• Security incident: ISF was recently accessed by intruders. Please change your password, and change it anywhere else you used it. Read more

Switzerland Anyone? (Health Care Reform)

Actually, while there is an obvious correlation between size and cost savings, I think there is also evidence that public plans are indeed more efficient than private. Krugman lays out a great argument here.

If you compare Medicare to Medicare Advantage, you can compare a public system and a private system that both serve the same population of patients, and you'll see that the private system is far more expensive.
A big problem, however, is that hospitals lose money on Medicare patients. The Mayo Clinic, for example, is renowned for being a world-class non-profit medical facility that is also a low-cost facility. But even they lose $840 million every year on Medicare patients, and they have to make that up by charging more to non-Medicare patients. If everyone was covered by Medicare the only way even a low-cost non-profit like the Mayo Clinic could keep its doors open is by eliminating equipment, personnel, and rationing services.
 
The parts you bolded dealt with administrative costs of companies offering health insurance, I thought that's what you were talking about?

No, those were the administrative costs for the insurers. Maybe it was unclear since I didn't include the preceding sentences. "Nor is it easy to measure administrative costs among private insurers. For one thing, which private insurers? When the Congressional Budget Office examined this issue, it found that administrative costs -- including advertising and profits -- accounted for 12 percent of the average insurer's dollar. But that hid substantial variation among insurers."


If you want to talk about administrative costs of insurance companies bear in mind they have to contend with 50 different sets of rules and regulations, Medicare only has one set of rules. My idea is to get the states out of health insurance regulation, so there's only one set of rules to follow instead of 50. This would greatly reduce administrative costs of health insurance, as would rules disallowing medical rating of the insured. The latter would eliminate all the procedures in place for determining pre-existing conditions among other things.

I agree with eliminating pre-existing conditions and other discrimination based on health, so no quibble there. I don't quite buy the claim that regulation is the cause of the higher administrative costs though. Do you have any proof for that?


First of all, all of the plans must offer at least the minimum coverage as set by the Federal insurance regulator. Everyone who wishes to purchase a particular plan must be allowed to do so, the insurance company cannot refuse. They also pay the same price, no one pays a different premium for the same plan - but the companies themselves set the actual premium. Because minimum coverages are set by the regulators, and insurers cannot deny coverage for pre-existing conditions or any other reason insurers will find that price is a major factor in customers picking their insurance carrier. This forces efficiency into the insurance market, since an insurer setting their price too high will soon find their customers moving on to their competitors instead.

Yes, I understand your proposal. My claim is that prices would then tend to stabilize at a certain standard level. Therefore there would hardly be any competition and no need for multiple private insurers, which would by definition have smaller pools and higher costs than one centralized single payer system.


Of course they would have multiple plans, because some people will want more than the minimum legal insurance coverage.

This implies to me that the minimum mandated coverage would be insufficient. Or that the "Cadillac" plans would be a small niche market for the well-off. At any rate, a single payer system doesn't necessarily preclude this kind of supplemental coverage. Why not go to single payer for your minimum mandated portion of the coverage and let private industry make their profits on the extras?


The pool is the same, I'm introducing competition for those in it.

No, your system by design has smaller pools of insured. If your system had only 5 insurers, they would each have a pool 1/5th the size of a single payer system. One central system is the largest possible pool, and therefore the most cost efficient, as risk is spread out from cradle to grave over the entire population.

If you're unhappy with the price or services of single-payer, what competitor can you turn to?

You could buy supplemental private insurance. I believe that's the way things operate in France for example.


A big problem, however, is that hospitals lose money on Medicare patients. The Mayo Clinic, for example, is renowned for being a world-class non-profit medical facility that is also a low-cost facility. But even they lose $840 million every year on Medicare patients, and they have to make that up by charging more to non-Medicare patients. If everyone was covered by Medicare the only way even a low-cost non-profit like the Mayo Clinic could keep its doors open is by eliminating equipment, personnel, and rationing services.

Well sure, at the moment Medicare patients are the most costly to treat because they are the oldest and sickest. If medicare was opened to all it would become much cheaper. And I'm not going to simply take Mayo's word for it that they're a low cost hospital. We have no idea what kind of unnecessary costs they may have.

