My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Dancing David]

Then can I assume you both agree that at least more than one neuron is required?

For organic consciousness as yet undefined, yes (probably a lot more), but not as a general, because it could be a lot of paper tubes and gold balls, or a computer mock up. There are many constructs which potentially could meet the as yet undefined 'consciousness'.

 

[Dancing David]

I presume you mean events outside of introspection?
In which case I have already said then that the only honest option to avoid dualism is to refer to an universal objective consciousness, which includes our own.

Well that is what you said, and I don't agree with as a construct. I avoid dualism because i assume that material monism is apparently capable of consciousness (as yet undefined) and if it is just patterns of interaction then there is no dualism.

We can discuss it in another thread, if you wish.

All the same alleged problems apply equally to monistic idealism and monistic materialism. The parts arrange and interact to give the appearnce of consciousness. neither is a free ride.

ETA: I am using introspection to cover the examination of the cogntions, memories and events that are resultant to sensation but not directly related to sensation.

The model of objectivity/science is not outside of the perceptions.

We can not prove the world exists in any system. So there are sets of events 'introspection' would refer to just the 'thought realm', science deals with teh appearnce of the world that we seem to sense and then perceive.

So they are both part of the larger set 'all events I experience' , they overlap and exclude in different areas.

So the model of science relies heavily on the perceptions, perceptions in sepearate settings and hopefully perceptions communicated between apparent beings.

 

[Robin]

My take on the chair thing would be slightly different.

Suppose we have three men, all confined to bed.

The first is quadriplegic and deaf and receives all information about the world visually.

The second is quadriplegic and blind and receives all information about the world aurally.

The third is deaf and blind and receives all information about the world through braille or a tactile terminal.

None of them know what a chair is.

We can give them all the same definition of a chair and they can all have the same understanding of a chair even though none of them receive any of the perceptual data that any of the others do.

Suppose further that they find out about the world through remote controlled data gathering robots. Again the robots report back using respectively visual, aural and tactile information.

Again the three can use their definition of a chair to actually identify a chair, and again none of them have ever received the same perceptual data as any of the others.

So there can be a complete and non-circular definition of a chair that is completely independent of the perceptions by which the chair is defined and identified.

 

[Robin]

I presume you mean events outside of introspection?
In which case I have already said then that the only honest option to avoid dualism is to refer to an universal objective consciousness, which includes our own.

What is the difference between a universal objective consciousness and Materialism?

It just sounds like a different label for the same concept.

 

[PixyMisa]

What is the difference between a universal objective consciousness and Materialism?

The latter is actually defined somewhere?

 

[westprog]

My take on the chair thing would be slightly different.

Suppose we have three men, all confined to bed.

The first is quadriplegic and deaf and receives all information about the world visually.

The second is quadriplegic and blind and receives all information about the world aurally.

The third is deaf and blind and receives all information about the world through braille or a tactile terminal.

None of them know what a chair is.

We can give them all the same definition of a chair and they can all have the same understanding of a chair even though none of them receive any of the perceptual data that any of the others do.

Suppose further that they find out about the world through remote controlled data gathering robots. Again the robots report back using respectively visual, aural and tactile information.

Again the three can use their definition of a chair to actually identify a chair, and again none of them have ever received the same perceptual data as any of the others.

So there can be a complete and non-circular definition of a chair that is completely independent of the perceptions by which the chair is defined and identified.

Not only do those three men receive information about the chair in different ways, everybody receives information about everything in different ways. We have no way of knowing whether my way of seeing a chair is the same as anyone else's.

The purpose of science is to make our perceptions predictable and repeatable.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Not only do those three men receive information about the chair in different ways, everybody receives information about everything in different ways.

And yet, all three of them would agree that this thing here is a chair.

ETA: It's as if we're pointing to a chair, and saying, "hey, this is a chair", and leaving it up to whatever means people have at their disposal to figure out when the next thing they encounter is a chair. In other words, perception is not what defines the chair, but rather, reference.

 

[!Kaggen]

And yet, all three of them would agree that this thing here is a chair.

ETA: It's as if we're pointing to a chair, and saying, "hey, this is a chair", and leaving it up to whatever means people have at their disposal to figure out when the next thing they encounter is a chair. In other words, perception is not what defines the chair, but rather, reference.

You can define anything you want, for instance God, choosing a few bible references if you wish.
Please don't plead when I volunteer to test your definition with my perception and give it a bit of a revision.

