• Security incident: ISF was recently accessed by intruders. Please change your password, and change it anywhere else you used it. Read more

My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:
 
Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?

It's the same question. You seem to want to learn about the concept of emergent properties.

Actually, you seem to be scoffing at the idea of emergent properties by asking reductionist questions.

Emergent properties is not about quantity. It's much more about levels of organization.

Organ systems have properties that you won't find at the level of tissue; tissue has properties that you won't find at the level of cells; cells have properties that you won't find at the level of molecules; molecules have properties that you won't find at the level of atoms.

The central problem with the "QM" approach to consciousness is that it acts as if you can find and examine properties of consciousness at the atomic level, when those properties don't emerge at that level. They're not there at all. (Similarly, the quantum "weirdness" is weird because it does not describe the way things act in the macro level.)

I suspect that part of the reason they do this is that a sloppy understanding of QM uses the pathetic fallacy, which is sort of like the literary figure of speech of personification. For example, they'll ask how entangled particles can "know" the state of spin of each other. (They can't. "Knowing" is an aspect of consciousness and it doesn't emerge until you get to the level of organ.)

ETA: And, as I've mentioned, it is the composition fallacy to think that every property of a part must necessarily be a property of the whole. For example, human bodies are something like 80% water by weight. Water has the property that it can evaporate. Do we therefore expect human bodies to evaporate? Water can flow to conform to any shape container. Do we therefore expect the human body to be able to conform to any shape container?

Here's another example of the composition fallacy:
Nevertheless, any large-scale physical phenomenon reduces to a composition of small/atomic scale physical phenomena. If consciousness is an actual physical phenomenon, then it will be possible to analyse it at all scales.

This is not true. A property of the whole is not necessarily a property of any part and vice versa. If that were true objects would be sort of like those Mandelbrot set graphics that look the same at any scale. Humans would not be organized into organ systems, tissues, cells, molecules, etc.. . instead we would be composed of atoms that looked and behaved just like tiny little humans. Why would we expect subatomic particles to have consciousness but not for them to have other properties of humans?
 
Last edited:
Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?
You've gotten off track here. It's not my question to answer. It's yours. But given that a wing is a variable needed for flight and all other variables are met, how many atoms are needed before flight can emerge.

BTW: Brain cells, like the wings of a plane for flight, are not all that is requisite for consciousness.

So we are back to your silly question about brain cells.
 
"Just a semantic argument" should only be used to refer to an argument where the only serious point of contention is what a specific word means.
Bingo. Words have meaning and their purpose is to convey ideas. The word Digital has a meaning and when used appropriately it correctly conveys ideas. I stand by my contention.

Can I suggest a test? If you can re-arrange the meanings of the words so that the point of contention/disagreement disappears, then it is merely a semantic argument. If you can't, then it isn't.
"re-arrange the meanings of the words"?

There's simply no need. If the crux of the argument is the meaning of the words then it is a semantical argument.
 
Last edited:
No it isn't.

Yes it is - for the reason below.

Can you provide some examples?

We literally do it all the time. Like, right now.

All I have when using any particular word is a private definition of it. Communication is possible when two private definitions agree sufficiently.

Either it's a general problem or it's not - I don't see why "consciousness" should be a particular problem.
 
Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.
Then we are in agreement. I specificaly said "medium". A transistor composed of semiconducting material IS the medium.
 
It's irrelevant - the system behaves as if it is digital because that is how system is setup.

Water can pass through the dam or it cannot. The individual motion of the water molecules doesn't really matter.

"Matter" is not a verb in physics. The behaviour of the individual water molecules is of exactly the same significance as the switching effect of the dam.

The reason that this matters is that if there's a contention that a physical process is happening with a switch, then that physical process needs to be unambiguously defined.
 
"Matter" is not a verb in physics. The behaviour of the individual water molecules is of exactly the same significance as the switching effect of the dam.

No, it isn't.

The reason that this matters is that if there's a contention that a physical process is happening with a switch, then that physical process needs to be unambiguously defined.

It's unambiguous as to whether or not water is passing through a dam.

It either is or it isn't.
 
Organ systems have properties that you won't find at the level of tissue; tissue has properties that you won't find at the level of cells; cells have properties that you won't find at the level of molecules; molecules have properties that you won't find at the level of atoms.

