My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Frank Newgent]

... and then we also have m-zombies

... although I prefer the m-zombie.

This one?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That isn't how things work -- the probe didn't magically appear, and the state wasn't magically loaded onto it, and the instruction wasn't magically programmed. All of these physical things have a physical history. A physical sequence of events can be followed, back to the beginning of time, that defines each moment.

I understand this.

And if you were to follow the physical sequence of events for a probe -- everything that led up to it's current physical state that influenced it's current physical state -- you would never ever encounter another probe. All you would encounter was Run2 and the intermediate saving and loading of states from Run2. It looks like this:

(beginning of time) --> (some stuff) --> (someone programs Run2) --> (Run2 takes place, up to instruction X) --> (someone saves the state of Run2, at X) --> (someone loads the state onto the probe, and programs the probe) --> (probe travels through space until time t has elapsed) --> (probe executes instruction X) --> (probe sits there doing nothing)

Okay, so we're considering the sequence of an initial portion of Run2 followed by one more instruction in each probe, but nothing following that. If that is sufficient to produce consciousness, great. But not every such sequence is sufficient. In particular, consider the probe with the first instruction of the simulation. I doubt that produces consciousness. This is why I thought we were considering the entire array of probes.

So I think I still don't understand.

~~ Paul

 

[AkuManiMani]

If my experiences don't exist, then nothing exists.

Not necessarily. If your experiences aren't real then it simply means you have no way to gather any sort of knowledge.

I think you misunderstand what westprog is saying. Hes not claiming that his experiences are necessarily an accurate depiction of the world, but that experience itself is an undeniably real and integral part of the world.

 

[westprog]

Only if behaviorism is true.

Problem is conceivable zombies violate their own definitions

There is no reason that we know of that the assorted zombies might not be conscious. We don't know for certain if other people are conscious. We infer it, we don't know it.

 

[westprog]

Actually, by definition, there IS no difference between a p-zombie and a not p-zombie.

And you're asserting that I'd know, but not explaining why.

Of course there's a difference. One has subjective experience, the other doesn't. We are not able to apply any test to conclusively show the presence of consciousness. That's why it's possible to make up scenarios where switches and computers are conscious. There's no gainsaying it.

 

[westprog]

Well Yes, and no. Often the same stream of information involves transduction into different signaling pathways which utilize different signals [like molecules, membrane potentials, etc.]. In other cases the opposite is true; the same pathway could involve multiple types of information. The same bit of information [be it some external stimuli, or endogenous] is often amplified and split off along multiple lines of processing. The body is really one vast network of overlapping information processing loops.

But, for some reason or another, only a particular line of cells produce conscious experiences from a very small portion of this information, and only then for limited periods of time. These very same neural cells still process information during periods of unconsciousness, and even during periods of consciousness most of the processing they carry out is unconscious. This shows that there are physiological constraints on conscious experience, which is why I stress the importance of understanding the physics of consciousness, and not just the computational architecture.

If you have neural systems performing computations, and one system produces consciousness and the other doesn't, then one can conclude that consciousness is not produced by neural computation alone, and that something else is needed. Or one can conclude that our guts are conscious, but are unable to communicate the fact.

 

[westprog]

Really ? So a non-conscious computer is incapable of doing science ?

Yes, entirely. It can't do science any more than a test tube can do science.

 

[biomorph]

Don't even bother -- when you point out to westprog that his/her position implies that animals are not conscious, nor mentally handicapped humans, nor young children, he/she will just change the subject.

It is easier to assume westprog isn't conscious isn't it?

 

[westprog]

Back to playing semantics games ?

I'm pointing out the contradictory nature of this particular philosophical position. But kudos on leaving all the pronouns out of your statement, indicating a simple event unassociated with some mythical "person".

 

[biomorph]

If you have neural systems performing computations, and one system produces consciousness and the other doesn't,

sorry, havn't been listening, how do you tell?

then one can conclude that consciousness is not produced by neural computation alone, and that something else is needed.

that "else" would have been apparent by now, I'd a thought.

Or one can conclude that our guts are conscious, but are unable to communicate the fact.

or not.

 

[westprog]

Well, then. It's a good thing that this isn't what is being claimed.

No, the Turing test is only there as a hypothetical to hit sceptics over the head with as to their possible reaction if it ever gets passed one day.

 

[westprog]

Don't even bother -- when you point out to westprog that his/her position implies that animals are not conscious, nor mentally handicapped humans, nor young children, he/she will just change the subject.

My position is that the Turing test is not remotely reliable or certain as a test for consciousness - and that indeed, there is no reliable test for consciousness in another person, though it is 100% reliable in oneself.

But I realise that I'm expecting my posts to be actually read, when it's a lot easier to just assign opinions to me.

 

[westprog]

Only if you are playing gotcha, you did not respond to most of what i said and di not even consider that the self is multifacted in usage terms. If one states that tehs elf is simply the body and its attendant processes then the common self is that body and the processes therein. My belief is (as stated multiple times) is that consciousness is a rubric for seperate events. the body is the only self taht i believe in, what part of consciousness is not justa temporary state of being?

I don't want to be mean, but this is very hard to read. What elf are we talking about? Who is Di?

The only reason we know about our bodies is through our consciousness. I don't disagree that consciousness is momentary, and that we can't be sure of the reliability of memory - indeed, we can be sure that it is at least somewhat unreliable.

Philosophers always avoid that, if you have a stroke you can loose your ability to process and make new memories or even to recal memories. So are you still conscious ? Is there a continuity of consciousness? Are you the same person you were yesterday? Or is it an illsuion of memory that leads to the eprsistence of self as a belief?

But of course it appears you are just here to play gotcha, which is too bad. If you answered the questions i posed I would feel that you weren't such a p-rudejerk. But ridicule is more your apparent style.

So are neurological zombies conscious and what is the difference between a quale and perception?

Funny, you did not answer those questions.

You may have mistaken me for wikipaedia. This is an argument, not a consultation.

 

[westprog]

Ack. What am I doing up?? I'm sick and I need to lie down! That's why I didn't go out to the Corner Pub with friends in the first place! Ahem. Clearly, we don't always do what we know we should because of competing interests.

When you're sick you shouldn't go out. Stay home and post whatever comes into your head to be read by the entire world, forever.

 

[westprog]

I think you misunderstand what westprog is saying. Hes not claiming that his experiences are necessarily an accurate depiction of the world, but that experience itself is an undeniably real and integral part of the world.

If I see a tree, I cannot be totally certain that the tree is there, but I can be certain, at the precise moment of the experience, of my seeing of the tree.

If I remember seeing the tree, I can't even be sure that it did actually happen. All I can be sure of is the instantaneous memory.

 

[westprog]

sorry, havn't been listening, how do you tell?

The person claims to be conscious, and his intestine doesn't.

Can we tell for certain? No. For all we know, our guts are people too.

that "else" would have been apparent by now, I'd a thought.




or not.

 

[cyborg]

What is the experience of an electron again Westprog?

 

[westprog]

What is the experience of an electron again Westprog?

I should clarify what I, personally believe. I know that I am conscious. I think it quite likely that other people are conscious. It seems quite possible that other living things have some form of consciousness.

I see no reason to believe that electrons, switches, rocks, buckets of water, computers, algorithms, thermostats or trees are conscious in any way whatsoever. Some people believe that they are, which I regard as meaningful and well-founded as a belief in naiads and dryads.

I draw a distinction between the people who think it probable that by throwing enough of the right code at the problem, maybe one day a conscious program might be produced, and those who think that a single switch is already conscious, and just linking them together will accumulate the consciousness into one big conscious thing. There are quite different levels of delusion involved.

 

[cyborg]

I should clarify what I, personally believe. I know that I am conscious.

And I should clarify that "experience" and "conscious" are two different words.

This makes the rest of your post redundant.

 

[Belz...]

In regards to consciousness, tho, the subject in question is the very foundation of all empirical observation: one's own perceptions.

That's philosophical, not scientific.

Its vital to study the conscious brain from the "outside" but, in order to full understand it, one must study their own consciousness from the "inside". In the study of consciousness, science is literally staring itself in the eye.

And so we're right back to introspection, something you admitted doesn't work ?

Computers are useful tools of science but, on their own, they cannot do science. Conscious scientists are required to design an utilize them for the purpose of science.

Why not ? Why couldn't you program a computer to do the science and interpreting all on its own ? Why would science require anything other than computation ?