Question: if you want to require all insurers to provide plans to everyone for the same prices, do you also want to require providers to bill their services at the same rate for every insurer? How will you account for regional differences in cost of living, real estate, doctor's salaries, etc. that would cause one hospital's costs to be higher than another?
 
Of course they would have multiple plans, because some people will want more than the minimum legal insurance coverage. They may want dental plans, for example. They may want a private hospital room when they have to go to the hospital, they may want brand-name drugs rather than generic drugs, they may want in-home nursing care, etc etc. Of course, there would be no Federal subsidy for the excess coverage but many people would opt to pay extra for these things, and in fact this is where insurance companies could increase their profit margins, by selling policies in excess of the mandated coverages.

I'm not sure you are correct here. If there are multiple plans with large differences I forsee that plans that offer more services will be inundated by those who know they need those services and thus the spreading around of cost would not exist. For example, if one plan has a much lower cost for prescription meds than another yet the monthly cost to subscribe is higher then I would expect people with costly prescriptions will flock to this program. The problem this causes is then the plan has few people in its program that are low cost consumers because the low cost consumers will flock to programs that are have lower monthly premiums.

It becomes an actuarial nightmare as the cost of the programs becomes weighted far different than the populace.
 
Last edited:
I'm not sure you are correct here. If there are multiple plans with large differences I forsee that plans that offer more services will be inundated by those who know they need those services and thus the spreading around of cost would not exist.

Yeah, it's really unclear what Wildcat's minimum mandated coverage would entail. I was assuming that any coverage worth mandating is going to have to basically cover everything apart from elective procedures like plastic surgery or upgrading to the fancy private hospital suite. Those don't seem like things worth buying insurance for IMO. They seem more like rare one-time out of pocket expenses.

On the other hand, if he's talking about a wide variety of plans with varying degrees of coverage (including annual out of pocket maximums, high deductible plans with HSAs, etc.) I don't see how it could possibly work. If you're disallowing discrimination based on preexisting conditions, what's to stop me from buying the cheapest plan until I get sick and then switching over temporarily to a better plan?
 
On the other hand, if he's talking about a wide variety of plans with varying degrees of coverage (including annual out of pocket maximums, high deductible plans with HSAs, etc.) I don't see how it could possibly work. If you're disallowing discrimination based on preexisting conditions, what's to stop me from buying the cheapest plan until I get sick and then switching over temporarily to a better plan?

Exactly. And as time goes on, more and more people will use this strategy and eventually the better plan will go bankrupt.

He might be talking about a cafeteria of plans that have minor differences that are tailored for specific demographics. That might work but I think eventually we would see the wisdom of just one plan for all and the others would wither away.
 
I'm not sure you are correct here. If there are multiple plans with large differences I forsee that plans that offer more services will be inundated by those who know they need those services and thus the spreading around of cost would not exist. For example, if one plan has a much lower cost for prescription meds than another yet the monthly cost to subscribe is higher then I would expect people with costly prescriptions will flock to this program. The problem this causes is then the plan has few people in its program that are low cost consumers because the low cost consumers will flock to programs that are have lower monthly premiums.

It becomes an actuarial nightmare as the cost of the programs becomes weighted far different than the populace.
I think you misinterpreted what I was saying here. Any coverage over the mandatory minimum would not be eligible for subsidies. To simplify it, these plans would be a rider/supplement on top of the basic plan. Thus, no one basic plan could have a lower cost for prescription drugs than any other because the mandated minimum drug benefit is the same for all plans. A plan that exceeds this, such as one allowing brand-name drugs in cases where a generic equivalent is available, would necessarily be on the rider which isn't available for subsidies.

In other words, every health insurance plan starts at the same baseline, but coverage in excess of that baseline must be paid for 100% out of pocket by the insured. No subsidies for "cadillac coverage".
 
Wildcat,

Ok, so why pay for the extra insurance when you can just pay out of pocket if you need it? Or what is to stop people from changing plans when they need it or from only those who benefit massively from flocking to the caddy plan and swamping it in cost?
 
