My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[biomorph]

The person claims to be conscious, and his intestine doesn't.

Can we tell for certain? No. For all we know, our guts are people too.

Good point, a person can claim to be conscious, however consciousness is a description of whole gamut of underlying physical process's, not a thing.

It can be defined for sure, but so can "atmosphere" and "understanding"

Yet these also are not items, just broad descriptions of several, even many, individual functions a person experiences or processes to survive.

making a collective description isn't incorrect, but to give that description attributes it doesn't have is misleading.

Consciousness isn't a thing, is it?

 

[Belz...]

I'd be inclined to agree that proposition if it weren't for the fact that I'm referring to the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness in the very same system.

Who to the what, now ?

Whether I convey this message to you via an electronic device [like this computer] or via a vacuum tube system as a written message, the function is still the same. The difference between the two methods is physical, not functional.

So what do you mean by "physical", if not all extant things are "physical" ?

 

[Belz...]

I think you misunderstand what westprog is saying. Hes not claiming that his experiences are necessarily an accurate depiction of the world, but that experience itself is an undeniably real and integral part of the world.

The problem is when someone claims they are the ONLY undeniably real part of the world, because if you doubt everything you experience, what's to stop you from doubting the experiece itself ?

Thing is, often these claims seem to set apart "experience" from everything else. I don't see such a distinction.

 

[Belz...]

Of course there's a difference. One has subjective experience, the other doesn't. We are not able to apply any test to conclusively show the presence of consciousness. That's why it's possible to make up scenarios where switches and computers are conscious. There's no gainsaying it.

Actually, no. There is NO WAY to tell the difference between a p-zombie and a not-p-zombie. As such whatever difference you imagine is irrelevant.

Yes, entirely. It can't do science any more than a test tube can do science.

A test tube doesn't compute data.

I'm pointing out the contradictory nature of this particular philosophical position. But kudos on leaving all the pronouns out of your statement, indicating a simple event unassociated with some mythical "person".

Lame. You DO know that a computer can say "I feel fine" even though you admit it has no consciousness ?

My position is that the Turing test is not remotely reliable or certain as a test for consciousness

Well, then you're not in luck, because it's pretty much the only conceivable test.

 

[Belz...]

If I see a tree, I cannot be totally certain that the tree is there, but I can be certain, at the precise moment of the experience, of my seeing of the tree.

No, you can't.

1. The moment you "experience" it, it's already a memory. You admitted that you can't be sure of your memories.

2. Your "consciousness" itself could be an illusion.

 

[biomorph]

I should clarify what I, personally believe. I know that I am conscious.

That's what you perceive, but without basis.

I think it quite likely that other people are conscious. It seems quite possible that other living things have some form of consciousness.

That recognition of other's consciousness is needed to survive. It short circuits having to recognize the individual process's to arrive at recognition of the general, and not entire picture.

After millions of years of evolution,"consciousness" becomes beneficial, over simplistic process recognition say in a step by step manner.

That does not make consciousness real, any more than recognition of such in others.

I see no reason to believe that electrons, switches, rocks, buckets of water, computers, algorithms, thermostats or trees are conscious in any way whatsoever. Some people believe that they are, which I regard as meaningful and well-founded as a belief in naiads and dryads.

Limited consciousness is scaled, until self recognition becomes the easier route to survival.

I draw a distinction between the people who think it probable that by throwing enough of the right code at the problem, maybe one day a conscious program might be produced, and those who think that a single switch is already conscious, and just linking them together will accumulate the consciousness into one big conscious thing. There are quite different levels of delusion involved.

I think you are not taking into account the arise of complexity, generated by simple iteration and feedback systems, that gives the illusion of an entity's individuality which is there in time and space biologically, and a collection of evolved experiences we call consciousness.

There is however no "mind" to be conscious to start with.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If you have neural systems performing computations, and one system produces consciousness and the other doesn't, then one can conclude that consciousness is not produced by neural computation alone, and that something else is needed. Or one can conclude that our guts are conscious, but are unable to communicate the fact.

Hmm, I think you could conclude that neural computation of one sort is not sufficient by itself, not that any sort of neural computation cannot produce consciousness. It depends on the particular architecture and processing potentially.

Most of what brains do occurs unconsciously, so it is clearly true that simple forms of neural computation are not sufficient. Consciousness, as defined as awareness, is a special condition that requires a certain type of architecture and certain type of processing. The best answer so far -- at least describing the process involving neurons -- seems like the global workspace idea that Nick championed in other threads. That model "gets at" awareness but doesn't explain things like qualia. But the more I think about this issue, the more I think the basis of "qualia" is unconscious; we simply become aware of that sort of processing when we are aware.

Pinning down what we mean by awareness is probably the best first step. I realize that is what has been going on in this discussion, but I doubt there is much consensus. I agree with you that self-reference alone is not awareness.

