John Mearsheimer's Iran Proposal

[Captain.Sassy]

http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261/page/1

Fortunately, there is a strategy that has proved effective in the past and could serve again today: "offshore balancing." It's less ambitious than President Bush's grand plan to spread democracy throughout the Middle East, but it would be much better at protecting actual U.S. interests. The United States would station its military forces outside the region. And "balancing" would mean we'd rely on regional powers like Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to check each other. Washington would remain diplomatically engaged, and when necessary would assist the weaker side in a conflict. It would also use its air and naval power to respond quickly to unexpected threats. But—and this is the key point—America would put boots on the ground only if the local balance of power seriously broke down and one country threatened to dominate the others.

This approach might strike some as cynical. It would do little to foster democracy or promote human rights. But Bush couldn't deliver on those promises anyway, and it is ultimately up to individual countries to determine their own political systems. It is hardly cynical to base U.S. strategy on a realistic appraisal of American interests and a clear-eyed sense of what U.S. power can and cannot accomplish.

...


The strategy has three particular virtues. First, it would significantly reduce the chances that we would get involved in another bloody and costly war like Iraq. America doesn't need to control the Middle East with its own forces; it merely needs to ensure that no other country does.

Second, offshore balancing would ameliorate America's terrorism problem. Foreign occupiers generate fierce resentment. Keeping America's military forces out of sight would minimize the anger created by having them stationed on Arab soil.

Third, offshore balancing would reduce fears in Iran and Syria that the United States aims to attack them and remove their regimes—a key reason these states are currently seeking weapons of mass destruction. Persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear program will require Washington to address Iran's legitimate security concerns and to refrain from overt threats.

A final, compelling reason to adopt this approach is that nothing else has worked.

 

[dudalb]

Depending on countries like Iran and Syria to police the mideast is like Depending on a Goat to guard the Cabbage patch.to quote an old Russian proverb.

 

[WildCat]

Depending on countries like Iran and Syria to police the mideast is like Depending on a Goat to guard the Cabbage patch.

Some people think the goat is actually a dove.

 

[dudalb]

And where are the US Troops are to be based?
I think this is a proposol for a complete US withdrawal from the Mideast under a very thin veil. If Mearsheimer wants an Isolationist US Foreign Policy, he should have the honesty to say so.

 

[Praktik]

Depending on countries like Iran and Syria to police the mideast is like Depending on a Goat to guard the Cabbage patch.to quote an old Russian proverb.

Im not sure that's what he's saying. He's talking balance of power between states like Iran and Syria on the one hand, states like Saudi and the UAE on the other.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Isolationist

nope.

 

[WildCat]

Im not sure that's what he's saying. He's talking balance of power between states like Iran and Syria on the one hand, states like Saudi and the UAE on the other.

That's not a balance...

 

[dudalb]

And the Balance Of Power to Preserve Peace idea is questionable anyway. Look at any good book on the Origins of World War One for a good example.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

And the Balance Of Power to Preserve Peace idea is questionable anyway. Look at any good book on the Origins of World War One for a good example.

This is a legitimate criticism. But, to be fair, the situations aren't exactly parallel. In WWI (and I admit I haven't read a great deal about the history leading up to the war), there was no external guarantor of the balance. What Mearsheimer is proposing is that the US establish a balance, but if it falls to pieces (i.e. interstate war), the US intervene on behalf of the losing party to re-establish the balance. The US doesn't completely extricate itself from the situation, but rather hangs over the balance like a sword of Damacles, ready to drop when needed.

Also, I'm glad we're using WWI references now. Ahmedinejad=Hitler was getting so played out...

ETA: PS. Mearsheimer talks about maintaining the balance through basically providing arms to the weaker side, but it's also possible to maintain a balance by encouraging multilateral disarmament.

 

[Beerina]

This is a legitimate criticism. But, to be fair, the situations aren't exactly parallel. In WWI (and I admit I haven't read a great deal about the history leading up to the war), there was no external guarantor of the balance. What Mearsheimer is proposing is that the US establish a balance, but if it falls to pieces (i.e. interstate war), the US intervene on behalf of the losing party to re-establish the balance.

This is exactly what the US did in the Iraq/Iran war -- helped Iraq to keep them from losing, even though they started it.

And later, Bush, Sr. stopped after kicking Iraq out of Kuwait precisely for the reason listed -- to prevent a "power vacuum" of a weak Iraq, especially w.r.t. Iran.

Did that work out well? Did it stop hatred of the US? How about the opposite, which we tried, too?

 

[Praktik]

And later, Bush, Sr. stopped after kicking Iraq out of Kuwait precisely for the reason listed -- to prevent a "power vacuum" of a weak Iraq, especially w.r.t. Iran.

Also because he didn't want to spend blood and treasure in an occupation that was guaranteed to be messy and was not guaranteed of serving the US interest that much at all really.

In this sense, the strategy actually comes out looking pretty good - especially with the benefit of seeing what happened when a future President decided to go all the way in Iraq.

And while Saddam was weak, he still had a deterrent effect on Iran - and he kept the Iranian sympathizing factions of his country under a heavy thumb. So this course also recognized the role of balance of power in keeping different forces in check.

If Iran weren't starting to crumble politically due entirely to internal reasons, we'd all be talking like we were in 2006 - about an "ascendant Iran" and a nervous nexus of Sunnis getting antsy.

Did that work out well? Did it stop hatred of the US? How about the opposite, which we tried, too?

In terms of fueling Islamic radicalism, sure, the troops necessary to enforce containment were an irritant. It was always just one item on the laundry list though and not the only place that had American influence in the ME. Further, the no fly zones had a risk of being a source of conflict escalation and they proved to be so a few times. There were costs to the policy, as there is with anything really.

If you are serious in your highlighting of the US presence and its role as a powerful radicalizing agent, then Mearsheimer's proposal provides a solution, one which I think would do little to negatively impact America's ability to project power when seen as necessary.

I think that to fatalistically resign oneself to the fanaticism of an opponent, as if anything you do can't ever make a dent - is to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. I have long been of the opinion that a drastically reduced ME presence is in the best interest of America and that most interventions and a heavy footprint have had more costs than benefits.

 

[Skeptic]

And the Balance Of Power to Preserve Peace idea is questionable anyway. Look at any good book on the Origins of World War One for a good example.

As Capt. Blackadder said, "there was only one tiny flaw in the plan... it was bollocks."

But I'm getting my camera. We're actually having a thread in the politics forum which deals with the actual merits or faults of a political suggestion and not with partisan bickering.... I suggest the moderators ban this thread as off-topic.

 

[Policenaut]

And while Saddam was weak, he still had a deterrent effect on Iran - and he kept the Iranian sympathizing factions of his country under a heavy thumb. So this course also recognized the role of balance of power in keeping different forces in check.

Yes but wasn't this mainly because nutter Saddam bluffed the whole world into thinking he had wmd? If Iran knew that Saddam and Iraq was as weak as it really was do you think they wouldn't have tried to assert themselves? Balance of power worked only because Saddam was insane and there was a virtual blackout of solid intel on Iraq's weapons programs for about 12 years after the first Gulf War. And as we all know that bluff also caused a slight problem for Saddam in 2003.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Yes but wasn't this mainly because nutter Saddam bluffed the whole world into thinking he had wmd? If Iran knew that Saddam and Iraq was as weak as it really was do you think they wouldn't have tried to assert themselves? Balance of power worked only because Saddam was insane and there was a virtual blackout of solid intel on Iraq's weapons programs for about 12 years after the first Gulf War. And as we all know that bluff also caused a slight problem for Saddam in 2003.

I've heard some people say that Iran has in fact asserted itself more in the region, but your are right that they didn't go 'balls out'.

Was this because of a miscalculation of Iraq's chemical capabilities or other WMD? Firstly, I think the tactical and strategic significance of gas is often overstated. In a modern context they are fairly hard to deliver, first of all, and secondly most armies will have reasonable countermeasures. The gassing of the Kurds, IIRC, relied on low-flying aircraft to disperse gas over Kurdish villages with little or no anti-aircraft capability. I don't know if the Iranians thought Saddam Hussein's Iraq had nuclear weapons, but I don't know how much of a deterrent mustard gas would have been.

I think far more important than Iraq's weakness was the fact that the United States and Britain had an air/naval presence in the region. I think an invasion of Iraq could have been counted on to get some bombings.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

As Capt. Blackadder said, "there was only one tiny flaw in the plan... it was bollocks."

But I'm getting my camera. We're actually having a thread in the politics forum which deals with the actual merits or faults of a political suggestion and not with partisan bickering.... I suggest the moderators ban this thread as off-topic.

lol

please don't I'm on thin ice already...

Anyways, I'm gonna throw out another one from the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs. A bit of a different take from Mearsheimer's but still relying on balance of power theory.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

After Iran Gets the Bomb
A summary of James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh’s (both of CFR) proposal for dealing with a nuclear Iran
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66032/james-m-lindsay-and-ray-takeyh/after-iran-gets-the-bomb
(Subcription required)


The authors start with the assumption that Iran is likely to get a nuclear weapon at this point. Even a successful airstrike would only delay Iran’s program by a few years, at the most. The authors also assume that Iran is a rational actor and as such can be deterred and contained. As the authors note: “Often, the clash of ideology and pragmatism has put Iran in the paradoxical position of having to secure its objectives within a regional order that it has pledged to undermine.” While Iran does seek regional hegemony [on this point the authors seem to differ somewhat from Mearsheimer, who seems to see Iran’s nuclear ambitions as mostly defensively motivated], it “does not seek to invade its neighbors.”

