My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And, of course, a comment about what in the name of all that is holy we actually mean by the words knowledge and learn.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

I find it interesting to ponder the thought experiment of Mary and the Short Room.

Mary has spent her entire life in a room with a 6-foot ceiling. During that time, she has learned everything there is to know about pole vaulting. One day she is finally let out of the room and makes an attempt at a pole vault. Would Mary learn anything new?

I used the example of the piano virtuoso. Learning sheet music and theory won't make a pianist (I love that word) a master. Learning to become a virtuoso is to, in part, increase the number of neural connections in the brain. This can't be done by reading a book. In fact, becoming proficient in math can't be done by simply reading a book. The brain must be programmed (conditioned) to understand math. There are modules in the brain dedicated for various things including processing math, playing piano, etc. Often multiple areas of the brain are used and those areas must learn and this happens through working the brain by thinking about problems and or physical means (practice playing the piano).

To learn color a specific area in the brain must be activated. This area can't be activated by reading black and white text from a book or simply uploading data into the brain (listening to instructional audio or watching BW instructional video)

 

[RandFan]

And, of course, a comment about what in the name of all that is holy we actually mean by the words knowledge and learn.

~~ Paul

I was writing my last post when you were posting this one. Great minds and sometimes even mediocre ones (like mine) think alike.

 

[RandFan]

My take on knowledge and learning.

For a pianist to become a virtuoso he or she needs more than abstract theory. In fact most of it will do the pianist no good if the precise instructions that directs muscle movements in the arms and fingers to play are not in the module that directs the arm and fingers to play. The brain isn't an Internet forum where you can simply upload data. It's more like a computer that must be programed.

In fact. You can't just read about math to learn math. YOU HAVE TO PERFORM MATH. You have to do homework. This is programing. It's not just abstract data. It's wiring the brain in specific ways.

Learning ISN'T simply acquiring abstract information. Learning is programing the brain. Learning abstract theory about surgery, piano playing, bike riding WON'T teach you everything there is to know. You must program your brain (to date this can only be done through physical experience of the real world).

I can upload program code into a Microsoft word document the computer won't be able to use the code. The code must either be an executable file in a specific place in the computer or the must be a line of code somewhere that the computer will know to access the code. [edited for typos]

ETA: I've argued that it will be possible (theoretically) to learn (program the brain) in the future using nanobots.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

To learn color a specific area in the brain must be activated. This area can't be activated by reading black and white text from a book or simply uploading data into the brain (listening to instructional audio or watching BW instructional video)

Agreed. And the cool thing is that we don't even have to assert this to trash the Mary argument. We simply have to point out that it might be true, and so Mary doesn't necessarily have a fair chance at experiencing color in the room. What I like about this is that I don't even need an opinion on whether Mary would experience anything new. Maybe she would, but she didn't have a fair chance to begin with.

The only way around this is to claim that physicalism holds that book learning should be sufficient to convey all possible internal experiences. Does anyone think this?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Learning ISN'T simply acquiring abstract information. Learning is programing the brain. Learning abstract theory about surgery, piano playing, bike riding WON'T teach you everything there is to know. You must program your brain (to date this can only be done through physical experience of the real world).

What do we call the brain state that you gain through this programming? I think it is confusing to call it knowledge, because that is the word we use to mean book learning.

ETA: I've argued that it will be possible (theoretically) to learn (program the brain) in the future using nanobots.

It better be possible through some sort of surgery or we gots a problem with physicalism.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

The only way around this is to claim that physicalism holds that book learning should be sufficient to convey all possible internal experiences.

Well, that's a bit economic and prosaic but ok, if you like that kind of thing.

Does anyone think this?

None that I know of.

 

[RandFan]

What do we call the brain state that you gain through this programming? I think it is confusing to call it knowledge, because that is the word we use to mean book learning.

I've not the expertise to debate the point. All knowledge is, to my understanding, the result of pruning and wiring or rewiring of the brain. Reading about math and performing equations both alter the structure of the brain (programming).

It better be possible through some sort of surgery or we gots a problem with physicalism.

It is envisioned that most if not all surgery in the future will be performed by nanobots. They would be far more precise non-evasive. Working somewhat like our own white blood cells and coagulants nanobots would consume some neural connections and build or rebuild others.

 

[Maia]

Thanks Mia.

I think you have, in general, a fair point. However we know that we can stimulate specific areas of the brain and get predicted results. We also know that we can alter perception by chaning specific parts of the brain. We can make mice blind or paralyzed by destroying specific parts of the brain. We can also create knockout mice and predict the behavior that will result. We can also make predictions that people with certain kinds of deffeciences will demonstrate certain MRI patterns.

No, we shouldln't categorically state anything but we aren't only in the dark either.

I don't think so either. However, a phenomenon like receptive aphasia really turns the question around so that we can look at it from a different direction. Certain parts of the brain can be said to be correlated with the ability to comprehend spoken language, but we're still left with all of the same unanswered questions we had before. The one which intrigues me most is the fact that Miss Ruby has Wernicke's aphasia, and yet she can always clearly understand what she herself is saying. Her words are always purposeful, and this shouldn't be possible.

But it gets better (or worse, or... well, I don't know.) I had a traumatic brain injury in a car accident many years ago. I've had PET, CAT, and MRI scans done. I have copies of all of these, and
the MRI scan has some notes on it. Basically, they said that I had general cerebral atrophy and neuronal damage (analagous to what you'd expect to see in something along the lines of, say, late-stage Korsakoff's Syndrome.) As y'all can clearly see, however, I'm typing complete sentences right now. There's definitely no way that I should have been able to get a masters' degree in social work. Now, there are complex neurological reasons why everything may have worked out this way and I'm not going to explore them all now, but the point is that knowing which abilities will be affected by manipulating corresponding portions of the brain can be a little like knowing that we can nudge two atoms together with a sledgehammer.

 

[Malerin]

It only does this if you define "complete knowledge" as including being in that mental state, as you have.

Because I don't believe mental states are identical to brain states. But this isn't about how I define things. This is about reductionism. Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain), then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway- scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so. The idea is laughable. We know a bit about the function and anatomy of the brain, and all this has occurred without brain state replication. At what point will scientists have to start adopting particular brain states to further their knowledge of the brain? I ask again: what information about brain state X cannot be learned without having brain state X? What process or anatomy is kept forever hidden unless you adopt a particular brain state?

You would if you defined complete knowledge of Joes arm as including having Joe's arm

I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state. Again, this is not about my definition, but about reductionism. Reductionists would not say you need to attach Joe's arm to yourself in order to study it. But I have to replicate Joe's brain state inside my own head to study it? Inconsistent and contradicted by actual scientific study of the brain.

So here is what you are saying:

I don't have to change my brain state to study a whale

So why should I have to change my brain state to study my brain states?​

Yes, that is what I am saying. And this is what is currently going on in science. Or are you claiming we know nothing of brain states? As far as I know, brain state replication is not possible, yet our understanding of the brain marches on. Funny, that.

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone, she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain. And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because I don't believe mental states are identical to brain states. But this isn't about how I define things. This is about reductionism. Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain), then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

Are you defining "knowledge of a particular brain state" to include being in or having been in that brain state?

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway- scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so. The idea is laughable.

Of course they change their own brains. How can you learn something without some change to your brain?

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone, she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain. And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

I can't respond without an answer to my question above.

~~ Paul

 

[PixyMisa]

Because I don't believe mental states are identical to brain states. But this isn't about how I define things. This is about reductionism. Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain), then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

No. Category error.

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway- scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so.

Yes they do.

The idea is laughable.

"It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble, it's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

We know a bit about the function and anatomy of the brain, and all this has occurred without brain state replication.

Yes. So what?

At what point will scientists have to start adopting particular brain states to further their knowledge of the brain?

In practical terms, never, because you can't do that.

In terms of Mary's Room, when they are supposed to know "everything there is to know" about a given mental process.

I ask again: what information about brain state X cannot be learned without having brain state X?

Not that I never said that you have to have brain state X to know anything specific about brain state X. But you have to have a mapping of brain state X, and the more detailed the information you are supposed to have, the better the mapping must be.

Mary is supposed to have perfect knowledge of a given field. For this, she needs perfect mappings of the appropriate brain states.

What process or anatomy is kept forever hidden unless you adopt a particular brain state?

Perfect and complete knowledge of any mental process. The sort of perfect and complete knowledge that Jackson's entire argument depends on.

I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state. Again, this is not about my definition, but about reductionism. Reductionists would not say you need to attach Joe's arm to yourself in order to study it. But I have to replicate Joe's brain state inside my own head to study it?

Okay, this is a good place to explain the difference:

In studying Joe's arm, you build a conceptual model of the arm. The muscles and bones and skin and ligaments and nerves and blood vessels and so on, how they are all interconnected and how they all work. A collection of data and a collection of routines to process that data.

This doesn't reproduce Joe's arm. It produces a mental model of Joe's arm. While you can't do what Joe's arm can do, you can know what Joe's arm can do. Can Joe throw a softball at 90 miles per hour? You can use your mental model of his arm to find out.

Now -

In studying Joe's brain, you build a conceptual model of the brain. The neurons and axons and synapses, the neurotransmitters and action potentials and so on, how they are all interconnected and how they all work. A collection of data and a collection of routines to process that data.

This doesn't reproduce Joe's brain... But it reproduces his mind, because the mind is information. Does Joe enjoy throwing softballs at 90 miles per hour? We can find out. If Joe speaks Italian (badly), we can use the model of his brain to speak Italian (badly).

It is physically impossible for one human to do this for another human. However, this is the sort of knowledge that Jackson grants to Mary.

Inconsistent and contradicted by actual scientific study of the brain.

No.

Yes, that is what I am saying.

You're wrong.

And this is what is currently going on in science.

No, in fact, it's completely impossible.

In studying a whale, you change your brain.

In studying anything, you change your brain.

In not studying anything, you still change your brain.

Or are you claiming we know nothing of brain states? As far as I know, brain state replication is not possible, yet our understanding of the brain marches on. Funny, that.

Yes, brain state replication is not possible. Perfect brain state replication is not possible even in principle. Yet it is exactly that sort of information that Jackson - and you - blithely assign to Mary.

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone

It's not.

she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain.

No she can't.

First, everything she learns changes her brain.

Second, it is impossible for a human to learn "complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception", because much of that data cannot be acquired through any human learning ability.

Third, it is impossible in any self-consistent, finite, material universe for any entity to acquire or possess "complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception", because that information would not fit inside that universe.

And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

No.

 

[RandFan]

Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain), then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

This is a non-sequitur. The brain doesn't think or experience.

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway...

Demonstrably false. I've explained this to you and given you the data. We can take away a persons ability to see or experience color by altering the brain.

...scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so.

Yes they do but this is a non-sequitur.

The idea is laughable. We know a bit about the function and anatomy of the brain, and all this has occurred without brain state replication.

This is a straw man. No one makes this claim. It's not predicted by materialism (physicalism).

You've gone off on some tangent.

I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state. Again, this is not about my definition, but about reductionism. Reductionists would not say you need to attach Joe's arm to yourself in order to study it.

Another straw man and rather disapointing after all I've said. One only need to map the neural corelates and then map those to the other brain.

But I have to replicate Joe's brain state inside my own head to study it?

NO! Straw man.

You have to map Joe's neural corelates to have the same ability that Joe has. Knowing the neural corelates isn't enough as has been demonstrated to you time and again.

Inconsistent and contradicted by actual scientific study of the brain.

