Are You Conscious?

[Limbo]

I'm screwed then, my ego is gargantuan.

Yeah. I don't believe in coincidence, I think you're on the winding road you're on because you can handle it. Even so, you're in for some tough trials and tribulations.

Though I suppose that even people like you must have a pretty big ego. Posting in forums like this pretty much presupposes you think you have something to say that others should give a damn about reading. To me, that's the essence of ego.

Yeah. It fluctuates. You'll find that the 'universal computer' has painful ways of serving humble pie. But the alternative is worse.

Individuation is not a walk in the park but it's worth it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Thanks for the link; I'll try to get to it soon. I do have a slight problem with Rama's viewpoint, though, since he doesn't think that other animals are able to experience qualia. That strikes me as wrong.

I'm not that familiar with Ramachandran's stance on animal consciousness. However, I do remember hearing him argue that reptiles probably do not experience visual qualia because they lack the brain structure that is correlated with it in humans. Humans that have damage to this specific area of the cortex suffer from blindsightedness and, the reasoning goes, since reptiles lack this region all together they are probably blindsighted in some sense.

Personally, I do no think that other animals are unable to experience qualia. It seems more likely that atleast some non-human animals are conscious and their qualia probably vary to some extent between species.

I also do not think it follows necessarily that computationalism is wrong. I think it depends considerably what we mean by computation and not speak of simple computer programs as the prime example. Neurons perform computational tasks and I do not think these tasks are observer dependent as computation (I think Searle is wrong).

It could be that computationalism is wrong, though. Who knows? I do think we need to try as many approaches as possible, so any non-computational approach that works I'm all in for.

I'm not arguing that computation plays no role in consciousness, or that thinking is not a form of computation. The problem with computationalism is that it approaches the subject strictly as a computational abstraction. Consciousness is not simply a matter of performing the right ops; what is essential is the -kind- of system performing the ops. What we should be focusing on is finding out what substrates provide conditions sufficient for producing consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I can't claim to speak for FUWF, but personally, if an artificial system exhibited behaviors indicative of volition I would consider it strong evidence that it's conscious. If we have a scientific theory of consciousness that meets the criteria I mentioned earlier we would be able to prove whether or not an entity is conscious, rather than rely on personal intuition and inference.

You would be right if we know it's true volition. But that's a big can of worms. That's why I tried to break volition up into computational pieces in one of my posts to Pixi. But if we had a free will thread you'd quickly see those pieces get mangled, even by me. I can't claim to have fully captured volition.

As you know, in my post to Pixi previous to expressing requirements for volition I also gave other pseudo-specific computational requirements for consciousness. Some, if not all of these, would probably be subsumed in supporting my conditions for volition as well.

I guess I'll just have to start another thread on volition then

My guess is that consciousness is extricably linked to biophysical processes and that to produce viable synthetic consciousness one would have to creating a living construct. IMO, if it's conscious it's a person.

Did you mean to use the word "extricably" or "inextricably"? Your second sentence suggest you meant "inextricably".

My bad -- major typo on my part. I meant to say "inextricably"

If the former we agree. If the later, we don't. I guess we'd just have to continue to agree to disagree on this. Physical brains are substrate for computation but they ARE not computation qua computation. If we want to learn how brains compute, then I agree we have to understand the biophysics. But the principles of conscious computation could probably be performed on a digital computer (or a quantum computer if by some remote chance Penrose is right).

Saying " consciousness is inextricably linked to biophysical processes" is analogous to saying "driving is inextricably linked to to the internal combustion engine". But we know we can drive electric vehicles too.

I concede that, as far as we know, consciousness can be produced by an abiotic substrate. Its just my personal opinion that for an entity to be conscious would mean that it's alive in some sense.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Anyone who wishes to discuss volition and free will are welcome to join the thread I just started

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

I'm not that familiar with Ramachandran's stance on animal consciousness. However, I do remember hearing him argue that reptiles probably do not experience visual qualia because they lack the brain structure that is correlated with it in humans. Humans that have damage to this specific area of the cortex suffer from blindsightedness and, the reasoning goes, since reptiles lack this region all together they are probably blindsighted in some sense.

I'd say we don't know enough to feel very confident one way of the other. I would tend to agree with Rama HOWEVER, neurobiologists have found that neural functions tend to migrate with neural evolution. Some processes that take place in real reptilian brain don't occur in our so called "reptilian" brain but have migrated to "higher" brain areas that took over some of these functions. We simply have more brain to deal with and you could view turtles as having to do more with less.

