Are You Conscious?

[westprog]

I do understand that. It is trivially obvious.

I understand that in physical reality, order dependence is instantiated as time dependence.

What westprog is claiming is that time dependence is not a type of order dependence. He/she is claiming that time dependence is some different creature altogether that is only incidentally related to order dependence. Hence, he/she thinks that the world of abstract computation has no way to emulate time dependence.

I am claiming that time dependence is a type of order dependence and thus can be emulated in the world of abstract computation -- because the world of abstract computation is built upon order dependence.

Critical word highlighted. I've already stated that a TM can simulate time dependent processes. It cannot, however, emulate them. That was why I gave the potted history of computing, with reference to real-time processing. The Turing model cannot describe time-dependent processing.

 

[Dancing David]

I didn't ask you that. I asked you if science conducted by delusional people is reliable.

That depends on the protocols and methods and the object of the experiment, some yes, some no.

 

[Dancing David]

It really doesn't matter how carefully I put things, people will read what they want to read.

Such evidence as there is indicates that QM is acausal, at a fundamental level. There's no disputing this - it's accepted by everyone. There is no evidence that reality at the level of QM operates on a cause and effect basis. Such evidence as we have - and there is a lot of it - indicates that QM operates on a statistical probabilistic basis. So on the basis of pure science, we appear to have an acausal universe - which would of course be non-computable.

Nevertheless, there is the possibility that underlying what appears to be randomness, there is a cause and effect mechanism - let's call it God - invisible, omnipotent and infinite. It will have to operate outside all currently known laws of physics, but it's always possible that new laws will turn up. If those new laws can be confirmed - though at present there isn't even any conceptual basis for guessing what they might be - then the computational cause and effect universe might be rescued.

So bearing this in mind, I specifically stated - because I knew that someone would jump on it - that I was speaking on the basis of current scientific knowledge. So I get told that when discussing the universe, talking about the most successful scientific theory ever is out of bounds. Yeah, that makes sense.

I stated why QM does not apply, and until we have GUT and more than 'interpretations' we can't say if QM is causal or not. Seriously, we don't have a good theory for interpretation yet. So if it is causal or not is unknown. It can be causal and probablistic as well.

So what was your 'not cuased' event you were reffering to?

The validity of QM as a theory is in no way bound with if the events are causal or not.

ETA: What is not computable on the macroscale?

 

[Dancing David]

I see the actual point has been missed. If one acts consciously in real time, then consciousness must be at least able to keep up. If one's consciousness is unable to react to the ball coming towards one, one cannot decide to catch it. A consciousness that operated on a much slower scale could not consciously interact with the world. I suppose that it's theoretically possible to have a consciousness far faster than necessary - that would simply be unlikely from an evolutionary viewpoint.

However, the essential aspect is that there is time dependence implicit in a consciousness that interacts with the world, and there is no reason to suppose that this can necessarily be abstracted away.

I can argue otherwise, if consciousness is different elements, the ability to catch a ball may not be a nessecary one, as the outlier of a person that is paralyzed would show.

ETA:
It is really dependant upon the features of the defintion, a slower consciousness would still be conscious, just at a seperate time scale.

 

[Dancing David]

Sigh. This is getting tiresome.

Really, just here for less than a week and you grow tired of having to explain yourself?

That is the JREF, you have to explain, over and over and over. Refine, define and explain.

We all agree that it's a "thing" since the damn word encompasses everything.

Nope that is your personal; idiom.

In fact, there's the word "thing" in "everything". Care to guess why ? What we're arguing here is whether it's a thing like legs or a thing like running.


It is a thing like neither. That is exactly the point. It is a thing entirely defined by itself, in itself, and of itself.

then that is not a defintion. that is a closed tautology, isn't it? If language is based upon external referents, then you have something that you are saying is beyond language. But that is just an assertion.

What about the medical usage of the term consciousness? And what makes *YOU* believe you are conscious?

