What is your excuse for killing animals?

[Piscivore]

I suppose, and if that's all you meant, then I have no problem with it. I thought you were making an argument along the lines of "people don't care about people unrelated to them dying."

Not at all. There are members of this forum I care a great deal more about than members of my own family that I'm only vaguely aware of.

 

[Cain]

It's pretty simple Cain - your objection to eating meat is not being based on the eating of the meat in and of itself.

No kidding? It depends on the circumstances.

Everything else is just a matter of how humans decide to farm the natural resources of the world. You don't like that people don't agree with you plain and simple. Nothing more morally high brow than that judging by your other responses to people.

Not quite. It's more than personal taste: I'm saying we have to take the preferences of animals into account; their interests matter. People are willing to say that animals should not be tortured for fun (the animal's suffering outweighs sadistic pleasure), but when it comes to eating animals -- regardless of the horrors on factory farms -- well, they taste delicious. The typical meat-eater sits in judgment, legislating their personal preferences.

NO YOU!

HAHA! I can act like a child too!

*fixed.

Where exactly? I say nothing of the sort: I imply that you seem unwilling to accept the realty of life being basically cruel.

You're venturing into naturalistic fallacy territory. Not that it matters, but I accept that nature is red in tooth and claw. The difference is that most humans are capable of moral decision-making.
-----------------

Mirrorglass:
Re: Rights are granted to those who understand them; toddlers have rights despite lacking a concept. Why? Ad hoc answer follows:

Because they're human and will soon develop into moral subjects, if given the chance. Chickens won't.

So I suppose this same potentiality applies to embryos in the womb. What about those humans who are severally mentally handicapped -- do they not have rights? Terminally ill infants? You're muddling along, I've seen it umpteen times.

Suppose I decide to sell my infant daughter to a wealthy South African. He has AIDs, but believes screwing a virgin can cure him. We agree to kill the baby after he's done his thing. Whose rights are violated? The infant will not "soon" understand these concepts because we are going to kill her. Yes, she has the "potential to learn" but so does an embryo. An X that is a potential Y does not have all the rights of Y because it's an X. Let's not confuse acorns for oak trees, eggs for chickens.

It is not arbitrary to set the line between human and animal to capability for abstract thinking. I could accept the idea that an ape that's been taught sign language deserves some moral consideration, though I'd only grant it rights similar to humans if it could show it understood the concept of morality.

That is the important point: a moral subject is a being capable of developing the concept of morality. All other beings are moral objects, and as such, have no inherent rights. The distinction is not arbitrary, no matter how many times you say it is.

This is inconsistent. On the one hand you're willing to grant rights for "abstract thinking," and an example of this is an ape who can use sign language. But before and after you go back to insisting on a "concept of morality."

Moral objects? You apparently have a thin understanding of the concepts under discussion. Philosophers tend to make a distinction between moral patients and moral agents.

Trust me, it's not a new one. The idea is much older than your idea of animal rights.

By "new one" I meant as an argument against animal rights. But if you want to say it's so old that it's new again, fine. It's still a terrible argument:

The attitude is not egoistic. It's closer to utilitarian.

No, it's closer to the sphere of egoism: you said animals only have meaning when some human decides to cast a magic shadow over them.

Are you actually saying we should be building hospitals for non-human primates, and that this endeavor is equally valuable to helping other humans?

Um, we already have "hospitals" for non-human primates. For non-primates even! I'm not sure what you think I've said to suggest all primates are created equally, but I do not find the idea terribly compelling.

Re: majority of people favor animal cruelty laws.

Why do you assume this is the view of the majority? Evidence?

Really? You don't recall how most people were horrified by the Vick dog-fighting? You think Humane Slaughter legislation wins bipartisan support in spite of industry efforts AND public opinion? I do not have any polling data on the number of people who wish to outlaw the initiation of premeditated lethal violence against humans, but I'd guess it's decisive.

In the case of outlawing torture against animals, it's easily the majority view; you'd have much better luck disputing "almost everybody." Who knows, maybe the public takes a Kantian view. Or maybe, they disapprove of animal cruelty as a form of expression not unlike flag burning.

I mean, how many times have we seen this scenario where a child strikes a doggie.
Mother: Don't do that!
Child: Why not?
Mother: Because it has an undesirable effect on your internal moral compass.
Child: Oh...

While we're here:

The first is an argument from incredulity, the second is a non-sequitur

This is a glib non-reply. The fact of the matter is people DO disapprove of cruelty and it's because it involves harming a being capable of feeling pain. Maybe pain is not good reason, but it's the reason. The second part -- thrashing Mr. Wilson's begonias versus stabbing stray cats -- follows rather directly from your view. When I thrash plants I'm disrupting the calibration of my internal compass and I'm harming Mr. Wilson; this is a legally actionable offense. Stabbing cats is kosher, unless we're dealing with some highly paternalistic government that seeks to limit property rights, invade privacy and restrict expression. In any case, I think these easily demonstrate your view as absurd, deserving mockery rather than acceptance.

No, like I've said, we don't believe any justification is needed. It's your idea of animal rights that's the new one.

The thing about meat-eaters -- most meat-eaters -- is that they already have an inchoate concept of rights for animals.

If you're content with looking down on meat-eaters, fine. But if you're genuinely interested in animal rights, the first thing you must do is construct proof they have any.

So, when your arguments fail, not only does meat-eating remain justified, but now I am obligated to "construct a proof?" Well, first, do you accept the standard you put forth -- "a concept of moral rights" -- is arbitrary? Do you agree it's silly to believe that harming a toddler is wrong because "pssssht- ten, fifteen, twenty years from now she'll have a concept of rights!"

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

see post #362 for a succinct answer to your query.

I'm not sure I understood that post as an answer to the question "Who speaks for animals?"
Could you care to elaborate? I mean, it's a pretty straightforward question: Who Speaks for the Animals? It shouldn't be too hard to answer.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Charles Darwin:
"I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created parasitic wasps with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars"

And I cannot believe in a moral that's inherent to nature, where this is allowed to happen either.

 

[Herzblut]

I'm saying we have to take the preferences of animals into account; their interests matter.

Preferences and interests are abstract concepts that exist in our minds only.

So I suppose this same potentiality applies to embryos in the womb. What about those humans who are severally mentally handicapped -- do they not have rights?

Embryos cannot be assigned human rights. Otherwise it would be impossible to kill an embryo in order to save the life of the pregnant woman.

Suppose I decide to sell my infant daughter to a wealthy South African. He has AIDs, but believes screwing a virgin can cure him. We agree to kill the baby after he's done his thing. Whose rights are violated?

That of the kid, as you already know.

No, it's closer to the sphere of egoism: you said animals only have meaning when some human decides to cast a magic shadow over them.

Sure. "Meaning", again, is just a concept in your mind. It does not exist at all outside of human minds.

The fact of the matter is people DO disapprove of cruelty and it's because it involves harming a being capable of feeling pain.
Maybe pain is not good reason, but it's the reason. The second part -- thrashing Mr. Wilson's begonias versus stabbing stray cats -- follows rather directly from your view.

"Cruelty" is just another abstract concept of mind (I repeat myself). In 3rd world countries, cats are not stabbed (to be eaten) - remember they are fortified and itchy. They are caught with a springe, hung up and slammed to death with a rod (the beasts just won't die dangling).

H

 

[Manopolus]

Hmm... thread still alive; haven't managed to kill it yet... let's see... further ideas...

I've implied this before. Most animals we eat (with the exception of other humans, in cases of cannibalism) have absolutely no sense whatsoever of the difference between right and wrong, as we do. If you have no morals yourself, then you do not inherently posses the right to the protections provided by them.

We DO extend these protections to other humans who lack this sense, admittedly.., actually the insanity plea is a perfect example of this... we institutionalize such people rather than putting them in prison in some cases (actually, though... I'm not sure which is worse).

When it comes to such decisions WITHIN the species, however, we encounter the problems of where to draw the arbitrary line, and the possibility we might be wrong. Such distinctions become very subjective in borderline cases. Outside of the species we are pretty sure we are not wrong about the question of whether creatures have any complex ethical thought comparable to our own. (which is based as much or more on logic as it is on emotion and learned behavior). Proof: well, do you honestly think a pig would take time to consider the ethical implications of its behavior before biting you? Or even feel guilty after the fact? Let me assure you, pigs DO bite. I can also tell you it hurts from personal experience. Also note that punishing a pig for biting will not stop it from doing it again... it will actually make it meaner.

Note that I do not condone torturing animals. For one thing, a person doing such things to animals is an indication that he is quite capable of doing the same to humans... and evidence that he gets a thrill out of such things. I also think that the anti torture ideal is a courtesy that we extend to our fellow creatures, rather than a right that they should have inherantly. When there is no particular reason to cause suffering to ANY creature... well... DON'T.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

They kill each other, they kill us, and I LIKE eating them. Life is what it is.

The naturalistic fallacy: stop posting it.

I ask you again, Kevin (and anyone who thinks they can answer this coherently): Tho whom do I have to justify the killing of animals? Any animal? (From a Gazelle to an ant, to bacteria on my glass of water). To whom? Who keeps tabs of the "rules" of who has a "right" to die and who doesn't? Who is the ultimate President of the Moral Rights of the living creatures of planet earth? Who speaks for the animals?

And who made him/her King of the Wild Kingdom? (Because unless it was the animals who voted him/her King, I suspect the answer will inevitably sound dishonest and self-interested from one particular species)

This question is nonsensical. To whom do you have to justify murder, rape, theft or arson? Who makes up the rules about whether or not you can rape and murder your next-door-neighbour?

Can you see your house from way up there? Here's your arguement used on another topic. Defecation is bad, immoral and must be stopped. It is bad for the environment. Feces contain organic substances that pollute our natural waters and is harmful to creatures that dwell there. Feces contain harmful bacteria which kill thousands of people each year. Defecation is morally wrong and should be stopped.

Once again I draw your attention to the fact that you are making up idiotic straw men because you do not understand the arguments others are making. This is rude and counterproductive. Stop it.

Nazis? Really? Nearly everyone (including me) considers the holocaust to be immoral and inhumane. Moral relativism does not require me to consider it acceptable. You inadvertantly proved MY point with YOUR straw man.

You need to get your story straight.

A minute ago morality was, according to you, just whatever the society in question thinks is moral. By that argument Nazism and slavery were perfectly moral, because the people at that time thought they were.

Now you're saying that morality is whatever society thinks right now is moral. So Nazis were bad people, but only because we think right now that they were bad people. Or possibly only because they lost - if they had won, we'd think they were moral, and hence they really would be moral.

That second position is actually a weird form of moral objectivism, claiming that the moral fashion of the moment is eternal moral truth because it is the moral fashion of the moment.

Objective moral standards with extenuating circumstances. Ok, I'll go look up that wikipedia article.

You're confusing objective with absolute.

I brought it up to use your same arguement against something you find morally acceptable.

Thus demonstrating only that you didn't understand the argument in the first place.

I think you're going to have to define what you mean by "useful".

One that provides guidance as to appropriate actions, does not clash to an unacceptable degree with our intuitions about what is good behaviour, and is not so demanding that nobody can or will follow it.

Also, are you actually saying there are multiple, but equally valid moral philosophies that are objectivistic, but do not make the same assumptions about what is objective? Do you know what this view is called?

I don't think it has a name as such, any more than the view that both soccer and baseball are sports has a special name.

To pick two very well-known examples, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism (the view that what is good is to maximise pleasure and minimise suffering) and Kant's Categorical Imperative (that what is good is take actions which you could wish with a good conscience be taken by all people in similar situations). As to whether Kant and Bentham's theories are "equally valid" I'll let you make up your own mind, but both are certainly coherent and useful in their own ways.

(Strictly speaking Kant's philosophy is absolutist, not objectivist, but this isn't the right audience for subtle distinctions).

