My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[Dancing David]

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.

Now that is just silly, there is no 'digital nature of the universe', that and all of it is semantic labeling.

 

[cyborg]

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices. They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

Yes. I can treat my computer as a large paperweight if I want to.

Now - how is this at all relevant to anything again?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you expected people to understand your original claim about the association between science and metaphysical assumptions, why do you think those same people would fail to understand the counter claim that scientists have for well over a century, carefully examined these assumptions and largely disavowed them?

The arguments I make tend to be neo-Kantian. They are addressed to people who are still engaged in pre-Kantian debates about ontology and epistemology (not that most of them realise this). You are talking about philosophical arguments that occured after the period of philosophical history which Kant triggered. In other words, people have to understand the issues raised by Kant and the people who immediately followed him before they can understand the relevance of Wittgenstein, Neurath and logical positivism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't know why you would even want to get to Nietzsche and the ability to get to post-modernism is hardly a recommendation.

One doesn't end up at Nietzsche or post-modernism because one wants to. One just ends up there because there is nowhere-else left to go.

But your claim seems to be that the thing metaphysics can do that science can't is to get from one philosopher to another.

I think science can operate quite effectively without having to do that.

Sure it can, provided we understand what "science" means and what its limitations are. Quite a lot of people here do not understand this. They think that understanding science - as in understanding things Darwinism or Newtonian mechanics - means that they automatically have a good grasp of how science fits into a broader spectrum of knowledge and enquiry. This is not the case. Some of the most scientifically-literate people have the biggest blind spots when it comes to acknowledging what science can't do.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Exactly. It was and is never going to be simple. It might be one of those things we never qute get a handle on but Im not one of those who advocate there are some things beyond the realm of human understanding.

All I have seen above is a bunch of people trying to score points off one another, pedantic and unhelpful. This is probably why no one has got to the bottom of the question yet.

No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask. I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness". If it is not possible to come to an agreement about exactly what is meant by that word and exactly what question we are trying to ask about the thing to which it refers then we stand zero chance of reaching a sensible answer.

Garbage in, garbage out.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

A semantical argument.

What, precisely, do you think is not a "semantical argument"?

"Just a semantic argument" should only be used to refer to an argument where the only serious point of contention is what a specific word means. For example, if a person disagrees that sex with a consenting pre-teen should be refered to as "rape" but accepts that it should still be illegal then it really is a merely semantic argument. You, on the other hand, continually try to claim "it's just semantics", even when there is a very real argument going on underneath the semantics. You use it as a means of avoiding the real underlying argument.

Arguments about consciousness end up being arguments about the definition of words NOT because there is a genuine disagreement about what the relevant words mean but because it is impossible to resolve the dispute simply by agreeing to a new and clearer set of definitions. It is not possible to come to agreement precisely because there is a genuine underlying logical problem (or set of logical problems) which certain people try to hide by providing definitions of words which are designed to avoid acknowledging a real, non-semantical problem. In this specific case, they try to avoid being forced to acknowledge a genuine difficulty in studying consciousness by attempting to define the word "consciousness" to mean something which can concievably be tacked by science rather than defining it to mean what most people mean when they raise the problem in the first place. This is a classic example of putting cart before horse. It's a bit like trying to define "evolution" to mean "God's method of creating life on Earth" and then wondering why people refuse to accept the definition. Is that a merely semantic argument? No, it is an abuse of language resulting from an attempt to hide from an unwanted problem and the attempted mis-definition has no power to solve the actual problem. What it does do is allow the person trying misdefine the word to avoid having to think too hard about the unwanted problem.

Can I suggest a test? If you can re-arrange the meanings of the words so that the point of contention/disagreement disappears, then it is merely a semantic argument. If you can't, then it isn't.

 

[cyborg]

No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask. I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness".

Right - there is a reason why that was my first post here.

So fire away.

 

[rocketdodger]

As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

I was being sarcastic.

 

[rocketdodger]

Now we come to the mysticism at the heart of Strong AI.

I don't find it surprising that when I use sarcasm to regurgitate westprog's argument, westprog realizes the absurdity of it and calls it mysticism.

Fail.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Right - there is a reason why that was my first post here.

So fire away.

It wasn't me who mentioned the word "consciousness". Ask the person who asked the original question. You should already know my answer to this: I think we depend on a subjective definition of this word - we have to define it privately in terms of our own experience of reality. The next question is: can we use a privately-defined word in a public discussion?

 

[westprog]

Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.

But the bit is just an idea that we have. The physics of it is not digital.

 

[rocketdodger]

Sorry, is this like the 'evolution is random' thing?

Pretty much. Here is a summary of about 1000 pages of posts:

Westprog thinks that consciousness can't be a physical process because all physical processes are equivalent and thus everything would be conscious -- an absurdity, according to westprog.

Westprog's proof of this is that he/she thinks the behavior necessary for computation -- switching -- is constantly exhibited by all existing physical entities, from the smallest particle to the entire universe. To show this, westprog is more than happy to come up with elaborate scenarios where any entity might indeed act as a switch (and he/she considers the fact that all these scenarios are entirely independent of each other to be beside the point, because after all its not like the switches involved in computing have to work together or anything). Thus, according to westprog, everything computes: there is no distinction between a pile of rocks, a pile of computer parts (or a bowl of soup -- yes, we actually argued about this) and a working computer.

And when anyone points out the obvious distinctions, westprog claims that those only exist in the minds of humans, and anyway computers are built by humans so somehow they can't be used in arguments about human consciousness because to do so would be circular, or something. Furthermore westprog thinks that all the stuff that exhibits such obvious distinctions that we could use in arguments that would not be circular, or something, -- such as all other life on the planet Earth -- is irrelevant (his/her repeated dodging of questions along those lines is equivalent to an admission of as much). Finally, when a clever observer points out that a rock doesn't compute when it is sitting in the sun, westprog intelligently replies that it is only not computing according to a human observer (then we are back to the whole "human centric" thing) and in fact we can come up with some definition of "computing" that such a rock sitting in the sun will satisfy. Again, the fact that definitions are completely changed to suit the specific case in question is irrelevant to westprog, because things like consistency should not get in the way of a good argument.

EDIT: Oh, and westprog also claims that a glass of pure water contains a virtual machine + software, equivalent to the central dogma of molecular biology (DNA + transcription, etc). He/she has yet to explain that one, since the thread died before yy2bggggs could get anything resembling an argument from him/her.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

How many organized brain cells till consciousness emerges?

I don't think it's a function purely of number.

For example, you might ask how many bricks make a house (and the emergent properties of a house)? It's not a matter of number (though it does take more than "some") as much as it is how they're organized to do certain functions.

(ETA: It also depends on how you define "consciousness". As I've been saying that's a term that refers to many different properties/functions.)

But again, back to the point of this thread, do you suppose QM or neuroscience will answer this question?

 

[cyborg]

we have to define it privately in terms of our own experience of reality.

That's just a cop out.

The next question is: can we use a privately-defined word in a public discussion?

We do so all the time.

 

[cyborg]

But the bit is just an idea that we have. The physics of it is not digital.

It's irrelevant - the system behaves as if it is digital because that is how system is setup.

Water can pass through the dam or it cannot. The individual motion of the water molecules doesn't really matter.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

When you say that something is not the subject of physics, then you are saying that you don't understand what is going on.

That's not true.

When I say consciousness is not the subject of physics I mean exactly what I said: consciousness is not the subject of physics.

Go to any reputable university and there is not one single physics department class on consciousness (or any of the collection of properties/functions that comprise consciousness like memory, proprioception, etc.)

 

[westprog]

Pretty much. Here is a summary of about 1000 pages of posts:

Westprog thinks that consciousness can't be a physical process because all physical processes are equivalent and thus everything would be conscious -- an absurdity, according to westprog.

Could you be any more confused about what I'm saying? You've managed to miss an astonishing number of points in a single sentence. Good lord.
It's not as if I haven't explained this point at great length.

I have always insisted that any scientific investigation of consciousness has to start with a physical theory. "All physical processes are equivalent"? Where do you get this? It's the proponents of Strong AI that insist that consciousness is independent of any given physical process, and that it can be produced by electricity, mechanics or punched cards. I've made the point that one cannot assume that an entirely different physical process cannot be simply assumed to produce the same result.

The context is the Strong AI claim that computing is something that produces consciousness, or can produce it, independently of the physical medium, but at the same time the insistence that computing only happens either in the brain or in human-made computers, but never in any way in natural phenomena.

Westprog's proof of this is that he/she thinks the behavior necessary for computation -- switching

Note the switch between "consciousness" and "computation" as if they were the same thing, when this is precisely the issue at dispute.

This kind of hamfisted switching around, using an argument about one thing as evidence for another, is all too typical of the discussions on this subject.

-- is constantly exhibited by all existing physical entities, from the smallest particle to the entire universe. To show this, westprog is more than happy to come up with elaborate scenarios where any entity might indeed act as a switch (and he/she considers the fact that all these scenarios are entirely independent of each other to be beside the point, because after all its not like the switches involved in computing have to work together or anything). Thus, according to westprog, everything computes: there is no distinction between a pile of rocks, a pile of computer parts (or a bowl of soup -- yes, we actually argued about this) and a working computer.

And when anyone points out the obvious distinctions,

FSV of "point out", as in claim "well, it's obvious".

westprog claims that those only exist in the minds of humans, and anyway computers are built by humans so somehow they can't be used in arguments about human consciousness because to do so would be circular, or something.

Yeah, "or something".

Furthermore westprog thinks that all the stuff that exhibits such obvious distinctions that we could use in arguments that would not be circular, or something, -- such as all other life on the planet Earth -- is irrelevant (his/her repeated dodging of questions along those lines is equivalent to an admission of as much). Finally, when a clever observer points out that a rock doesn't compute when it is sitting in the sun, westprog intelligently replies that it is only not computing according to a human observer (then we are back to the whole "human centric" thing) and in fact we can come up with some definition of "computing" that such a rock sitting in the sun will satisfy. Again, the fact that definitions are completely changed to suit the specific case in question is irrelevant to westprog, because things like consistency should not get in the way of a good argument.

EDIT: Oh, and westprog also claims that a glass of pure water contains a virtual machine + software, equivalent to the central dogma of molecular biology (DNA + transcription, etc). He/she has yet to explain that one, since the thread died before yy2bggggs could get anything resembling an argument from him/her.

The thread died waiting for anyone to come up with a physical description of computing. There was a fair split between people who said it wasn't necessary, while not actually accepting that this implied that computing could not therefore be considered a physical process, and people who made some attempts to define computing in a physical sense but were unable to do so. Either there was a perfectly good physical theory, or it was a total irrelevance.

I had no particular wish to revisit this, but the alternative seems to be to have Rocketdodger give his misunderstood version.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's just a cop out.

No it isn't. It's one of the central questions discussed by Wittgenstein in what is widely considered to be the most important philosophical book of the 20th century.

We do so all the time.

Can you provide some examples?

 

[westprog]

That's not true.

When I say consciousness is not the subject of physics I mean exactly what I said: consciousness is not the subject of physics.

Go to any reputable university and there is not one single physics department class on consciousness

Which is what I already said. I'm also insisting that this necessarily implies that consciousness is not scientifically understood.

True, there are no physics classes on auto engineering, but there are classes on all the processes that scientifically describe auto engineering.

(or any of the collection of properties/functions that comprise consciousness like memory, proprioception, etc.)

Already by stating that consciousness is comprised of a number of listed properties the question is being massively begged.

 

[RandFan]

I will only note that you cannot answer the question.

Then you are being dishonest. You asked a question about how many brain cells are needed for consciousness to emerge. I asked how many atoms are needed for flight to emerge.

1. Neuroscience does not hold that the only thing necessary for consciousness is brain cells.
2. Likewise, I do not hold that the only thing necessary for flight are wings.

So the question still stands.