Losing AA 11, NEADS-Tapes based timeline

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About two weeks ago I started a thread about the question why NEADS was unable to track AA 11 after the FAA alarmed them about the hijacking of the flight. In response, several reliable researchers pointed out that NEADS had to face a problem the FAA didn’t face: The NEADS radar scopes displayed all the ground clutter the FAA radar scopes didn’t display. Using my limited means and knowledge, I tried to check this explanation with some of the primary sources I am aware of, namely the NEADS Tapes. During this process, I compiled a comprehensive transcript with all transmissions relevant to the process of tracking attempts by the NEADS staff.
As anyone slightly familiar with the topic in question is aware, the story of the tracking attempts by NEADS staff was already well told in an excellent article by Michael Bronner for Vanity Fair, which was released back in 2006.
However, Bronner’s narrative includes only a fractional amount of the relevant conversations among NEADS staffers, and between NEADS staffers and the controllers at the FAA who were tracking AA 11. This is no flaw in Bronner’s narrative, his approach is not exactly mine. But it’s a possibility for a step two in the description and analysis of the NEADS tracking attempts. So this is step two to Bronner’s article in some sense. The following timeline is an attempt to document every significant conversation which tells something about the positional information NEADS got from the FAA as well as the tracking attempts of the NEADS Technicians.
For this timeline, I used five NEADS channels.

DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op
Tape starts at 08:30:30 EDT.

DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK
Tape starts at 08:30:25 EDT.

DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op
Tape starts at approximately 08:26:03.

DRM1 DAT2 Channel 7 ID2 OP
Tape starts at 08:30:20 EDT.

DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op
Tape starts at 08:29:15 EDT.

For each transmission, I’ll provide the time of a particular conversation in EDT, followed by the time where one can find the conversation on Tape (in squared brackets). Since several conversations on different channels overlap each other, I as well included the time at which a conversation ended.
Background about the NEADS floors is provided in the Vanity Fair article I already mentioned. Some short background essential to the topic in question:
MCC Op (2) is the Mission Crew Commander Operations floor channel, where basically all information comes together.
The ID channels, ID Op (4 & 7), are the channels for the Identification Technicians, who keep up contact between FAA and NEADS, and relay their information to the MCC.
MCC TK (3) apparently is part of the ID section.
AST Op (15) is the Air Surveillance Technician channel. The AST relays positional information from the ID Section to the Tracking Technicians (TT), who then try to track the target. The results are relayed to the MCC. There are some extra TT channels, but as far as I can see (or hear), all relevant transmissions are contained in the AST Op channel, too.
There are radar scopes all over NEADS, and tracking attempts were made by the ID, MCC and AST staff. More information on these attempts is contained in the MFRs, released by NARA. I recommend the Huntress ID MFR, the McCain MFR, and the Richmond/LaMarche MFR.
The following transcript and my comments on it are in various aspects closely connected with topics discussed in the thread about the inability of NEADS to track AA 11. But since both, transcript and comments, in a great extent exceed the issues of the thread about the inability of NEADS to track AA 11, I decided to open a new thread about it. If moderators decide to merge both threads, I’m fine with this.
I was unable to find out every speaker’s name. If someone here is able to fill the remaining gaps, I’d appreciate this.

 

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Timeline of events, pre-crash

08:39:03-08:39:36 EDT [13:00-13:33]
Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZBW) relays first positional informations to the ID Desk: 40 miles north of JFK, heading towards JFK, primary only, speed decreases
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Colin Scoggins (ZBW): Right now the position’s about 40 miles North of Kennedy.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): 40 miles north of Kennedy?
Scoggins: Right.
Watson: Do you have a mode 3?
Scoggins: No we don’t he’s a primary target only.
Watson: Primary target only?
Scoggins: Yup.
Watson: OK and you don’t know where he’s coming from or his destination?
Scoggins: No idea. He took off out of Boston originally heading for Los Angeles.
Watson: Boston to Los Angeles?
Scoggins: That was his original destination yeah.
Watson: And where are they going now do you know?
Scoggins: No idea, he’s heading towards Kennedy, oh looks like speed is decreasing. I’m not exactly sure where, nobody really –

08:39:19-08:39:28 EDT [08:54-09:03]
MCC TK meanwhile asks ZBW for a Lat/Long on AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK

Dawne Deskins (NEADS): OK. Do you have a general location as to where he is?
Joseph Cooper (ZBW): We're still tracking him right now.
Deskins: You're tracking. Can you give me a Lat/Long of where you think he is just for RSA?
Cooper: Yeah, hold on second.

08:39:51-08:40:19 EDT [13:48-14:16]
Further positional information relayed from ZBW to the ID Desk: 35 miles north of JFK, still primary target, heading towards JFK
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Shelley Watson (NEADS): But you don’t have any modes or codes on him?
Colin Scoggins (ZBW): Nope, right now it’s just, uh, no we don’t have any modes yet.
Watson: Is he inbound to JFK?
Scoggins: We don’t know.
Watson: You don’t know where he is at all?
Scoggins: He’s being hijacked, the pilots having a hard time talking to the … I mean we don’t know, we don’t know where he’s going. He’s heading towards Kennedy, he’s, like I said, he’s about 35 miles north of Kennedy now, at 367 knots.
Watson: OK.

08:40:03-08:40:11 EDT [09:38-09:46]
MCC TK receives first coordinate for AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK

Joseph Cooper (ZBW): 4115 North.
Dawne Deskins (NEADS): 4115 North.
Cooper: 07346 West.
Deskins: 07346 West.