We also know that there is amazing plasticity. There are a few relatively normal or at least conscious people around who developed after losing relatively huge amounts of their brains. Areas normally associated with one function can develop others. Various forms of cognitive synesthesia appear to involve abnormal recruitment of visual cortex often enabling various forms of mathematical savants.

So I wouldn't bet my car on Rama but he serves a reasonable working assumption.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

I concede that, as far as we know, consciousness can be produced by an abiotic substrate. Its just my personal opinion that for an entity to be conscious would mean that it's alive in some sense.

I guess that means we have to define life and living. If life means biological organisms that reproduce, or anything that must be able to reproduce, then I disagree. I get the feeling that I came very late to this debate and you made your case on this long ago. I don't want to make you repeat why life is necessary for consciousness. Or do you want to redefine life as including any conscious? I'm a bit lost.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I concede that, as far as we know, consciousness can be produced by an abiotic substrate. Its just my personal opinion that for an entity to be conscious would mean that it's alive in some sense.

I guess that means we have to define life and living. If life means biological organisms that reproduce, or anything that must be able to reproduce, then I disagree. I get the feeling that I came very late to this debate and you made your case on this long ago. I don't want to make you repeat why life is necessary for consciousness. Or do you want to redefine life as including any conscious? I'm a bit lost.

Actually, I don't think I've made much of an issue over whether or not consciousness can be produced in non-living entities. Frankly, I'm not prepared to strongly argue for that position; its just a hunch and I don't seriously hold to it, ATM.

As to what I mean by 'life':

I would tentatively define 'life' as any autopoietic system that adaptively maintains itself against thermodynamic equilibrium [reproduction, IMO, is just a secondary feature of life].

 

[Frank Newgent]

When will you come clean you big lug you?

I can't... still on the run for once having been involved in the political bombing of a self-referencing anemometer lab. A researcher was struck and killed by a ping-pong ball.

 

[Maia]

Yeah. It fluctuates. You'll find that the 'universal computer' has painful ways of serving humble pie. But the alternative is worse.

Carl Sagan's Apple Pie Universe Recipe. Try it with milk.

 

[rocketdodger]

Frank, I'm convinced from your often hilarious and pithy remarks that you understand the essence of consciousness but are withholding your revelations from us. If so, why? When will you come clean you big lug you?

No, please -- it is better if he keeps his revelations to himself.

 

[rocketdodger]

I still don;'t think you fixed the qualification error though - do you intend to mean that all or any form of SRIP is conscious, e.g., simple recursion?

I am not sure simple recursion fits the notion of self-reference that I have in mind. I will post about this tomorrow when I am waiting for a compile.

 

[PixyMisa]

I've put FUFW back on ignore. I'm going to be really busy the next few days, and he seems to have decided to argue semantics, where he simply has nothing interesting to say. He's not even entertainingly wrong; it's just misguided pedantry against strawmen.

Pleh. One good post is not enough. UcE had one good post in the NOMA thread.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

I've put FUFW back on ignore. I'm going to be really busy the next few days, and he seems to have decided to argue semantics, where he simply has nothing interesting to say. He's not even entertainingly wrong; it's just misguided pedantry against strawmen.

Pleh. One good post is not enough. UcE had one good post in the NOMA thread.

This is mere pontification and handwaving to conceal what I suspect is the fact that you realize you're in an untenable position and can't admit your errors. Grow up, Pixi.

Unlike you, in post after post, I set forth logical premises, claims, and logical straightforward conclusions following proper semantics and philosophical discipline which apparently you can't handle - so you dismiss it. Before you put me on ignore because I was "uncivil". I changed my incivility removing that excuse and now I'm on ignore because "I'm repetitive and pedantic".

It is no longer enough to yell "strawman" and fling ad homs as you hypocritically accused me of doing. You have to explain logically from my premises why they are "strawmen" and back up all your claims you never have with a properly structured logical argument.

You are behaving like a coward. You're putting me on ignore and you've been absent from these arguments of late because you know or are at least beginning to fear I'm right and you have not thought of an adequate defense. So I suspect you will wait until you think this has all blown over before you come back and pretend you won, it was all semantic misunderstanding, or just hope it goes away. It won't.

I suspect even some of your friends who still agree with your arguments see the game you're playing. I don't think they or anyone else will be impressed or forget. I know I won't. I think you're a very smart person Pixi. You don't have to agree with my arguments, but until you fairly address them logically premise by premise, you deserve no respect in this forum and I hope nobody, especially your friends, let you off the hook. If they do, they won't be doing you any favors.

 

[Belz...]

