My take on why indeed the study of consciousness may not be as simple

[!Kaggen]

I assume you are withdrawing your silly question about brain cells.

I will only note that you cannot answer the question.

 

[!Kaggen]

To achieve flight there needs be a number of variables. If and only if all of the variables are met can flight happen (aka emerge).

Lets move onto the next question then.

How many variables are needed for flight to 'emerge'?

 

[Wudang]

http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Aeronautics-and-Astronautics/16-333Fall-2004/LectureNotes/index.htm

Fill your boots. Note btw the absence of QM

 

[Robin]

I am not convinced of your proof.

It was your own reasoning, with "matter" and "physical" swapped for "consciousness" and "think". You seemed to think you had made some point because you had a circular definition.

I was pointing out that circular definitions are easy to come by.

You said you would like to see me find a circular definition for matter. I did. That is all.

In any case I was not suggesting that matter or thinking would create themselves if they were defined self-referentially. You suggested this and I suggested you try prove it.

I don't recall asking anything of the sort. I think you will have to quote that part.

What I did say was that what I myself create, is self-referential.

Your original claim was that consciousness creates consciousness as I seem to recall.

I gave you a dictionary definition of think and conscious as a guide and proceeded to explain why you saying you think and me saying I think is not equivalent. The point being to show you how only I can create and address my consciousness.

Only you can address your consciousness - but you cannot create it.

Recall when I asked you how you created your consciousness you were unable to answer.

I would rather be polite at this stage.

Glass houses.

 

[westprog]

A semantical argument. Digital has a real and fundamental meaning when it comes to data transmission. That all underlying medium is analog does not obviate that meaning. Digital transmission has high fidelity (not perfect). Analog, by comparison, does not.

The only meaning "digital" has in the real world is in terms of the interpretation we place on the information received. The electrical processes on an analogue telephone line are exactly the same as when converted to ADSL. It's just a matter of decoding at each end.

And the quality of reproduction of either analogue or digital is entirely dependent on the precision of the equipment. In any case, we see and hear the information in an entirely analogue way, because our senses don't work on digital.

 

[Robin]

Hmm.. not and no better are not equivalent. This is shifting the goalposts.

You were drawing metaphysical conclusions on the basis of "thinking"

I said thinking was no better a metaphysical starting point than matter.

I thought you understood that matter was not a metaphysical starting point at all, so it was a genuine misunderstanding.

But at least we can now agree that thinking is no basis for drawing metaphysical conclusions.

 

[westprog]

Assuming of course that nature is not in fact digital.

Feynman once conjectured that nature might be fundamentally discrete. If that was the case then digital devices would be an emulation of digital on an emulation of analog.

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.

 

[westprog]

This is true too and more to the point. A digital system is no less a digital system because it is built on an analog system.

All real-world digital devices are built on an analogue system. When we call something a digital device, that's the unspoken assumption.

 

[westprog]

As a former and ardent duaalist I have to ask. Pray tell what process could it be then?

Now we come to the mysticism at the heart of Strong AI.

 

[westprog]

No. Again, we know quite a lot about consciousness (memory, arousal, proprioception, etc.) and it's all based on the neuroscience model. The field is advancing pretty quickly these days. . . in neuroscience, not in physics, and certainly not from QM.

I'm not dissing physics. It's just that the collection of properties or functions we call consciousness is not the subject of physics. (No more than auto repair and house construction are!)

When you say that something is not the subject of physics, then you are saying that you don't understand what is going on. Auto repair and house construction are understood in physical terms, and indeed the people who design houses and cars, and the materials used to make houses and cars, have to be very familiar with the physical principles involved. There are no mysterious, mystical "emergent properties" when it comes to houses and cars. We can follow what is going on from top to bottom. A brick or a brake has its engineering properties because of its physical characteristics.

When someone says that something is not in the purview of physics, that's the same as saying that it is not a matter of science. Neurological investigation is an important first step in the understanding of consciousness, but if there is no physical theory, there is no real understanding.

 

[westprog]

No. There is no such thing as the understanding of a car on an atomic level.

You can learn about atoms by studying things at the atomic level, but not cars.

The properties of a car (something you can sit in, the ability to transport you and other loads from place to place, etc.) do not emerge at the atomic level.

However, they emerge because of the behaviour of the components of the car at an atomic level, and the connection between the behaviour of the atoms and the macro-scale behaviour of the car is well understood. When we say that we understand how a car works - how the ability to transport you from place to place emerges - we mean that we understand how the atomic level processes produce the large-scale processes. That is what physical understanding means.

Again, this statement:


Is not true. In the car analogy, consciousness is a higher level emergent property (or rather a collection of properties) like the ability of a car to transport you from one place to another. You can't analyze either of these properties at the atomic level.

We both know that's not the case. We don't know how the atoms in the brain produce consciousness, which is in any case poorly defined. We know exactly how the atoms in the car produce motion, comfy seats, well balanced MP3 sound systems and a pleasant interior temperature. There's a direct link between the micro and the macro level, every stage of which is understood.