 

[drkitten]

You can define anything you want, for instance God, choosing a few bible references if you wish.
Please don't plead when I volunteer to test your definition with my perception and give it a bit of a revision.

Please don't plead when we ignore your proposed revision as being meaningless word salad.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Then can I assume you both agree that at least more than one neuron is required?

Look you're smart enough not to be making such crude mistakes, so I have to assume you're being disingenuous.

I clearly stated that I don't consider neurons to be necessary for consciousness. I specified that they are necessary for human consciousness. In fact, the very reason I made that statement was to make this distinction, and now you're pretending there is a disagreement where there isn't one.

 

[RandFan]

I know what sense he was using it and that is why I corrected it to mean

reads^dict
32. to admit of being interpreted: a rule that reads in two different ways.

Pedantic at best. Pointless at worst.

 

[Robin]

Not only do those three men receive information about the chair in different ways, everybody receives information about everything in different ways. We have no way of knowing whether my way of seeing a chair is the same as anyone else's.

Which only reinforces my point about things not being defined in terms of perceptions.

The purpose of science is to make our perceptions predictable and repeatable.

It is?

 

[Malerin]

Perhaps you could. But I didn't, so why are you bringing it up here?

Because it's a non-circular objection to the thought experiment (argument, scenario, whatever you want to call it)?

What do you mean "everything there is to know physically possible about seeing colour"?

That does not even seem to make grammatic sense.

You're asking me to explain what I mean? I should think it's obvious

I don't let Wiki or SEP do my thinking for me.

Neither do I. Just pointing out that people who do this stuff for a living (professional philosophers), haven't found anything circular yet (as far as my mad Google skills can tell), and I don't expect them to because it's not circular. If you can find a paper explaining why Mary's Room fails because of circular reasoning, it would be an interesting read.

If seeing a colour is information and if consciousness were physical then seeing a colour would be physical information.

It'll help to think of it in terms of a formal argument:

1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all mental states are reducible to brain states.
2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.
3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.
4. Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.
5. Mary perceives red for the first time.
6. Mary learns of a new mental state associated with perceving red.
7. Complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceving red did not result in complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceving red.
8. Physicalism is false.

So if you say she has all the physical information and has never seen a colour you simply to assume that seeing a colour does not comprise physical information.

It is information that came about through a physical process, but it is not "physical information". If it were, then Mary would be able to learn of it by studying the physical process of seeing. Why is seeing so important, unless you're trying to sneak in subjective experience through the back door? Subjective experience as a necessary condition for any information violates the reductionism contained in physicalism/materialism.

So your conclusion is contained in the premiss.

Not at all, which I just showed- Mary knows all the brain states involved in seeing red, and learns something new when she actually sees red for the first time. There is nothing circular at all about that. If it's true she learns something new after having complete knowledge of all the corresponding brain states, then there are some mental states not reducible to brain states. Not good news for physicalism/materialism.

The problem becomes clearer if you try to state the argument rigorously.

Actually, it disappears, which is why you see all the objections focus on Mary's knowledge.

(Incidentally, you have been using "Mary in the black and white room" somewhat inconsistently.

You initially referred to it as a "thought experiment" although usually it is presented as an argument. However after I responded to it you drew the usual conclusion from it as though it had been presented as an argument.

Initially you stated that it was a good thought experiment to show whether someone regards consciousness as a hard problem or not. You have still not demonstrated why this should be the case.)

If one thinks that Mary learns something new by experiencing red, then one will probably not find materialism/physicalism very convincing as a theory of consciousness.

This is doubly true if the proponents of physicalism make reference to conscious toasters to support their argument

 

[RandFan]

It'll help to think of it in terms of a formal argument:

1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all mental states are reducible to brain states.
2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of mental states.
3. If physicalism is true, then Mary has complete knowledge of the mental states associated with perceiving red when Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.
4. Mary has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with perceiving red.

Whoaaaaaa.... That's the end.

5. Mary perceives red for the first time.

False (see step 4).

This has been explained to you time and again.

 

[Malerin]

Whoaaaaaa.... That's the end.

False (see step 4).

This has been explained to you time and again.

It's an objection I'm familiar with. You're saying the actual perception of redness is learned (or offers no new information) when complete knowledge of brain states occurs. I don't agree. I think someone studying the brain states involved with, say, falling in love learns something new when they actually fall in love.

Why you can't see this is a mystery to me.

 

[RandFan]

It's an objection I'm familiar with. You're saying the actual perception of redness is learned (or offers no new information) when complete knowledge of brain states occurs. I don't agree. I think someone studying the brain states....

You are making a fundamental error.

Complete knowledge likely can't be gained simply by studying.

You are confusing study with knowledge. Our brains might not have the capacity to know all brain states simply through reading text. Perhaps we will have to program the brain with nanobots or electrodes.

And I've already told you that we can simulate the perception of color using ectric probes.

Why you can't get this is a mystery to me.

 

[RandFan]

I think someone studying the brain states involved with, say, falling in love learns something new when they actually fall in love.

Why you can't see this is a mystery to me.

BTW: I gave another example of riding a bike so I'm not failing to get your point. It is theoretically possible to use chemicals (drugs), electrical probes, or nanobots to program the brain to cause someone to know what actually falling in love is without ever meeting anyone.

 

[yy2bggggs]

It'll help to think of it in terms of a formal argument:

Converting Mary's seeing red to Joe's playing basketball:

1. If physicalism (materialism, reductionism, whatever) is true, all biomechanical capabilities are reducible to brain states.
2. If physicalism is true, complete knowledge of brain states results in complete knowledge of biomechanical capabilities.
3. If physicalism is true, then Joe has complete knowledge of the biomechanics associated with playing basketball when Joe has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with playing basketball.
4. Joe has complete knowledge of the brain states associated with playing basketball.
5. Joe plays basketball for the first time.
6. Joe loses.
7. Complete knowledge of the brain states associated with playing basketball did not result in physical ability to play basketball.
8. Physicalism is false.​

8 doesn't follow from 7. 6 is merely a result your limiting Joe from actually playing basketball. You're basically claiming that physicalism/materialism/whateverism means that Joe and team should be able to beat the Globetrotters without ever touching a basketball, which is a giant straw man.

Joe needs to experience playing basketball in order to actually be able to compete--and not because it requires some form of spiritualism to play basketball. It requires something quite mundane--athletic capability. But your brain has to actually do the work to get it.

Mary needs to experience looking at red things in order to actually be able to see them--and not because it requires some form of spiritualism to see things. It requires something quite mundane--observation. But your brain has to actually do the work to have the observation.

Studying isn't playing. Studying isn't seeing. Learning everything physical about basketball isn't learning how to play. Learning everything physical about seeing red isn't learning how to see red.

It is information that came about through a physical process, but it is not "physical information".

Doesn't matter, because even if I grant this to you, this:

If it were, then Mary would be able to learn of it by studying the physical process of seeing.

...is bollocks, for the same reason Joe shouldn't be able to compete by studying the biomechanics of basketball. Joe's brain has to actually play basketball in order for him to acquire the capability. Likewise, Mary's brain has to actually look at something red in order for those circuits to fire.

Why is seeing so important, unless you're trying to sneak in subjective experience through the back door?

It's not necessary to sneak subjective experience through the back door... it's coming in through the front door in spades. Mary has to subjectively experience the books she studies in black and white in order to learn "everything" there is to know about seeing red. But no amount of black and white will make red (assuming Mary can't/doesn't cheat with Benham's discs or something).

It's perfectly consistent with physicalism/materialism/whateverism. There are potential physical patterns in Mary's brain that nominally need to be exposed to actual red colors in order to exhibit themselves, and studying how the brain works doesn't magically make the requisite circuits dance. There's no logical reason for you to assert that it must, or even should.

 

[!Kaggen]

Please don't plead when we ignore your proposed revision as being meaningless word salad.

Sure, if it reads that way, be my guest.
Otherwise you could just ask for more clarification.
Nothing wrong with asking questions unless it is dogma that you are after to either reject or accept and that feeling of superiority that comes with that type of discussion.

 

[!Kaggen]

The purpose of science is to make our perceptions predictable and repeatable.

I think that is the purpose of common sense. Science has another purpose altogether and that is to make our thoughts/hypothesis predictable and repeatable. All this talk of materialism in science is really a meaningless explanation for the common sense concept solidity. Common sense has nothing to say about un-felt solidity let alone an unseen rainbow or chair for that matter. Honest scientists acknowledge that physics confirms common sense. Followers of scientism on the other hand are stuck in idolatry.