Yes but only because you have erected a straw man.

Yes, that is what I am saying. And this is what is currently going on in science. Or are you claiming we know nothing of brain states? As far as I know, brain state replication is not possible, yet our understanding of the brain marches on. Funny, that.

Another straw man.

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone, she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain. And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

No.

There is an area in the brain that must be activated before Mary can see color. Book learning wont' activate that area.

 

[RandFan]

Now, there are complex neurological reasons why everything may have worked out this way and I'm not going to explore them all now, but the point is that knowing which abilities will be affected by manipulating corresponding portions of the brain can be a little like knowing that we can nudge two atoms together with a sledgehammer.

I don't at all agree with your simile but that's fine. No one is arguing that there are no anamolies or that we understand the brain perfectly. Not even close. Nothing you've said obviates anything I've said.

If we couldn't know which abilities will be affected by manipulating corresponding portions of the brain then a hell of a lot of research is a scam. Including knock out mice for behavioral research. Now, that's possible and it's possible that the peer reviewed research is all nonsesne but I'm not buying it.

 

[RandFan]

Because I don't believe mental states are identical to brain states. But this isn't about how I define things. This is about reductionism. Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain), then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway- scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so. The idea is laughable. We know a bit about the function and anatomy of the brain, and all this has occurred without brain state replication. At what point will scientists have to start adopting particular brain states to further their knowledge of the brain? I ask again: what information about brain state X cannot be learned without having brain state X? What process or anatomy is kept forever hidden unless you adopt a particular brain state?

I don't define it that way. Joe's arm is a physical thing, not a mental state. Again, this is not about my definition, but about reductionism. Reductionists would not say you need to attach Joe's arm to yourself in order to study it. But I have to replicate Joe's brain state inside my own head to study it? Inconsistent and contradicted by actual scientific study of the brain.

Yes, that is what I am saying. And this is what is currently going on in science. Or are you claiming we know nothing of brain states? As far as I know, brain state replication is not possible, yet our understanding of the brain marches on. Funny, that.

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone, she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain. And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

In case you ignore my other post and in the hopes you read this one.

Malerin, this is full of non-sequiturs and straw men.

No one is saying that you must have a duplicate brain state to study or understand said brain state. Materialism, reductionism, says that to experience what Joe experiences you will need the same neural correlates (brain state). This would require surgery (probably nanobots). Please see my Pianist virtuoso example.

To experience red you must activate the area of the brain correlated with color. Book learning won't activate that area of the brain.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Because I don't believe mental states are identical to brain states. But this isn't about how I define things.

Yes it is.

This is about reductionism. Reductionists who do believe this are inconsistent: If its possible to have complete knowledge of the sun without having the sun's brain state (which should show you the error right there- to be consistent, you should claim complete knowledge of a fountain pen is only possible if you insert it in your brain),

No no no. Fountain pen actually being inserted into the head has nothing to do with it. You're severely confused.

Jane is shown a red object. She sees red. That causes her brain to go into a particular brain state. This is S₁. Mary studies Jane, and finds out how Jane's brain gets into S₁. This is a brain state too. This is S₂. The fact that S₂ is about S₁, and S₁ is a brain state, does not make S₁ equal to S₂.

Unless you're Malerin.

Where is the brain state associated with your fountain pen made of straw?

then its possible to have complete knowledge of a particular brain state without having that particular brain state.

Sure, it's possible, under physicalism, for her to have knowledge of this brain state without having that brain state. If Jane can see red, then have red taken away, and then have a memory of seeing red, then we could simply have Mary's brain surgically put into a state of having a memory of seeing red, without her ever seeing red. Then Mary knows what it's like to see red, without ever having seen red.

But your thought experiment doesn't really start with Mary having complete knowledge. It starts with Mary having no knowledge. That's the whole point of the black-and-white room, her being a cognitive scientist, her studying the brain (duplicate Mary for example), etc--remember those? It's part of the problem!

So we have to get Mary to know what it's like to see red, without ever seeing red. And we can demonstrate that the knowing is possible, under physicalism, because Jane has a brain state, and she isn't currently seeing red, and all we need is to get that brain state into Mary. But that would mean that the specific thing we need to do is to get Mary to remember seeing red (because that's what Jane is doing).

So you have to show that it's possible for Mary to remember seeing red by learning things in a black-and-white room, in order to show that Mary can have the knowledge you argue that she should be able to have, under physicalism. And that is something I don't think you can argue must be possible.

Unless you beg the question again.

You're handwaving that Mary can have the knowledge, but she can only have knowledge that she gains.

Brain states as a necessary condition for knowledge is ad hoc and absurd anyway- scientists who study the brain do not have to change their own brains while they do so. The idea is laughable.

Uhh... brains have to change state just to stay alive. That's why our brains consume about 30% of our caloric intake--they use that energy to constantly change state. Those MRI's you mentioned earlier show brains changing state--that's what the MRI does in the first place.

Are you predicting that if a brain scientist were to study a brain while being attached to an MRI, you would not see any changes?

I ask again: what information about brain state X cannot be learned without having brain state X?

What it's like to have brain state X.

What process or anatomy is kept forever hidden unless you adopt a particular brain state?

Having the particular brain state.

But I have to replicate Joe's brain state inside my own head to study it?

Not at all! No more than I have to play basketball to study basketball. But practically speaking, I have to either play basketball, or experience a really good simulation, to know what it's like to play basketball.

In terms of seeing red, that's a more primitive sort of thing--there's no difference between seeing red and a really good simulation in this case. So to learn what it's like to see red, practically speaking, I would have to actually see red.

Unless you're going to argue that there must be a way to get me to remember seeing red without ever seeing it.

So, to get back to Mary's room: once the requirement that Mary adopt a particular brain state is gone, she can gain complete knowledge of the brain states and physical processes associated with color perception without changing her own brain.

She can only gain complete knowledge if she can gain complete knowledge--you're so busy handwaving your way to complete knowledge that you forget that the state has to actually get there by some means.

Bald assertion is not enough to show that a limited set of means is sufficient to establish a brain state.

And if brain states are identical to mental states, she would have complete knowledge of the mental state associated with color perception.

But would she ever be able to remember seeing red, by reading about how people remember seeing red?

 

[PixyMisa]

Jane is shown a red object. She sees red. That causes her brain to go into a particular brain state. This is S₁. Mary studies Jane, and finds out how Jane's brain gets into S₁. This is a brain state too. This is S₂. The fact that S₂ is about S₁, and S₁ is a brain state, does not make S₁ equal to S₂.

Unless you're Malerin.

That's where the magical phrase "everything there is to know" comes into play. If S₂ is defined as "everything there is to know" about S₁ (where S₁ is itself information), then S₂ is a superset of S₁.

But your thought experiment doesn't really start with Mary having complete knowledge. It starts with Mary having no knowledge. That's the whole point of the black-and-white room, her being a cognitive scientist, her studying the brain (duplicate Mary for example), etc--remember those? It's part of the problem!

Yep. The argument just asserts that Mary knows "everything there is to know" about the physical process of colour perception. There are at least two unrelated reasons why this is impossible.

 

[Malerin]

This is a non-sequitur. The brain doesn't think or experience.

Wait, what?

Demonstrably false. I've explained this to you and given you the data. We can take away a persons ability to see or experience color by altering the brain.

You can explain it all you want. Color or experience are not relevant. If brain states are identical to mental states, I don't need to ever see anything to know what "seeing color" is like. I could be blind, it doesn't matter. So long as I know the relevant brain state "seeing color", I know the mental state.

Yes they do but this is a non-sequitur.

