Robin
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Apr 29, 2004
- Messages
- 14,971
Oh and look, there you go again, assuming your conclusion.I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state.
Oh and look, there you go again, assuming your conclusion.I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state.
Why would you say that? We have computers that are sensitive to the temprature and can turn on a heater. We have computers that are sensitve to light and can turn on the lights when it gets dark.
Just like humans.What you have are computer programs that react to the values contained in certain areas of memory. The source of the data is abstracted.
(see Pixy's post)What you have are computer programs that react to the values contained in certain areas of memory. The source of the data is abstracted.
And if it is the case that consciousness requires a physical process that we cannot replicate in the computer model, then it won't snow on computer consciousness, either. Time will tell.RandFan said:ETA: Actually westprog responded indirectly stating that we can model the brain in a computer the way we can model weather in a comptuer. It doesn't mean that it snows in the computer.
ref. Pixywestprog said:What you have are computer programs that react to the values contained in certain areas of memory. The source of the data is abstracted.
This conversation will go nowhere until you define exactly what you mean by a qualitative experience and what is required to accept that such a thing is occurring. Otherwise we're going to have the "bits moving around just can't be conscious" circle dance again, and we've all had that dance too many times.
You inability to imagine bits moving around as conscious is not a sufficient argument. Why would systematically replacing each of my neurons with a little computer not do the trick?
~~ Paul
(see Pixy's post)
Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.
This is but an assertion and rather vague. However, even if I grant it for arguments sake it doesn't demonstrate anything or obviate the point made.There's a seamless connection between the nervous system and the brain.
What the hell does that even mean?No, not remotely in the same way as humans. There's a seamless connection between the nervous system and the brain.
What the hell does that even mean?
Westprog has an understanding of computers that excludes about 99.9% of what computers actually do.
That doesn't even make any sense. In respect to sensory perception, there is no "the brain"; there is, rather, a series of discrete stages of data transformation in different regions of the brain.No, not remotely in the same way as humans. There's a seamless connection between the nervous system and the brain.
Westprog also has an understanding of the brain that excludes 99.9% of what we actually know about the brain.What the hell does that even mean?
See my definition of consciousness. My case is proven. Back to you.Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.
Agreed, that is what I'm saying: There has to be more to the argument than your personal incredulity.westprog said:Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.
It's empirical that:It would seem that we have more than met the burden of proof.
- We have bits moving around.
- We have consciousness.
- When we alter the bits moving around we alter the consciousness.
If you think there is a ghost in the machine then it is your burden to demonstrate that ghost and not ours to demonstrate that it isn't there.
Yes.If you are using the word "bits" to mean chunks of information, then that is certainly true.
No.However, such "bits" of information are part of the workings of any physical system.
No. We haven't said that. We haven't said anything that even resembles that.What is most bizarre about this whole discussion is that the more I say that the aim should be to find a physical explanation for consciousness, the more people seem to interpret that as a denial that there can possibly be a physical explanation for consciousness.
Like what?There is such a strong attachment to the computational model that people seem unwilling to consider any other physical explanation.
We have one. You reject it. Why?I have never claimed that there is a ghost in the machine. I've always said that it's for scientists to look for a physical explanation for consciousness.
Since no-one has claimed that, the fact that you find it extraordinary is rather beside the point, is it not?No other physical processes equate to the operation of mathematical processes. That's not how physics normally works. There are physical processes, which can be described mathematically. The claim that consciousness is produced by an abstract mathematical process is an extraordinary one.
The claim that babies are produced by some unknown physical means is so mild as to be, I would have thought, a default starting point.The claim that consciousness is produced by some unknown physical means is so mild as to be, I would have thought, a default starting point.