08:40:49-08:40:53 EDT [11:34-11:38]
AST Op staff plans the recall of the J53 radar site (North Truro, MA) as a backup for J52 (Riverhead, NY)
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

NEADS staffer: [Inaudible] recall 53?
Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Yes, go forward. 52 backup.

08:41:03-08:41:10 EDT [11:48-11:55]
NEADS trackers prepare to look for primary targets
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

TT 1 (NEADS): I start looking for primary out there some place, guys.
TT 2 (NEADS): You look at the maps … primary? Search, any search maps in?

08:41:15-08:41:27 EDT [12:00-12:12]
AST Op informs MCC Op about the planned recall of J52
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): MCC? Be advised 53 is down. We’re recalling it now. About 15 minutes to get it back up, we hope. Hope they haven’t burnt it apart.

08:41:17-08:41:23 EDT [15:14-15:20]
NEADS ID Desk is worried about finding AA 11 without a mode 3 code
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): There’s no way we can find him without a mode 3.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): I got cold chills, oh my God.

08:41:35-08:41:51 EDT [12:20-12:36]
NEADS trackers still wait for positional information
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): So far it’s a hijack. They don’t have a position. They’re seeing it primary only they said. They’re seeing it primary only. [Background conversation] That could be anywhere, as it was over the land.

08:41:49-08:42:37 EDT [15:46-16:34]
NEADS ID Desk requests mode 3 code from ZBW
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Colin Scoggins (ZBW): Boston Center.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Yeah, Huntress calling. Did you guys have a mode 3 at all on American 11?
Scoggins: Last altitude we saw him he was descending to flight level 2-9-0.
Watson: You have a, I’m sorry, a prior mode 3 for American 11?
Scoggins: Um.
Watson: Do you have anything, any information for mode 3 because we can locate him on the scope, if so.
Scoggins: Well, last known altitude was flight level 2-9-0, before that he was requesting, uh, hold on it looks like he was requesting flight level 3-5-0.
Watson: OK, all we’re asking is your mode 3, your mode 3. Did you assign any mode 3 to that aircraft?
Scoggins: Um, originally it was … hold on.

08:42:05-08:42:30 EDT [12:55-13:19]
Meanwhile AST Op gets informed that a J53 recall is impossible
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): I’m off the loop, off the loop, open line. Good [inaudible], Sgt. Richmond.
Patty ? (NEADS): Uh, MC?
Richmond: Yes.
Patty: I can’t hear you.
Richmond: Yes, go. Sgt. Richmond.
Patty: This is Patty. Just called the site J53 and they said it is totally, utterly impossible.
Richmond: Impossible?
Patty: Yup.
Richmond: They just can’t start put it back together?
Patty: Nope.
Richmond: Thank you.
Patty: OK.

08:42:31-08:42:58 EDT [13:20-13:47]
Working radar sites established
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): MCC?
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Yes.
Richmond: I’ve just got a call that it’s totally, utterly impossible to recall 53.
Nasypany: Three zero six four. [Simultaneous background conversation]
Richmond: 52 is working.
NEADS staffer (McCain?): What we’re looking at right now is, we can’t make sure that 55, 56 and 52 [inaudible].
Richmond: 52 is good, 55 is good.

08:42:44-08:42:45 EDT [16:41-16:43]
According to ID Desk staff, J53 is not needed to track AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Shelley Watson (NEADS): We still should be able to get it without 53.

08:43:10-08:43:50 EDT [12:40-13:20]
Coordinate arrived at MCC Desk; note: This is three minutes after this coordinate was relayed to NEADS (ID Desk)
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

Stacia Rountree (NEADS): This is the Lat/Long we’re showing him at. We’re showing him at the last –
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Speed? Lat/Long 41 –
NEADS staffer 1: 2-9-0 [inaudible].
Nasypany: Right.
NEADS staffer 2: 073.
Nasypany: What was that? [Background conversation] Okay. Let’s find this guy. Yeah, 41 – remember we’re putting it in. 1443, look for it.
NEADS staffer 2: I just put in the Z-point.

08:43:15-08:43:42 EDT [14:00-14:27]
AST Op staff plans to call the J53 radar site
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

NEADS staffer: I need a real-world, uh, mine [?] here.
Richmond: For what? North Truro? You going to call them? They’re not going to help you out.
NEADS staffer: Would you read that up to me?
Richmond: It’s a commercial number. [Reads North Truro phone number]

08:43:19-08:43:32 EDT [17:16-17:29]
ID Desk wants to request mode 3 code of planes near AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Stacia Rountree (NEADS): You know what, I have an idea. Ask him if he's got anybody near - like, near the aircraft that (inaudible) track him (inaudible) aircraft that's near him.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Okay.
Rountree: You know, at least trying to figure out where the hell he's flying. They could see him on primary (inaudible).

08:43:42-08:44:13 EDT [17:39-18:10]
ZBW relays mode 3 code to NEADS ID Desk
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Colin Scoggins (ZBW): Hello.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Yes, go ahead.
Scoggins: His original code was 1443.
Watson: 1443…copy that, sir. One more question.
Scoggins: Yup.
Watson: Are any aircrafts close by him that you maybe can give us a mode 3?
Scoggins: Um.
Watson: Yes.
Scoggins: I think we’re working on that. I don’t have anybody next to him right now but um his speed is slowing down now, he’s flying southwest bound now so… we don’t have anybody close to him.
Watson: OK, thank you sir.
Scoggins: OK.