Their brains change when they learn, but scientists do not have to adopt a particular brain state in order to learn about brain states. Yet that is exactly what is being asserted: in order to have complete knowledge of brain state X, one must replicate brain state X in their brain. That does not go on in neurological studies, nor is there any reason to think it will ever become a necessary condition. It's ad hoc.

This is a straw man. No one makes this claim. It's not predicted by materialism (physicalism).

Um, that's my point. Adopting a paricular brain state is not required to gain knowledge of brain states. Yet to have complete knowledge of a brain state, it's being asserted by you (and a few others), that one must... adopt a partcular brain state. This is not consistent, and no one has answered my question: what neural process or anatomy (or any other part of a brain state) is inacessile unless a person adopts that particular brain state?

Another straw man and rather disapointing after all I've said. One only need to map the neural corelates and then map those to the other brain.

To learn about a guy's arm? What are you talking about?

You have to map Joe's neural corelates to have the same ability that Joe has. Knowing the neural corelates isn't enough as has been demonstrated to you time and again.

It hasn't been demonstrated. It's merely been asserted. If Joe's ability is a particular mental state(s), then knowledge of the brain state(s) is knowledge of that ability. You keep making my argument for me. Of course it's absurd, but that's the consequence of the position mental states are identical to brain states. I don't think you believe that, but you're kind of all over the place. Do you believe they're identical?

There is an area in the brain that must be activated before Mary can see color. Book learning wont' activate that area.

That area doesn't need to be activated. That's the whole point. If mental states ARE brain states, then knowing the brain state "seeing red" IS knowing the mental state "seeing red". Mary could have no eyes at all and still have the mental event "see red", if brain states = mental states. Do you see why this doesn't work?

Of course I agree with you that she has to see color (or have her brain activated in a color-seeing way) in order to know the mental state "color perception". That's been my point from the outset. Type physicalism, which holds that mental events are identical to physical events, doesn't work.

 

[PixyMisa]

Their brains change when they learn, but scientists do not have to adopt a particular brain state in order to learn about brain states.

That depends on what they want to learn.

Yet that is exactly what is being asserted: in order to have COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE of brain state X, one must replicate brain state X in their brain.

YES.

In order to have COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE
you DO have to replicate brain state X in your brain.

That does not go on in neurological studies, nor is there any reason to think it will ever become a necessary condition. It's ad hoc.

Baloney.

Neurological studies do not provide COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE. In simple systems where complete knowledge is possible - in computers - this is exactly what happens.

Um, that's my point. Adopting a paricular brain state is not required to gain knowledge of brain states.

Of course it isn't.

Yet to have COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE of a brain state, it's being asserted by you (and a few others), that one must... adopt a partcular brain state.

Not adopt, but include.

This is not consistent

Wrong, wrong, completely wrong. We are consistent. You are not consistent. You keep dancing around the requirement for COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE.

and no one has answered my question: what neural process or anatomy (or any other part of a brain state) is inacessile unless a person adopts that particular brain state?

COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE

It hasn't been demonstrated. It's merely been asserted. If Joe's ability is a particular mental state(s), then knowledge of the brain state(s) is knowledge of that ability.

Yes. And?

You keep making my argument for me.

No.

Of course it's absurd, but that's the consequence of the position mental states are identical to brain states.

No.

I don't think you believe that, but you're kind of all over the place.

No, that's just you.

Do you believe they're identical?

No. Mental states are brain states, but the perspective is different. It's a mapping.

That area doesn't need to be activated. That's the whole point. If mental states ARE brain states, then knowing the brain state "seeing red" IS knowing the mental state "seeing red".

No. You have to also understand the mapping.

Mary could have no eyes at all and still have the mental event "see red", if brain states = mental states.

Yes, of course. And this actually happens.

Do you see why this doesn't work?

No.

Of course I agree with you that she has to see color (or have her brain activated in a color-seeing way) in order to know the mental state "color perception".

But that contradicts your own argument. You assert that she has COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE. Then you assert that she doesn't. You can't do that.

That's been my point from the outset.

And you've been wrong since the outset.

Type physicalism, which holds that mental events are identical to physical events, doesn't work.

No, it's just that you're incapable of maintaining a consistent position.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Color or experience are not relevant.

How can you say it's not relevant? It's the very thing you're arguing disproves physicalism.

If brain states are identical to mental states, I don't need to ever see anything to know what "seeing color" is like.

If you have to have the mental state to know what "seeing color" is like, and mental states are brain states, then yes you do.

I could be blind, it doesn't matter. So long as I know the relevant brain state "seeing color", I know the mental state.

Sure. But you have to somehow acquire the relevant brain state. And brain states are mental states.

So how do you acquire the mental state?

Their brains change when they learn, but scientists do not have to adopt a particular brain state in order to (A) learn about brain states. Yet that is exactly what is being asserted: in order to (B) have complete knowledge of brain state X, one must replicate brain state X in their brain.

(A) is learning about something. (B) is having complete knowledge of something. These two things are so far removed that it's pathetically absurd to say that people who claim (A) are claiming (B).

Um, that's my point. Adopting a paricular brain state is not required to gain knowledge of brain states. Yet to have complete knowledge of a brain state, it's being asserted by you (and a few others), that one must... adopt a partcular brain state.

No, to learn, not to "have". You obviously aren't even reading my posts. Nor are you reading RandFan's posts. RandFan I believe was one of the first to mention manually putting the knowledge there in this thread. But Mary is simply studying things.

This is not consistent, and no one has answered my question:

I answered it.

It hasn't been demonstrated. It's merely been asserted.

Shifting the burden of proof.

This is your argument against physicalism that you are defending. And it's your argument against physicalism that we are attacking.

If Joe's ability is a particular mental state(s), then knowledge of the brain state(s) is knowledge of that ability.

Knowledge of a brain state is not having the brain state. Repeat that over and over until it sinks in.

I know of the fact that mantis shrimp have 16 eye pigments. But I nevertheless don't have the mental state of what it's like to have 16 different color pigments... I'm still a lowly trichromat, mentally speaking. Aren't you, after knowing this?

So if mental states are brain states, why would knowing of the mantis shrimp's 16-pigments result in knowing what it's like to see 16 colors, mentally speaking? Why should it produce knowledge of what it's like physically speaking then?

You keep making my argument for me. Of course it's absurd, but that's the consequence of the position mental states are identical to brain states.

No, it's a consequence of your inability to distinguish knowledge of a thing from the thing itself.

Knowledge of a unicorn isn't a unicorn. Knowledge of being a president isn't being a president. Knowledge of Jane seeing red isn't seeing red. Knowledge of Jane remembering seeing red isn't remembering seeing red.

That area doesn't need to be activated.

That's true. But pragmatically, it has to be activated to learn it--that is, to acquire the brain state by observation rather than have your brain magically pop into the state, or be put into it manually.

That's the whole point. If mental states ARE brain states, then knowing the brain state "seeing red" IS knowing the mental state "seeing red".

Picture it this way. Jane sees red, attached to a high fidelity MRI. Take a snapshot. Let's suppose the picture looks strikingly like the letter "A".

Now she forms a memory of seeing red. Take another snapshot. Let's suppose the picture of that looks strikingly like the letter "B".

Now you ask Jane if she knows what it's like to see red. "Sure!", she says, while remembering that she saw red. Take another snapshot. Let's suppose that picture looks strikingly like the letter "C".

Okay, now I'm the one in the black-and-white room, watching Jane's MRI's in real-time. Oh, and by the way, there happens to be another MRI attached to my brain while I'm watching this. As I see all of this, I learn that Jane's MRI looks strikingly like the letter "A" when she looks at red, and "B" when she forms a memory, and "C" when she recalls it.

Assuming physicalism, please prove to me that the MRI attached to my brain will have ever formed a pattern that looks strikingly like the letter "C".