farming vegetables and how it's impossible to do this without still killing some animals?

You know, BenBurch asked that exact question over and over again because he didn't like the answer, and the answer didn't change. It's not changing now.

Do you really think that that's what I actually believe? No offense, but for someone who accuses me of not paying attention to the thread, you have just displayed a complete lack of awareness of the context in which I used those words. I even clarified to Cavemonster that I was being the Devil's Advocate.

Do you see why I feel it's worthless having an argument with you? when even the most basic notions of what my actual argument is, fly over your head, and you continue believing and claiming that I actually stand for things like that.

It's that or your position is confused and self-contradictory, and you aren't reading what I say very closely. I'm guessing in this case you missed the italicised word "not" in that sentence in your haste to see something you could disagree with.

As I and others have mentioned, your idea of a world where we don't kill anything is an Utopia. Even if you follow a strict vegan diet, you're gonna end up killing millions of things. And the animals you don't kill so that you remain "moral", begin accumulating on the surface of earth and sooner or later it's either them or us.

That's not just a straw man, it's a whole straw planet.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

So we have an outcome you don't like for #1

It's an outcome that shows that your rule is not a useful moral rule, because it leads to consequences that virtually all moral philosophies and virtually all moral intuitions hold to be immoral.

A non sequitur for #2 that I can't for the life of me figure out how it flows from my condition.

It's an outcome that shows that your rule is not a useful moral rule, because it leads to consequences that virtually all moral philosophies and virtually all moral intuitions hold to be stupid.

And for #3 a straw man.

It seems like an accurate assessment of your position to me, and you don't seem to be able to defend it.

Kevin, does "morally relevant" to you mean "sounds about right to kevin"? because I can't imagine another meaning from the way you're using the phrase. And if that's one of your central criteria, then discussion is pretty clearly no going to be productive.

Your failures of imagination aren't my fault.

Suppose I decided to discriminate in my hiring practises between humans on the basis of their skin colour, or nationality, or religion, or hairstyle, or accent. Why is that generally held to be both immoral and stupid? Because those factors have nothing to do with their ability to do the job, and because racism and such are morally objectionable.

Whereas discriminating on the basis of proven capabilities, relevant qualifications, physical capability to do the job and so on is fine.

When it comes to discriminating morally between entities you similarly have to choose qualities that matter, not irrelevant qualities. Is it okay to eat a human if it can't fight back and can't do anything to help you? I'd say no, just about everyone would agree, so your first rule is stupid. Is it okay to eat a human if it doesn't agree with your first rule? No, so your second rule is stupid. Your third rule is just putting your prejudices up on a pedestal and calling it morality, and that is if anything even stupider than your first two attempts.

 

[Cavemonster]

When it comes to discriminating morally between entities you similarly have to choose qualities that matter, not irrelevant qualities. Is it okay to eat a human if it can't fight back and can't do anything to help you?

That would almost make sense if I was presenting the first rule in isolation. But that human would also have to be one that failed both other conditions as well.

I'd say no, just about everyone would agree, so your first rule is stupid.

Oh, so your point is an argument from popularity! Okay.

Is it okay to eat a human if it doesn't agree with your first rule? No, so your second rule is stupid.

Again, your interpretation of my second rule has no resemblance to what I wrote. My condition was that if an entity was under the protection of an entity who had the first quality, it would be a bad idea to harm it, since it would cause the same kind of negative results that harming someone in the first category would. It has absolutely nothing to do with agreeing on the first rule, in any way. What is your first language Kevin?

Your third rule is just putting your prejudices up on a pedestal and calling it morality, and that is if anything even stupider than your first two attempts.

No, my third rule, like my first two is a practical statement. If I have an emotional attachment to any entity then harming it will harm me emotionally the same way that stabbing my own arm with a fork will harm me physically. That's just descriptive. Have you noticed that I didn't call it morality?

All three of the qualities that warrant my protection are practical qualities, not moral ones. I have described a system where it's in my own clear self interest to refrain from killing and eating humans but not to refrain from killing most animals. I have described a list of qualities, which I follow consistently.

Oh, and Kevin, you still haven't described "morally relevant" in any meaningful way.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That would almost make sense if I was presenting the first rule in isolation. But that human would also have to be one that failed both other conditions as well.

So an entity has to meet all three criteria to have moral importance, and otherwise it's food?

Again, your interpretation of my second rule has no resemblance to what I wrote. My condition was that if an entity was under the protection of an entity who had the first quality, it would be a bad idea to harm it, since it would cause the same kind of negative results that harming someone in the first category would. It has absolutely nothing to do with agreeing on the first rule, in any way. What is your first language Kevin?

What's yours? As written your criteria says that to be morally important you have to protect entities of the sort described in your first criteria, not be protected by such entities. However the revised version is even stupider than what I thought you wrote, because then a baby with no family can go straight on the barbecue since it can't help or hinder you and nobody is protecting it.

No, my third rule, like my first two is a practical statement. If I have an emotional attachment to any entity then harming it will harm me emotionally the same way that stabbing my own arm with a fork will harm me physically. That's just descriptive. Have you noticed that I didn't call it morality?

Did you have a point then?

All three of the qualities that warrant my protection are practical qualities, not moral ones. I have described a system where it's in my own clear self interest to refrain from killing and eating humans but not to refrain from killing most animals. I have described a list of qualities, which I follow consistently.

Oh, and Kevin, you still haven't described "morally relevant" in any meaningful way.

I guess not. We're having a discussion about morality, not self-interest. Of course it's in your self-interest to eat meat if you want to eat meat and the thing you want to eat can't fight back - did you think that was news? Post again when you do have something to say about morality.

 

[Cavemonster]

So an entity has to meet all three criteria to have moral importance, and otherwise it's food?

You misunderstand at a very fundamental level. Any one of the three qualities imparts protection. Really Kevin, what is your first language?

You also misunderstand by stating that this thread must be about "morality" it's about the charge that it's inconsistent to protect human lives and interest, but not animals.

I guess I could call these behavioral structures "morals" but you've already got a circular definition they wouldn't fit, so there's no reason.