My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[rocketdodger]

As I understand the concept of a desk check, I don't believe this reasoning applies. If we have gates A'₁ and A'₂ having inputs (11) and (01) respectively, that feed into gate A'₃ in the next cycle, then A'₃ is going to get inputs (01). We can calculate (01)->1 for A'₂, then (01)->1 for A'₃, then (11)->0 for A'₁.

Suppose for some odd reason a mistake in the A' algorithm showed up, where the A'₂ gate emitted 0, then it'd be a different thing we do is all--it may even change the order of our checks (in this case it would). We use N to compute A'₃ first as (00)->1, and that would look right. Then A'₂ as (01)->1, and that would look wrong, and then we'd be done with our desk check, and conclude that the A'₂ gate's calculation messed up. This means that our A'₃ calculation computed what it did, yet not what it was supposed to, but so what? We found the error--it failed the desk check. We go and fix A'₂ and rerun it.

So no, we don't have to wait for A'₂ to complete in order to run A'₃ in a post hoc desk check. We simply assume the entire thing ran smoothly, and try to prove the assumption false.

If we were doing a test in the blind, however, we wouldn't have this information, so we have to run the whole thing in order. But we're not doing that, I don't think. I think all we're doing is figuring out if A' ran correctly, and I think we already know everything A' did. But the case to consider is the case in which it did happen to run correctly, and we're running N out of order.

Don't you have the same problem computing entire time slices backwards? You have to know what the inputs were to slice 2000 in order to simulate that at all. That depends on what happened in 1999. I can't see a way to reasonably interpret doing a desk check backwards without having the same concerns about serial versus concurrent processing.

Yeah but I disagree with Pixy about the backwards thing too, so my argument still stands. See my post on that.

 

[rocketdodger]

In some ideal way perhaps.

But I think I prefer this... may I paraphrase you:

And?

I see no problem with that statement...

 

[Belz...]

It is more or less the proposition that AkuManiMani suggested earlier models can do the action but don't duplicate the ontology.

A chess program is not strictly speaking a model anyway - there is no "thing" that it is modelling.

No ? I was under the impression that it modeled a person playing chess.

 

[Belz...]

If consciousness is a form of energy, like electricity or matter, simply modeling functions correlated with it in a program will not be enough. One would have to recreate the actual physical process that generates consciousness.



My guess is if we did create conscious programs we would have to create the appropriate physical medium. After that, it would be a matter of having them interface with some purely virtual environment and/or an interface with the external environment we operate in. For entities like that, interfacing with the "external" world via some robotic system might be akin to us using an avatar in a VR interface

We have no reason to presume that consciousness is "a form of energy" or that it requires a particular "physical medium". As far as we know it's just a process of a certain type/complexity.

 

[Belz...]

You define pain as behaviour?

What else ?

 

[Belz...]

Yes, there is. It's an expression of doubts which not everybody posting on this topic has.

Not necessarily.

 

[Frank Newgent]

The fact that we cannot tell if we are experiencing a past life regression or not has no more bearing on the consistency and truth values of our logical statements than the fact of a being arbitrary has on the relative difference between a and b.

I see no problem with that statement...

Cool. Thanks. May I paraphrase further?

Here is the question I would like you to answer -- if we are in a past life regression, is there any mathematical reason that a property of an entity in our level could not be replicated at a lower level?

Are you asking that if we are in a past life regression, is there any mathematical reason that a property or entity in that past life regression could not be reproduced by a past life regressed by some other method?

The answer is that I don't know.

Yes, that is the question.

The relevance to this discussion being that if there is no mathematical reason why not, and if we are in a past life regression, then we should be able (with sufficient technology) to replicate every single property of every physical substance in the universe within a past life regression of our own.

I am not aware of any such mathematical reason either.

I am saying that because there is no way to prove we are not already in a past life regression, it is a fallacy to speak of "reality" in anything other than relative terms.

We are in some other frame I.E. already in a past life regression and consciousness like our's is unique to this frame for an arbitrary reason OR it is independent of the truly primary primary properties and thus can arise in any other frame as well.

You're a funny guy RD.

 

[AkuManiMani]

We have no reason to presume that consciousness is "a form of energy" or that it requires a particular "physical medium". As far as we know it's just a process of a certain type/complexity.

Well, what I'm arguing is that the process in question differs more along the lines of "type" than "complexity". After giving this discussion a lot of thought, I've come to the conclusion that whats at issue here isn't merely a matter of information being computed, but the energetic form of the "stuff" in question.

The simulated water in your example has many of the same operational properties as H₂0. But, physically speaking, the simulated water is completely different than drinkable water. It does not, and cannot, serve as a stand-in for a body of H₂0 because they do not have the same physical make-up, and therefore have completely different physical properties. The same goes for the simulated dynamo, mentioned earlier, for exactly the same reasons.

The same also goes for biological processes like consciousness. Asserting that producing consciousness is simply a matter of flipping a particular pattern of switches in a Turing machine is like claiming that and ad hoc simulation of solar panels is an efficacious instance of photosynthesis.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The simulated water in your example has many of the same operational properties as H20. But, physically speaking, the simulated water is completely different than drinkable water. It does not, and cannot, serve as a stand-in for a body of H20 because they do not have the same physical make-up, and therefore have completely different physical properties. The same goes for the simulated dynamo, mentioned earlier, for exactly the same reasons.