If I'm correct, you're essentially saying morality forms the basis for which outcomes are desirable. In my opinion, it's exactly opposite; "desirable outcome" is the basis and reason for all human activity. Any moral system is simply a tool that is used to reach that outcome. Desire does not depend on morals, morals depend on desire.

This is wrong as a matter of fact. Kant, for example, famously cared nothing for outcomes. In his view moral behaviour was all about taking moral kinds of actions, and the outcome of those actions did not matter a jot. If telling the truth meant someone died, for example, Kant would still have you tell the truth. That, to him, was moral behaviour. To him the ends really did never justify the means.

 

[Telaynay's G'son]

you are not an animal. you are a critical thinking human. and you have other options for nutrition that don't involve killing
the nature argument is just a bad argument. as civilized beings we drift away from natural instincts
but if you want level you logic with the dumber beings, feel free to do so

Exactly what is your definition of "civilized beings" ?

 

[Mirrorglass]

So, when your arguments fail, not only does meat-eating remain justified, but now I am obligated to "construct a proof?" Well, first, do you accept the standard you put forth -- "a concept of moral rights" -- is arbitrary? Do you agree it's silly to believe that harming a toddler is wrong because "pssssht- ten, fifteen, twenty years from now she'll have a concept of rights!"

Bolding mine.

I'll come back to answer you in more detain when I have the time, but until then, I'll ask you to be sure the statement above, namely that it's silly or arbitrary to give children human rights because they're human, truly represents your views. Because honestly, this isn't making you look very good.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Bolding mine.

I'll come back to answer you in more detain when I have the time, but until then, I'll ask you to be sure the statement above, namely that it's silly or arbitrary to give children human rights because they're human, truly represents your views. Because honestly, this isn't making you look very good.

Fail.

 

[Mirrorglass]

I don't think it has a name as such, any more than the view that both soccer and baseball are sports has a special name.

To pick two very well-known examples, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism (the view that what is good is to maximise pleasure and minimise suffering) and Kant's Categorical Imperative (that what is good is take actions which you could wish with a good conscience be taken by all people in similar situations). As to whether Kant and Bentham's theories are "equally valid" I'll let you make up your own mind, but both are certainly coherent and useful in their own ways.

(Strictly speaking Kant's philosophy is absolutist, not objectivist, but this isn't the right audience for subtle distinctions).

My point, which you missed, was that the idea that more than one objective moral view can be correct is, in fact, indistinguishable from moral relativism.

This is wrong as a matter of fact. Kant, for example, famously cared nothing for outcomes. In his view moral behaviour was all about taking moral kinds of actions, and the outcome of those actions did not matter a jot. If telling the truth meant someone died, for example, Kant would still have you tell the truth. That, to him, was moral behaviour. To him the ends really did never justify the means.

This is nothing but an argument from authority. If Kant said it, it must be true? Then why are we still debating about animal rights?

 

[Manopolus]

The naturalistic fallacy: stop posting it.



This question is nonsensical. To whom do you have to justify murder, rape, theft or arson? Who makes up the rules about whether or not you can rape and murder your next-door-neighbour?

Certainly chickens do not presume to make this decision for us, nor to judge those that do rape and murder their next door neigbor. Note also that baby chicks actually kill their own... they go after the lame chicks and kill them.

 

[Manopolus]

This is nothing but an argument from authority. If Kant said it, it must be true? Then why are we still debating about animal rights?

I'd have to side with Kevin on this, if nothing else (though not in the particular application of it). Kant actually is an established authorative source in the Philosophy of ethics. Therefore, in this case, yes, it is an argument from authority, but it is not a fallacy.

 

[Manopolus]

Continued clarification of my position:

Humans who do not participate to our satisfaction in ethical society are sanctioned by a partial dismissal of what are otherwise considered human rights (in case you are dense, I'm talking about criminals). We cage them. We put them to death, in some cases. The reason that they retain any degree of rights at all might be connected to the notion that they can reform, and also the notion that despite safeguards, we could actually be wrong about the details of what they have done.

This is symbolically consistent with my arguments.