Aku concludes it to be ‘physical’ in the broad sense of the word, in so far as everything that exists is physical. It is not like legs, it is not like running, it is not like anything….it is itself, and itself exists….and everything that exists in a physical universe is, by definition, physical. The specific characteristics that describe / define it are exactly what is elusive (significantly so, and for very good reason [your difficulty recognizing them is simply evidence of this fact {Dawkins didn’t describe it as the biggest unanswered question in science for nothing}]).

The difference is that you conclude that ‘consciousness’ is not itself a distinct reality,

And what defintion do you use to make it a distinct reality, seriously. I would like to see that parsed out.

you think it is ‘merely’ a function of the brain (which, by itself, would still make it a reality of truly formidable dimensions)….perhaps because you simply lack the vocabulary to imagine it adequately (this is a fundamentally relevant issue when dealing with ‘consciousness’….our ability to conceptualize what is involved).

And have you seen it not associated with a brain, do you have a brain or not?

Aku suggests it is a physical reality in and of itself….and you naturally ask, what kind of physical reality? It is the sum total of something very very significant. Beyond that, we don’t know (scientifically).

Really, so all that is known is just tossed aside? Okay.

All we know (or, perhaps more accurately, reasonably speculate) is that it is one, and one of singularly unique and elusive properties and dimensions….most of which get described in weird philosophical ways by weird philosophers (like me).

just because you describe it that way does not mean it is the only way to describe it.

…in….my…opinion

 

[rocketdodger]

Not sure I followed your argument with westprog very closely, but is he saying that a simulated consciousness isn't a consciousness because it doesn't do what a consciousness does with the same speed ?

Not quite.

He (is westprog a "he?" I haven't found out yet so I don't like to make the assumption...)/she is saying that a consciousness "simulated" on a pure abstract ideal Turing machine might not be conscious because each operation doesn't take any "time" to complete.

The argument being that in the "pure abstract" world (which is irrelevant, because it doesn't exist, but even so westprog is wrong in another way) there is no such thing as "time."

I think, though, that I have shown -- and I hope you agree with me -- that this is wrong. In the "pure abstract" world, time actually is the order of events.

 

[rocketdodger]

Critical word highlighted. I've already stated that a TM can simulate time dependent processes. It cannot, however, emulate them. That was why I gave the potted history of computing, with reference to real-time processing. The Turing model cannot describe time-dependent processing.

Blah blah blah.

How about you try something new for a change and actually address the arguments everyone levels at you?

We know you think "The turing model cannot describe time-dependent processing." We know. We know we know we know -- because thats all you ever say.

What you don't say -- ever -- is why all the posts numerous individuals have made about why you are wrong are wrong themselves.

Every time you do post something novel it is merely a rant that has nothing to do with the issue, such as your treatise about "time dependent processing." Dude, you can talk all you want, but if you don't actually argue a point in a valid fashion then nobody really cares about all the talk.

 

[AlBell]

In the "pure abstract" world, time actually is the order of events.

Yup, time exists so everything doesn't happen at once.

Is it trivially obvious to you that consciousness arises in your "pure abstract" world? It isn't to me.

 

[rocketdodger]

What RD needs to do - and which he hasn't done, in spite of lapsing into bold - is show how a Turing machine can carry out time dependent functions.

Wrong.

Look at a Turing machine. It does step n of the algorithm before step n + 1.

before

before

BEFORE

It doesn't do step n + 1 before step n. That would be a different algorithm.

Are you seriously disputing this?

The time dependence is there, it just isn't what you think it is. We don't need to be concerned with how "long" a step takes because it is irrelevant as long as step n occurs before step n + 1.

There's always, when discussing Turing machines, the problem of what, say, the tape is, and what the machine is. That's the kind of thing that needs to be nailed down if the claim that the functionality of the brain is equivalent to a TM is to be given consideration.

No, actually, there isn't always that problem. If you had taken courses on computation theory, you would know this. Nobody really cares about what the "tape" is vs. the "machine" unless it is a test question on an exam. The notion of Turing equivalence is about the types of operations that can be performed on information -- educated people call this computation, in case you are interested -- not "tapes" vs. "machines."

For instance, please tell me what is the "tape" and what is the "machine" in The Game of Life, which is known to be Turing equivalent. I have no idea what it is. I don't know if anyone does. But I accept that TGOL is Turing equivalent (it can emulate a Turing machine) due to the types of things TGOL can do.

To claim there must be a "tape" and a "machine," otherwise Turing equivalence is invalid, is like some idiot peasant arguing with a biologist about whether microorganisms actually exist because "they can't be seen."

In the case of the ball catching, if timing does reduce to physical order, it does so on a far smaller scale than that of the supposed TM which runs on the neurons of the brain.

wtf are you talking about?

If the hand reaches the goal at any time -- any time -- prior to when the ball reaches the goal, the ball can be caught.

How on Earth is that "a far smaller scale...?"

 

[rocketdodger]

Is it trivially obvious to you that consciousness arises in your "pure abstract" world? It isn't to me.

No, not at all.

In fact it is very counterintuitive, given how intrinsically linked we are to the rate of events in our surrounding environment.

However, because I am a programmer, and I have an education in computer science, and I understand computation theory, I am able to take things on what you could call "logical faith." That is, if something is logically valid, then no matter how counterintuitive it seems to me, as a human, it is still correct.

The human computer programmer side of me just assumes that the reason there is such a disconnect between intuition and logical reason when it comes to consciousness is that the fundamentals of consciousness are so far removed from the actuality, it just isn't possible for a creature with our inference capability to "see the forest through the trees" without assistance from computers or other tools that we might not currently have available to us.

I mean, I already work in codebases that are beyond my complete understanding -- once I understand one part I have forgotten the details of other parts -- and I already have to take things on this "logical faith." I take it on logical faith that if each of my functions returns something correctly, then the entire system will work correctly -- and I don't need to simultaneously understand the whole thing in one glance to believe this.

So consciousness is the same way. I assume that if consciousness can be reduced to Turing equivalent algorithmic steps -- and I think it can, for logical reasons -- then the reason it doesn't seem that way to me as a human is just because there is a literally incomprehensible number and complexity of those algorithmic steps.

 

[rocketdodger]

Yup, time exists so everything doesn't happen at once.

I am saying it is the other way around -- not everything happens at once, and the order of things happening is what we label time.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not claiming that consciousness needs to operate at any particular rate. It might be that certain consciousnesses could operate at a much slower or faster rate.

However, I do claim that a conscious being that interacts with its environment must have a consciousness that is timed in order that its interaction makes sense. Events must happen in succession, without too great or small an interval in the subjective experience. I don't claim that it would be impossible for something to have a much slower consciousness, but it would have to interact in different ways.

OK. I'm not sure I accept that, though. We construct our reality largely, so I can conceive of a situation in which temporal succession could be very different from what we experience and consciousness still be possible. The need for one event to succeed another seems, at least to me, to concern more how we are constructed and what we experience. I have no reason to suppose that consciousness could not be constructed in a different way to deal with an entirely different temporal profile.

This implies that human consciousness is time dependent, and that any model of consciousness should take this into account. In particular, the model of consciousness that allows three different "conscious" programs to run at different speeds and have the same experience is, I consider, unlikely.

I don't think that implies time dependence at all. You are really just speaking of sequencing which could be done in a time dependent manner -- at least in terms of how we use those words -- or could be fashioned, theoretically, in a completely different way.

There is a time dependent necessity to neural function, though.

That three different programs working at different speeds with a single environmental input would have the same experience I would doubt too. There is obviously one thing changed in the experiences, which is the time element; so there is no reason to suppose that the experience would be the same. In fact there is every reason to believe that it would not. But that has nothing much to do with consciousness itself as a process but rather with differences in particular experiences within consciousness.

 

[AlBell]

No, not at all.

