Robin
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Apr 29, 2004
- Messages
- 14,971
Yes.Is the clue in the words "is capable of"?
Yes.Is the clue in the words "is capable of"?
Drkitten, on the other hand, would rather fling around straw than try to read a sentence properly.So Robin and Westprog are in the rather uncomfortable position of asking whether or not it's possible to exceed the speed of light. I have told them, several times, that relativity theory says that it isn't. They then ask if relativity theory applies to angelic unicorns that are defined to have the ability to exceed the speed of light at will.
Take a hammer and hit your thumb (not really of course).So what is there about consciousness that is over and above behavior?
~~ Paul
I accept that for most things, understanding, thinking, intelligence.Indeed, but sometimes the ontological difference is largely irrelevant. Adding 2 + 2 in a computer program is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to adding 2 + 2 on your fingers. The question is whether this equivalence holds for consciousness.
~~ Paul
Not JUST understands Chinese.Thus if the Chinese room is able to pass the Turing test in Chinese, then by my definition it understands Chinese.
Well that is your problem -- you think "true" and "non-arbitrary" are the same thing.
Why? Those terms don't have anything to do with each other...
No, you changed the claim.But no one claimed that cars couldn't float. The claim, however, is that all algorithms behave according to the mathematics of information processing.
Yes I know what the Turing Test is. You are just quibbling. Yes of course it needs to know more stuff.Not JUST understands Chinese.
Do you even know what the Turing Test is? We are not even talking Leobner.
We are talking about the ability for a computer to have a conversation to with a human being and the human being not able to discern whether or not it's a computer. So the computer needs to "understand" many things. It needs to be able to think like a human.
Would not understand what? It meets your definition of understand. Clearly Searle doesn't mean what you mean. He's appealing to our intuition. How can file cabinets, pencil and paper carry on a conversation, in Chinese no less.He says the person does not understand and yet can converse in Chinese using the program. So therefore a computer conversing in Chinese would not understand.
Searle appeals to our intuition. He has no other argument.I, on the other hand, was making an appeal to intuition and explicitly so (I said so to Paul and I said so to you)
It directly addresses your appeal to intuition.Why are you repeating all this stuff, dragging it out?
Who said it did?But it does not need to have identical conscious states to humans.
This "more powerful" is a red herring. An algorithm needs to be equivalent to a function on natural numbers.What? Why can't humans be more powerful than a Turing machine? Anything more powerful can perform arithmetic.
~~ Paul
I don't know if you got attacked hard. But to the extent that people took issue with your argument it was, IMO, because appealing to intuition can be problematic. QM and Relativity are counterintuitive. That they are isn't a valid argument against them.If everybody is so comfortable with this idea why did I get attacked so hard? Especially when I had started out saying that it was only an intuition.
Can you clarify?For example a process that was genuinely random could not, strictly speaking, be random...
Well since my entire point was whether or not the desk checked algorithm had identical conscious states to humans and you keep dragging up Searle and Strong AI as though it was relevant, so I guess you said it did.Who said it did?
I did, in the rest of the sentence you quoted.Can you clarify?
Robin said:For example a process that was genuinely random could not, strictly speaking, be random since a function cannot map a point on it's domain to more than one point on it's range.
By showing that a Turing-machine is a universal computational device.
Anything that is capable of computing -- of performing arithmetic, really -- is either equivalent to a Turing machine or is less powerful than a Turing machine.
Since humans are capable of performing arithmetic, they are either equivalent to or less powerful than a Turing machine.
But why are you getting into this stuff again. Am I not allowed to have a different definitionWould not understand what? It meets your definition of understand. Clearly Searle doesn't mean what you mean.
But they are just the program and data in Searles argument. The person is the computer.He's appealing to our intuition. How can file cabinets, pencil and paper carry on a conversation, in Chinese no less.
Do you understand Chinese? If not, is it just an intuition that you don't?Searle appeals to our intuition. He has no other argument.
Even if he did, it is still not the same.It directly addresses your appeal to intuition.
Identical conscious states? I'm sorry but I don't remember this. Sincerely. I would have told you from the start that the answer was no. Why would that even be a point for discussion? Who cares? So long as the algorithm is conscious. You and I don't even have identical conscious states. Not even identical twins have identical conscious states.Well since my entire point was whether or not the desk checked algorithm had identical conscious states to humans and you keep dragging up Searle and Strong AI as though it was relevant, so I guess you said it did.
I don't know why that would be anyone's objection. If you've made this clear to me then I sincerely apologize. I would never have been in such a discussion. I honestly don't know what the purpose of proving you and I don't have identical conscious states so it would be even less obvious to me why your thought experiment would advance any discussion about consciousness.Please answer this question: is Searles objection to the Chinese Room that it does not have identical conscious states to humans?
I won't bring it up again I assure you.You have this bee in your bonnet for some reason - you want Searle's argument to be what I am saying and it really is not. Can we get past this?
It was just the entire point I was making. Sheesh.Identical conscious states? I'm sorry but I don't remember this. Sincerly. I would have told you from the start that the answer was no. Why would that even be a point for discussion? Who cares? So long as the algorithm is conscious. You and I don't have identical conscious states.