My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[!Kaggen]

I presume you mean events outside of introspection?
In which case I have already said then that the only honest option to avoid dualism is to refer to an universal objective consciousness, which includes our own.

What is the difference between a universal objective consciousness and Materialism?

It just sounds like a different label for the same concept.

Sure, if you follow a dogma everything tends to either fit or not.

The latter is actually defined somewhere?

Yes you are right, materialism is a popular well defined religion ,universal objective consciousness is just a concept, ready to be tested by perception.

 

[!Kaggen]

I clearly stated that I don't consider neurons to be necessary for consciousness.

Then what is?

 

[PixyMisa]

It'll help to think of it in terms of a formal argument:

1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all mental states are reducible to brain states.

Correct.

2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.

Correct.

3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.

Correct.

4. Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.

Stipulated.

5. Mary perceives red for the first time.

That depends on the definition of "perceive".

6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.

That's the argument. Under materialism (physicalism, etc) it is false.

THIS IS ONLY TRUE IF YOU ASSUME THAT MATERIALISM IS FALSE. THIS IS WHY THE ARGUMENT IS CIRCULAR.

GOT IT?

7. Complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceving red did not result in complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceving red.

Non-sequitur, complete failure, argument collapses in disarray.

8. Physicalism is false.

That's the argument. It doesn't work, because it's circular.

It is information that came about through a physical process, but it is not "physical information".

Yes it is.

If it were, then Mary would be able to learn of it by studying the physical process of seeing.

She did.

Why is seeing so important, unless you're trying to sneak in subjective experience through the back door?

I don't know. Why is seeing so important, unless you're trying to sneak in subjective experience through the back door?

Subjective experience as a necessary condition for any information violates the reductionism contained in physicalism/materialism.

There are two problems here. First, this is not true, and second, you haven't established that it is a necessary condition.

Not at all, which I just showed- Mary knows all the brain states involved in seeing red, and learns something new when she actually sees red for the first time.

No she doesn't.

There is nothing circular at all about that.

The assertion that she learns something new is where the circularity is introduced. Under materialism, this is false.

If it's true she learns something new after having complete knowledge of all the corresponding brain states, then there are some mental states not reducible to brain states.

And if not, then there aren't. So?

Not good news for physicalism/materialism.

But, as has been explained, you have compeltely failed to establish this, so it's not any sort of news.

Actually, it disappears, which is why you see all the objections focus on Mary's knowledge.

That's the entire point of the argument.

If one thinks that Mary learns something new by experiencing red, then one will probably not find materialism/physicalism very convincing as a theory of consciousness.

So what? The argument fails, because under materialism, this is not true.

Mary's Room attempts to establish a proof by contradiction. It cannot show a contradiction, so it fails to establish anything at all.

 

[PixyMisa]

Then what is?

Information processing.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's an objection I'm familiar with. You're saying the actual perception of redness is learned (or offers no new information) when complete knowledge of brain states occurs.

Right.

I don't agree.

Whether you agree or not doesn't matter.

Under materialism, it's true.

If you assert that it's not true, then you assert that materialism is false. Hence the argument is circular.

I think someone studying the brain states involved with, say, falling in love learns something new when they actually fall in love.

Well, of course they do.

Which is completely unrelated to Mary's Room, which postulates a complete physical impossibility. Mary is supposed to know everything there is to know about the perception of colour. That's not possible.

Why you can't see this is a mystery to me.

We know exactly what you're saying. Where you are correct, it does not relate to the argument, and where it relates to the argument, you are not correct.

 

[RandFan]

Then what is?

To the extent that neurons necessary they are not the only things necessary so your question isn't an easy one to answer.

That said, if your question is what cold be an analog for neurons then one answer would be a digital switch such as a transistor. As I said before, it's is theoretically possible to replace neurons with transistors.

 

[RandFan]

Information processing.

We'll maybe it is easy to answer.

 

[Malerin]

THIS IS ONLY TRUE IF YOU ASSUME THAT MATERIALISM IS FALSE. THIS IS WHY THE ARGUMENT IS CIRCULAR.

GOT IT?

Not really, because you're confusing modus tollens with circular reasoning. Consider this simple argument:

1. If A then B
2. Not B
:. Not A.

Not circular. Moving right along...

1. If Odin exists, then brave warriors go to Valhalla when they die.
2. Brave warriors do not go to Valhalla when they die.
:. Odin does not exist.

OMG!!! (2) IS ONLY TRUE IF YOU ASSUME ODIN DOESN'T EXIST!!! CIRCULAR!!!

Which brings us to the argument at hand:
1. If physicalism is true, then complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.
2. Complete knowledge of brain states does not result in complete knowledge of mental states.
:. Physicalism is not true.

Not circular. Got it?

Incidentally, Robin, this is why Westprog thinks not being able to know what its like to be a bat (or mouse) is a big problem (a hard problem, if you will). If materialism is true, then it should be possible to know exactly what it is like to be a bat just by learning enough about bat brains, bat physiology, bat neurochemistry, etc. The fact that learning all this would bring you no closer to knowing what its like to actually be a bat is a bit of a problem for materialism.

 

[Malerin]

To the extent that neurons necessary they are not the only things necessary so your question isn't an easy one to answer.

That said, if your question is what cold be an analog for neurons then one answer would be a digital switch such as a transistor. As I said before, it's is theoretically possible to replace neurons with transistors.

Which would seem to suggest conscious AI is possible. If we created a brain that was the exact duplicate of a human brain, except it had transistors instead of neurons...

 

[!Kaggen]

Well that is what you said, and I don't agree with as a construct. I avoid dualism because i assume that material monism is apparently capable of consciousness (as yet undefined) and if it is just patterns of interaction then there is no dualism.

We can discuss it in another thread, if you wish.

All the same alleged problems apply equally to monistic idealism and monistic materialism. The parts arrange and interact to give the appearnce of consciousness. neither is a free ride.

ETA: I am using introspection to cover the examination of the cogntions, memories and events that are resultant to sensation but not directly related to sensation.

The model of objectivity/science is not outside of the perceptions.

We can not prove the world exists in any system. So there are sets of events 'introspection' would refer to just the 'thought realm', science deals with teh appearnce of the world that we seem to sense and then perceive.

So they are both part of the larger set 'all events I experience' , they overlap and exclude in different areas.

So the model of science relies heavily on the perceptions, perceptions in sepearate settings and hopefully perceptions communicated between apparent beings.

The fact that you refer to the appearance of things with consistent and predictable behavior as what science deals with and then clarify this with science dealing with perceptions seems contradictory. An appearance refers to a representation of the unrepresented. The physics, chemistry and biology giving us an explanation (representation) of how we sense particles (unrepresented). An abstract idea which cannot be perceived. What we perceive is the represented. It is therefore true that science deals with the appearances and there consistent and predictable behavior, but not true that it relies on perception. That is the domain of common sense.

 

[RandFan]

Which would seem to suggest conscious AI is possible. If we created a brain that was the exact duplicate of a human brain, except it had transistors instead of neurons...

That's correct. And it is what is being attempted (well, reverse engineering is being attempted).

Blue Brain Project.

Reverse-engineer the brain

Consciousness is at best on the distant horizon though there could be at anytime a break through akin to realitivity or QM.

 

[RandFan]

It is therefore true that science deals with the appearances and there consistent and predictable behavior, but not true that it relies on perception.

Nonsense. We don't have anyother means to upload the data into our brains. No other means to analyze the data. We can't prove that there exists a material world beyond our perceptions. We have no choice but to rely on perception. Yes, we also rely on cognition to process the data but reliance on the later doesn't obviate the former.

That is the domain of common sense.

"Common sense"? I can't agree with that. If you mean cognition and/or abstract thought then that's fine.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Which brings us to the argument at hand:
1. If physicalism is true, then complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.
2. Complete knowledge of brain states does not result in complete knowledge of mental states.

1 begs the question. You're saying that Mary can know everything there is physically to know without actually seeing red.

But if Mary is her brain--which, presumably, is the thing you're supposed to be disproving--then Mary's brain undergoes a different set of patterns once you expose her to something red--something that Mary's brain never underwent during all of her study, no matter how complete that study is.

So, Malerin--are you really arguing that physicalism implies that one can put their brain into the same exact state it would be in if it were exposed to the color red, by merely studying what brains do when they are exposed to red? Would you also suggest that merely by learning enough about flying, you would actually start flying?

 

[!Kaggen]

It was not obvious from the start of the numbers discussion

You mean numbers of neurons, I spelled it out?

Yes, I think we have covered this now.

The question then is what is the common link between introspection, observation and testing?

The lack of ability to show consistent results from introspection across different observers, is the short form. (If introspection is the only method used.)

For example 'confirmation bias', if we only use introspections as the data reference then we can definitely get into all sorts of interesting results through confirmation bias, where the lack of actual data collection from an non-introspective source would lead to beliefs based upon the process of noting only the events that meet our expectations.

How do we compare the results from the introspection of different observers?
Surely we define the results in terms of the data that we observe in order to communicate them?
In which case I don't see a problem here.
Confirmation bias is just terminology to describe one of the results of this processes on the way to a definition which we can communicate.
The point of introspection is to realise how we organise and interpret the data and systematize this .

You have in the past stated that all experiences are subjective including "objective" ones. Perhaps you could then clarify this with a counter-example?
I am also curious to know how something can be real at one moment and not the next?

well take a delusion, which is in many ways the memory equivalent of an auditory hallucination. It is very real for the person having it IE to them it is reality, it is their experience. therefore from their single perspective of internal experience it is valid.

But if we then look at say the 'historical record' and we find that the event they experience 'I lived at this house and was married to this person in 1990' is not supported by other evidence. We have pictures of their residence from that time, we can talk to people who also claimed to have lived in the house at that time, and their photos suggest that they were in residence, we can interview the person's family and they say that they did not live there, we can interview them and look at the records and no marriage was preformed...etc. there is a converging stream of possible data that points to the individual having a memory event and experience that is not supported by the converging data.
We are then looking at possibilities of what is the explanation:

1. The person has slipped through a hole in alternative universes.
2. The person is the subject of a consistent and overwhelming fraud and conspiracy. (The Truman Show)
3. There is some ambiguity in the data.
4. The person is sane and others are delusional.
5. The person is sane and others are lying. (Perhaps and family feud, murder and cover up, close to #2)
6. That this person is having an experience which for them is very real, but not a valid reflection of the 'collective events we call reality'.

And this is where we would stand, the only course then is to gather further data and then try to decide which explanation is more consistent with the continuing data stream.

Such as, does this person's memory remain fixed over time? is there evidence of fraud and conspiracy, what evidence is there that everyone else is having delusions.

So that is an example of the delusions that would be 'real' for an individual but not valid as a model of reality.

Confabulation of memory after head trauma would be a similar one.

This is all very well, but it does not tell us anything about the relationship between inner and outer reality. It just assumes that there are two kinds of reality. One personal, one a consistent model. It is in my opinion a form of dualism. This is the problem that arises if we do not recognize the nature of thinking. It is not finished until the subject and object is reconciled as they were before thinking starts.

Someone on this forum (I cannot remember exactly were) someone mentioned that this is the nature of the human condition, perhaps due to an evolutionary advantage, to think of themselves as a subject. I tend to agree. I think that it gives us the ability to be free. Whether it is an illusion or not is irrelevant since it is not what we hypothesize of freedom passively that counts, but what we actively do when we reconcile the subject/concept with the object/percept by means of cognition. The thing-in-itself is not given in cognition as such it is what cognition makes of it. Yes this freedom comes with a price. The possibility of error, but that is why we can change our minds
I think it is the fear of error which creates dogma but we need not fear if we learn to trust our thinking, by embracing it wholeheartedly instead of ignoring it as a consequence of matter and therefore expecting to find an explanation of thinking in matter.

By replacing objectivity with consistency you are only introducing the scientific method as a logical language of communication.

that may be, but consistency is an axiom for the scientific method to work at all.

I do not think it is a necessary axiom. What difference would it make to the scientific method if it weren't?

If the behavior of the unknown reality is inconsistent in settings, time and across observers, then it does not work.

Why do we have to make assumptions about something that is unknown?
Why does the unknown need properties before it becomes known?
Is it now good enough to get to know something by its properties?
We would only know if something was inconsistent by using the scientific method in the first place.
If you reject the need for the consistency axiom, why does this imply that we would automatically only discover inconsistency?
Why is memory not good enough?
Do you think we might forget what we know about something unless it had some form of axiomatic existence?

However we still need to clarify the meaning of the language for any of it to make sense. Especially when it comes to introspection. So what is meaning other than what our consciousness gives it? In which case if our consciousness has no objectivity then neither does our methods and are we then justified in our beliefs about the abilities of science?

That last one I will have to ponder, and respond carefully.

How is the pondering going?

Introspection is the examination of the contents of 'experience', tentatively I would say that objectivity does not 'exist', it is an appearance of the 'apparent world' , which may we not determine that nature of.

Sure, if we need axioms of existence in order to trust our perception then the world will be an appearance. It will be an idol.

 

[!Kaggen]

We can't prove that there exists a material world beyond our perceptions.

I think that is the common sense proof of solidity you are referring to.
Science does not prove things remember.

 

[PixyMisa]

Not really, because you're confusing modus tollens with circular reasoning.

No, that's you.

Consider this simple argument:

1. If A then B
2. Not B
:. Not A.

Yes, but you have to actually establish that B is false. You can't just assert it.

Not circular. Moving right along...

If your argument that B is false depends on assuming that A is false, then it is circular.

1. If Odin exists, then brave warriors go to Valhalla when they die.
2. Brave warriors do not go to Valhalla when they die.
:. Odin does not exist.

OMG!!! (2) IS ONLY TRUE IF YOU ASSUME ODIN DOESN'T EXIST!!! CIRCULAR!!!

What is your evidence for premise 2?

Which brings us to the argument at hand:
1. If physicalism is true, then complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.

Correct.

2. Complete knowledge of brain states does not result in complete knowledge of mental states.

Unsubstantiated assertion.

:. Physicalism is not true.

Non-sequitur.

Not circular. Got it?

Wrong. It's entirely circular. Your argument for premise 2 rests on denying premise 1. You can't do that. (Admittedly here you haven't provided any argument for premise 2, but you can't do that either.)

Incidentally, Robin, this is why Westprog thinks not being able to know what its like to be a bat (or mouse) is a big problem (a hard problem, if you will).

And this is why he's wrong.

If materialism is true, then it should be possible to know exactly what it is like to be a bat just by learning enough about bat brains, bat physiology, bat neurochemistry, etc.

It's physically impossible for a human to do that.

The fact that learning all this would bring you no closer to knowing what its like to actually be a bat is a bit of a problem for materialism.

Baloney.

Even if it were physically possible to do that (which it isn't) and extrapolate a mental map for a bat (which is possible, just not by that means) it is still a logical contradiction to introspectively analyse what it is like to be a bat from the position of being a bat, because the very essence of batness involves not having that introspective facility.

Bats are Bats (as Nagel would have it), but do not have the abstract reasoning to grasp this fact. So it is only possible to know what it would be like to be a bat, not what it is like to be a bat.

So the question is wrong, the answer is wrong, and the conclusion drawn from it is wrong.

At least you're consistent.

 

[PixyMisa]

1 begs the question. You're saying that Mary can know everything there is physically to know without actually seeing red.

Yes, that's another problem. This is not actually possible. If we allow it for the sake of argument, the arguer promptly falls down a hole because they have failed to grasp the implications of their own position.

But if Mary is her brain--which, presumably, is the thing you're supposed to be disproving--then Mary's brain undergoes a different set of patterns once you expose her to something red--something that Mary's brain never underwent during all of her study, no matter how complete that study is.

No. If her study was complete, her brain has already undergone those paterns. If her brain has not already undergone those patterns, her study was not complete.

So, Malerin--are you really arguing that physicalism implies that one can put their brain into the same exact state it would be in if it were exposed to the color red, by merely studying what brains do when they are exposed to red?

Well, the argument stipulates that Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical perception of colour. This is of course impossible, but it's reality that makes it impossible; it doesn't actually contradict materialism.

Would you also suggest that merely by learning enough about flying, you would actually start flying?

I don't think that's a good analogy at all. All mental states are physical states, but not all physical states are mental states.

 

[!Kaggen]

All mental states are physical states, but not all physical states are mental states.

Except the ones you mentally define as physical

 

[PixyMisa]

Except the ones you mentally define as physical

I see you're enjoying your subscription to Non-Sequitur of the Month Club.

 

[!Kaggen]

I see you're enjoying your subscription to Non-Sequitur of the Month Club.

Feel free to boast that your logic is consistent.
But it helps naught if your premise is false.