08:43:45-08:43:48 EDT [13:15-13:18]
The mode 3 code almost simultaneously arrives at the MCC Desk
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

NEADS staffer: 1443.
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): 1443, look for it.

08:43:25-08:44:45 EDT [13:33-14:15]
Z-point is established in the tracking system of MCC Op
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

NEADS staffer: I just put in the Z-point. [Background conversation]
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Right there. Okay. Mode 3: 1443. Last known. No, this is real world. Okay we’re in the high chair. Sir, last know position that we got out of this guy was right there at the Z- point. He’s heading 190 at 29,000 feet, he’s heading down. So we’re looking for somebody – you know what? Just start hitting up tracks all around that area that Z-point. What scramble it? OK. Just north of, um, there.

08:44:19-08:44:32 EDT [18:16-18:29]
ID Desk staff approximates the current location of AA 11 on the scope
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): (Inaudible) on the scope up there is his approximate location.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): He said nobody – should have a – surveillance hit up everybody in that area and bring up – it looks like they are, though.
NEADS etaffer: You know what, they're starting to track all around that area.
Watson: Yeah. He said nobody in that - nobody in -
NEADS staffer: Okay, just north of –

08:44:58-08:45:17 EDT [14:28-14:47]
Destination for PANTA flights established (= Z-point)
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

James Fox (NEADS): MCC I don’t know where I’m scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Okay I’m gonna give you the Z-point. It’s just north, um, of New York City.
Fox: I got this Lat/Long, 4115:7436 or 7346.
Nasypany: Head them in that direction.

08:45:04-08:45:55 EDT [15:49-16:40]
Reference point for the TT established; note: This is five minutes after this coordinate was relayed to NEADS (ID Desk)
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Is it that reference point? Is it that reference point? OK, so I got Eleven. Is it you on, eleven? Eleven?
TT (NEADS): Eleven on.
Richmond: OK, eleven. Let’s look. Pay attention here to what I’m sending you.
TT: OK, stand by. Send it.
Richmond: See that arrow, I believe that is his last known position. I want you to tag everything around that in a standard 25 miles thing. And you’ve got that area until we find him.
TT: [Inaudible] that. I’m on it.

08:46:02-08:46:27 EDT [16:47-17:12]
Reference point for the trackers confirmed
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): KKKK is his last position? MCC? MCC? KKKK, is that his last position?
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Yes.
Richmond: We’re working on a 25 miles box around that, hitting everything up.

08:46:03-08:46:18 EDT [20:00-20:15]
ID Desk staff tries to locate AA 11 through its original mode 3 code
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): Keep trying to F-locate that mode 3.
NEADS staffer: Got nothing. Do it again. 1443, (inaudible).
Dooley: Yes.

08:46:37-08:46:51 EDT [16:07-16:21]
25 miles search radius around the Z-point gets confirmed in MCC Op
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Okay. What we’re doing, we’re trying to locate this guy. We can’t find him via IFF what we’re going to do. We’re going to hit up every track within a 25 miles radius of this Z-point that we put on the scope. 29,000 heading 190, we’re going to try to find this guy.

 

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Timeline of events, post-crash

08:46:52-08:47:07 EDT [17:37-17:52]
NEADS TTs don’t know last known heading of AA 11; note: ZBW told ID Desk AA 11’s heading towards JFK; note: AA 11 is flown into the North Tower of the WTC at this very moment
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

TT (NEADS): That’s 11.
Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Go ahead, 11.
TT: Do we have a last known heading?
Richmond: We don’t know. All we know is what was his last know area, don’t know heading. Um, just - from what they’re telling me, from what we’re getting, we’re looking for a primary target.
TT: Copy.
Richmond: Search target.

08:46:55-08:47:07 EDT [20:52-21:04]
Meanwhile NEADS ID Desk asks ZNY for a further Lat/Long
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Sharon Majeski (ZNY): Right now he’s primary only.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): You have no mode 3 or anything?
Majeski: Um, I’m not …
Watson: Or a location?
Majeski: Not showing anything no.
Watson: A Lat/Long?
Majeski: Hold on, I can get a Lat/Long. Hold on a second.

08:46:53-08:47:42 EDT [16:28-17:17]
Meanwhile ZBW is talking to the NEADS MCC Tech; AA 11 claimed to be 15 miles east of JFK; note: AA 11 is flown into the North Tower of the WTC at this very moment
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK

Joe McCain (NEADS): Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sgt. McCain.
Colin Scoggins (ZBW): Yes, Colin Scoggins, Boston Center. How are you doing?
McCain: Doing just fine.
Scoggins: Are you all working trying to get someone up …?
McCain: Yes, we are.
Scoggins: By any chance can you give me an altitude on him. Do you have an altitude …?
McCain: Last was 29,000.
Scoggins: OK, I didn't know if your radar could actually pick up a correct altitude just so we could kind of nail it down maybe.
McCain: We haven't even found the track yet.
Scoggins: Oh, you haven't found the track. Hold on one second. [To ZBW tracker:] Can you give me range bearing off of the nearest NAVAID? [Back to McCain:] It's primary only but I'll get you - I'll get you a [inaudible] and you'll be able to find him.
McCain: Is there any way you can –
Scoggins: 15 miles east of Kennedy.
McCain: 15 miles east of Kennedy.
Scoggins: Yeah, east of JFK, travelling southwest bound. He's only doing about 300 knots.
McCain: 15 miles East of Kennedy doing 300 knots.
Scoggins: Yeah.

08:47:12-08:47:16 EDT [17:57-18:01]
NEADS trackers at AST Op are awaiting updates
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

NEADS staffer 1: We’re getting updates now on him. Stand by.
NEADS staffer 2: We’re getting updates now on him. Stand by.

08:47:25-08:47:39 EDT [21:22-21:36]
ZNY relays a second coordinate to NEADS ID desk; note: this is some 30 seconds after AA 11 crashed; the coordinate is south of WTC, where AA 11 never was
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Sharon Majeski (ZNY): It’s showing a 40-39 North.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): 40-39 North.
Majeski: And 74-03 West.
Watson: 74-03 West. What was your last one?
Majeski: What’s what?
Watson: Thank you, Ma’am.
Majeski: OK.

08:47:41-08:48:37 EDT [21:38-22:34]
ID Desk staff unsuccessfully searches for AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Shelley Watson (NEADS): Right there. That's where she said it was. I don't see anybody going – well, wait a minute. Learn how to offset. Hello. I forgot how to offset.
NEADS staffer: ID 46 scrambled.
Maureen Dooley (NEADS): 46 scrambled? Is that Z-point? 40, 39, 44.
NEADS staffer 1: Track roughly –
NEADS staffer 2: At 46 (inaudible).
NEADS staffer 1: I've got him eight miles north of (inaudible).
NEADS staffer 2: OK.
Maureen Dooley (NEADS): Let's bring it up and find a primary.
Watson: Well, we're looking to see for a search target. That's all they have, is primary. I don't see – well, if she knows that –

08:47:53-min08:47:54 EDT [17:23-17:24]
Last given JFK Fix/Radial/Distance from ZBW arrives at MCC Op
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

NEADS staffer: 15 Miles east of Kennedy.

08:48:07-08:48:47 EDT [17:42-18:22]
ZBW talks to NEADS MCC Tech; MCC Tech tracks primary target east of JFK and loses it; both these events happen well after AA 11 crashed into the north tower of the WTC
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK

Colin Scoggins (ZBW): You have visual on him?
Joe McCain (NEADS): We're picking up a search track – let me give you a bearing right here. I got it 8 miles East, northeast of Kennedy on search only.
Scoggins: Eight miles East northeast from Kennedy. Eight miles northeast East. We have [inaudible] [To ZBW tracker:] Is that about right? [Back to McCain:] That's about right. Do you have an altitude on that?
McCain: No, I don't.
Scoggins: You don't. When you get an altitude can you call us here at the Center?
McCain: I will do my best.
Scoggins: And we can pass that on to New York, our DSN here is 11635.
McCain: We’re losing primary on him now.
Scoggins: You're losing primary on him now. Do you have another site or –
McCain: No.

08:48:22-08:48:58 EDT [17:52-18:28]
MCC Op talks to a Sgt. from CONR, locates possible target which turns out to be unstable
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

CONR (Sgt. ?): The general would like – do you have radar coverage on this guy?
Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): We are picking them up – we’ve think we’ve picked them up right now. In search only track, he’s approximately 20 –
CONR: Can you point – can you point in or something for us?
Nasypany: We are getting ready to do that right now.
CONR: Great.
Nasypany: We’re getting ready to do it.
CONR: Yeah, I understand.
Nasypany: We just did a 25 mile track area, track production area, where we’re just beating that whole area up.
CONR: I can be looking forward to it on our screen momentarily?
Nasypany: It’s in and out and in and out, so we can’t give a good warm feely on that.
CONR: Right. Copy that, sir. Thanks a lot, appreciate it.

08:48:57-08:49:13 EDT [22:54-23:10]
ZNY tells NEADS ID Desk that AA 11 is a CST right now
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Stacia Rountree (NEADS): Is there any way, Ma’am, that we can get updates as far as the Lat/Long for that aircraft, you know as often –
Sharon Majeski (ZNY): Actually, I’m showing they’re tracking coast right now, so I don’t –
Rountree: Tracking coast what does that mean – is he northbound?
Majeski: It means as far as I’m showing we lost track on him, let me see if I can find out and –

08:49:07-08:49:19 EDT [19:52-20:04]
NEADS Trackers told to keep up; note: no positional updates for the trackers since 8:45 EDT
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): OK, guys, keep an eye on the track. And, um, 11?
TT: Yeah?
Richmond: We’re looking for a search target, OK?

08:49:07-08:49:20 EDT [18:37-18:50]
Possible target located in MCC Op
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Okay. Yeah, that’s CONR.
NEADS staffer 1: That’s what were seeing right now.
Nasypany: Yeah, but this – I don’t think it’s anything. How about that guy right there?
NEADS staffer 2: Roger that. I’ll do what we can.

08:50:12-08:50:46 EDT [19:42-20:16]
MCC Op still got no track on AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

Kevin Nasypany (NEADS): Nope, not yet. We’re still trying to search. We think we might have them just east of New York, but it’s – no. Nope. We’re just – we got American Airlines, it’s a 767. American Airlines 11. Yes, American Airlines 11. OK. And we just got a call from CONR – well can you put it in we haven’t found them yet, so I already told them that.

08:50:27-08:50:43 EDT [24:24-24:40]
ID Desk staff tries to find out what a coast track is
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): They showed him heading – what it was – she said north (inaudible) –
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Coastal. I didn't know what coastal – I didn't know what that meant.
Dooley: She said they – he – they showed him heading coastal now.
[Electronic Voice: Your call cannot be completed as dialed.]
Dooley: (Inaudible) to explain that –
Watson: We can't call long distance from this.
Dooley: It's primary only.

08:50:45-08:50:59 EDT [21:40-21:54]
Second Z-point for trackers announced
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Is that second Z-point his last position? Is it that Z-point?

08:50:45-08:51:13 EDT [24:42-25:10]
Meanwhile NEADS ID Desk is waiting for more positional updates
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): They’re going to give us 3-5 minutes Lat/Long updates right now.
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Hey, you want to dial this number? 631-
Dooley: She’s watching him. That last Lat/Long is 40-39 n, 74-03w, and they’re going to give 3 and 5 minute updates.

08:50:50-08:52:00 EDT [20:20-20:30]
McCain at the MCC Op tells that AA 11 would be east of JFK due to ZBW
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

Joe McCain (NEADS): 15 miles due east of JFK. Last position I got from Boston was 15 miles east of JFK. Okay?

08:50:58-08:51:12 EDT [24:55-25:09]
ID Desk searches for AA 11 around JFK
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): Yes – no, that's –
NEADS staffer: That's JFK. All right?
Dooley: She's watching him. That last Lat/Long was 4039-7403 west, and they re going to give us three- and five-minute updates.

08:51:14-08:51:31 EDT [21:59-22:16]
Second coordinate is finally relayed to the TTs; trackers notice that it’s not east of JFK; note: this is more than four minutes after AA 11 crashed and 3-4 minutes after the coordinate was relayed to NEADS (ID Desk) by ZNY
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): OK. Eleven?
TT: Eleven on.
Richmond: See Bravo 2-10.
TT: Bravo 2-10, stand by.
Richmond: It’s a Z-point east of JFK.
TT: West.
Richmond: No, west. No, that can’t be, that’s west of JFK. Oh my, disregard.

08:51:32-08:52:19 EDT [22:17-23:04]
TTs locate their first primary targets; note: this is more than five minutes after AA 11 crashed
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

TT: We’ve got three straight search tracks, Bravo 264 244 and 275.
Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Where? Where are they at?
TT: Most of them are south of the Z-point, quite a ways.
Richmond: OK, um, the Z-point you’re looking at?
TT: Yes.
Richmond: OK, now we’re just told the last known position was 15 miles east of JFK.
TT: OK.
Richmond: So, where are you’re search targets you’re talking to me about?
TT: Uh …
Richmond: Give me an arrow. OK.

08:51:54-08:52:17 EDT [25:51-26:14]
ID Desk learned of the WTC crash and now asks ZNY for altitude and tracking of AA 11; ZNY is unable to confirm anything
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Shelley Watson (NEADS): New York (inaudible), Huntress ID.
Maureen Dooley (NEADS): See if they lost altitude on that plane altogether.
Sharon Majeski (ZNY): New York.
Watson: Yes, ma'am. Did you just hear the information regarding the World Trade Center?
Majeski: No.
Watson: – being hit by an aircraft?
Majeski: I'm sorry?
Watson: Being hit by an aircraft?
Majeski: You're kidding.
Watson: It's on the world news.
Stacia Rountree (NEADS): Ask them if they still have altitude.
Watson: Do you still have altitude on that aircraft that you have –
Majeski: No. Like – like I said, I'm – I don't work a radar here.

08:52:20-08:52:42 EDT [23:05-23:27]
TTs at AST Op locate more targets
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

TT: Um …
Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): We’re trying, we’re trying to locate information.
TT: Whoops. I got a straight search, another one just came up.
Richmond: That’s had beacon to it, the one you just showed me. The first arrow, 25 miles south of JFK!

08:52:50-08:53:22 EDT [23:35-24:07]
TTs are looking around JFK, new JFK Fix/Radial/Distance established
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

TT: Where’s JFK?
Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): Turn on your NAVAID.
TT: Alright, got it. So, I’m just going to search south of JFK then.
Richmond: Yeah, we’re looking around JFK now, alright?
TT: Alright, straight search.
Richmond: They’re telling that he’s 20 miles south of JFK. Could be that he’s on approach and we can’t see him now, which is a very good possibility.
TT: OK.

08:52:55-08:53:41 EDT [26:52-27:38]
ID Desk learns from ZNY that tracking of AA 11 stopped
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 4 ID Op

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): She doesn't have – we need to find out who's tracking this guy on their scope in the New York Center –
Shelley Watson (NEADS): Is there anybody tracking
Dooley: – (inaudible) and see if he still has an altitude. If he doesn't have an —
ZNY (Jack Jackson?): Hello?
Dooley: – altitude, then they're possibly –
Watson: New York Denter, Huntress ID.
Dooley: – the same aircraft. Did we get a tail number on that?
Watson: Is anyone tracking the hijacked American 11?
ZNY: I'm sorry. Start over again. What about American 11?
Watson: The hijacked aircraft, American 11, is anyone tracking, from New York Center, that aircraft?
ZNY: We had a primary target on him. We are trying to follow him as best we can. He is not squawking a beacon code whatsoever.
Dooley: Can you still see primary?
Watson: Can you still see primary?
ZNY: No, I do not see a primary target at this moment; however, he's not in my airspace. So –
Watson: Okay. I just wanted to give you a heads-up, New York. I don't know if you know, but the world Trade Center's just been hit by an aircraft.
Dooley: They've lost primary on this guy.

08:53:25-08:53:59 EDT [24:10-24:44]
One more target located by TTs
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): So just find me search targets, don’t be, don’t worry about airliners that we know that are cruising it.
TT: Um, there’s a Bravo 214, straight search.
Richmond: OK. I got Bravo 214, south.
TT: Looks like the best possibility. Started squawking now. Now he’s squawking 2113.
Richmond: That was a search target, but now he’s got a beacon to it?
TT: Alright.
Richmond: OK.

08:53:55-08:54:16 [23:35-23:56]
ZBW tells NEADS ID Desk that AA 11 got lost
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 7 ID2 OP

Colin Scoggins (ZBW): And the last hit we had, he was about eight miles south speed miles east of JFK, and he was tracking –
Maureen Dooley (NEADS): Do you have –
Scoggins: – southwest bound.
Dooley: Do you have any - are you still seeing him on your scope –
Scoggins: No.
Dooley: – at all?
Scoggins: No, we've lost everything.

08:54:09-08:54:22 [24:54-25:07]
Richmond is frustrated; no situational awareness yet
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 15 AST Op

Jeffrey Richmond (NEADS): What’s wrong with our, our – those numbers should be right. There’s a problem with the FAA numbers then. That’s what I’m saying. Those are the new numbers, those are the numbers that were given to us, 80-7-06.

08:54:45-08:54:54 EDT [24:15-24:24]
PANTA flights get redirected; 20 miles south of JFK FRD repeated
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 2 MCC Op

James Fox (NEADS): All right. Our last actual reported position if he didn’t crash into the World Trade Center was 20 miles south of JFK. So I want you take them down into this area.

08:55:30-08:55:51 EDT [25:05-25:26]
Otis AFB staff mistrusts the second coordinate
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 3 MCC TK

Michael Kelly (Otis ANGB): And confirm that the location was 4040 north, west 74, please.
Joe McCain (NEADS): I'm sorry, say that again.
Kelly: 4040 North West 74.
McCain: And 74 West. And that is the location of the Main 85?
Kelly: No, that's the – that was the location you guys gave me of the -- of the 767.
McCain: Okay.
Kelly: I wanted to double check the 74 West.

08:56:02-08:56:20 EDT [25:42-26:00]
ZBW repeats the information about the loss of AA 11
DRM1 DAT2 Channel 7 ID2 OP

Maureen Dooley (NEADS): Are you – are – can you say – is anyone up there tracking primary on this guy's (inaudible)?
Colin Scoggins (ZBW): No. We had – the last that we had was about 15 miles east of JFK, or eight miles east of JFK was our last primary hit. He did slow down in speed, the primary that we had, it slowed down below – down to 300 knots.
Dooley: OK.
Scoggins: But that was the last thing we had on him.
Dooley: Okay.
Scoggins: And –
Dooley: And then you lost him.
Scoggins: Yeah, and then we lost him.

No verifiable tracking attempts after that.

 

[progge]

Comments

1. Tracking

The story about NEADS searching for AA 11 is a story about a tracking attempt which ultimately turned out not to be successful. First, as to Lat/Long tracking, at 08:40:03 EDT, ZBW relayed a Lat/Long to NEADS MCC TK, which is 41:15n/73:46w. At around 08:43:10 EDT, this coordinate was feed into the tracking system at MCC (Mission Crew Commander) Op. At 08:45:18 EDT, this coordinate was feed into the tracking system at the AST (Air Surveillance Technician) Op for the TT (Tracking Technicians).
AA 11 was flying 41:15n/73:46w neither at 08:43:10, nor 08:45:18 EDT. AA 11 was flying in a 25 miles scope around 41:15n/73:46w neither at 08:43:10, nor 08:45:18 EDT. At 08:43:00 EDT, AA 11 was at 40:57n, 73:50w, according to the RADES data. This is already outside the 25 miles scope. All other Lat/Longs used for tracking were post-crash Lat/Longs.
Therefore, apparently no one at the MCC Op or AST Op was in any position to successfully track AA 11, based on the Lat/Longs that were given, and independently from other problems like ground clutter.
As to Fix/Radial/Distance Tracking, ID Technician Shelley Watson received two Fix/Radial/Distance (FRD) updates from cheap shot until 08:40:19 EDT, one 40 miles north of JFK, the other 35 miles north of JFK. So the ID Desk had the chance to try to track AA 11 via FRD quite fast. MCC Op tried so, too. Just from the Tapes, the first verifiable tracking attempt via FRD at AST Op happens at 08:52 EDT, well after AA 11´s crash.

Although some people believe that NEADS finally tracked AA 11 shortly before crash, it’s pretty clear from the Tapes that they didn’t. The only possible successful tracker, MSgt. Joe McCain, tracked a disappearing search/primary target, which (i) was east of JFK, where AA 11 never was; (ii) he detected after AA 11 had already crashed. Actually, the dialogue between cheap shot and MSgt. Joe McCain at 08:48:07 EDT is quite interesting. Both seem to locate a target northeast of JFK. However, AA 11 was never east or northeast of JFK. It is pretty clear from the Tapes that cheap shot tracked AA 11 constantly, so he probably was looking west of JFK, while McCain was in fact looking east of JFK, I assume. So they both seem to look at the same radar echo or echoes, but apparently in fact don’t.

It’s also pretty clear from the Tapes that there were several possible targets which turned out to be clutter or other planes. I counted at least nine wrong targets. All these wrong targets were detected after the actual crash of AA 11. I may have overheard other possible target locations in the background. Interestingly, the inability to track AA 11 is communicated differently for the ID Section than for the MCC/AST section: The MCC/AST Technicians locate wrong targets, the ID Technicians don’t locate anything at all. At least this is how it appears just from listening to the Tapes.


2. Types of information coming from the ARTCCs to NEADS

There was much accurate and useful information:
- 40 miles north of JFK
- 35 miles north of JFK
- Heading towards JFK
- Primary target
- Last known altitude 290
- Speed decreases
- Speed decreased to fewer than 300 knots
- Flying southwest bound

There was also accurate, but useless information:
- Original beacon code 1443

There was one slightly inaccurate, but useful information:
- Lat/Long 41:15n, 073:46w

And there was some inaccurate and useless information
- 15 miles east of JFK
- 8 miles east of JFK
- 20 miles south of JFK
- Lat/Long 40:39n, 74:03w

Note: “useful” means useful for tracking AA 11; “useless” means useless for tracking AA 11.
All the information in 3.4 was relayed after the crash of AA 11, so it wasn’t counterproductive. The Lat/Long in 3.3 is only slightly inaccurate (the corresponding RADES coordinate is 41:15n, 073:48w), therefore useful nonetheless.
Remember that cheap shot may have or has provided further FRD updates to NEADS, which were not being recorded. I counted four (40 miles north of JFK, 35 miles north of JFK, 15 miles east of JFK, 8 miles east of JFK).


3. Some remaining questions

I wasn’t able to determine the origin of the “20 miles south of JFK” notion.
I’m still puzzled that there is just one Lat/Long communicated before 08:46 EDT, when comparing this to your recall of the events, cheap shot! I’m not really in any position to judge about what you did, but in my humble opinion you did a great job.

 

[bio]

Concerning J53, I have the impression from the your script, that j53 was needed to backup J52. As this was not possible, NEADS thought, they could still find the plane without J53.

some question:

1. Why was it necessary, that NEADS had to track the hijacked plane by their own radar before they scrambled? Why did NEADS scramble at all after the first crash?

2. You wrote, that "no one at the MCC Op or AST Op was in any position to successfully track AA 11, based on the Lat/Longs that were given" on the other hand "did Cheap Shot a great job" ... What is the conclusion of your good work?

 

[beachnut]

Flight 11? Who cared on 911 save the hazard to other traffic since no one except 19 murderers knew what was going on at the moment and for some time after impact with the WTC.

At first feared a terrible accident, then minutes later feared a terrible attack. What about flight 11? The people watching on RADAR did not know when 11 impacted the WTC at the moment it did; the RADAR world of ATC is not the visual world we see. What about Flight 11, explain how your post means anything to 911 truth and the delusions they make up?

So Flight 11 is a very serious safety issue, an aircraft randomly moving as far as everyone is concerned.

The Controllers and the military at this time are tracking an aircraft so they can keep other planes from crashing, and they would assume he may have serious problems and wants to land at JFK! END OF STORY

Tracking Flight 11 means nothing on 911 since we don't know what Flight 11 is doing! NO ONE KNOWS Flt 11 is about to start killing, the first attack of 4.

What a waste of time save fixing the tracking errors for the next surprise attack by idiots who steal planes; but next time they will bring their own planes with big bombs and lots of jet fuel.

I suspect the military I left in 2002 after 28 years is ready to intercept with new innovative rules to keep air traffic safe in minutes if needed. SO?

What does this have to do with 911 idiotic conspiracy theories?

 

[progge]

Flight 11? Who cared on 911 save the hazard to other traffic since no one except 19 murderers knew what was going on at the moment and for some time after impact with the WTC.
At first feared a terrible accident, then minutes later feared a terrible attack. What about flight 11? The people watching on RADAR did not know when 11 impacted the WTC at the moment it did; the RADAR world of ATC is not the visual world we see. […] So Flight 11 is a very serious safety issue, an aircraft randomly moving as far as everyone is concerned.
The Controllers and the military at this time are tracking an aircraft so they can keep other planes from crashing, and they would assume he may have serious problems and wants to land at JFK! END OF STORY
Tracking Flight 11 means nothing on 911 since we don't know what Flight 11 is doing! NO ONE KNOWS Flt 11 is about to start killing, the first attack of 4.

beachnut, thanks. This, in some sense, is a description I agree with.

What a waste of time save fixing the tracking errors for the next surprise attack by idiots who steal planes; but next time they will bring their own planes with big bombs and lots of jet fuel. I suspect the military I left in 2002 after 28 years is ready to intercept with new innovative rules to keep air traffic safe in minutes if needed. SO?

It’s a sad and painful story, but worth to be told. The information flow was slow, yes, at least AST Op got positional info much too late, and if new innovative rules imply a faster flow of info: Good to hear. But don’t over-interpret my “critical” notes. I don’t criticize NEADS for what they did and how they did it; they tried hard and did a great job, using the means and info they had.
I don’t know whether I understand the bolded part right, but if this timeline can be used as a guideline by future terrorists, I vote for removing it immediately – I just don’t think it can be used as such.

What does this have to do with 911 idiotic conspiracy theories?

I didn’t write this timeline for the JREF CT forum, just decided to share it here, for it might help people to get a sense for how hard lots of concrete and nameable people worked on this plane. My impression is that especially CTers are unable to acknowledge this. But the timeline wasn’t intended to counter any particular CT, and perhaps would have been better placed in the History forum therefore.
What do the mods think?

Why was it necessary, that NEADS had to track the hijacked plane by their own radar before they scrambled?

Who said so?

Why did NEADS scramble at all after the first crash?

bio, it wasn’t immediately known that AA 11 was the plane that flew into the WTC. This is even clear from the transcript you were responding to.
As a footnote on wording, “scramble” for NEADS means the order to get fighters airborne, not the process of getting them airborne.

You wrote, that "no one at the MCC Op or AST Op was in any position to successfully track AA 11, based on the Lat/Longs that were given" on the other hand "did Cheap Shot a great job" ...

So?

What is the conclusion of your good work?

This, of course, depends on the question.

 

[gumboot]

Hi progge, nice work. Only a few points to make really:

Your timeline can probably be better understood if you have a basic grasp of the layout of the SAOC (Sector Air Operations Centre). Firstly, the OPs Floor is a single open space with the glass-enclosed "Battle Cab" located above it. All of the NEADS recordings come from the Ops Floor, which is why there's so much background chatter - everyone's in the same place.

On the right is the ID desk, and their primary job is to collate information from the FAA and pass it through to the others. That's why on 9/11 they're the ones you hear so much, and why they're more interested in things like the original information on the flights than where the flights are right at that moment.

The team responsible for actually identifying aircraft on radar scopes and detecting suspect targets is the Surveillance Team led by the Air Surveillance Technician. The Tracking Techs answer to the AST and have assigned areas and targets they're given to monitor.

The third crucial leg in the tripod is the Weapons Team who are responsible for the fighter aircraft.

At the top of the tripod is the Mission Crew Commander who is the duty officer in charge of the Ops Floor. He is normally standing and moving about the room - he doesn't have a "desk" per se.

Most of the information came from the ID Techs, and two people are gathering that information - Senior Airman Stacia Rountree and Technical Sergeant Shelley Watson. Behind them stands Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley who relays the information they're gathering back to the MCC.

As such, when the ID desk receives some information - such as a lat-long - the entire room knows it instantly. There's no delay in "getting it to the MCC's desk".

 

[gumboot]

It’s a sad and painful story, but worth to be told. The information flow was slow, yes, at least AST Op got positional info much too late, and if new innovative rules imply a faster flow of info: Good to hear. But don’t over-interpret my “critical” notes. I don’t criticize NEADS for what they did and how they did it; they tried hard and did a great job, using the means and info they had.

One of the crucial factors with regards to 9/11 is that there was no common ground for the FAA and NORAD to share information. NORAD's computer systems were so obsolete they couldn't share data directly, and the civil ATC use totally difference reference points for positioning.

Post 9/11 the NORAD computer system was given a huge overhaul so that now the FAA and NORAD can exchange computer data virtually instantly. Locating a target just isn't likely to be a problem again.

It's worth, however, playing a bit of the hypothetical and imagine AA11 kept its transponder on (this was what made tracking it difficult for NORAD). Assume, the moment NORAD know about the flight, they can pick it up on radar and follow it.

Would it have made any difference?

Well they were notified at 0837 and the aircraft crashed at 0846. Nine minutes. The nearest fighters were 190mi away from the WTC, and from when Scramble was ordered it took them six minutes to get airborne (they're allowed up to 15 minutes). That gave the fighters three minutes to get from Otis ANGB to the WTC.

Even assuming these F-15s were in "slick" configuration with no external fuel tanks and no weapons carried on board, and even had the pilots flown them at absolute maximum speed on afterburner, they could not have reached AA11 in time. In fact, they could not have reached the WTC at all - an F-15's internal fuel load only allows six minutes of flying at afterburner, and the flight to the WTC would have taken over 7 minutes.

There is simply no way NORAD could have reached AA11, no matter how "perfectly" everything went for them. And the other sobering fact to consider is that NORAD had more of a chance of intercepting AA11 than any of the other flights.

 

[progge]

Thanks for additional and helpful info, gumboot. Just one question back.

As such, when the ID desk receives some information - such as a lat-long - the entire room knows it instantly. There's no delay in "getting it to the MCC's desk".

Speaking of the MCC you may very well be right. But I still have the impression that the Tracking Technicians, led by J. Richmond (AST Op), received their info too late. Richmond asks at 08:45:04 "Is it that reference point". He then relays the coordinate to his Tracking Technicians and tells them to look within a 25 mile box around that coordinate. This indicates that they didn´t use the coordinate to track AA 11 before 08:45:04, and therefore they started using it too late. Are we on the same page here?
Again, I don´t accuse anybody of anything. It´s just an observation.

 

[gumboot]

Thanks for additional and helpful info, gumboot. Just one question back.



Speaking of the MCC you may very well be right. But I still have the impression that the Tracking Technicians, led by J. Richmond (AST Op), received their info too late. Richmond asks at 08:45:04 "Is it that reference point". He then relays the coordinate to his Tracking Technicians and tells them to look within a 25 mile box around that coordinate. This indicates that they didn´t use the coordinate to track AA 11 before 08:45:04, and therefore they started using it too late. Are we on the same page here?
Again, I don´t accuse anybody of anything. It´s just an observation.

I think it would be a mistake to assume, in such situations, that they're referring to some particular reference point, or that it's the first time they've referred to it. The tapes don't tell you everything that's being said, and obviously you're often missing context based on what people are referring to.

You may be right, and that delay may have occurred (although it looks like quite a delay on paper, it's really not that long at all) but there's so many potential explanations that I don't think you can say with any certainty what has happened.