Yeah, it's really unclear what Wildcat's minimum mandated coverage would entail. I was assuming that any coverage worth mandating is going to have to basically cover everything apart from elective procedures like plastic surgery or upgrading to the fancy private hospital suite. Those don't seem like things worth buying insurance for IMO. They seem more like rare one-time out of pocket expenses.

On the other hand, if he's talking about a wide variety of plans with varying degrees of coverage (including annual out of pocket maximums, high deductible plans with HSAs, etc.) I don't see how it could possibly work. If you're disallowing discrimination based on preexisting conditions, what's to stop me from buying the cheapest plan until I get sick and then switching over temporarily to a better plan?
Minimum coverage is determined by the government regulatory body. If done correctly there would be no advantage to switching plans once you get sick, because you wouldn't get any extra coverage unless you are willing to pay for it yourself. This is a good point though regarding the extra coverage, I think it's reasonable to allow some medical rating for the extra coverage much as it is now with individual plans so people don't buy dental plans just for when their kid needs braces for example. And companies could offer the extra insurance (even as a group plan) as part of a benefits package if they wish.

The point is no one should be left without coverage for medically necessary treatment throughout their lifetime, nor go bankrupt in the process.
 
Wildcat,

Ok, so why pay for the extra insurance when you can just pay out of pocket if you need it? Or what is to stop people from changing plans when they need it or from only those who benefit massively from flocking to the caddy plan and swamping it in cost?
Good point, answered in post 68.
 
No, those were the administrative costs for the insurers. Maybe it was unclear since I didn't include the preceding sentences. "Nor is it easy to measure administrative costs among private insurers. For one thing, which private insurers? When the Congressional Budget Office examined this issue, it found that administrative costs -- including advertising and profits -- accounted for 12 percent of the average insurer's dollar. But that hid substantial variation among insurers."
Which supports what I said. Companies offering policies in many states will have higher administrative costs in order to comply with the regulations in those different states. Think of a small state like Wyoming, which is 1/30 the population of Illinois. Yet administrative costs of complying with the regulations are roughly the same, since it's a fixed cost which doesn't correlate with population.

I agree with eliminating pre-existing conditions and other discrimination based on health, so no quibble there. I don't quite buy the claim that regulation is the cause of the higher administrative costs though. Do you have any proof for that?
:confused:
I think it's obvious it requires more time, effort, money, and personnel to comply with 50 sets of regulations than it does for one. It's not like these regulations fit on a post-it note...

Yes, I understand your proposal. My claim is that prices would then tend to stabilize at a certain standard level. Therefore there would hardly be any competition and no need for multiple private insurers, which would by definition have smaller pools and higher costs than one centralized single payer system.
The experience of countries in which this is in place doesn't support that view. The Netherlands, for example, has fierce price competition among the private insurers. So much so that they actually lose money selling the basic policies, and make their money selling the extra coverage.

This implies to me that the minimum mandated coverage would be insufficient. Or that the "Cadillac" plans would be a small niche market for the well-off. At any rate, a single payer system doesn't necessarily preclude this kind of supplemental coverage. Why not go to single payer for your minimum mandated portion of the coverage and let private industry make their profits on the extras?
You could do that, but then there is no price competition at the basic level. Government bureaucracies tend to become bloated and inefficient over time, even in health care. Our public hospital system here in Cook County is extremely bloated with political payrollers, so much so an outside consulting firm hired by the county determined that 30% of the staff could be eliminated and we'd still be in the top tier of staffing in the industry. All that bloat costs money, and it's not easy to fix. That report I mentioned sits on a shelf where it's been for years, ignored and gathering dust while the bloat continues and more tax dollars are poured into the system. This is what I wish to avoid nationally.

No, your system by design has smaller pools of insured. If your system had only 5 insurers, they would each have a pool 1/5th the size of a single payer system. One central system is the largest possible pool, and therefore the most cost efficient, as risk is spread out from cradle to grave over the entire population.
Once you reach a certain size the risk variance become negligible, and our population is large enough and number of insurance companies small enough where this shouldn't be an issue at all. Bigger doesn't necessarily mean more efficient, particularly in the absence of competition..

Well sure, at the moment Medicare patients are the most costly to treat because they are the oldest and sickest. If medicare was opened to all it would become much cheaper. And I'm not going to simply take Mayo's word for it that they're a low cost hospital. We have no idea what kind of unnecessary costs they may have.
It's not that they're the costliest to treat, it's that Medicare doesn't pay enough for the treatment given. And in the industry, in stats compiled by 3rd parties, the Mayo Clinic is usually at or near the top as far as keeping costs low goes. You don't have to take their word for anything.

Question: if you want to require all insurers to provide plans to everyone for the same prices, do you also want to require providers to bill their services at the same rate for every insurer? How will you account for regional differences in cost of living, real estate, doctor's salaries, etc. that would cause one hospital's costs to be higher than another?
I don't think the differences are all that great where that becomes an issue. A Target store, for example, sells a particular model of television for the same price here in Chicago as they do in rural Indiana. In general, high-cost areas are also high-volume areas so they tend to cancel each other out.
 
=The Netherlands, for example, has fierce price competition among the private insurers. So much so that they actually lose money selling the basic policies, and make their money selling the extra coverage.

OK, so I looked up the Netherlands example and it seems to answer a lot of my questions. Is this what you're proposing?

"Insurers set a standard price for each adult for the year for a given region of the country and have to insure all people who apply for insurance at that price regardless of the age or health status of the applicant. An equalization fund, which is essentially a national sickness fund funded from a form of income tax on employers and employees is used to pay for the health care of all Dutch children and to compensate insurers if they have more high risk profile clients than the other insurers. Thus Dutch insurers welcome the sick and the elderly because they are fully compensated for the higher risk profile of these clients. People living in more expensive areas of the country have to pay higher premiums but the elderly and the sick pay the same premiums as everyone else in that region. Social insurance covers the insurance costs of those with limited incomes such as the unemployed and the permanently disabled."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-tier_health_care
 
OK, so I looked up the Netherlands example and it seems to answer a lot of my questions. Is this what you're proposing?

"Insurers set a standard price for each adult for the year for a given region of the country and have to insure all people who apply for insurance at that price regardless of the age or health status of the applicant. An equalization fund, which is essentially a national sickness fund funded from a form of income tax on employers and employees is used to pay for the health care of all Dutch children and to compensate insurers if they have more high risk profile clients than the other insurers. Thus Dutch insurers welcome the sick and the elderly because they are fully compensated for the higher risk profile of these clients. People living in more expensive areas of the country have to pay higher premiums but the elderly and the sick pay the same premiums as everyone else in that region. Social insurance covers the insurance costs of those with limited incomes such as the unemployed and the permanently disabled."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-tier_health_care

Of course, I can't answer for WildCat, but his proposal looks a lot like the Dutch situation. What's missing from his proposal is the risk equalization pool, which would IMHO be necessary to make sure that insurers won't try to only attract the young and healthy. In practice, in the Dutch situation about half of the insurance premiums is paid by the people through the tax office (and is income-related) and redistributed to the insurance companies. What I hear, the algorithm the pool uses works great.

I don't understand what the wiki article you quote means by geographical premium differences. AFAIK, the premiums are the same throughout the country.

Insurance companies compete fiercely on price and on service. Most also throw in some token extras in their basic plan, which cost nothing but sound nice in ads. When the current system was introduced in 2006, over 20% of the people switched insurer, and still people switch quite a lot I think.

And they all also sell additional coverage. Think of dental plans, coverage of sCAM, coverage abroad (read: outside Europe), extra coverage on glasses, fysiotherapy, around pregnancy, etc.
 
Of course, I can't answer for WildCat, but his proposal looks a lot like the Dutch situation. What's missing from his proposal is the risk equalization pool, which would IMHO be necessary to make sure that insurers won't try to only attract the young and healthy.
How does that work? Are high-risk people assigned to a particular insurer?
 
How does that work? Are high-risk people assigned to a particular insurer?

On the contrary. The part of the insurance premiums that is distributed to the insurance companies through the risk equalization pool is distributed on basis of the statistical risk of their clients. So an insurer gets, say, 5 times as much from the pool for a 65-year old than for a 25-year old. That way, an insurer has no incentive to try to avoid the high-risk people.

I don't know which parameters are used for the distribution, but since the introduction of the current Dutch system they have fine-tuned the distribution algorithm.
 
