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My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

Why would you say that? We have computers that are sensitive to the temprature and can turn on a heater. We have computers that are sensitve to light and can turn on the lights when it gets dark.

What you have are computer programs that react to the values contained in certain areas of memory. The source of the data is abstracted.
 
RandFan said:
ETA: Actually westprog responded indirectly stating that we can model the brain in a computer the way we can model weather in a comptuer. It doesn't mean that it snows in the computer.
And if it is the case that consciousness requires a physical process that we cannot replicate in the computer model, then it won't snow on computer consciousness, either. Time will tell.

~~ Paul
 
westprog said:
What you have are computer programs that react to the values contained in certain areas of memory. The source of the data is abstracted.
ref. Pixy

You keep repeating this kind of statement, so we really do understand what you're saying. You need to take the next step and explain how you think the brain may be different. Otherwise, as I said, you appear to be repeating the mantra "moving bits just can't be conscious" without explaining why you think that is so.

I, for one, agree that "moving bits just can't be conscious" has a certain folksy appeal, but that emotion is not sufficient to reach a conclusion.

~~ Paul
 
This conversation will go nowhere until you define exactly what you mean by a qualitative experience and what is required to accept that such a thing is occurring. Otherwise we're going to have the "bits moving around just can't be conscious" circle dance again, and we've all had that dance too many times.

You inability to imagine bits moving around as conscious is not a sufficient argument. Why would systematically replacing each of my neurons with a little computer not do the trick?

~~ Paul

Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.
 
Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.


It's empirical that:
  1. We have bits moving around.
  2. We have consciousness.
  3. When we alter the bits moving around we alter the consciousness.
It would seem that we have more than met the burden of proof. If you think there is a ghost in the machine then it is your burden to demonstrate that ghost and not ours to demonstrate that it isn't there.
 
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There's a seamless connection between the nervous system and the brain.
This is but an assertion and rather vague. However, even if I grant it for arguments sake it doesn't demonstrate anything or obviate the point made.
 
There's a seamless connection between a USB webcam and the computer it's plugged into.
 
No, not remotely in the same way as humans. There's a seamless connection between the nervous system and the brain.
That doesn't even make any sense. In respect to sensory perception, there is no "the brain"; there is, rather, a series of discrete stages of data transformation in different regions of the brain.

You are completely and hopelessly wrong here, Westprog. I refer you again to the MIT Introduction to Psychology lecture series. The lecturer, Prof. Jeremy Wolfe, is a researcher in visual perception, and covers this subject in depth.
 
westprog said:
Why would it? I think that the burden of proof is on those making the claim. There has to be more to the argument than personal credulity.
Agreed, that is what I'm saying: There has to be more to the argument than your personal incredulity.

As RandFan noted, all we have so far is electrochemical neurons and their interconnections. No one has found the receiver so we can adopt the TV receiver model. No one has found the quantum horsing around so that we can adopt the Orch-OR model. No one has found the akashic record so we can adopt anything Sheldrake talks about. No one has found consciousness elsewhere so we can adopt panpsychism. We just have neurons.

So it seems like someone asking "Why would it?" to the idea that we could replace neurons with computers must have something in mind. Perhaps something hypercomputational. What might that be?

~~ Paul
 
It's empirical that:
  1. We have bits moving around.
  2. We have consciousness.
  3. When we alter the bits moving around we alter the consciousness.
It would seem that we have more than met the burden of proof.

If you are using the word "bits" to mean chunks of information, then that is certainly true. However, such "bits" of information are part of the workings of any physical system.

If you mean that the workings of the human brain involve binary digits, then you are stepping a long way beyond what it commonly accepted.

If you think there is a ghost in the machine then it is your burden to demonstrate that ghost and not ours to demonstrate that it isn't there.

What is most bizarre about this whole discussion is that the more I say that the aim should be to find a physical explanation for consciousness, the more people seem to interpret that as a denial that there can possibly be a physical explanation for consciousness. There is such a strong attachment to the computational model that people seem unwilling to consider any other physical explanation.

I have never claimed that there is a ghost in the machine. I've always said that it's for scientists to look for a physical explanation for consciousness.

No other physical processes equate to the operation of mathematical processes. That's not how physics normally works. There are physical processes, which can be described mathematically. The claim that consciousness is produced by an abstract mathematical process is an extraordinary one. The claim that consciousness is produced by some unknown physical means is so mild as to be, I would have thought, a default starting point.
 
If you are using the word "bits" to mean chunks of information, then that is certainly true.
Yes.

However, such "bits" of information are part of the workings of any physical system.
No.

What is most bizarre about this whole discussion is that the more I say that the aim should be to find a physical explanation for consciousness, the more people seem to interpret that as a denial that there can possibly be a physical explanation for consciousness.
No. We haven't said that. We haven't said anything that even resembles that.

There is such a strong attachment to the computational model that people seem unwilling to consider any other physical explanation.
Like what?

We have neurons. As Paul just pointed out, we only have neurons. Neurons compute. The computational model is the only one that is supported by any evidence, but fortunately it is both very well supported and in principle explains all our observations.

I have never claimed that there is a ghost in the machine. I've always said that it's for scientists to look for a physical explanation for consciousness.
We have one. You reject it. Why?

No other physical processes equate to the operation of mathematical processes. That's not how physics normally works. There are physical processes, which can be described mathematically. The claim that consciousness is produced by an abstract mathematical process is an extraordinary one.
Since no-one has claimed that, the fact that you find it extraordinary is rather beside the point, is it not?

The claim that consciousness is produced by some unknown physical means is so mild as to be, I would have thought, a default starting point.
The claim that babies are produced by some unknown physical means is so mild as to be, I would have thought, a default starting point.
 

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