 

[Manopolus]

To pick two very well-known examples, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism (the view that what is good is to maximise pleasure and minimise suffering) and Kant's Categorical Imperative (that what is good is take actions which you could wish with a good conscience be taken by all people in similar situations). As to whether Kant and Bentham's theories are "equally valid" I'll let you make up your own mind, but both are certainly coherent and useful in their own ways.

(Strictly speaking Kant's philosophy is absolutist, not objectivist, but this isn't the right audience for subtle distinctions).



This is wrong as a matter of fact. Kant, for example, famously cared nothing for outcomes. In his view moral behaviour was all about taking moral kinds of actions, and the outcome of those actions did not matter a jot. If telling the truth meant someone died, for example, Kant would still have you tell the truth. That, to him, was moral behaviour. To him the ends really did never justify the means.

I completely disagree with Jeremy Bentham on the "no pain, no gain" principle, and on the notion that there is no such thing as a free lunch. You might have guessed this by the source of my sig.

I admire Kant, but please explain to me anything he ever said about animal rights. I'm pretty sure all of his philosophy consisted of principles of human interaction amongst ourselves, but correct me if I'm wrong... I'm not an expert.

 

[Manopolus]

Hell, why not? I'll address the Nazi analogy you've posed, Kevin.

Proper ethics while living in a society ruled by Nazi Germany would not be that of the Nazis, but they WOULD be affected by the conditions the Nazis imposed. In this case, the morality of many people would require them to do violence, specifically against the Nazis.

So there you have relative morality applied to the society under which you live, no? Relativistic morals are NOT decided by the rulers, but rather by conditions.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

My point, which you missed, was that the idea that more than one objective moral view can be correct is, in fact, indistinguishable from moral relativism.

You are moving the goalposts and by doing so making a joined-up conversation impossible.

I didn't say they were simultaneously correct. That would be stupid. They yield contradictory results in many situations, hence they cannot be simultaneously correct.

However that's not at all what you asked. You asked whether "there are multiple, but equally valid moral philosophies that are objectivistic, but do not make the same assumptions about what is objective". I would say that Bentham's and Kant's theories are equally valid. They are both coherent and potentially useful, even if I wouldn't personally live my life by either moral philosophy.

I suspect your problem is that you think that a moral theory is the kind of thing which can be "correct". This is a category error. Moral theories can be consistent, and they can be useful, and they can agree with our intuitions about what is good, but they can no more be "correct" or "incorrect" than they can be "sleeping" or "purplish".

Moral relativism is a crap moral theory because it's incoherent and useless, not because it's "incorrect".

This is nothing but an argument from authority. If Kant said it, it must be true? Then why are we still debating about animal rights?

I hope the error here is now obvious: I didn't say "if Kant said it, it must be true".

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Hell, why not? I'll address the Nazi analogy you've posed, Kevin.

Proper ethics while living in a society ruled by Nazi Germany would not be that of the Nazis, but they WOULD be affected by the conditions the Nazis imposed. In this case, the morality of most people would require them to do violence, specifically against the Nazis.

So there you have relative morality applied to the society under which you live, no? Relativistic morals are NOT decided by the rulers, but rather by conditions.

I don't know what point you think you are making. I find it hard to imagine any moral philosophy which would not mandate different actions in different circumstances, let alone one such which would be useful.

 

[Herzblut]

Humans who do not participate to our satisfaction in ethical society are sanctioned by a partial dismissal of what are otherwise considered human rights (in case you are dense, I'm talking about criminals). We cage them. We put them to death, in some cases. The reason that they retain any degree of rights at all might be connected to the notion that they can reform, and also the notion that despite safeguards, we could actually be wrong about the details of what they have done.

For me, human rights are indivisible and undeniable to every human being. They cannot be dismissed. Death penalty and torture are incompliant to human dignity and are, hence, unacceptable.

 

[Manopolus]

I don't know what point you think you are making. I find it hard to imagine any moral philosophy which would not mandate different actions in different circumstances, let alone one such which would be useful.

I am suggesting that the morality of the whole of the society does not correlate to the party line. I am not certain that there are correlations to the O.P., I'm merely contemplating the statement in general. I have yet to come to any conclusions.