In fact it is very counterintuitive, given how intrinsically linked we are to the rate of events in our surrounding environment.

However, because I am a programmer, and I have an education in computer science, and I understand computation theory, I am able to take things on what you could call "logical faith." That is, if something is logically valid, then no matter how counterintuitive it seems to me, as a human, it is still correct.

The human computer programmer side of me just assumes that the reason there is such a disconnect between intuition and logical reason when it comes to consciousness is that the fundamentals of consciousness are so far removed from the actuality, it just isn't possible for a creature with our inference capability to "see the forest through the trees" without assistance from computers or other tools that we might not currently have available to us.

I mean, I already work in codebases that are beyond my complete understanding -- once I understand one part I have forgotten the details of other parts -- and I already have to take things on this "logical faith." I take it on logical faith that if each of my functions returns something correctly, then the entire system will work correctly -- and I don't need to simultaneously understand the whole thing in one glance to believe this.

So consciousness is the same way. I assume that if consciousness can be reduced to Turing equivalent algorithmic steps -- and I think it can, for logical reasons -- then the reason it doesn't seem that way to me as a human is just because there is a literally incomprehensible number and complexity of those algorithmic steps.

OK. Thanks.

Last night the Sci Channel had a program in part on artificial consciousness; iirc the comment was made 'the human brain processes 10 billion trillion steps every second'. Does that capability exist with current computer technology?

I don't dispute that most of that 'computing' is overhead, yet how does one separate the part actually needed for human consciousness?

Until we can produce the implications of 'logical faith' in reality we have accomplished nothing.

 

[rocketdodger]

OK. Thanks.

Last night the Sci Channel had a program in part on artificial consciousness; iirc the comment was made 'the human brain processes 10 billion trillion steps every second'. Does that capability exist with current computer technology?

I don't dispute that most of that 'computing' is overhead, yet how does one separate the part actually needed for human consciousness?

That kind of estimate is based upon a whole-brain simulation, using either a good model of biological neurons or a suitably featured artifical neural network model. The number they have at wikipedia is 10^16 computations per second, which is equivalent to 10 petaflops.

Also listed at wikipedia is the world record for the currently fastest supercomputer, the Cray "jaguar," that is capable of 1.75 petaflops.

So that puts it in perspective that we are *almost* able to just simulate the entire brain in a naive fashion -- it will be technically possible, as in we will have hardware that can do it, well within a decade.

EDIT -- on a single machine, that is. We could already do it in a distributed fashion if we wanted to.

But that isn't very intersting, now is it, because it doesn't address your second question, which is where all the exciting stuff is. There are some very good ideas floating around (I even started a thread on it in the science & mathematics section, although I have already moved on from my original model) that give insight into probable mechanics. If you really want to know, I would start with the wikipedia pages for "associative memory" and "self organizing maps."

If you would like to discuss how such associative computation probably gives rise to you and I, I would be happy to go into detail regarding my own pet theories (and I think ~wasp here has some ideas on it as well, it would make a good thread topic), but I am sure your brain will start making connections as soon as you read those wiki pages.

Until we can produce the implications of 'logical faith' in reality we have accomplished nothing.

Yep I agree.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Is science conducted by delusional people reliable? It's a simple yes or no answer, Belz.

No, it isn't.

So does the possibility of delusion render empirical investigation in general unreliable?

What do you mean by "delusional" ? If you're asking me if science done by people who have malfunctioning senses or brains is reliable, it'll depend on whether the science is done very, very thoroughly.

I mean "delusional" in the same sense that you used it earlier. You cited the fallibility of human cognition and judgment to conclude that introspection is "unreliable".

Thats not mistaking one sensation for another; thats one sensation being substituted for another.

Huh ? How is that different ?

What the hell, Belz?!?! You should be able to figure that out for yourself. If someone shot you in the foot with a nail gun your resulting experience of pain would not be mistakable for any other. Assuming somehow that instead of the sensation of pain you experienced the taste of sweet in response being shot with a nail gun, your experience of sweetness would not be mistakable with any other. You tacitly and unequivocally are directly aware of whatever you're feeling at any given time. How could this possibly be a point of contention for you?

So you have a means of identifying consciousness in others without the need for self-reports?

Those are two distinct things. Intuitive guessing would be me saying "hey! That guy acts like me, and I'm conscious, so he must be as well!". Basing yourself on other people's reports of being conscious is a different criterion altogether.

Neither of which are fully sufficient, in and of themselves. Consciousness can, and does occur irrespective of self-reports or motility. That is why I'm saying that we need a means of physically identifying consciousness without having to rely on those criteria.

Then stop asking the same question I've already answered.

You haven't.

Yes, I damn well did:

"I'd say that consciousness is something like 'legs' [LOL! ] and experiences are akin to 'running'"

You haven't told me if you understand that "legs" and "running" aren't the same thing although they are both things, and why you think consciousness is more akin to the former than to the latter.

Legs run. Consciousness experiences. Noun, verb. Anything clicking in there yet?

By studying living brains with the co-operation of a conscious subjects, pursuing an understanding of how the biophysics of the brain produces conscious experience, and using that understanding to identify what it means to be conscious in physical terms.

Neat. How do you link consciousness to its physical causes ?

Why divination, of course!

[hint: the answer is in the post you just responded to]

You've an extremely bad habit of drawing conclusions that do not at all follow from given premises. Thats called a non sequitur, Belz.

If NOTHING exists outside your own mind and your mind is, obviously, unreliable, then NOTHING can ever be known except that. It's not a non-sequitur. It's an obvious fact.

[bolding added]

If everything that exists is simply the contents of the solipsists mind then those things must be knowable to the solipsist. Ergo, your earlier claim that solipsism implies that knowledge is not possible is patently false. You really should be more self-aware of what you're saying and your line of reasoning, Belz [Oops! that would require your unreliable skills of introspection, wouldn't it? You really need to work on that.]

You're questioning the validity of introspection when science is itself simply extrospection -- introspection inverted. Both extro- and introspection are empirical, except the former is outward observation and the latter is inward observation. In any case, they both have the exact same ontological basis: consciousness.

This comes back to claiming that a non-conscious machine couldn't do science even if it were programmed to. I see no reason why it couldn't. Also, I'm not disagreeing that subjective data is required in science (what you call introspection although I don't think we're talking about the same thing). I'm saying that the point of science is to remove the "subjective" from the "data".

Science is the systematic acquisition of knowledge. Data cannot become knowledge until some conscious entity(s) become aware of it, and awareness is -by definition- a subjective phenomenon. All mental endeavors, whether they be sensations, emotions, thoughts, reasoning -- all of them are subjective phenomena.

[ETA: I'm really beginning to suspect that a lot of the contention here comes from your understanding of english words like "subjective" and "introspection".]

Critical thinking is inherently a philosophical exercise. If "its stupid and it's useless" are the best rebuttals you can make against solipsism then your critical thinking skills are extremely lacking.

Usefulness is not a characteristic of a good hypothesis ? That's new to me.

Useful for what purpose? Think, Belz! Show your work!

 

[AkuManiMani]

I didn't ask you that. I asked you if science conducted by delusional people is reliable.

That depends on the protocols and methods and the object of the experiment, some yes, some no.

The protocols are only as good as the individuals designing them and the quality of the experimental design is only as good as the scientists conducting it.

 

[westprog]

Not quite.

He (is westprog a "he?" I haven't found out yet so I don't like to make the assumption...)/she is saying that a consciousness "simulated" on a pure abstract ideal Turing machine might not be conscious because each operation doesn't take any "time" to complete.

The argument being that in the "pure abstract" world (which is irrelevant, because it doesn't exist, but even so westprog is wrong in another way) there is no such thing as "time."

I think, though, that I have shown -- and I hope you agree with me -- that this is wrong. In the "pure abstract" world, time actually is the order of events.

We need to consider the nature of a physical model. It is not a matter of whether time exists in a "pure abstract" world. All physical models which refer to time are abstract models.

The question is whether a model which has no concept of time is the correct model for a physical process where time is an essential element. One doubts whether it is. If it were true that order is sufficient to model processes that deal in time, then why would the theory of general relativity need to concern itself with the concept - either as time or space-time?

Physical models abstract as much as possible about the process which they are describing - but no more.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Ya think? Here I thought we are discussing human, or at least human-like consciousness.


Indeed. And if you can't compute fast enough to react to real world events what are we discussing?


We certainly agree on that anyway.


Yup. So again, what do you think this thread is discussing?

I am trying to clear up what I think is a central confusion in this argument.

Yes, human consciousness is time dependent. It is a particular example of consciousness -- the only example of which we are sure -- realized in neural structures.

There is another issue at play in this discussion, which concerns Turing machines and time independence.

That Turing machines work independent of time is interesting but of no real consequence in this discussion really, because Turing machines are an abstraction and they deal with consciousness as an abstract computational issue. That Turing machines do not necessarily include a time component does not mean that they cannot deal with time issues by computational means. The abstract computation of Turing machines demonstrate that consciousness (as a computable function) can theoretically be recreated in other media. That's all it shows. This does not mean that Turing machines are or can be conscious. They are not. They don't exist. They are abstractions.

For some reason the idea that Turing machines can be conscious has entered this discussion, but that whole area is a red herring. Turing machines are not and cannot be conscious. They are important to demonstrate that more than one possible physical solution is theoretically possible since the whole shebang can be abstracted. That is why this whole issue over time is not really important to that particular issue. Time is an important issue for any physical example of consciousness, whether we are discussing humans, computers or whatever.

 

[westprog]

If the hand reaches the goal at any time -- any time -- prior to when the ball reaches the goal, the ball can be caught.

That might be the case in the simplest of physical instances, but in most contexts it is not a matter of holding out the hand and waiting, but moving the hand so that it passes through the required space within a particular time. Too soon is as bad as too late.

I was watching Aston Villa play Blackburn Rovers tonight, as an example of how human consciousness works in practice. Holding out the hand (or foot, or head) and waiting for the ball is not how it works. Moving the body in order to intercept within a small time window is what happens.

 

[AlBell]

I am trying to clear up what I think is a central confusion in this argument.

Yes, human consciousness is time dependent. It is a particular example of consciousness -- the only example of which we are sure -- realized in neural structures.

Agreed.

There is another issue at play in this discussion, which concerns Turing machines and time independence.

That Turing machines work independent of time is interesting but of no real consequence in this discussion really, because Turing machines are an abstraction and they deal with consciousness as an abstract computational issue. That Turing machines do not necessarily include a time component does not mean that they cannot deal with time issues by computational means. The abstract computation of Turing machines demonstrate that consciousness (as a computable function) can theoretically be recreated in other media. That's all it shows. This does not mean that Turing machines are or can be conscious. They are not. They don't exist. They are abstractions.

I see your point here, but do not agree that captures the essence of what has gone on in this and in similar threads.

For some reason the idea that Turing machines can be conscious has entered this discussion, but that whole area is a red herring. Turing machines are not and cannot be conscious.

If PixyMisa and RD agree that this is what they have been saying, I'll stand corrected.

Pixy did mention his thermostat (which doesn't have SRIP) isn't conscious, but his toaster I believe still is. As are programs he and many others have coded.

They are important to demonstrate that more than one possible physical solution is theoretically possible since the whole shebang can be abstracted. That is why this whole issue over time is not really important to that particular issue. Time is an important issue for any physical example of consciousness, whether we are discussing humans, computers or whatever.

As I asked RD, what meaning does abstracted consciousness have?

ps. I'm sorry nothing approaching closure was reached in your Awareness thread. I still like 'awareness of awareness'.