A rather simple example: the cardio vascular system. As an organ system is has the property of being able to pump blood through the lungs to be oxygenated and then throughout the rest of the body to deliver that oxygen via the capillaries to cells and to return the unoxygenated blood to the heart.

We could look at any of the organs in the system, but let's take the heart. The heart does not in itself have the property of delivering oxygenated blood to the cells. (You need arteries, arterioles, capillaries, venules, veins, and lungs.) However it does have the ability to pump blood.

The heart is made of several different kinds of tissues. None of them has the ability to pump blood. Some tissue can contract, some is organized into valves, etc. These have various properties/functions that the cells which compose them don't have.

And so on.

Using QM to study consciousness is no different than trying to use QM to study cardiovascular function. What can QM tell us about blood pressure regulation?
 
The only meaning "digital" has in the real world is in terms of the interpretation we place on the information received. The electrical processes on an analogue telephone line are exactly the same as when converted to ADSL. It's just a matter of decoding at each end.

And the quality of reproduction of either analogue or digital is entirely dependent on the precision of the equipment. In any case, we see and hear the information in an entirely analogue way, because our senses don't work on digital.
Wrong.
 
No-one has got to the bottom of the question because nobody has worked out what question they are actually trying to ask.
Wrong. I know exactly what I am trying to ask, and that's why I have an answer.

You might not like my question. You might not like my answer. But that's your problem, not mine.

I'm afraid it really does come down to how you define the word "consciousness". If it is not possible to come to an agreement about exactly what is meant by that word and exactly what question we are trying to ask about the thing to which it refers then we stand zero chance of reaching a sensible answer.
This is all true. So, what's your definition?

Garbage in, garbage out.
We noticed.
 
*Looks at radical growth of thread since the last time he posted*

..... I think I have created a monster :boxedin:
Yep.

Just mention consciousness and the people who can't even define the term come out in droves to argue - incoherently - with the people who can.
 
The only meaning "digital" has in the real world is in terms of the interpretation we place on the information received. The electrical processes on an analogue telephone line are exactly the same as when converted to ADSL. It's just a matter of decoding at each end.

And the quality of reproduction of either analogue or digital is entirely dependent on the precision of the equipment. In any case, we see and hear the information in an entirely analogue way, because our senses don't work on digital.
I will take some exception with Pixy as this isn't entirely wrong. In any event. Using the same analogue telephone line we can send and receive a voice message in analouge and record it over and over and very quickly we will see degredation. Not so with digital. We can make millions if not billions of copies without degredation (that's not to say there will be no degredation of information in transit however we have digital error checking and can resend any data that is degraded). That's a fact jack.
 
But our senses are digital.
I will agree with you that it could be argued that they are. The rods and cones in our eyes are in digital configuration. The data transmission, I think, is digital. As an aside, the four protein arrangement of our DNA is digital. It's not as clear cut as it may seem. It comes down to how you define digital. I'm going to alter my stance on this one a bit.

But please to tell me how our senses are digital other than the rods and cones in our eyes and the transmission of data from nerves to brain? FWIW: I'm not insisting that they are not. :)
 
Bingo. Words have meaning and their purpose is to convey ideas. The word Digital has a meaning and when used appropriately it correctly conveys ideas. I stand by my contention.

"re-arrange the meanings of the words"?

There's simply no need. If the crux of the argument is the meaning of the words then it is a semantical argument.

Randfan, the trouble is that I have heard you cry "semantic argument" on numerous occasions when there was far more at stake than the mere meanings of words.

Anyone who thinks this dispute about consciousness is "merely semantic" simply because the debate can't go anywhere at all unless you first nail down the definition of the word "consciousness" is badly mistaken.
 
Randfan, the trouble is that I have heard you cry "semantic argument" on numerous occasions when there was far more at stake than the mere meanings of words.
This would be a fallacy. If there is an error in logic then what's at stake has no relevance as to the error in logic.

Anyone who thinks this dispute about consciousness is "merely semantic" simply because the debate can't go anywhere at all unless you first nail down the definition of the word "consciousness" is badly mistaken.
And this would be a strawman.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom