My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[RandFan]

I think I'll take a rain check on this trip if you don't mind

Malerin at least had the honesty to address the questions. If anyone has acted the troll it is you. Not I. You asked a silly question and I showed you why it was silly and absurd. Your only response was to act like a child.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

What did you expect mentioning the word "consciousness" in a thread title?

Well, I certainly didn't expect the Spanish Inquisition.........

...............

 

[!Kaggen]

act like a child.

Thanks, the compliment is noted.

 

[RandFan]

Thanks, the compliment is noted.

If you consider immaturity in an adult complimentary then you are welcome.

 

[Dancing David]

Ok, I see what you mean.

Being aware of ones thoughts.

That is a start, so what is that awareness like, is it the experience of thinking or something else?

 

[Dancing David]

Which really is the same thing as saying consciousness is what we make it.
Which is why I think any questions addressing consciousness need to be first formuated by philosophy, then tested by science.

Sorry , so far the defintions presented a philosophical definition of conscious lack rigor.

Now of course the use of the term consciousness is idiomatic, which is why the definition is crucial. Some of us believe that it is the crux of the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Penrose's rambling.

A lack of consistent defintion and clarity leads to muddled theory.

 

[Robin]

=!kaggen]In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it.

I don't recall asking anything of the sort. I think you will have to quote that part.

If someone provided a circular definition of "matter" would that prove that matter creates itself?

Please try, it would be most interesting to see.

Recall now?

So you are telling me that when I say...

...would that prove it?​

What I really mean is...

...that would prove it​

Is this what you are saying? You do appreciate the difference between the too don't you?

 

[Robin]

One doesn't end up at Nietzsche or post-modernism because one wants to. One just ends up there because there is nowhere-else left to go.

If the only place left to go is post-modernism then one should stay put IMO.

But if the think metaphysics can do that science can't is to bring us to post-modernism then the question simply becomes : "what can post-modernism do that science can't"

Sure it can, provided we understand what "science" means and what its limitations are. Quite a lot of people here do not understand this. They think that understanding science - as in understanding things Darwinism or Newtonian mechanics - means that they automatically have a good grasp of how science fits into a broader spectrum of knowledge and enquiry. This is not the case. Some of the most scientifically-literate people have the biggest blind spots when it comes to acknowledging what science can't do.

I can't think of any off the top of my head, but no doubt there are some who have this blind spot.

But that is not what is under discussion.

What I am trying to find out is the thing that science cannot do that some other epistemic system can.

After all it is hardly a problem if science can't do something that cannot be done at all.

That would be a limitation of human knowledge generally, rather than a limitation specifically of science.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

After all it is hardly a problem if science can't do something that cannot be done at all.

The problem is that some people believe that science can do things that cannot be done at all. This is not a problem for science, but for the people who hold the incorrect beliefs about what it can do. Is there an epistemic system that can do things that science can't do? Depends...is art an epistemic system?

 

[Robin]

The arguments I make tend to be neo-Kantian.

I have noticed that - whereas mainstream philosophy is post-Kantian.

They are addressed to people who are still engaged in pre-Kantian debates about ontology and epistemology (not that most of them realise this).

But you were making claims that science itself was stuck in pre-Kantian assumptions.

So you are saying science is stuck with pre-Kantian assumptions

I am saying science is not stuck with pre-Kantian assumptions

And you counter that the people here cannot understand the arguments supporting my counter claim because they are also stuck with pre-Kantian assumptions.

Well I am prepared to let them decide for themselves what they can and can't understand.

(After all, a significant number of them are much smarter than me).

 

[Robin]

The problem is that some people believe that science can do things that cannot be done at all.

And the other problem is that some people believe that science cannot uncover knowledge that can be uncovered in other ways.

Both are not really such problems because sometimes the most spectacular acheivements are those that were previously thought undoable.

So it is not a bad thing for people in science and philosophy to be sometimes trying to achieve the unachievable. Because just occasionally it turns out to be only apparently unachievable.

This is not a problem for science, but for the people who hold the incorrect beliefs about what it can do.

Can't disagree with that.

Is there an epistemic system that can do things that science can't do? Depends...is art an epistemic system?

Good question - I have personally always been open to the idea that art is a way of knowing things that can't otherwise be known.

But I have never reached any firm conclusions one way or the other.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I think its problematic to refer to an emergent property without first defining this property and identifying at what stage it emerges.