Personally, I'd rather not live forever...

That's odd. Most people don't want to die, which is one reason we invented religion. Personally, I'd like to at least live as long as I'd like... which isn't going to happen as far as I know. But since I don't believe in things just because they'd be convenient to me...

 

[Belz...]

Are you claiming the subjective experience of pain confers an evolutionary advantage? Do you admit that qualia exist??

Pain is a behaviour, Malerin.

 

[Belz...]

None of my experience of pain is modelled on someone else's experience of pain, because I've never had someone else's experience of pain.

Westprog, did you even read what I said ? I didn't say "experience", I said "behaviour", and I didn't say "all", but "much".

My behaviour when I experience pain might well be based, partly, on how other people behave.

Precisely.

That people can behave differently when experiencing the same pain can be readily confirmed.

How could you tell if it's the same pain other than through their behaviour ?

 

[AkuManiMani]

I've put FUFW back on ignore. I'm going to be really busy the next few days, and he seems to have decided to argue semantics, where he simply has nothing interesting to say. He's not even entertainingly wrong; it's just misguided pedantry against strawmen.

Pleh. One good post is not enough. UcE had one good post in the NOMA thread.

This is mere pontification and handwaving to conceal what I suspect is the fact that you realize you're in an untenable position and can't admit your errors. Grow up, Pixi.

Unlike you, in post after post, I set forth logical premises, claims, and logical straightforward conclusions following proper semantics and philosophical discipline which apparently you can't handle - so you dismiss it. Before you put me on ignore because I was "uncivil". I changed my incivility removing that excuse and now I'm on ignore because "I'm repetitive and pedantic".

It is no longer enough to yell "strawman" and fling ad homs as you hypocritically accused me of doing. You have to explain logically from my premises why they are "strawmen" and back up all your claims you never have with a properly structured logical argument.

You are behaving like a coward. You're putting me on ignore and you've been absent from these arguments of late because you know or are at least beginning to fear I'm right and you have not thought of an adequate defense. So I suspect you will wait until you think this has all blown over before you come back and pretend you won, it was all semantic misunderstanding, or just hope it goes away. It won't.

I suspect even some of your friends who still agree with your arguments see the game you're playing. I don't think they or anyone else will be impressed or forget. I know I won't. I think you're a very smart person Pixi. You don't have to agree with my arguments, but until you fairly address them logically premise by premise, you deserve no respect in this forum and I hope nobody, especially your friends, let you off the hook. If they do, they won't be doing you any favors.

QFT

 

[westprog]

Pain is a behaviour, Malerin.

No, it isn't. I've already said that I can have different behaviours for the same pain, and the same behaviour for different pains. I do not experience pain due to watching how other people behave when they are (presumably) suffering pain. I just behave in a similar way.

Anybody who has ever suffered a toothache in silence knows that pain is not behaviour.

 

[westprog]

How could you tell if it's the same pain other than through their behaviour ?

I'm talking about my own pain. I can behave entirely differently for the same pain through simple choice.

Women from different cultures behave quite differently in childbirth. Are we to assume that their actual experience of pain is different?

A statement like "pain is behaviour" is so obviously, provably wrong, that it could only be made in a philosophical discussion.

 

[westprog]

I'm not that familiar with Ramachandran's stance on animal consciousness. However, I do remember hearing him argue that reptiles probably do not experience visual qualia because they lack the brain structure that is correlated with it in humans. Humans that have damage to this specific area of the cortex suffer from blindsightedness and, the reasoning goes, since reptiles lack this region all together they are probably blindsighted in some sense.

Personally, I do no think that other animals are unable to experience qualia. It seems more likely that atleast some non-human animals are conscious and their qualia probably vary to some extent between species.

Any assertions about animal qualia should be very cautious indeed. Perhaps reptiles don't experience qualia. Perhaps they experience different qualia using different parts of the brain - areas that don't work for humans because they have something better. Reptiles can certainly see - that's all we know for sure.

I'm not arguing that computation plays no role in consciousness, or that thinking is not a form of computation. The problem with computationalism is that it approaches the subject strictly as a computational abstraction. Consciousness is not simply a matter of performing the right ops; what is essential is the -kind- of system performing the ops. What we should be focusing on is finding out what substrates provide conditions sufficient for producing consciousness.

We know that the brain performs certain functions which are computational. We also know that it performs other functions which are not computational. It's not possible to make a brain which is purely computational. No such device is possible outside theory. We can make devices which by design have no essential components which are not computational. Whether or not these are essentially equivalent to human brains is an open question. I can see no reason to confidently assert this.