Agreed.

The same also goes for biological processes like consciousness. Asserting that producing consciousness is simply a matter of flipping a particular pattern of switches in a Turing machine is like claiming that and ad hoc simulation of solar panels is an efficacious instance of photosynthesis.

A mere assertion on your part. What is it about consciousness that escapes a simulation in any important way? We agree, of course, that a simulated human is not a human. But looking specifically at consciousness, what is it other than complex inner behavior?

~~ Paul

 

[westprog]

I don't think so.


But it is not a proof that all algorithms are Turing compatible. So the brain could employ an algorithm that is not Turing compatible.

I agree that this is a nit-pick, since surely the Church-Turing thesis is correct.

~~ Paul

It still doesn't follow that the operations of the brain are algorithmic.

 

[AkuManiMani]

A mere assertion on your part. What is it about consciousness that escapes a simulation in any important way? We agree, of course, that a simulated human is not a human. But looking specifically at consciousness, what is it other than complex inner behavior?

~~ Paul

Up until a few years ago I would have completely agreed with this statement. But, after giving the subject more serious thought, I eventually came to the conclusion that there must be some basic underlying physics to consciousness.

Algorithmic functions can, and are, carried out unconsciously all the time. They can, of course, be carried out consciously as well. The difference between the two isn't so much a matter of degree, but kind. Sure, consciousness is a behavior; but it is a specific type of behavior. Its not simply the processing and conveyance of information but the capacity to be aware of information as some subjective quality.

I've mentioned before that, whatever consciousness is, its not just a matter of complex information processing because, when you really think about, it biology at every level involves very sophisticated IP. This is true whether we are awake, sleeping, or comatose. Even our neurons continue to fire and process information regardless of whether we're conscious or not. There are significant physiological differences between conscious/conscious states. Given the above, it stands to reason that it isn't simply how, or how much, information is being processed but the physical state of the system doing the processing.

 

[westprog]

Agreed.


A mere assertion on your part. What is it about consciousness that escapes a simulation in any important way? We agree, of course, that a simulated human is not a human. But looking specifically at consciousness, what is it other than complex inner behavior?

~~ Paul

There's circular reading going on here. We claim that algorithmic processing has the property of consciousness because algorithmic processing is going on in the human brain, and then say that there can't be anything more than algorithmic processing going on in the brain because algorithmic processing is sufficient to produce consciousness.

It's a fact that there is more going on in the brain than algorithmic processing. If we assume that it's the algorithmic processing that produces consciousness, then it's like extrapolating from a single point.

 

[westprog]

I've mentioned before that, whatever consciousness is, its not just a matter of complex information processing because, when you really think about, it biology at every level involves very sophisticated IP.

I'm sure the digestive system is equivalent to some kind of Turing machine.

 

[westprog]

Not necessarily.

I'm aware of that and that's why I drew attention to it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'm sure the digestive system is equivalent to some kind of Turing machine.

Exactly.

There are innumerable systems like those in our bodies. Nearly all of them operate unconsciously.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm sure the digestive system is equivalent to some kind of Turing machine.

I hope that was supposed to be sarcastic.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

complex inner behavior?

~~ Paul

"inner behaviour"???

This term means nothing to me. Behaviour is outer. I can observe behaviour. I can observe "inner behaviour" in your brain. I can't observe your consciousness.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It still doesn't follow that the operations of the brain are algorithmic.

Correct. That is why we keep asking for a coherent description of how the brain might not be algorithmic.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Algorithmic functions can, and are, carried out unconsciously all the time. They can, of course, be carried out consciously as well. The difference between the two isn't so much a matter of degree, but kind. Sure, consciousness is a behavior; but it is a specific type of behavior. Its not simply the processing and conveyance of information but the capacity to be aware of information as some subjective quality.

And why is this awareness more than a behavior?

I've mentioned before that, whatever consciousness is, its not just a matter of complex information processing because, when you really think about, it biology at every level involves very sophisticated IP. This is true whether we are awake, sleeping, or comatose. Even our neurons continue to fire and process information regardless of whether we're conscious or not. There are significant physiological differences between conscious/conscious states. Given the above, it stands to reason that it isn't simply how, or how much, information is being processed but the physical state of the system doing the processing.

I don't know why you're placing consciousness on a special pedestal. Breathing is different from blood pumping, too. Is one of them special? I agree that consciousness is different from other bodily functions, but why is it different in a special way?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There's circular reading going on here. We claim that algorithmic processing has the property of consciousness because algorithmic processing is going on in the human brain, and then say that there can't be anything more than algorithmic processing going on in the brain because algorithmic processing is sufficient to produce consciousness.

Who is saying that algorithmic processing has the property of consciousness just because it is going on in the human brain? I'm not, nor are others. I'm saying that certain types of processing produce internal behaviors that we call consciousness, and that this would be the case in a computer as well as a human brain.

And the only reason I'm saying that it must be an algorithmic process is because nobody can describe a super-algorithmic process coherently, let alone in a way that convinces me that it is required for consciousness.

It's a fact that there is more going on in the brain than algorithmic processing. If we assume that it's the algorithmic processing that produces consciousness, then it's like extrapolating from a single point.

What more is going on except perhaps for randomness?

~~ Paul