My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[yy2bggggs]

Think logically - how do we define something? It has to be in terms of something else. So either we define everything in a circle - so that nothing is defined to be anything in particular - or we have to have something irreducible that cannot, in principle, be defined.

Or, things boil down eventually to reference to other things which may very well be reducible.

 

[PixyMisa]

And all that computing science and philosophy and neuroscience has really given us no more insight into what it feels like to be a mouse than the first person who considered the question.

There are two problems with this. First, your position is completely contrary to the facts, and second, the question is stupid.

I'll address the latter first: To know what it feels like to be a mouse, in the immediate sense, you have to be a mouse. And a mouse lacks the mental faculties to know that it knows what it feels like to be a mouse. The question has not been answered because the question is set up so that it cannot be answered.

However, more broadly, it is being answered. While it is impossible in principle to know in the sense of immediate apprehension what it is like to be a mouse and still retain the faculties to analyse or communicate this, it is perfectly possible to analyse to problem from many angles and come to an intellectual understanding of the question, and indeed we have made considerable progress both generall and specifically in this area.

So another epic and abject fail for you.

 

[PixyMisa]

Think logically - how do we define something?

By its interactions.

So we define everything in terms of our perceptions

No we don't.

Looks at a physics textbook some day, since you claim to hold the field in such esteem. You will find that your assertion is categorically false.

and our perceptions are defined by our sensations

Wrong.

which are subjective experiences

Which are objective, measurable processes.

which are part of consciousness.

Which is an objective, measurable process.

Sooner or later we have to come to the end of the road.

No.

Everything cannot be defined.

Sure it can.

 

[Robin]

• I have no idea
• Nor does anyone else
• We haven't even defined consciousness adequately
• It may well be impossible to define consciousness precisely
• This does not mean that consciousness is not "real". On the contrary.

I was with you until the last three words.

 

[westprog]

There are two problems with this. First, your position is completely contrary to the facts, and second, the question is stupid.

I'll address the latter first: To know what it feels like to be a mouse, in the immediate sense, you have to be a mouse. And a mouse lacks the mental faculties to know that it knows what it feels like to be a mouse. The question has not been answered because the question is set up so that it cannot be answered.

However, more broadly, it is being answered. While it is impossible in principle to know in the sense of immediate apprehension what it is like to be a mouse and still retain the faculties to analyse or communicate this, it is perfectly possible to analyse to problem from many angles and come to an intellectual understanding of the question, and indeed we have made considerable progress both generall and specifically in this area.

Let's just condense that down and remove the excess verbiage and convoluted thinking and see what it reduces to:

Ah yes - "we don't know what it feels like to be a mouse".

So another epic and abject fail for you.

"indeed we have made considerable progress both generall and specifically in this area". Is that a direct quote from Gordon Brown?

 

[westprog]

By its interactions.

And how do we detect these interactions?

Looks at a physics textbook some day, since you claim to hold the field in such esteem. You will find that your assertion is categorically false.

Everything in the physics textbook depends on experimental results, which are all derived from the perceptions of the experimenters.

 

[westprog]

Well it is quite simple in my opinion.

Take what it feels like to be yourself. Now remove any aspect of that experience that comes from physical structure that a mouse does not have.

What remains is probably very close to what it feels like to be a mouse.

And like I said, there's nothing in the above that couldn't have been done ten thousand years ago - with a similar likelihood of accuracy.

 

[Robin]

Everything in the physics textbook depends on experimental results, which are all derived from the perceptions of the experimenters.

A bit of a non-sequitur - just because we use perceptions to gain knowledge of a thing does not mean that we define it in terms of perceptions.

If I drop a pebble in a well to find how deep it is, it does not mean that I define the depth of the well in terms of pebbles.

 

[Robin]

And what is the point about the mouse thing?

We can't know what it is like to be a mouse, or whether there is a "what it is like to be a mouse".

So what?

 

[westprog]

You may well be correct. Confusingly, I do think that consciousness is somehow an emergent property of our brains in the same way that wetness is an emergent property of H2O molecules.

And this may well be the case. However, we fully understand how the molecular interactions of H2O molecules produce the macro phenomenon we call "wetness". That's why there's no Hard Problem Of Damp. We understand how electrical imbalance lets water adhere to other substances, and we understand why mercury just slides off. We aren't even conceptually close to having such an understanding of consciousness.

 

[westprog]

A bit of a non-sequitur - just because we use perceptions to gain knowledge of a thing does not mean that we define it in terms of perceptions.

If I drop a pebble in a well to find how deep it is, it does not mean that I define the depth of the well in terms of pebbles.

But the only way you can find out how deep the well is is by the perceptions you have of it, directly or indirectly.

 

[Robin]

But the only way you can find out how deep the well is is by the perceptions you have of it, directly or indirectly.

Sure, but you are just repeating the same non-sequitur.

There is a difference between :

I discover X by means of Y​

and

I define X in terms of Y​

whether or not Y is the only way of discovering X is beside the point.

We gain information about physical things by means of observations but we define them in terms of mathematical models.

It is an important distinction. If we defined a physical thing in terms of perceptions then a physical thing would be an unmeasurably imprecise changeable thing.

 

[PixyMisa]

Let's just condense that down and remove the excess verbiage and convoluted thinking and see what it reduces to:

Ah yes - "we don't know what it feels like to be a mouse".

Doubly wrong, as I already pointed out. Your question is wrong, and your answer is wrong.

"indeed we have made considerable progress both generall and specifically in this area". Is that a direct quote from Gordon Brown?

Do you actually deny that enormous progress has been made in understanding the operation of the brain and the mind in general, and of mouse brains and minds specifically?

 

[PixyMisa]

And what is the point about the mouse thing?

We can't know what it is like to be a mouse, or whether there is a "what it is like to be a mouse".

So what?

Not quite. There is a "what it is like to be a mouse" - a mouse is a be-able thing, unlike, say, a fencepost - but a mouse cannot describe what it is like to be a mouse.

So complaining that we don't know what it is like to be a mouse in the experiential rather than the analytical sense is distinctly dishonest.

 

[PixyMisa]

We aren't even conceptually close to having such an understanding of consciousness.

No, that's just you.

 

[PixyMisa]

And how do we detect these interactions?

By further interactions.

Everything in the physics textbook depends on experimental results, which are all derived from the perceptions of the experimenters.

Which is, as Robin pointed out, a complete non-sequitur, neither true nor apposite.

Look at the physics textbook. Are things defined in terms of our perceptions? No, they are not. Your earlier statement was false.

 

[Robin]

Not quite. There is a "what it is like to be a mouse" - a mouse is a be-able thing, unlike, say, a fencepost - but a mouse cannot describe what it is like to be a mouse.

I am not so sure, but I left open the possibility that there was a "what it is like to be a mouse", but I am still not sure why it is a problem.

So complaining that we don't know what it is like to be a mouse in the experiential rather than the analytical sense is distinctly dishonest.

I don't understand the point being made by westprog, so I can't really say whether it is dishonest or not.

There is no way to get inside a mouse's mind and feel mouselike but I don't understand why that should be a problem for science.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is no way to get inside a mouse's mind and feel mouselike but I don't understand why that should be a problem for science.

Precisely. Once you're inside the mouse mind, you're a mouse, and you can't describe what that feels like because mice don't have that level of abstract reasoning.

Of course, we can study mouse brains and mouse psychology and build computer simulations of mouse (or actually, rat) neocortexes, but apparently this counts for nothing with westprog because we can't answer a question that is based upon false assumptions in the first place.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

There is no way to get inside a mouse's mind and feel mouselike but I don't understand why that should be a problem for science.

It's not a problem for science. It is a problem for people who think that science has no absolute limitations. It may also cause problems for people with certain types of metaphysical beliefs.

What usually gets said on this board is something like "either science can investigate it or there is nothing to investigate". The problem is caused by this overly science-biased way of looking at the world. Science itself just carries on regardless

We are back to questions like "are non-scientific types of knowledge possible?" In other words, is there something like what it is to be a human which humans can know directly but science can't know at all? Some people seem to feel threatened by the mere suggestion that there could be something which exists, but which is impossible for science to investigate. But the fact that science can't investigate X isn't actually "a problem for science". Science can only have problems in areas that it can theoretically investigate, but is having practical or technical problems doing so.

Is poetry a problem for mathematics? No, mathematics has nothing to tell us about poetry. It would only appear to be a problem if somebody believed mathematics has something to tell us about everything that could be investigated at all. The fact that mathematics can't investigate poetry is not a criticism of mathematics. The fact that science can't investigate consciousness is not a criticism of science. It's just the way things are.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's not a problem for science. It is a problem for people who think that science has no absolute limitations.

You're confused.

Science cannot answer questions based on false assumptions. It can, of course, point out those false assumptions.

This is not a failing or limitation of science.

What usually gets said on this board is something like "either science can investigate it or there is nothing to investigate". The problem is caused by this overly science-biased way of looking at the world.

What problem?

We are back to questions like "are non-scientific types of knowledge possible?"

The answer to which is, of course, yes.

In other words, is there something like what it is to be a human which humans can know directly but science can't know at all?

Which is a completely different question, and the answer is no.

Some people seem to feel threatened by the mere suggestion that there could be something which exists, but which is impossible for science to investigate.

Not at all; that's merely an ad-hominem.

All we say to those who want to propose such a thing is that they must define it.

But the fact that science can't investigate X isn't actually "a problem for science". Science only has problems in areas that it can theoretically investigate, but is having practical or technical problems doing so.

This is true. But furthermore, there is neither any evidence for nor any coherent definition of any such X. (At least, not that is not tautologically unexaminable.)