This is an ugly one.
As noted above, the procedure played a major role in the case; it wasn't simply a case asking whether a cross was a religious symbol. Indeed, the placement of a cross on public land was determined by a lower court to be constitutionally improper, and that ruling was not challenged before the Supreme Court. Buono obtained an injunction that barred Government from having this cross at this location. What WAS at issue before the Supreme Court was the Government's tactic of selling the land around the cross and the cross itself to the VFW. With this little cute technique, the cross no longer stood on "public" land.
Buono went to court again, saying the Government was violating the injunction. He won, both at the district court and appellate court levels. But the Supreme Court reversed.
A majority of the Court (including some who dissented) agreed that Buono had standing to bring the suit. Justices Scalia and Thomas did not think that Buono had any standing to enforce the injunction that he got. (In Scalia's mind, Buono was trying to EXPAND the injunction because the injunction only dealt with a cross on government-owned land ... even though the injunction did not actually say that.)
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, basically said that the lower courts looked at the land transfer in the wrong way. Basically, the lower courts thought that the government had improper motives, therefore the transfer was wrong. Justice Kennedy said:
By dismissing Congress's motives as illicit, the District Court took insufficient account of the context in which the statute was enacted and the reasons for its passage. Private citizens put the cross on Sunrise Rock to commemorate American servicemen who had died in World War I. Although certainly a Christian symbol, the cross was not emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message. [Authority.]Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation's fallen soldiers. See Brief for Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae 15 (noting that the plaque accompanying the cross "was decorated with VFW decals").
Time also has played its role. The cross had stood on Sunrise Rock for nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted. By then, the cross and the cause it commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness.
...
The 2002 injunction thus presented the Government with a dilemma. It could not maintain the cross without violating the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring. (emphasis mine)
Got that? Justice Kennedy agreed with the point made by Justice Scalia at oral argument, namely, that the cross honors EVERYONE, regardless of religious beliefs. To remove the cross is to diss ALL of the country's fallen soldiers.
In spite of those pronouncements, Justice Kennedy left undecided whether what the government did was actually proper. He and Chief Justice Roberts thought the case ought to be sent back to the lower courts to decide the constitutional question in the proper way.
Chief Justice Roberts issued a small opinion that focused upon the cosmetic nature of relief being sought:
At oral argument, respondent’s counsel stated that it "likely would be consistent with the injunction" for the Government to tear down the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and return the cross to them,with the VFW immediately raising the cross again. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government to skip that empty ritual and do what Congress told it to do—sell the land with the cross on it. "The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows."
It may be argued that Roberts misstates the record, in that Buono's lawyer was asked to assume MORE than what Roberts said, and in fact counsel said (twice!) that the assumptions were not accurate. But leaving that issue aside, there is an irony in Roberts's discussion of the cosmetic nature of the remedy, since what the Government did—change nothing on the land but shuffle some papers so that the land technically belonged to the VFW—was little more than a cosmetic change. Roberts would apparently give the green light to similar sham land transfers, which could (perhaps would) lead to erection of all sorts of religious symbols on what people THOUGHT was public land, but was actually a small plot owned by a private entity.
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Kennedy on every point, except:
I would not remand this case for the lower courts to decide whether implementation of the land-transfer statute enacted by Congress in 2003, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, § 8121, would violate the District Court's injunction or the Establishment Clause.
...
There is also no merit in JUSTICE STEVENS' contention that implementation of the statute would constitute an endorsement of Christianity and would thus violate the Establishment Clause.... Here, therefore, this observer would be familiar with the origin and history of the monument and would also know both that the land on which the monument is located is privately owned and that the new owner is under no obligation to preserve the monument's present design.... (A) well-informed observer would appreciate that the transfer represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and to find a solution that best accommodates conflicting concerns.
The mind boggles. Not only is this "reasonable observer" analysis unsupported by precedent (even Justice Kennedy says that such an analysis is generally improper and questions its usefulness in any respect), the rationale as applied by Justice Alito is impractical, irrational and total bunk. Like Roberts, Alito would give the green light to shams.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.