I did those things. Please re-read my posts. There are emergent properties at every level of organization from atom, to molecule, to organelle, to cell, to tissue, to organ, etc.

You keep asking how many parts of a whole it takes for a property of the whole to emerge, and I keep pointing out that it's not a question of quantity.

The question of Penrose and his thesis on QM being capable of explaining consciousness ?

Your question makes no sense. ( In fact, it's a sentence fragment, so I'm not even sure how to parse it.) I asked whether QM or neuroscience is more likely to lead to new knowledge about consciousness.

I do not believe it is consciousness that needs explaining, but thinking.
This can only be explained using thinking. We can confirm our thoughts on consciousness using the scientific method. In other words consciousness is a question for philosophy to unravel and science to communicate.

I disagree. We know many of the components of consciousness (memory, arousal, proprioception, nociception, language, etc.), and we can localize those functions to specific brain structures. Neuroscience promises to unravel more of the unknowns in this area.

In fact, as much as I enjoy philosophy and logic, deductive logic can't lead to new knowledge on its own. Logic can only lead you to information that is already there in the premises.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Kaggen's not asking how many atoms it takes before consciousness can emerge (which would lead to your rebuttal question about atoms and wings).

He asked how many cells it takes before consciousness emerges. I pointed out why this is a bad question. Emergent properties emerge as a result of levels of organization, not quantities of things.

Again, his question is similar to asking how many bricks before the property of "shelter from the weather" emerges. Of course, that is a property of the level of organization of the house, and not a property of bricks, no matter how many you have.

The principle of emergent properties at various levels of organization is a basic principle of general biology.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I am very much aware of the concept of emergence and have no issues with it.

The questions you're asking demonstrate that you do not actually understand the concept.

I just do not see why we should not ask when does an emergent property emerge and therefore how much of "whatever" was required before a new property emerged.

Again, this shows the lack of a basic understanding of the idea of emergent properties. It is not a question of "how much". You can have all the bricks in the world without getting properties of a house.

Otherwise stating that something complex is difficult to understand because "it is an emergent property" is just hand waving.

I've never claimed that something complex is difficult to understand because it is an emergent property.

I've argued that it's wrong and fruitless to look for an emergent property at the wrong level. That is, you can't find an emergent property of the whole by focussing on examination of one of the lower level component parts.

You can't learn about a house by looking very closely at individual bricks.

You can't learn about a high level brain function (consciousness) by studying things at the atomic level with QM.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The problem is that some people believe that science can do things that cannot be done at all.

I disagree that that's the problem of the topic of this thread. The problem is which science is likely to give us more knowledge about consciousness. Penrose thinks QM can lead us to that knowledge. However, as I've shown, consciousness is a collection of higher level functions/properties that emerge at a much higher level of organization than the atomic level.

If there is anything we can learn about consciousness (and I think there is since we've learned quite a lot already and continue to learn more right now), I'm confident we will learn about it from the field of neuroscience (and perhaps also psychiatry or other such fields) and not from QM or physics.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

On a slight derail: the composition fallacy is also what's happening with these anti-vaxers who observe that the flu vaccine contains mercury, and since elemental mercury is toxic, deduce that the vaccine must be toxic. In fact, the mercury compound in the vaccine has very different properties from elemental mercury.

Similarly, table salt, a compound of sodium and chlorine does not have the properties of elemental sodium (a metal, solid at room temperature) or chlorine (a non-metal, gas at room temperature).

!Kaggen's question is equivalent to asking, "How many sodium atoms does it take before you get saltiness?"

 

[PixyMisa]

"Matter" is not a verb in physics.

Wrong.

 

[PixyMisa]

The problem is that some people believe that science can do things that cannot be done at all.

Such as?

 

[drkitten]

Such as?

Well, the Venus Project seem to think that science can create a post-scarcity society in which there will be no more shortage of goods at al. Just think, I can get that Guanarius violin I've always wanted -- and a mint-condition 1964 Chevy Camaro.

Any number of idealists and science fiction aficionados seem to think that the speed of light is just a guideline instead of a hard limit.

Any number of perpetual motion/free energy types seem to feel the same way about the laws of thermodynamics.

Of course, one of the key insights you can glean from this list is that very few, if any, of these people are actually practicing scientists; most scientists seem to be, if anything, more aware of the limits of science than the general public. Which makes sense, if you think about it.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

"Matter" is not a verb in physics.

Why does that matter?