A worst case scenario resulting from Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capability involves a loss of diplomatic clout for Washington, proliferation of nuclear weapons from Iranian sources, and an increase in Iranian support for Hamas, Shiite militias and terrorist groups. Each of these three possible outcomes is either unlikely or overstated in its gravity.

Iran’s subversive activities in the region (sponsoring terrorism and militias) might increase as Iran’s leaders feel emboldened by their nuclear deterrence. However, these activities are likely to continue to lead to only marginal gains for Iran’s regional power: “any efforts to destabilize their Sunni neighbors would meet the same unsuccessful fate as have similar campaigns in the past.” Similarly, while a nuclear Iran might also allow Hamas, Hezbollah and other militant groups in the region to become “more strident in their demands and bolder in their actions”, Israel’s “considerable conventional military power, as well as the US’ support for Israel, would keep these actors in check.” The authors point out [correctly IMHO] that Iran will not risk a nuclear confrontation with Israel [in possession of some 200 nuclear warheads] to support these groups.

The authors are similarly dismissive of arguments that Iran would sell nuclear weapons to its terrorist allies. They make this argument based on Iran’s rationality and observance of clear limits to the escalation of its support to anti-American irregulars in Iraq: “Iran has observed clear limits when supporting militias and terrorist organizations in the Middle East. Iran has not provided Hezbollah with chemical…weapons… or Iraqi militias with the means to shoot down US aircraft. Iran’s rulers understand that such provocative actions could imperil their rule by inviting retaliation.”

So, while Iran might increase its support to these groups following acquisition of a nuclear weapon, this increased support is unlikely to radically alter the balance of power in the region. Nor is Iran likely to supply these groups with a nuclear device, a suicidal move which would invite immediate destruction of Iran. And unlike, say, Pakistan, the authors find that Iran has is unlikely to sell nuclear fuel and technology to other states.

Washington, however, faces serious diplomatic challenges if it does not mount a sufficient response to Iran’s nuclear acquisition, which could lead to a weakening of its standing in the Middle East and ultimately to other Middle Eastern countries seeking their own nuclear devices. Washington should lay out ‘redlines’, i.e. actions that would trigger an immediate and severe American response to Iran (up to and including a nuclear strike); for example, “Washington should … inform Tehran that it would strike preemptively, with whatever means it deemed necessary, if Iran ever placed its nuclear forces on alert.”

The authors worry that a nuclear Iran might threaten to bomb Europe, negating the credibility of a US nuclear deterrent to an Iranian nuclear attack on its neighbours. For this reason, the authors propose that the US continue with plans to deploy a robust ballistic missile defence system and extend this missile defence protection to the Arab countries.

The US should explicitly outline that it will retaliate with nuclear weapons if Iran mounts a nuclear strike on Israel. The authors are in favour of signing a treaty with Israel to this effect. Conventional forces in the region should be sufficient to counter a conventional threat from Iran, which the authors note has a very limited ability to project force outside of its borders.

Rather than broad-ranging economic sanctions, which are opposed by the Iranian opposition movement, the article suggests the “wiser course of action would be to strengthen and better monitor existing export controls” i.e. to further restrict Iran’s military capabilities and undermine the Revolutionary Guard.

The article’s most interesting proposal is that the US encourage the “formation of a regional alliance network that would marshal Arab states into a more cohesive defense grouping.” The authors are not in favour of extending the US nuclear umbrella to cover the regions Arab states, at least not explicitly, though they do favour using US BMD to protect these countries.




My take on this proposal is that it is unnecessarily aggressive. Forming a regional alliance of Arab states would be seen by Iran as a very threatening move. I tend to agree with Mearsheimer's assesment that Iran is mostly pursuing a nuclear weapon because it feels threatened. How about this as an alternative: bringing all middle eastern powers into a collective security treaty? This way, an attack on Iran would be seen as an attack on all, just as an attack by Iran would be seen as an attack on all. This would be much much much much much more difficult to implement, but it doesn't run as much of a risk of Iran acting more aggessively in response to an increased perceived threat.

I also wonder if these authors, and perhaps Mearsheimer too, underestimate the possibility of Iran 'winning' Iraq? I think Iran's influence waned somewhat following the last Iraqi elections but I could be wrong on this.