My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[westprog]

No, you can't.

1. The moment you "experience" it, it's already a memory. You admitted that you can't be sure of your memories.

I am sure of my memories, in the same way that I am sure of my experiences. I am sure of the precise fact of the memory, or of the experience, or of the experience of the memory. I cannot be sure that the memory or experience is a reliable indicator of an external reality - external encompassing the Andromeda galaxy or my big toe.

2. Your "consciousness" itself could be an illusion.

No, it can't be, because without consciousness, you can't have an illusion. If there is no-one there to be fooled, there is no illusion.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The ironic part is that information processing, of any type, is not a physical property, but an abstract functional property. The SRIP explanation of consciousness bypasses biology and physics altogether and tries to reduce it to a technical IT problem.

I think that is a mischaracterization and one of the side issues that impairs such discussions. Discussions of information processing simply deal with the issue at a different level than the bare physics. What still occurs at a simpler level is Turing machine equivalence -- replace 0 with 1, replace 1 with 0, move one space to the left, move one space to the right.

Information processing is built on this fundamental level; and that information processing is designed by humans. Nature does the same thing in a blind way with neurons. There isn't that much difference in the two; we simply do not discuss the lower levels because explanations involving that sort of detail are cumbersome.

 

[cyborg]

I find it strange that some people don't seem to care whether the people they encounter have experiences

What is the experience of an electron?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Together with research on brain function, that's the most important step to be taken.

So, what is 'awareness'?

 

[westprog]

And I should clarify that "experience" and "conscious" are two different words.

Yes, which is why I said that I preferred not to use the term "experience" because I found it ambiguous. That's not to say that I haven't used it before, and probably will do again.

This makes the rest of your post redundant.

I might have a number of beliefs, but I'm not eccentric enough to think that everyone arguing with me actually reads my posts.

 

[westprog]

So, what is 'awareness'?

I'll get on it right away. Tomorrow OK?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'll get on it right away. Tomorrow OK?

The check is in the mail?

I would be amazed if we could all agree on a definition, so I would appreciate any help. I tried to get Geoff (UE) to do this years ago, but he wouldn't bite.

By the way, as I think you agree, I'm not interested in debate tactics. I would really like to arrive at a workable definition that we might operationalize.

 

[cyborg]

Yes, which is why I said that I preferred not to use the term "experience" because I found it ambiguous.

Yet somehow "consciousness" isn't when you use it?

 

[westprog]

Yet somehow "consciousness" isn't when you use it?

Everything in this discussion is hazy and ill-defined.

 

[blobru]

Involving self-referential information processing does not necessarily imply that this is sufficient to explain consciousness, only that it is necessary.

Is awareness simply self-referential information processing? Is there nothing else to it? Clearly when we speak of human consciousness we include awareness under aspects of emotion and motivation; and I think we confuse the picture whenever we move the issue around from discussions of what awareness is to these other aspects of human experience (even though they are undeniably a part of the whole picture).

I think if we could systematically pin down what we mean by these words, then we could try to operationalize them in different systems.

I think the basis of "self"-awareness may be the understanding of oneself in the abstract, as a part of the abstractions that one categorizes qualia with. {A rambling aside: by "qualia" I understand the non-verbal information within consciousness: sense qualia: sight, sound, touch, taste, smell; and embodied 'gut' (prioperceptive) qualia, informing consciousness of one's immediate, emotional reaction. Qualia are a 'language': part of the internal signalling between competing cognitive systems. In computational terms: the current environment is conscious input to unconscious sense algorithms which output sense qualia; which are input to an unconscious gut algorithm, which outputs to consciousness a gut-reaction emotional qualia (the feeling of fear, e.g., if your current environment includes a ticking timebomb); the gut reaction qualia trigger memory algorithms which output a more informed rational appraisal of the current environment ("I know I saw MacGyver dismantle one of these once"); the emotional reaction and rational appraisal are input to behavior algorithms ("10 seconds... do I trust MacGyver and cut the blue wire, or run like heck?"); cue the anxiety qualia, cue the faith in MacGyver qualia, behavior algorithm scales tip in latter's favor ("cut the blue wire"), decision qualia cues doubt algorithm ("no wait, the red wire, the red wire, dummy!"), memory algorithm ("yes, it was the red wire!"), sense algorithm ("2 seconds!"), gut algorithm ("this is it, chump!"), and... tune in next week.

Note that the output described in words isn't necessarily output to consciousness in words: the output is probably better characterized as a mix of feelings of anticipation -- potential success or disaster -- that involve any or all of the sense and gut qualia, which we might call irrational qualia; and possible courses of action, understood as urges to move here with this instrument in hand and do this, in equivalent terms that is, not those exact words.