On the contrary. The part of the insurance premiums that is distributed to the insurance companies through the risk equalization pool is distributed on basis of the statistical risk of their clients. So an insurer gets, say, 5 times as much from the pool for a 65-year old than for a 25-year old. That way, an insurer has no incentive to try to avoid the high-risk people.

I don't know which parameters are used for the distribution, but since the introduction of the current Dutch system they have fine-tuned the distribution algorithm.
Ah, that makes sense. So basically the government pays a premium on top of the regular premium for high-risk individuals?
 
Ah, that makes sense. So basically the government pays a premium on top of the regular premium for high-risk individuals?

No, the basic idea of the pool is only that the government (re)distributes the money.

The insurance premiums you pay in Holland are more or less split in half.

One half you pay directly to your insurance company. The height of the premium is set by the insurance company. That's the price part the companies can compete about.

The other half is collected by the tax office, and is 6.8% over the first 30,000 of your taxable income. The tax office then distributes this money over all insurance companies on basis of the risk profile of their clients. That's the risk equalization pool.
 
The gap I see between the system in the Netherlands and Wildcat's proposal is that I get the feeling Wildcat doesn't want to dramatically increase government spending. Is that correct?

"In 2005, the Netherlands spent 9.2% of GDP on health care, or US$3,560 per capita. Of that, approximately 65% was government expenditure" source

"In 2007, the U.S. spent $2.26 trillion on health care" source

So if we adopted an identical system to the Netherlands, and the government covered 65% of total health care expenditures that would amount to around $1.5 trillion a year. Since people already complain about the current cost of Medicare and things like "will the real 10 year cost of Obamacare be $6 trillion" I don't see how a far more expensive plan is a real solution.
 
No, the basic idea of the pool is only that the government (re)distributes the money.

The insurance premiums you pay in Holland are more or less split in half.

One half you pay directly to your insurance company. The height of the premium is set by the insurance company. That's the price part the companies can compete about.

The other half is collected by the tax office, and is 6.8% over the first 30,000 of your taxable income. The tax office then distributes this money over all insurance companies on basis of the risk profile of their clients. That's the risk equalization pool.
I see now. I like that idea.
 
The gap I see between the system in the Netherlands and Wildcat's proposal is that I get the feeling Wildcat doesn't want to dramatically increase government spending. Is that correct?

"In 2005, the Netherlands spent 9.2% of GDP on health care, or US$3,560 per capita. Of that, approximately 65% was government expenditure" source

"In 2007, the U.S. spent $2.26 trillion on health care" source

So if we adopted an identical system to the Netherlands, and the government covered 65% of total health care expenditures that would amount to around $1.5 trillion a year. Since people already complain about the current cost of Medicare and things like "will the real 10 year cost of Obamacare be $6 trillion" I don't see how a far more expensive plan is a real solution.
It's not "far more expensive" - $2,26 trillion ~ $7,500 per person. We're paying more than double per capita what they pay in the Netherlands. Bear in mind there is no equivalent of Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, VA, etc etc in the Netherlands - everyone is covered under the plan described by ddt.

Competition helps keep costs down, even the socialists in Europe (;)) are realizing that. Too bad we have no competition in the US, and aren't going to get any under the idiocy passed by the House nor the foolishness being considered by the Senate.

Btw psychicity, (correct me if I'm wrong ddt) the Netherlands had single payer until a few years ago. It was scrapped in favor of the private insurance system they have now because the government-run single payer resulted in all the problems inherent in such systems.

What's really pathetic is we have examples of systems that work elsewhere, and we're completely ignoring them in favor of the disaster looming before us.
 
It's not "far more expensive" - $2,26 trillion ~ $7,500 per person. We're paying more than double per capita what they pay in the Netherlands.

I'm saying it would be more expensive than the current plan under discussion which is being falsely spun to be $6 trillion over the next 10 years or some such nonsense. Even if you believe those bogus numbers, your plan if done exactly like the Netherlands would be far more expensive.

Which is fine with me, and apparently the people of the Netherlands. I'm not worried about cost. But I think it's disingenuous of you to show support for a plan that you think is the cheap, efficient, market solution, when in fact, it requires large amounts of public spending raised through additional taxes to actually work.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom