My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Belz...]

Yes, of course.

But here is the thing.

Identity Materialism says "Brain state X is identical to some mental state Y".

Your definition of "complete knowledge of mental state Y" includes the actual experience. Yes?

But if brain state X is mental state Y then this would entail that "complete knowledge of brain state X" must also include the actual experience.

Otherwise you are using the expression "complete knowledge" inconsistently.

Also, if X is identical to Y, this does not entail that the mathematical isomorphism of X must be identical to Y.

I entails that the mathematical isomorphism of X is identical to the mathematical isomorphism of Y.

Yes, that's what I was trying to convey, but more eloquent.

 

[Dancing David]

But that would also entail that she could not achieve that particular brain state, wouldn't it?

That is my beleif, there is little good evidence either way but much of the evidence we have would make it likely she would not develop color vision.

 

[!Kaggen]

I think that is the common sense proof of solidity you are referring to.
Science does not prove things remember.

Ooops, not commons ense again.

The existance of the material world is not a given, we could be brains in vats or butterfly dreams, god thought or dancing energy.

No way to tell, that is why use the term appeance.

What I mean by common sense is not thinking about but figuration. In other words figuration is that part of appearance which we add to from our experience.
So if I duck because someone throws a punch at me it is not because I think about it, but because I know from experience that a fist is solid.
I am not claiming a special position for common sense as opposed to the scientific method.
I am saying that it is difficult to avoid everyday common sense and we should embrace it consciously and direct it wisely rather than dismiss it as unreliable.

How do we compare the results from the introspection of different observers?

The same way we do everything through communication.
Different peopel do report different results from instrospection. But that is abroad etrm we may need to narrow it.

Yes, but we describe the results based on a common percept. Otherwise we would not be understood.

Surely we define the results in terms of the data that we observe in order to communicate them?

yes but it can be very hard to establish metric of the qualitative nature of introspection, such as "It was beautiful."

I was not meaning a metric when I used the term data, but perceptive information (sensory neurochemical data).
Communicating concepts such as beautiful is interesting since as you pointed out to Robin you believe that Mary does not learn to experience a concept. She actually won't have the capacity to experience the colour red through the lack of real experience. The wavelengths of red light and the physiological response of her sense organs is surely still happening, but her brain is not primed to recognize what she sees due to lack of exposure to what her brain receives as a stimulus. In another way if Mary only ever saw colours and never was given any information about what she saw would she be able to recognize that one specific colour was "red" when explained all the information we know about the colour red without any reference to what she was seeing? I do not believe so. Would it be the same for a chair? If Mary had never seen a chair before?Would she recognize one when it was put in front of her, by answering the question, what is this?, after being provided with enough information about what a chair looked like? I do not believe she would.

Based on the above, I do not believe that we can communicate our experience of reality without both having a percept and a concept which are related by thinking.

In which case I don't see a problem here.

The issue is that there is little consistency between the tintrospective reports of different observers. Some patterns are found but it is difficult to form a theory based upon them, that would be the issue.

that and that different events seem to have a wide variety of introspective ersults. Future theories may have the pwoer to resolve them.

I think that behaviorsim already does. But that is an opinion not shared by many.

I am even more optimistic and believe there are methods of refining the consistency between different observers through exercises in active perception. Active perception being when we consciously direct our figuration.

Confirmation bias is just terminology to describe one of the results of this processes on the way to a definition which we can communicate.

It is a little more specific than that:
It is a statement about tehs elf reinforcing nature of beliefs. If an entity only retains the data that confirms their belief and disregards the data that contradicts thier beleif, then it might be possible that analysis of the data shows there is no corrwelation.

I understand what you are saying. However I think we do this even if we try hard to avoid it, because of figuration. Eventually when we think things through using the scientific method it will eventually become figuration. This certainly a positive thing and has help us grow out of much figuration which was destructive. I do not say we should stop this process, only recognize it.

The point of introspection is to realise how we organise and interpret the data and systematize this .

Well, that is one of the things that happens yes.

This is all very well, but it does not tell us anything about the relationship between inner and outer reality.

They are the same, in all cases humans have interior (or self referencing models) of the action of themselves, reality and the role of themselves in that reality. the models are about different ways of organizing human thoughst and the body is the common boundary between them in human thoughts. Now there are forces which interpenetrate the body (like gravity).

But the human brain (whatever that is) set up these models and events that sort of and try to organise the events of perception. However some of them seem to have little ability to predict the behavior of the reality that is not the body.
In that a confabulated memory of a large sum of money in the bank account is going to be invalid to making with drawls from teh bank.

Nice point. I do think though that the models about the exterior get refined overtime just as the models of the body were refined overtime. The difference being of course that the models of the interior are past on genetically and the models of the exterior get passed on culturally. There are cultures in my opinion who have very successful models of the exterior, even if they are not based on scientific findings. However I am not saying this is not the way to go. We have gained much from our striving to develop and overcome poor models of figuration, but I still think we can learn from them how their figuration was adapted to be more successful in areas were we struggle. Such as environmental stewardship, the importance of culture and social cohesion.

It just assumes that there are two kinds of reality. One personal, one a consistent model. It is in my opinion a form of dualism. This is the problem that arises if we do not recognize the nature of thinking. It is not finished until the subject and object is reconciled as they were before thinking starts.

The issue is the organic nature of the brain and associative learning, as well as social, personal and cultural convention.
I don't see it as a dualism, but then I am not you. I see it as models of communication within the organic brain, some seem to be spurious or invalid to the nature of the world of which they are a part.

You have definitely characterized well what I have been thinking. The dualism for me is not really a negative thing, but a necessary step to make unconscious figuration conscious. I just believe we need to follow through with what we have learnt by our conscious exploration of the world of matter into the world of mind.

Someone on this forum (I cannot remember exactly were) someone mentioned that this is the nature of the human condition, perhaps due to an evolutionary advantage, to think of themselves as a subject.

It is more of a cultural convention, running through the dichotomy of hellenism and going to Zoroaster and beyond. there are net theories as well of organization, and multifacted pluralistc appraoches. Dualism is not inherent, it seems to be social.
Now the belief that the body is an idependant unit in the world is probably a result of not having sensations outside the body.

Not inherent in the world yes. Our culture however I believe is a reflection of how we think. In this regards I believe a study of cultural convention will give us a good idea of how thinking happens and has changed for that matter. This is what I meant earlier in our exchanges when I referred to the evolution of consciousness.

I tend to agree. I think that it gives us the ability to be free. Whether it is an illusion or not is irrelevant since it is not what we hypothesize of freedom passively that counts, but what we actively do when we reconcile the subject/concept with the object/percept by means of cognition. The thing-in-itself is not given in cognition as such it is what cognition makes of it. Yes this freedom comes with a price. The possibility of error, but that is why we can change our minds
I think it is the fear of error which creates dogma but we need not fear if we learn to trust our thinking, by embracing it wholeheartedly instead of ignoring it as a consequence of matter and therefore expecting to find an explanation of thinking in matter.

I am not afraid, I have already learned that free will may be an illsuion and that i am not a self.
You show me a way outside of matter that is not dualsim and that is great. So far I haven't seen a way to distinguish idealism from materialsim. I can always change my mind.

The way for me is to recognize the human contribution in the process of knowledge. By human contribution I mean, figuration.

I do not think it is a necessary axiom. What difference would it make to the scientific method if it weren't?

Then we would not have the symetries of physics and the alpha fine constant would vary.
And the differences if predictable would not matter.

I honestly do not see this as a problem. It only matters when we need to use the results for something practical. In which case if they work then great.
Why does it matter if our theorizing about what happened at the Big Bang could not be re-conciled with evidence.
Unless of course someone wanted to enforce something based on a theory without adequate evidence.
In which case it is not a matter of knowledge, but politics.
Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, could you explain what you mean in another way.

Universal objective consciousness postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness.

Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of matter which will be defined by manipulating matter until it becomes conscious.

Now this is really an interesting statement !Kaggen and at this point I feel like lampooning you by just asking a bunch of questions and dismissing it out of hand.

But I instead will try this.

"Idealism postulates consciousness as a state of the universe which manifests in degrees and is best defined by human self-consciousness. "

and

"Materialism postulates consciousness as a property of patterns of interaction ofmatter which will be defined through observable behaviors and then applied to objects that demonstrate those behaviors."

So what do you think of those changes?

I brought up the concept "Universal objective consciousness" to reconcile the dualism I see when we do not recognize figuration. The result being consciousness as a concept which has no obvious sensory percept and the concept matter which have no obviously observable consciousness. If you see the definition of universal objective consciousness as a form of idealism you are correct in that it is a monistic idealism which I intuitively derived from this observation.

I do not agree with the concept as an alternative to materialism. I see it it as property of cognition in process just as a I see materialism as a property of cognition in process.
I believe we can reconcile the two eventually by making figuration a conscious process.

 

[RandFan]

Yes - but S1 <> S2. That's the important thing.

I've no problem with that.

 

[RandFan]

I don't mind the term "programming" being used in this context if it's analogous to computer programming. If it's a claim that it's the same process then I quibble.

Correct.

 

[RandFan]

Clearly the brain is a single general CPU...

Clearly it's not. Have you read Ramachandran's book?

Thre is no explanatory hypothesis for how a brain that is a general CPU could experience Capgras disorder. On the contrary, we can see that different modules in the brain light up for different proccesses and this is the same in most if not all people. IOW: We've identified the area of the brain where sight is processed. Where math is performed. These are specialized modules. Did you know that there is a specialized module just for nouns? It's true. My best friends father had a stroke and he lost his ability to use nouns. It sounds bizaare but it's true and it could only happen if the brain had specialized modules to process data.

 

[Dancing David]

What I mean by common sense is not thinking about but figuration. In other words figuration is that part of appearance which we add to from our experience.

Okay, yet that seems to be subject to error and bias, at least in the application of some models vs. the behavior of reality. So I am always cautious about it. (As an aside. Especially personally, as a person living with depression and anxiety my 'formations' are often out of balance.)

So if I duck because someone throws a punch at me it is not because I think about it, but because I know from experience that a fist is solid.

Sure that is a learned habit, often habits are empty of actual validity. Again caution advised.

I am not claiming a special position for common sense as opposed to the scientific method.
I am saying that it is difficult to avoid everyday common sense and we should embrace it consciously and direct it wisely rather than dismiss it as unreliable.

Well there may be areas where that is true and areas where that is false, as I have stated there are many places where such habits are unreliable and very prone to bias and error. So caution is advised..

Now perhaps this forum is one area where more caution is observed than normal.

Yes, but we describe the results based on a common percept. Otherwise we would not be understood.

In some areas yes introspection will provide some reliable effects, but you have to be very careful, especially here to define and discuss the parameters.

Often the actual results of introspection as reported are widely variant. Take prayer or other forms of meditation, different people will report different result and consequences.

I was not meaning a metric when I used the term data, but perceptive information (sensory neurochemical data).

that too is prone to error of many sources between observers, which is again my point. Introspection unless carefully defined is such a broad term as to be fraught with communication errors alone, much less differences of perception. I am fairly certain that my best friend and I actually perceive the color red differently, part of it is language usage and self idiom, but I seriously suspect that his eye and brain perceive a higher red content than mine.

Now I have not done a pattern matching test with different shades to see if we would identify the same quantative vales. But he calls 'pink' what I often call 'purple'. Now part of that is language patterns and application but I seriously believe that he perceives more red than I do or that I perceive more blue than he does.

Much less when we get to an abstracted concept like 'pretty'.

Communicating concepts such as beautiful is interesting since as you pointed out to Robin you believe that Mary does not learn to experience a concept.

Actually I am claiming something else, it is my belief that she will not develop color vision, and will be unable to tell the 'color red' from a similarly matched and saturated 'color grey'. There are many issues with this, she may have photo receptors in her fovea, but there is a rather complex neural network that develops in the retina, hers will not be as developed as those of humans who are exposed to colors from birth on. So even at the level of the retina I believe her neural circuitry will not be developed to perceive color they way it could be.

then there is the whole issue of perception and pathways and processes of perception. Much of that is developed and learned in response to the stimulus of exposure to color.

So there are many possible outcomes:
-she will not develop color vision, she will be unable to distinguish shades of tint from similar shades of grey tint.
-after considerable exposure, say a matter of days and weeks , she may begin to develop some rudimentary form of color vision, which may develop in acuity and discrimination-however due to her lack of exposure during developmental phases of her growth, she may never have more than very broad and gross color vision, she is likely to not have the acuity of vision, the ability to distinguish shades that people who develop in exposure to color do.

She actually won't have the capacity to experience the colour red through the lack of real experience. The wavelengths of red light and the physiological response of her sense organs is surely still happening,

maybe, maybe not, it sure will be very different. And a highly unethical experiment.

but her brain is not primed to recognize what she sees due to lack of exposure to what her brain receives as a stimulus.

yes! However there are often crucial stages in development that occur roughly at 1.5-3 years of age, 8-12 years of age and so on, where brain growth is occurring and associations are forming.

So she may be rather limited or not capable of color vision.

In another way if Mary only ever saw colours and never was given any information about what she saw would she be able to recognize that one specific colour was "red" when explained all the information we know about the colour red without any reference to what she was seeing?

well that is the subject of a rather abstracted derail right now, I would say that she could recognize color and would learn to use idiomatic reference to color in exposure to others.

But the 'complete knowledge' argument is a fallacy of construction, which you have wisely avoided.

I do not believe so. Would it be the same for a chair? If Mary had never seen a chair before? Would she recognize one when it was put in front of her, by answering the question, what is this?, after being provided with enough information about what a chair looked like? I do not believe she would.

Well that hinges upon the phrase 'information of what a chair looked like', I have identified the common name of birds that have been described to me verbally without seeing them.

Based on the above, I do not believe that we can communicate our experience of reality without both having a percept and a concept which are related by thinking.

yes, and language is a very specific set of symbolic self referencing and idiomatic set of symbols.

it is a set of experience but not related to all experience.

I am even more optimistic and believe there are methods of refining the consistency between different observers through exercises in active perception. Active perception being when we consciously direct our figuration.

Sure , I would as well, but I think that this thread alone has had three derails based exclusively upon the problems of language usage. Where people seem to me to often not be interested in actually using the idiomatic reference to communicate but rather to show gaps in the logical application of language as though that alone is proof of an underlying reality.

The equation of 'complete knowledge' to a critique of 'materialism' is a very good example of that.

Which is why I truly believe that often in the se discussion is really does come down to the vagueness of the concepts.

The 'hard problem of consciousness' seems to me to be inherent in the sloppy usage of language and an unwillingness to actually try to define terms. Which is also why I avoid qualia like the plague.

Time to rest....

I understand what you are saying. However I think we do this even if we try hard to avoid it, because of figuration. Eventually when we think things through using the scientific method it will eventually become figuration. This certainly a positive thing and has help us grow out of much figuration which was destructive. I do not say we should stop this process, only recognize it.





Nice point. I do think though that the models about the exterior get refined overtime just as the models of the body were refined overtime. The difference being of course that the models of the interior are past on genetically and the models of the exterior get passed on culturally. There are cultures in my opinion who have very successful models of the exterior, even if they are not based on scientific findings. However I am not saying this is not the way to go. We have gained much from our striving to develop and overcome poor models of figuration, but I still think we can learn from them how their figuration was adapted to be more successful in areas were we struggle. Such as environmental stewardship, the importance of culture and social cohesion.




You have definitely characterized well what I have been thinking. The dualism for me is not really a negative thing, but a necessary step to make unconscious figuration conscious. I just believe we need to follow through with what we have learnt by our conscious exploration of the world of matter into the world of mind.


Not inherent in the world yes. Our culture however I believe is a reflection of how we think. In this regards I believe a study of cultural convention will give us a good idea of how thinking happens and has changed for that matter. This is what I meant earlier in our exchanges when I referred to the evolution of consciousness.



The way for me is to recognize the human contribution in the process of knowledge. By human contribution I mean, figuration.



I honestly do not see this as a problem. It only matters when we need to use the results for something practical. In which case if they work then great.
Why does it matter if our theorizing about what happened at the Big Bang could not be re-conciled with evidence.
Unless of course someone wanted to enforce something based on a theory without adequate evidence.
In which case it is not a matter of knowledge, but politics.
Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, could you explain what you mean in another way.




I brought up the concept "Universal objective consciousness" to reconcile the dualism I see when we do not recognize figuration. The result being consciousness as a concept which has no obvious sensory percept and the concept matter which have no obviously observable consciousness. If you see the definition of universal objective consciousness as a form of idealism you are correct in that it is a monistic idealism which I intuitively derived from this observation.

I do not agree with the concept as an alternative to materialism. I see it it as property of cognition in process just as a I see materialism as a property of cognition in process.
I believe we can reconcile the two eventually by making figuration a conscious process.

Hey !Kaggen Thanks for the response, this will take a while to respond to. There is lot to discuss here.

 

[westprog]

Clearly it's not.

I mean that it is capable of being a single CPU. It can perform simple mathematical tasks, for example. However, I consider that this ability is peripheral to the function and workings of the brain, and that the ways in which it has additional functionality to being a single CPU are far more interesting. I don't think we're in significant disagreement on this point.

 

[RandFan]

I mean that it is capable of being a single CPU. It can perform simple mathematical tasks, for example. However, I consider that this ability is peripheral to the function and workings of the brain, and that the ways in which it has additional functionality to being a single CPU are far more interesting. I don't think we're in significant disagreement on this point.

I'm going to hold off taking a position. I'm a bit skeptical about the brain being capable of being a single CPU and I think there is good reason to support the proposition that it is not. However, we've not resolved the Binding Problem (or more precisely The Combination Problem). Therefore it would really be premeture of me to take a hard line counter position. IOW: You may very well be correct.

 

[Maia]

Clearly it's not. Have you read Ramachandran's book?

Thre is no explanatory hypothesis for how a brain that is a general CPU could experience Capgras disorder. On the contrary, we can see that different modules in the brain light up for different proccesses and this is the same in most if not all people. IOW: We've identified the area of the brain where sight is processed. Where math is performed. These are specialized modules. Did you know that there is a specialized module just for nouns? It's true. My best friends father had a stroke and he lost his ability to use nouns. It sounds bizaare but it's true and it could only happen if the brain had specialized modules to process data.

Believe it or not, I do follow this entire thread; I just rarely post to it. I do have to pop in here, though. Any study of Alzheimer's disease also tends to contraindicate the general CPU hypothesis, but it also shows that nothing here is as simple as it seems, whether this is in a lab condition, clinical application, or in the field. Receptive aphasia, for instance, is absolutely fascinating in this regard. The affected person has a great deal of trouble with understanding spoken language, but can express themselves in it. I get a chance to see this every single day and it never ceases to amaze me; I don't think anyone really understands the intricacies involved here. Miss Ruby seems to understand what she says and she speaks appropriately, but she doesn't understand what I say to her except for very simple sentences and ideas. However, she responds in complex ways to things that are shown to her, and not only simple things. She seemed to understand the entire plot and theme of an old Shirley Temple movie shown on DVD. Was she responding to her memory of this particular film (nobody knew if she'd seen it before, and nobody asked), or to the structure of the narrative? Would she respond to sign language? If she can understand her own use of language, then why can't she understand what others say?

To ask questions about what parts of the brain are involved, it actually seems that you have to assume facts not in evidence. We don't know enough about how phenomena like receptive aphasia actually work to start from premises as simple as "this part of the brain controls X." It's a little like starting from the premise that there are only four elements, and trying to deduce everything else from that point.

 

[RandFan]

Believe it or not, I do follow this entire thread; I just rarely post to it. I do have to pop in here, though. Any study of Alzheimer's disease also tends to contraindicate the general CPU hypothesis, but it also shows that nothing here is as simple as it seems, whether this is in a lab condition, clinical application, or in the field. Receptive aphasia, for instance, is absolutely fascinating in this regard. The affected person has a great deal of trouble with understanding spoken language, but can express themselves in it. I get a chance to see this every single day and it never ceases to amaze me; I don't think anyone really understands the intricacies involved here. Miss Ruby seems to understand what she says and she speaks appropriately, but she doesn't understand what I say to her except for very simple sentences and ideas. However, she responds in complex ways to things that are shown to her, and not only simple things. She seemed to understand the entire plot and theme of an old Shirley Temple movie shown on DVD. Was she responding to her memory of this particular film (nobody knew if she'd seen it before, and nobody asked), or to the structure of the narrative? Would she respond to sign language? If she can understand her own use of language, then why can't she understand what others say?

To ask questions about what parts of the brain are involved, it actually seems that you have to assume facts not in evidence. We don't know enough about how phenomena like receptive aphasia actually work to start from premises as simple as "this part of the brain controls X." It's a little like starting from the premise that there are only four elements, and trying to deduce everything else from that point.

Thanks Mia.

I think you have, in general, a fair point. However we know that we can stimulate specific areas of the brain and get predicted results. We also know that we can alter perception by chaning specific parts of the brain. We can make mice blind or paralyzed by destroying specific parts of the brain. We can also create knockout mice and predict the behavior that will result. We can also make predictions that people with certain kinds of deffeciences will demonstrate certain MRI patterns.

No, we shouldln't categorically state anything but we aren't only in the dark either.

 

[Robin]

Yes, that's what I was trying to convey, but more eloquent.

Thank you.

It actually took me the best part of an hour to write (yes, I need a life) but I still got a typo in the last line.

 

[westprog]

I'm going to hold off taking a position. I'm a bit skeptical about the brain being capable of being a single CPU and I think there is good reason to support the proposition that it is not. However, we've not resolved the Binding Problem (or more precisely The Combination Problem). Therefore it would really be premeture of me to take a hard line counter position. IOW: You may very well be correct.

I'm not particularly hardline on it myself. I see little resemblance between the brain and a CPU. It would only be in the sense that you can use a microscope as a hammer if nothing else comes to hand.

 

[westprog]

Believe it or not, I do follow this entire thread; I just rarely post to it.

However, when you do your experience is well worth sharing.

 

[RandFan]

I'm not particularly hardline on it myself. I see little resemblance between the brain and a CPU. It would only be in the sense that you can use a microscope as a hammer if nothing else comes to hand.

I can't agree. I think there are some very important differences. However, there are without question some very important parallels. I think you are simply focusing on the differences. Your microscope for hammer analogy simply dosen't work IMO.

We can significanlty simulate brain processes by computer. This is an objective and substantial advancement.

 

[Dancing David]

Believe it or not, I do follow this entire thread; I just rarely post to it. I do have to pop in here, though. Any study of Alzheimer's disease also tends to contraindicate the general CPU hypothesis, but it also shows that nothing here is as simple as it seems, whether this is in a lab condition, clinical application, or in the field. Receptive aphasia, for instance, is absolutely fascinating in this regard. The affected person has a great deal of trouble with understanding spoken language, but can express themselves in it. I get a chance to see this every single day and it never ceases to amaze me; I don't think anyone really understands the intricacies involved here. Miss Ruby seems to understand what she says and she speaks appropriately, but she doesn't understand what I say to her except for very simple sentences and ideas. However, she responds in complex ways to things that are shown to her, and not only simple things. She seemed to understand the entire plot and theme of an old Shirley Temple movie shown on DVD. Was she responding to her memory of this particular film (nobody knew if she'd seen it before, and nobody asked), or to the structure of the narrative? Would she respond to sign language? If she can understand her own use of language, then why can't she understand what others say?

To ask questions about what parts of the brain are involved, it actually seems that you have to assume facts not in evidence. We don't know enough about how phenomena like receptive aphasia actually work to start from premises as simple as "this part of the brain controls X." It's a little like starting from the premise that there are only four elements, and trying to deduce everything else from that point.

Kudos, thanks!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sorry to come in late. I presume someone has pointed out that it is not possible to put the brain in all its possible states merely by reading books. Therefore there are states that Mary cannot put herself in, except perhaps if surgery is allowed. Therefore whether or not Mary learns anything new when she leaves the room is not a comment about physicalism, but about the limitations of human book-learning.

I assume it's also been noted that knowing everything there is to know about the human vision system is tantamount to knowing everything.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Recommended paper:

http://consc.net/misc/achromat.html

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I find it interesting to ponder the thought experiment of Mary and the Short Room.

Mary has spent her entire life in a room with a 6-foot ceiling. During that time, she has learned everything there is to know about pole vaulting. One day she is finally let out of the room and makes an attempt at a pole vault. Would Mary learn anything new?

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

Sorry to come in late. I presume someone has pointed out that it is not possible to put the brain in all its possible states merely by reading books. Therefore there are states that Mary cannot put herself in, except perhaps if surgery is allowed. Therefore whether or not Mary learns anything new when she leaves the room is not a comment about physicalism, but about the limitations of human book-learning.