It's because we have such a strong understanding of the physical processes involved that we can, if we wish, produce electric cars, hybrid cars, electronic engine management systems, kinetic energy recovery braking systems and so on. It is because we don't have any understanding of how the atoms of the brain produce consciousness that we are totally unable to produce anything apart from a human brain that has the consciousness property.

That's not true. Again, most auto engineers, designers and mechanics do not know QM, and yet we do actually know how a car works. The properties that we're concerned with in higher levels are not the properties of subatomic particles.

Not it's not. It's saying that we can understand these properties without worrying about individual atoms much less subatomic particles. In fact, it says that atomic theory and subatomic particles doesn't tell us anything about how cars work.

You don't think that the theory of combustion tells us anything about how cars work? What a superficial level of understanding that would be. Put in the petrol, switch on and go. Why does burning fuel make the wheels go round? Gee, who cares?

In fact, if you don't understand how cars work on a physical level, you might be able to drive 'em, repair 'em and maybe even build 'em, but you won't be able to design 'em.

I've already given you several examples of this. In neuroscience, specific components of consciousness (memory, proprioception, systems of arousal, etc.) have been studied in some detail and have led to practical applications, especially in medicine.



I'm not arguing about the difference between experimental vs theoretical work. I'm arguing that neuroscience (which is both theory and experiment) has led us to theories of consciousness that have led to very practical applications.

Those "theories" are at the same level as the mechanic who knows how to set the timing or tighten up the brakes. There is no deep insight to be found in a purely neurological approach. It's a necessary first step, but it won't tell us "how the brain works".

QM (which is also theoretical and experimental) has not. Applying QM to consciousness has only resulted in the publication of New Agey books that compare subatomic particles to the mind.

That's obviously because we don't have a decent theory yet. In fact, we have no physical theory of consciousness. We do have a complete physical theory of how cars work.

 

[Robin]

That might well be the case - but it doesn't change how the digital devices actually work. The digital nature of the computer is still not the same as the digital nature of the universe.

Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

 

[Robin]

All real-world digital devices are built on an analogue system.

Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

 

[westprog]

Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

In fact it does. There is no physical distinction between a digital and an analogue device. The difference is purely operational. A computer is a digital device because we choose to use it as such.

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices. They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

 

[Dancing David]

Transistors (digital switches) are mechanical devices composed of semiconducting material. IOW: They are an analog medium. There is no such thing as a metaphysical switch.

Sure, that I know, the voltage potential gate is analog, but the effect is digital as far as bit switching. The gate is open or closed, the bit is on/off. The bit is not 53%.

 

[Dancing David]

Oh, God, please don't bring up switching...

Sorry, is this like the 'evolution is random' thing?

 

[Dancing David]

If you like. The difference for me is that for thinking I cannot see how I can experience its appearance without producing it myself.

Now taht is the appearance, it could be a Brain In Vat situation, it could be that thoughts are partly determined or mostly determined causaly and that they are an appearance of interactive free will, when in fact they are not.

My point is that 'there appear to be the experiences we labels as thought', but the usage of the word 'myself' is yet undefined.

Now if you use 'meslef' to denote the 'apparently organic body which I reference as mine' then I can agree to that.

But the appearnce is that we are organice beings and that the brains of those being have neural nets which generate patterns of interaction we call thought.

That requires a lot more than phenomenolgy, in phenomenology we could be BIVs.

What are these other experiences, if I may ask?

They are myriad and multiple, i would list auditory cognition and visual cognition. then there are a host of other processes. there is nothing as pure as the concept "I had a thought."

No, but that's the only experience I have had (consistent and repeatable )

Thoughts yes, not thinking.

Yes but that is the point, we have to couch it carefully, especially in these discussions, there is an appearance of *I think*.

 

[Dancing David]

In fact it does. There is no physical distinction between a digital and an analogue device. The difference is purely operational.

Sorry, I don't get that either.

The usage is what determines the nature of the computation. Justa s in defintions of analog and digital.

There are no absolutes, the usage of the machine is digital, that is the part that matters, the parts are use digitally whatever the ultimate construction.

Why would it matter? (Most importantly)

A computer is a digital device because we choose to use it as such.

And a screw driver or cal phone can be used as a hammer.

Your point being?

The reason this is an important distinction is because there's an apparent belief that digital devices are distinct in some sense from analogue devices.

Nope, that is your straw man, they are digital because taht is the way they process the 'material' we give them. You are imposing these absolutes where none exist.

I could sue my desktop computer as a hammer, that does not mean that it becomes a hammaer.

They aren't. We can treat digital devices as analogue, or analogue as digital, depending on our requirements.

Excuse me, the process is digital, there is no meaning in the usage of the term otherwise.

You can use analog processes as well to generate analog computing algorithims, we don't.

You are making a distinction based upon some absolute, the process is digital.

That is physical process. It does not happen in some Kantian metaspace.

 

[Dancing David]

Nor does the analog basis of digital devices change how they work.

Where did I say otherwise???

I said the fact did not make them any less digital.

Exactly.

 

[Dancing David]

That's obviously because we don't have a decent theory yet. In fact, we have no physical theory of consciousness. We do have a complete physical theory of how cars work.

Argument of the gaps, we do not have a complete understanding of QM at all, it is still a useful theory, as are the theories of neurons and neural nets.