 

[Dancing David]

I know it's p-zombies, and then we also have m-zombies, which in turn are different from post, pre- and wii- zombies. (This is why friends don't let friends take Lortabs and post.) The main problem is that I don't think that anyone who originally came up with the term knew what an actual zombie was. What do you want to bet that Thomas Nagel, Robert Kirk, and David Chalmers all got the idea from George Romero?

AkuManiMani, did you ever make any zombies?

There are always astral zombies, which in Western traditional mysticism are the shells left on the astral plane when the true soul moves on. These are the ghosts and things mediums talk to, they are the detrius of the spirit.

 

[AkuManiMani]

In regards to consciousness, tho, the subject in question is the very foundation of all empirical observation: one's own perceptions.

That's philosophical, not scientific.

However you wanna categorize that fact, it's still immediately relevant to science. One cannot conduct science without empirical observation and it just so happens that one must be conscious to observe. Ergo, consciousness is the foundation of the scientific process.

Its vital to study the conscious brain from the "outside" but, in order to full understand it, one must study their own consciousness from the "inside". In the study of consciousness, science is literally staring itself in the eye.

And so we're right back to introspection, something you admitted doesn't work?

I didn't say introspection doesn't work. I said that intuiting a theory doesn't necessarily mean that its true; the theory must still be put to empirical test. Intuition and introspection are not the same. The former is the faculty we use for inductive reasoning, the latter simply means observing one's own internal states. Introspection is absolutely vital to the scientific study of the brain. For instance, how else can we know what brain stimulus is correlated with a particular sensation if the subject does not report their own internal states?

Computers are useful tools of science but, on their own, they cannot do science. Conscious scientists are required to design an utilize them for the purpose of science.

Why not ? Why couldn't you program a computer to do the science and interpreting all on its own ? Why would science require anything other than computation ?

Because you would still need a conscious scientist to design the computer for the specified task, and a conscious observer to interpret the outputs of the machine. Unless the machine itself is conscious it cannot be aware of any of it's operations or understand its outputs.

I'd be inclined to agree that proposition if it weren't for the fact that I'm referring to the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness in the very same system

Who to the what, now ?

Meaning that complexity has little relevance as to whether or not a system is conscious. A human's brain does not become less complex when they go unconscious.

Whether I convey this message to you via an electronic device [like this computer] or via a vacuum tube system as a written message, the function is still the same. The difference between the two methods is physical, not functional.

So what do you mean by "physical", if not all extant things are "physical" ?

You're missing what I'm saying. I presented two methods of conveying the same message: one used an electronic computer network, the other was a hand written message sent via vacuum tube system. The function of the two methods was identical [to convey a specific message to you] but the two means of carrying out that function were physically different. Understand?

I think you misunderstand what westprog is saying. Hes not claiming that his experiences are necessarily an accurate depiction of the world, but that experience itself is an undeniably real and integral part of the world.

The problem is when someone claims they are the ONLY undeniably real part of the world, because if you doubt everything you experience, what's to stop you from doubting the experiece itself ?

Thing is, often these claims seem to set apart "experience" from everything else. I don't see such a distinction.

Okay, lets phrase it a different way: Even if it turns out that everything we experience in life is illusion we can still know that the experience itself is absolutely real. We can have no knowledge at all of "everything else" unless we are conscious to begin with.

 

[Dancing David]

This one?

-zombie!

 

[Dancing David]

Of course there's a difference. One has subjective experience, the other doesn't. We are not able to apply any test to conclusively show the presence of consciousness. That's why it's possible to make up scenarios where switches and computers are conscious. There's no gainsaying it.

Yet many people maintain that they experience consciousness, so if you are not a radical behaviorist, you can ask people about what defines the experience and look for consistency (non-radical behaviorsm). (Or as a sociologist/anthroplogist)

But I am a p-zombie so i still maintain that it is just a cognitive label for seperate events.

It is valid to ask people why they believe they are conscious. the validity of reposnses and range of responses will vary.

 

[Dancing David]

I don't want to be mean, but this is very hard to read. What elf are we talking about? Who is Di?

The only reason we know about our bodies is through our consciousness. I don't disagree that consciousness is momentary, and that we can't be sure of the reliability of memory - indeed, we can be sure that it is at least somewhat unreliable.



You may have mistaken me for wikipaedia. This is an argument, not a consultation.

So, what is the difference between a quale and perception?
So it is an argument and not a discussion, if you use the term qualia or quale, then I can just badger you.

I would rather ask you, what is the difference between qualia /quale and perception? (ETA: Since you have wisely avoid qualia, then I ask what makes a subjective experinec different from perception.)

Is there persistence of consciousness or is it a fragmentary experience that changes and is insconsistent?

Nice dodge by the way.

No you are not wikipedia, but you have been using the term consciousness and you made a pithy ridicule of my take on the persistence/lack of persistence of consciousness.