Words of course allow us to step back from our environment and consider it in abstract terms, try to classify it and compare it to previously learned, formally similar environments. If the information in memory isn't sufficient, we can inform consciousness with information stored outside memory, peers, books etal., which abstract others' understood experience as potential knowledge; then commit that understood experience by rote, or abstract the logic behind the experience and apply it to other formally similar situations, etc.}

Anyway, the key point I want to make about "self-awareness" is that we are self-aware when we understand ourselves as an abstraction -- "one locus of experience, a point-of-view among other points-of-view, agent among agents, differentiating self from not-self and other selves, embodied within time & space, etc." -- and are able to see ourselves in abstractly understood potential future situations, to make rational plans based on these abstractions which include our "self" as potentially effective and/or vulnerable agent, and thus behave rationally, taking account of our understood past and potential futures, rather than simply react instinctively, or by rote ritual, to our sensed present.

Hope that makes sense and isn't too obvious or irrelevant.

 

[westprog]

The check is in the mail?

I would be amazed if we could all agree on a definition, so I would appreciate any help. I tried to get Geoff (UE) to do this years ago, but he wouldn't bite.

By the way, as I think you agree, I'm not interested in debate tactics. I would really like to arrive at a workable definition that we might operationalize.

That would be nice, but I don't think it's going to happen.

 

[cyborg]

Everything in this discussion is hazy and ill-defined.

That's because it suits your view for it to be so.

 

[westprog]

That's because it suits your view for it to be so.

Then help the Wasp out. He's looking for some sharp definitions.

 

[cyborg]

He wants a definition everyone can agree on. This will preclude people who are not interested in such things.

 

[Dancing David]

Well let us start the criteria list and the refine it:
levels of consciousness^WP

Normal: (not very helpful wiki) they are oriented X3 and respond quickly. I would state as well that they are alert and responsive to the enivorment, capable of following directions, have memory retention and a level of problem solving and response. So they can recall and respond to local events and stimuli. They can recall simple memories (John Plotz lives on Aberdeen Avenue and works as a florist) and state 'general knowledge'. They seem to have a sense of the enviroment around them.

Confusion: delayed response to questions, often not oriented x3, slow to respond and may not respond to instructions, possible memory problems. I would add that response times vary pst five seconds is delayed, 35 seconds is very delayed, once in an assesment it took and individual to the count of 95 to respond. delayed response in noticable in people who have psychosis or are intoxicated.

Delirious is listed but in actuality not very different from Confused, mainly in response to internal stimuli and beliefs not shared by others.

Obtunded: a person has a decreased interest in their surroundings, slowed responses, and sleepiness.

the next 3 have to do with level of arousal and specifically response to stimuli from somewhat if incoherent response to no response.

So it is a start, and probably a new thread?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think the basis of "self"-awareness may be the understanding of oneself in the abstract, as a part of the abstractions that one categorizes qualia with. {A rambling aside: by "qualia" I understand the non-verbal information within consciousness: sense qualia: sight, sound, touch, taste, smell; and embodied 'gut' (prioperceptive) qualia, informing consciousness of one's immediate, emotional reaction. Qualia are a 'language': part of the internal signalling between competing cognitive systems. In computational terms: the current environment is conscious input to unconscious sense algorithms which output sense qualia; which are input to an unconscious gut algorithm, which outputs to consciousness a gut-reaction emotional qualia (the feeling of fear, e.g., if your current environment includes a ticking timebomb); the gut reaction qualia trigger memory algorithms which output a more informed rational appraisal of the current environment ("I know I saw MacGyver dismantle one of these once"); the emotional reaction and rational appraisal are input to behavior algorithms ("10 seconds... do I trust MacGyver and cut the blue wire, or run like heck?"); cue the anxiety qualia, cue the faith in MacGyver qualia, behavior algorithm scales tip in latter's favor ("cut the blue wire"), decision qualia cues doubt algorithm ("no wait, the red wire, the red wire, dummy!"), memory algorithm ("yes, it was the red wire!"), sense algorithm ("2 seconds!"), gut algorithm ("this is it, chump!"), and... tune in next week.

Note that the output described in words isn't necessarily output to consciousness in words: the output is probably better characterized as a mix of feelings of anticipation -- potential success or disaster -- that involve any or all of the sense and gut qualia, which we might call irrational qualia; and possible courses of action, understood as urges to move here with this instrument in hand and do this, in equivalent terms that is, not those exact words.

Words of course allow us to step back from our environment and consider it in abstract terms, try to classify it and compare it to previously learned, formally similar environments. If the information in memory isn't sufficient, we can inform consciousness with information stored outside memory, peers, books etal., which abstract others' understood experience as potential knowledge; then commit that understood experience by rote, or abstract the logic behind the experience and apply it to other formally similar situations, etc.}

Anyway, the key point I want to make about "self-awareness" is that we are self-aware when we understand ourselves as an abstraction -- "one locus of experience, a point-of-view among other points-of-view, agent among agents, differentiating self from not-self and other selves, embodied within time & space, etc." -- and are able to see ourselves in abstractly understood potential future situations, to make rational plans based on these abstractions which include our "self" as potentially effective and/or vulnerable agent, and thus behave rationally, taking account of our understood past and potential futures, rather than simply react instinctively, or by rote ritual, to our sensed present.

Hope that makes sense and isn't too obvious or irrelevant.

Yes, and that is a very good discussion of the self and the abstraction that we need to realize when we discuss self-awareness.

I'm a little more interested in the 'awareness' side of things, though. What exactly do we mean by awareness, or understanding for that matter?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

That would be nice, but I don't think it's going to happen.

But why not try? If we can't start at the beginning, then what is the point of all this discussion?

I'll start a new thread with definitions in mind.

I don't pretend to have an answer; I'm hoping that we can arrive at one through interaction. That's the only chance I think we have.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I would be amazed if we could all agree on a definition, so I would appreciate any help. I tried to get Geoff (UE) to do this years ago, but he wouldn't bite.

By the way, as I think you agree, I'm not interested in debate tactics. I would really like to arrive at a workable definition that we might operationalize.

I gave up offering definitive definitions of consciousness or awareness many years ago for a very simple reason. You can only show inconsistencies in people's belief systems by getting them to provide the definitions and then show that their own definitions and arguments lead to a contradiction. If instead you supply the definition yourself, then you leave yourself open to the accusation that you have assumed your conclusion in the definition, even if you haven't. So whenever I am now faced with the question "will you please explain to me exactly what the problem with consciousness is?" I always end up asking the questioner to give me their definitions, and I adapt the argument to suit.

I think the only way to make progress on this is to try to get agreement on the following: that no definition of consciousness or awareness which is couched purely in terms of behaviour or neural activity is ever going to suffice. Any attempt to define consciousness or awareness as "information processing", "self-referencing in the brain", "the ability to to respond to external stimuli" or any of the thousands of other material alternatives that are floating about just isn't going to work. The debate goes nowhere because as soon as somebody makes this sort of claim, the materialists respond by accusing you of assuming your conclusion or by claiming it is an argument from ignorance or a rejection of science - they basically resort to any means possible of justifying a refusal to accept that a materialistic definition is permanently inadequate. If we could get beyond that then we could address some much more interesting (to me) questions - questions about what the actual implications are of accepting the claim as true. What are the consequences for science, materialism, religion and other types of "woo"? The questions are interesting not least because they would be likely to split "skeptical" opinion on this board - some people would be likely to feel severely threatened even by opening this up as a sensible line of inquiry. Others would be less bothered.

Accepting that no materialistic definition of consciousness is possible does have consequences, but they aren't necessarily as bad as some people fear. It may result in certain concessions to some forms of religion or "woo", but not the forms which cause most of the serious problems. The concessions are of little use to your average muslim fundamentalist or YEC, which is why even after nearly two decades of this debate raging in its current form, these forms of religion have not really shown much interest in pursuing the consciousness problem as a way of attacking their scientific and political opponents. The materialists see a threat, but those religious people do not appear to see an opportunity to use it to their advantage.

 

[cyborg]

So it's all just about qualia again isn't it?

So again: if your red is not my red why does that matter for consciousness?

If it doesn't matter why are qualia relevant? A quale could exist without consciousness.

If it does then at what point does having different qualia stop something being conscious?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So it's all just about qualia again isn't it?

So again: if your red is not my red why does that matter for consciousness?

If it doesn't matter why are qualia relevant?

It's always been about "qualia", although I maintain that word is only ever invoked in response to a materialistic attempt to mis-define "consciousness" as something physical and that the correct way of dealing with it is to challenge the misdefinition of consciousness rather than using the word "qualia".

Whether your red or my red are the same is not important. All that matters is that there is something like "your red" in the first place. The whole of the natural world could, it seems, operate exactly as it currently does, even if there were no "qualia". They can't be given a material definition and serve no known biological purpose. You could take the entire scientific story of life on earth, remove any references to qualia or consciousness, and nothing significant would have changed. There is no reason for them to appear in that story until you start taking into account complex human artistic and religious behaviour, or your own consciousness, at which point you aren't really doing science anymore.