So are you having the same consciousness from moment to moment?

(Sorry about the typos, I was in a rush)

 

[Dancing David]

I should clarify what I, personally believe. I know that I am conscious. I think it quite likely that other people are conscious. It seems quite possible that other living things have some form of consciousness.

I see no reason to believe that electrons, switches, rocks, buckets of water, computers, algorithms, thermostats or trees are conscious in any way whatsoever. Some people believe that they are, which I regard as meaningful and well-founded as a belief in naiads and dryads.

I draw a distinction between the people who think it probable that by throwing enough of the right code at the problem, maybe one day a conscious program might be produced, and those who think that a single switch is already conscious, and just linking them together will accumulate the consciousness into one big conscious thing. There are quite different levels of delusion involved.

So do you think it likely that the experiences are perceptions?

I would say it is likely we could make a program (if it was a huge one comparable to 1 trillion neurons) that was showing something we could label as consciousness. I am in disagreement with Pixy, we can define a switch as aware, but it is not the sense I am aware of pain, since I would say that it is likely I am aware of a peception of pain created by some sort of nerve stimulation.

 

[westprog]

The problem is when someone claims they are the ONLY undeniably real part of the world, because if you doubt everything you experience, what's to stop you from doubting the experiece itself ?

Thing is, often these claims seem to set apart "experience" from everything else. I don't see such a distinction.

We have no access to anything except through experience. It makes sense to doubt everything else and trust experience, because experience is more basic. It even makes sense to doubt everything. What doesn't make sense is to trust everything except the means by which we apprehend everything. How can we trust that the world is real while doubting the means by which we interact with the world?

 

[AkuManiMani]

So, what is the difference between a quale and perception?

A quale is an element of perception.

 

[AlBell]

....

Pinning down what we mean by awareness is probably the best first step. I realize that is what has been going on in this discussion, but I doubt there is much consensus. I agree with you that self-reference alone is not awareness.

Interesting comment, but isn't anything that can be said to exist aware in some sense of the word? Or for that matter that doesn't involve self-referential information processing?

Am I wrong in thinking that a physicalist worldview can offer nothing beyond self-referential information processing as the necessary and sufficient basis for all consciousness, up to and including human?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Interesting comment, but isn't anything that can be said to exist aware in some sense of the word? Or for that matter that doesn't involve self-referential information processing?

Am I wrong in thinking that a physicalist worldview can offer nothing beyond self-referential information processing as the necessary and sufficient basis for all consciousness, up to and including human?

Involving self-referential information processing does not necessarily imply that this is sufficient to explain consciousness, only that it is necessary.

Is awareness simply self-referential information processing? Is there nothing else to it? Clearly when we speak of human consciousness we include awareness under aspects of emotion and motivation; and I think we confuse the picture whenever we move the issue around from discussions of what awareness is to these other aspects of human experience (even though they are undeniably a part of the whole picture).

I think if we could systematically pin down what we mean by these words, then we could try to operationalize them in different systems.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Interesting comment, but isn't anything that can be said to exist aware in some sense of the word? Or for that matter that doesn't involve self-referential information processing?

Am I wrong in thinking that a physicalist worldview can offer nothing beyond self-referential information processing as the necessary and sufficient basis for all consciousness, up to and including human?

The ironic part is that information processing, of any type, is not a physical property, but an abstract functional property. The SRIP explanation of consciousness bypasses biology and physics altogether and tries to reduce it to a technical IT problem.

 

[westprog]

Actually, no. There is NO WAY to tell the difference between a p-zombie and a not-p-zombie. As such whatever difference you imagine is irrelevant.

It's not irrelevant to me whether I'm conscious or not. Hence it actually matters to me whether other entities are conscious. I find it strange that some people don't seem to care whether the people they encounter have (subjective) experiences or not. To me, that's a fundamental part of human interaction. If I see a child crying, I differentiate between that and a picture of a child crying. I assume that there is an actual experience taking place, which is similar to what I feel when I behave in the same way.

If I thought that there was no subjective experience happening, then I wouldn't care. Fundamentally, the only thing that matters - insofar as anything matters - is the actual experience of creatures capable of having subjective experience.

A test tube doesn't compute data.

Of course it does, just like any other lab tool. Like a computer.

Add a drop of A into solution B in the test tube at concentration C. Tabulate the results in Excel. If the computer is doing science, so is the test tube, so is the solution, so is the pipette.

Lame. You DO know that a computer can say "I feel fine" even though you admit it has no consciousness ?

Yes, I keep saying that there is no reliable test.

Well, then you're not in luck, because it's pretty much the only conceivable test.

None of us are in luck. There is no reliable test. Choosing the least reliable and hoping for the best is all we can do.

 

[westprog]

I think if we could systematically pin down what we mean by these words

Together with research on brain function, that's the most important step to be taken.