Pan Am 103: Unaccompanied bag from Malta: Evidence?

[Rolfe]

This is very much related to the question of the authenticity of the timer fragment, of course. Coleman describes the bomb going on at Frankfurt, by way of a Turkish baggage handler who switched an innocent case for it after security checks, as was his routine for smuggling on bags full of herion. Whether or not he knew the bag he put into the system wasn't heroin on this occasion was uncertain. (A lot of this relies on polygraph evidence though, so shouldn't be taken too seriously.)

Of course this is Coleman, and we're not sure whether he's the real deal or a fantasist. Frankovich puts forward a similar story - or rather, part of it, apparently having got it from Coleman. But a Frankfurt introduction is quite a popular theory.

However, it's entirely at odds with a simple "Jibril did it" theory. Jibril's standard devices would have exploded somewhere around Paris, if loaded at Frankfurt. Any theory apart from the Heathrow one actually demands a different, more sophisticated timing device - possibly an MST-13. It's just that the question then arises, once you've got the MST-13, why set it for 7pm instead of midnight?

I've sort of got a vague idea....

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Well, vague idea coming up (I've mentioned it before actually).

If you're simply relying on a timer alone to detonate a bomb on PA103, you set it for about midnight. However, there's still the possibility the device might not be airborne at that time - particularly, if it isn't loaded on the plane for some reason (hey, it happens!). It's winter in northern Europe, planes get delayed, connections get missed, anything can happen.

Jibril's group always favoured including an altimeter in their devices for exactly that reason. Whatever happened, the thing would be airborne when it exploded. However, as it would be triggered by any ascent to altitude, these devices had to be loaded on to the final leg where the explosion was desired.

Now, suppose he decided to circumvent security and detection by placing the device on a feeder flight rather than directly on the final leg, he might still have been keen to include a barometric sensor to make sure that whatever happened as regards delays, the device wouldn't trigger until after take-off.

We discussed in another thread the concept of a barometric sensor which could count, and would delay the triggering of the device until the second or the third ascent. Suppose that's what the MST-13 was being used for? I don't know enough electronics to know if this is plausible, but the thing was versatile.

Suppose the components the timer was populated with in some way ensured that the device would remain inert during the earlier leg(s) of the flight, only allowing the main mechanism, which was still the barometer/ice-cube arrangement, to kick in on the Heathrow/JFK leg?

I'm not sure exactly how this would work, I don't have the expertise, but it could certainly work for a Frankfurt loading. If you're 99.9% sure you'll get it on at Frankfurt and the Frankfurt flight isn't gonig to be delayed by more than a couple of hours, then you just set it (using the MST-13) to lie dormant until 6pm when the Heathrow take-off is scheduled. If that plane is delayed, or if the bag misses the connection, then the objective is still achieved.

My main question with this is, given that train of thought, why not set the time for 11pm GMT rather than 6pm? That way, if the plane is airborne at that time, the final 30-minute countdown will start immediately and you'll probably get a detonation over the ocean. But if there's a big delay, then so long as the bag has reached Heathrow by 11pm, it'll sit quiet until it eventually takes off.

I suppose, though, that this latter scenario would be a bad one anyway, with such a delayed bag being liable to be x-rayed and/or hand-searched.

As I said, I'm a bit hazy about this, and I also wonder if it's possible the MST-13 might have been rigged to count take-offs rather than to delay the triggering until a certain time. But I think there's the germ of a possibility here.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I think I've found the source for Bollier's claim that the orphan bag at Frankfurt belonged to an airline pilot. It's in The Trail of the Octopus where it describes Pan Am's grounds for appeal against the negligence conviction. (The appeal hasn't happened by the time the book ends, but so far as I know it was unsuccessful and Pan Am was bankrupted as a result.)

Worse still, at no point in the trial proceedings had Pan Am been allowed even to mention the possibility that a rogue bag might have been slipped into the system further down the line in order to bypass its security checks. Nor was it allowed to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs' own experts on the subject of 'rush-tag' bags, which, by definition, are unaccompanied by their owners.

This last turned out to be particularly damaging.

When Pan Am called Kurt Maier, operator of its baggage X-ray machine at Frankfurt on the day in question, he testified, first, that he had been told to call a supervisor if he saw a radio inside any bag, and second, that none of the 13 unaccompanied bags he screened for Flight 103 had contained a radio-cassette player. (When Maier's competence as an operator was challenged, Pan Am sought to demonstrate the X-ray machine to the jury in order to prove that anyone, trained or not, could identify a radio-cassette player from the image on its monitor, but once again, the airline was not permitted to do so.)

Maier's testimony was crucial because the plaintiffs (and the government) insisted that 12 of the 13 bags had been accounted for, and that the 13th was the one with the bomb.

Pan Am, on the other hand, contended that the 13th bag must have belonged to a Pan Am captain who had sent two suitcases home from Berlin via Frankfurt, rush-tagged to Seattle via New York, before piloting a flight to Karachi. One suitcase had unaccountably been left behind at Frankfurt. The other, containing Christmas presents for his family, was found at Lockerbie. As this was not among the 12 unaccompanied bags officially accounted for, and as all 13 had been X-rayed and cleared, the 13th bag could not, therefore, have contained the bomb.

On attempting to cross-examine one of the plaintiffs' own experts on the subject of rush-tag bags, however, Pan Am's counsel was specifically barred from asking if the 13th bag could not, in fact, have belonged to the pilot. They were also prevented from asking another of the plaintiffs' experts if it might not have been easier for a terrorist to have placed the bomb in a parcel of cargo rather than in an unaccompanied bag.

A "rush-tag" seems to be what happens to lost or delayed baggage when it is being sent to catch up with its owner. It seems that airline staff are allowed to "rush-tag" luggage they need to travel on a plane they are not themselves travelling on.

Bollier has more detail, including the name of the pilot. I imagine he's taking this directly from the court papers. It looks as if this court action has had more detail about what did or didn't happen at Frankfurt than was heard at Camp Zeist.

This account is in line with my own take on the Maier story, also. Maier's training was specifically derided in the Camp Zeist verdict, and it was implied that he had no idea how to spot a bomb. However, that wasn't actually the point. He'd been told to pull out anything that had a radio in it, never mind whether it looked suspicious otherwise. No specialist training is needed to see a radio-cassette player on an airport x-ray machine. He was looking for something like that, and he didn't see anything.

Reading The Trail of the Octopus, the treatment of Pan Am by the US government seems extraordinary. If even a fraction of that book is true (and since the allegations should all be verifiable I can't see any reason for serious doubt), the government went hell-for-leather to load all the blame on Pan Am's security procedures, as if a bomb in a suitcase was some sort of natural disaster caused by nobody else.

Of course, by the time Camp Zeist happened, Pan Am was long ago bankrupt and forgotten. It almost looks to me as if the pillorying of Pan Am had a two-fold purpose - turn the blame on Pan Am rather than whoever planted the bomb, and bankrupt Pan Am (which I gather was already a bit shaky) so that it vanishes as a corporate entity. Thus, later proceedings don't have to worry about representations from Pan Am trying to put their side of the story and defend their version of the baggage trail.

Here's another section - this is actually taken from Paul Foot's review of the book, as the book's text is difficult to search.

Jailed and baited, he trawled through journalistic contacts to find out why he was being victimised. One of these, Sheila Hershow, had just been fired as an investigator from the sub-committee looking into the Lockerbie disaster. Her sacking followed her demands for more US government information about security at Frankfurt airport.

Am I the only one who thinks Tom Thurman in 2008 looks rather like Lester Coleman in 1994? It's probably just the beard....

Sorry, that was an aside.

I really don't know if the bomb went on at Heathrow (timer fragment was fabricated, and the "Bedfod suitcase" was the bomb bag) or at Frankfurt (MST-13 probably real, and being used to prevent a Khreesat-type device from detonating on the first leg). However, even if the former is the actual bomb introduction method, there certainly seems to have been something helluva fishy going on at Frankfurt.

Just covering up for a drug smuggling operation the authorities knew about and were turning a blind eye to?

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

That's really a fascinating find, Rolfe. I'll look it over later on, but off the bat my mind goes back to those two near-consecutive number late arrival (rush?) bags at gate 41. (44?) But then it would, huh?

Speaking of consecutive numbers, I was watching the Air Crash Investigation video (part 4) and saw a Frankfurt Airport authority document I hadn't seen before. Took a few screen caps and reassembled it. It's some re-created made up gibberish. Not as goofy as their PT/35(b) re-enactment, but due to that potentially confusing. So FWIW, here that is:

The top portion is re-created from the Bach-Wolf worksheet I found on Bollier's sites, some contemopraneous sample he was re-working, with no connection to the case I've noticed. The middle, data, just is a way to show what the Erac printout showed for 8849, while looking more like a worksheet. It might be fun to analyze it and imagine what station this would be and who the heck would be running it.

So in case that confuses anyone into thinking there WAS a signed hand-filled form for all this data, it's not so. We have a printout by chance saved in a personal locker for weeks, plus the official files deleted before someone looked at them (someone too fast or too slow?), plus a 7 month wait by German police before alerting the investigation (ah, that does make them seem the slow ones). Thanks.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Not to make things more confusing, but something I didn't know before, from Coleman's same chapter:

...Pan Am's counsel insisted that the Libyan/Air Malta theory, advanced by government and plaintiffs alike, rested on circumstantial evidence alone [...including...] that a schedule prepared by the Scottish police had matched every bag with a passenger except one, the unaccompanied bag containing the bomb.

Was this comparison made before or after one body was removed I wonder? I hadn't heard this - did they really identify every bag and passenger and found only one unaccompanied bag in the whole lot? That doesn't sound right.

ETA: Support for the Hubbard bag story, non-Mebo source, listed as "Lockerbie" by William Paul, from Scotland on Sunday, Aug 30 1998:

The route of the fatal suitcase bomb is a serious difficulty for the prosecution. The defence will pose many other alternatives, probably including the conspiracy theorists' favourite that a rogue CIA unit was allowing Lebanese and Syrian drug barons to send heroin through Frankfurt in return for their influence in gaining the release of the western hostages in Beirut. Terrorists knew about the 'protected consignments' and hijacked one delivery, replacing it with the bomb.
A much simpler option is that a suitcase belonging to Pan Am pilot John Hubbard was removed and replaced with the bomb. Hubbard had interlined two suitcases from Pakistan through Frankfurt en route for New York and finally his home city of Seattle, where he intended to spend Christmas. One bag was found on the ground at Lockerbie, the other arrived at Seattle 24 hours later having somehow been diverted to Hamburg. Besides, no baggage system is perfect. One bag found at Lockerbie was tagged to be on a different plane.

 

[Rolfe]

Not to make things more confusing, but something I didn't know before, from Coleman's same chapter:

Was this comparison made before or after one body was removed I wonder? I hadn't heard this - did they really identify every bag and passenger and found only one unaccompanied bag in the whole lot? That doesn't sound right.

There were quite a few unaccompanied bags on PA103 - Coleman mentions 12 or 13 Interline bags for a start. I think I saw the number 35 mentioned somewhere. I've never seen anything reliable about all the bags being matched to passengers, in fact it all seems quite confused. Pan Am's Frankfurt baggage system didn't really seem to know what was on the plane and what wasn't.

ETA: Support for the Hubbard bag story, non-Mebo source, listed as "Lockerbie" by William Paul, from Scotland on Sunday, Aug 30 1998:

That's funny, that was my regular Sunday paper at the time, and I don't remember seeing that. It was published at the end of August and it's likely I was on holiday in Switzerland at the time.

It's an interesting view, of course dating back to before Giaka was discredited but clearly foreshadowing that. And he's clear about why Tom Thurman didn't give evidence - he'd already been given the elbow for being involved in dodgy sexing-up of evidence.

I wonder why the Hubbard bag wasn't mentioned at the trial? Was the theory disproved for some reason, that the defence didn't raise it? I note that Coleman merely suggested that the orphan bag from station 206 was Hubbard's, but he seemed to be suggesting it was perfectly innocent. He of course has a different theory about the insertion of the bomb bag, involving these Turkish baggage handlers.

However, Paul's hypothesis is different. He points out that Hubbard had two bags, but one went astray and surfaced later having gone the scenic route, while the other was picked up at Lockerbie (full of Christmas presents). The suggestion is that the first bag was deliberately diverted so that the bomb bag could be put in its place.

I would have thought the answer to that might have been whether the original tags were still on the delayed case when it showed up - surely if it had been substituted in this way, the tags would have been taken off to use on the bomb bag? This, however, is not recorded. Also, if two "Hubbard" bags went through to PA103A (one real one and one substituted one), surely there would have been two orphan bags on the Erac printout?

Not sure about this, but isn't Coleman's suggestion more probable? That Hubbard's second bag just went AWOL as bags do, and the second one, quite legitimately being rush-tagged through to the USA, was introduced at station 206 while the KM180 bags were being coded?

There are several possibilities to explain the orphan bag, possibly a legitimate interline bag from a flight other than KM180, or a misrouted bag from just about anywhere, and the Hubbard bag theory - whether that's thought to be the bomb or a simple innnocent bag of Christmas presents.

Why did they convict Megrahi, again?

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

There were quite a few unaccompanied bags on PA103 - Coleman mentions 12 or 13 Interline bags for a start. I think I saw the number 35 mentioned somewhere. I've never seen anything reliable about all the bags being matched to passengers, in fact it all seems quite confused. Pan Am's Frankfurt baggage system didn't really seem to know what was on the plane and what wasn't.

Well apparently the police made a rigorous study, probably more for the press than anything, that there was one unaccompanied bag only, and its origin was of great importance, and then Frankfurt and yadda yadda...

That's funny, that was my regular Sunday paper at the time, and I don't remember seeing that. It was published at the end of August and it's likely I was on holiday in Switzerland at the time.

Switzerland, certainly, with a stop-over in Malta I presume, or Triploli.

It's an interesting view, of course dating back to before Giaka was discredited but clearly foreshadowing that. And he's clear about why Tom Thurman didn't give evidence - he'd already been given the elbow for being involved in dodgy sexing-up of evidence.

"Jiachi." Huh, third spelling I've seen for this much-rumored name. That's interesting. I wonder if Thurman wasn't let go in order to keep him out of that? Can you see the stern judges with their wigs grilling him "was it 2-4 days, Mr. Thurman, or "literally months"?"

However, Paul's hypothesis is different. He points out that Hubbard had two bags, but one went astray and surfaced later having gone the scenic route, while the other was picked up at Lockerbie (full of Christmas presents). The suggestion is that the first bag was deliberately diverted so that the bomb bag could be put in its place.

And as a new thought to me, it's compelling. Whatever it was in that item, this is a way to sidestep normal searches, it would seem.

I would have thought the answer to that might have been whether the original tags were still on the delayed case when it showed up - surely if it had been substituted in this way, the tags would have been taken off to use on the bomb bag? This, however, is not recorded. Also, if two "Hubbard" bags went through to PA103A (one real one and one substituted one), surely there would have been two orphan bags on the Erac printout?

That's a good question. I don't know tagging procedures, how secure, how easy to spot a fake - but it would need new tags to be "deliberately diverted" to a plane other than 103A, huh? Not sure about the printout - rush bags might have been dealt with outside the ssytem actually - I recall somewhere an exception to putting it through trays and stores if there was a big rush. Ah, here, para [26]

Transit baggage was taken to one of two areas, identified as V3 and HM respectively, where it was fed into the system at points known as coding stations. All baggage at the airport went through the automated system, with the exception of transit baggage when there was less than 45 minutes interval between flights. In that case, baggage might be taken from one aircraft to another without going through the system.

Also, I'm not sure anyone ever said there was only one unaccompanied item on there, just that this one was.

Not sure about this, but isn't Coleman's suggestion more probable? That Hubbard's second bag just went AWOL as bags do, and the second one, quite legitimately being rush-tagged through to the USA, was introduced at station 206 while the KM180 bags were being coded?

You know, I think I forgot that's where this started. I'm not sure right now what makes sense here.

There are several possibilities to explain the orphan bag, possibly a legitimate interline bag from a flight other than KM180, or a misrouted bag from just about anywhere, and the Hubbard bag theory - whether that's thought to be the bomb or a simple innnocent bag of Christmas presents.

Why did they convict Megrahi, again?

Rolfe.

What we're looking at here is all the how of course, not the why. That's why the whys keeps not appearing and how only the hows keep making sense.

However I still say that one stupid printout chose just that time for that item to enter right there does still imply KM180 a little better than I'm comfortable with. Airport people swore that normally time + station = flight no, as if they worked on that principle.

And whatever to make of it, doesn't the system being erased and the onlt record kept in one person's custody before enttering the investigation constitute one of those chain of evidence breakage incidents? Isn't this way more substantial than the fragment going to Virginia? Why aren't people demanding an explanation for this gaping hole on which the case really does depend?

What I'd like to find out if I had the hours to do so is figure out what would normally be expected of federal police in some cases similar to this - when do they normally go after records to help with the investigation? How distant does the connection have to before it's fir to just not even think about it? Etc... Cause this one doesn't smell right and I'd like if anyone could show me how that's just my feet.

 

[Guybrush Threepwood]

Why did they convict Megrahi, again?

Rolfe.

Because it would have been really, really, really embarrassing to have the whole Camp Zeist thing and let everybody off, and who cares if some Libyan spy gets banged up for a few years.

Seriously, that is pretty much a summary of my opinion on this.

 

[GlennB]

Why did they convict Megrahi, again?

Rolfe.

"Just consider the course of events if their [the Six's] action were to proceed to trial ... If the six men failed it would mean that much time and money and worry would have been expended by many people to no good purpose. If they won, it would mean that the police were guilty of perjury; that they were guilty of violence and threats; that the confessions were involuntary and improperly admitted in evidence; and that the convictions were erroneous. That would mean that the Home Secretary would have either to recommend that they be pardoned or to remit the case to the Court of Appeal. That was such an appalling vista that every sensible person would say, 'It cannot be right that these actions should go any further.' They should be struck out either on the ground that the men are estopped from challenging the decision of Mr. Justice Bridge, or alternatively that it is an abuse of the process of the court. Whichever it is, the actions should be stopped"

How's that for logic (or ... what Guybrush said, pretty much). "We're in this too deep. It's all too difficult. Let's put an end to it".

 

[Rolfe]

Because it would have been really, really, really embarrassing to have the whole Camp Zeist thing and let everybody off, and who cares if some Libyan spy gets banged up for a few years.

Seriously, that is pretty much a summary of my opinion on this.

+1

The judges have recently sworn they were put under no political pressure to convict. But of course that's not how it works. They would have been as embarrassed as anyone if the whole three-ring circus had been for nothing, if all these reports of "incontrovertible evidence" had been so much smoke and mirrors, if Libya had suffered 10 years of sanctions for nothing. Good grief, imagine if Gadaffi tried to sue or something, for the economic losses of these 10 years!

I think there was just enough circumstantial evidence to allow them to fool themselves into thinking it was a sound conviction. It was cognitive dissonance, I think, but they had as much at stake as anyone in the indictments being upheld.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Well apparently the police made a rigorous study, probably more for the press than anything, that there was one unaccompanied bag only, and its origin was of great importance, and then Frankfurt and yadda yadda...

I'd like to see a bit more detail about this. Do you have any references?

"Jiachi." Huh, third spelling I've seen for this much-rumored name.

They call him "Majid" as well, in a variety of spellings, as if it's a surname. Arabic doesn't transliterate well into the Roman alphabet, and most of these names are guesswork, especially at the start. Later, one spelling tends to become dominant and accepted. (Look at how many spellings of "Gadaffi" are littering the place!)

That's interesting. I wonder if Thurman wasn't let go in order to keep him out of that? Can you see the stern judges with their wigs grilling him "was it 2-4 days, Mr. Thurman, or "literally months"?"

Uh, no, I can't see it. These judges were bending over backwards to give maximum credibility to the prosecution evidence. I imagine he'd have got that story straight if he'd had to give evidence. Megrahi was the only one slated in court for lies he told to a journalist, as if lying to someone making a documentary proves you're a mass murderer.

And as a new thought to me, it's compelling. Whatever it was in that item, this is a way to sidestep normal searches, it would seem.

No, I don't think so. I think the Maier evidence is a bit of a killer to any theory that the orphan Erac bag was the bomb bag, wherever it came from. Remember, all luggage going on PA103A was x-rayed by Maier, and nobody slid anything round the side just because it was supposed to belong to a PA employee. The Erac bag would have been x-rayed. Maier was conscientious, and had been explicitly told to call a supervisor if he saw anything even remotely resembling a radio or radio-cassette recorder.

That's a good question. I don't know tagging procedures, how secure, how easy to spot a fake - but it would need new tags to be "deliberately diverted" to a plane other than 103A, huh? Not sure about the printout - rush bags might have been dealt with outside the ssytem actually - I recall somewhere an exception to putting it through trays and stores if there was a big rush. Ah, here, para [26]

Also, I'm not sure anyone ever said there was only one unaccompanied item on there, just that this one was.

No, the suggestion was that one of Hubbard's bags, rush-tagged for PA103, was snagged from the system. The tags were removed and put on the bomb bag, thus ensuring its passage through the system to PA103A. The snagged bag was just shunted off somewhere, say to store. How it would have got to its owner in Seattle without its tags, is one question. Possibly his normal luggage label, name and address, perhaps even an official PA employee permanent label, was used to send it home. Tags do simply come off sometimes. That's why we also label our luggage.

The problem here is that in this scenario Hubbard's two bags should both have shown up on the Erac printout - or maybe not I suppose, if the untampered one went a different way earlier, and it was only the tampered one that was slipped in at station 206 at the crucial time.

The other problem is that the bloody bag would have been x-rayed. Maier's evidence suggests that the bomb bag was inserted after the point when he x-rayed the luggage. He would have x-rayed the orphan Erac bag. Also, the rush bags that didn't go through the normal conveyor system would have been x-rayed too - this seems to have been SOP.

You know, I think I forgot that's where this started. I'm not sure right now what makes sense here.

I think the theory that the orphan Erac bag was simply something taking the scenic route through the system makes the best sense. Otherwise you have to contend with these facts.

• There is good evidence that no unaccompanied bag travelled on KM180
• There is good evidence that none of the KM180 passengers was any sort of mule or accomplice
• There is good evidence that no legitimate bag tagged for KM180 was left behind
• There is no evidence that anything loaded on KM180 was tagged for New York
• There is good evidence that everything coming through the baggage system on to PA103A was x-rayed by Maier
• There is good evidence that Maier did not see a radio-cassette player in any of these bags

This all argues against the "bag loaded at Luqa" theory, but it also argues against that "bomb bag inserted at station 206 at Frankfurt" theory.

I think if it was loaded at Frankfurt, this happened after Maier x-rayed the stuff. Or of course it happened at Heathrow.

However I still say that one stupid printout chose just that time for that item to enter right there does still imply KM180 a little better than I'm comfortable with. Airport people swore that normally time + station = flight no, as if they worked on that principle.

However, you have to acknowledge all the evidence that these worksheets were approximate at best. That the operators were paying attention to where the bags were going to, not where they had come from. That the Luqa luggage had been in transit for some time before it even got to station 206. That the time period in question could have encompassed a container from a Damascus flight as well as KM180. That baggage handling staff could and did just walk up to a coding station with a stray bag, code it, and walk off again.

The suggestion that the orphan bag really did come from Luqa (as opposed to having been inserted after the KM180 luggage was unloaded, or having come from another flight, or having been encoded singly at that station on a rush tag or something like that) is tenuous in the extreme. I'm not really sure why you're quite so wedded to it.

Compared to Bedford's evidence of an actual brown Samsonite sitting mysteriously in AVE4041 in almost exactly the place the bomb bag ended up, and not being x-rayed after that, it's thistledown.

And whatever to make of it, doesn't the system being erased and the onlt record kept in one person's custody before enttering the investigation constitute one of those chain of evidence breakage incidents? Isn't this way more substantial than the fragment going to Virginia? Why aren't people demanding an explanation for this gaping hole on which the case really does depend?

Well, Coleman's book suggested someone was fired for asking exactly that question....

What I'd like to find out if I had the hours to do so is figure out what would normally be expected of federal police in some cases similar to this - when do they normally go after records to help with the investigation? How distant does the connection have to before it's fir to just not even think about it? Etc... Cause this one doesn't smell right and I'd like if anyone could show me how that's just my feet.

I think it's fishy. I'm not necessarily convinced it's Semtex fishy though.

Remember, all the stuff about Frankfurt airport being the hub of a drug-smuggling route has never been refuted. All the refuting going on has been of the suggestion that the route was exploited to get the bomb bag on board. It has been suggested that the Frankfurt (and maybe Heathrow) authorities knew it was going on, and knew it was part of a US operation (remember, the hostages and Oliver North), and were turning a blind eye.

It's possible, if this is the case, that somebody's immediate reaction was a backside-covering one, to avoid preserving records if possible, for fear of what they might show. Either just the drug smuggling, or even that this might have been the way the bomb got on board. It doesn't need the latter actually to have happened to potentially get someone's knickers in a twist.

I agree, I'd still like to know a lot more about what was going on at Frankfurt. Conceivably, the backside-covering exercise actually led to the airport being implicated, when a fuller disclosure of the records might have shown nothing untoward.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I recall somewhere an exception to putting it through trays and stores if there was a big rush. Ah, here, para [26]

I don't think that's about "rush tags". Rush tags are for unaccompanied bags, usually bags that have been accidentally left behind from a flight and are being "rushed" to reunite them with their owners.

That quote is just about carrying bags round the electronic system and directly to a gate if there was a short turnaround between planes. I'm pretty sure both "rush tag" bags, and luggage being hurried to a gate so that it stays with its owner and doesn't get left behind, would have been x-rayed.

The one place x-raying doesn't seem to have happened is between PA103A and PA103. There was only a 20-minute turnround, and bags were unloaded on a "rocket" to be packed into AVE4041. I haven't seen any reference to an x-ray machine at that point - but I'm not certain about that. Can anybody say for sure?

The interline bags already in AVE4041 were x-rayed (most of them belonged to the CIA operatives who'd flown in earlier from Nicosia or somewhere). Bedford says Kamboj told him that he x-rayed the two mysterious suitcases. Kamboj later denied all memory of the conversation.

Given that Maier seems reliable, it really has to be an introduction after the Frankfurt x-ray screen, or the Bedford suitcase.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

All in all I'm apparently arguing just beyond my depths and need to get more acquainted with these finer points. On my adherence to 8849 being more than likely from KM180, I'd like to respond fully before the point slides into oblivion, but I'll have to put a little time into it, so perhaps not tonight. Again, I don't believe a bag DID come from that flight, but the points are both philosophical and technically relevant and worth explaining once in full. So, later...

 

[Rolfe]

I think there's stuff going into that other thread that's more appropriate here.

Lost CCTV tape "reveals true Lockerbie bomber"

A secret videotape exists of the moment the bomb that brought down Pan Am flight 103 was planted but has been “lost” by the authorities, it emerged yesterday.

The footage was shot by German intelligence at Frankfurt Airport and shows a baggage handler slipping a Samsonite suitcase rigged with explosives onto a luggage trolley. [usw]

This is right back to Coleman and the octopus.

Coleman's thesis, as I understand it, is that Jafaar was a drugs courier. Given his background, that seems highly probable. Next, though, Coleman asserts that he (and his entire poppy-growing family in the Bekaar valley) were CIA "assets". This was related to a DEA-approved drugs sting, whereby they sanctioned consignments of heroin coming into the USA through Frankfurt airport to New York and Detroit, so that they could track the shipments and pounce on the drug dealers at the other end. This is not wholly implausible.

Coleman then goes on to link all this to the Beirut hostages and North's "arms for hostages" deal, which also involved drugs for hostages. I have no idea how plausible this is, but given that "arms for hostages" is known to have happened, I suppose it can't be discounted.

The point is that these suitcases with drugs in them were being wafted past the Frankfurt x-ray machine somehow, so that Maier wouldn't have seen them. Coleman's contention is that this channel of insecurity was exploited by the bombers to get the bomb suitcase past the Frankfurt security system. He further seems to be alleging that the CIA knew about this, and didn't stop it. I'm not quite sure why, but it might have been about not wanting to blow certain agents' cover.

Coleman seems to build an awful lot of bricks with very little straw. Some of his strongest evidence (he thinks) comes from polygraph examinations of the Frankfurt baggage handlers. And we all know how reliable polygraph testing is!

Nevertheless, the existence of such a drugs route through Frankfurt and its possible security (and public relations) implications might be enough to explain the disappearing baggage records, even if the bomb actually went on at Heathrow.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I think there's stuff going into that other thread that's more appropriate here.

Lost CCTV tape "reveals true Lockerbie bomber"

You're right, it does fit here. An excerpt:

“The video shows a baggage handler called Roland O’Neill,” said Mr Aviv. “He picks up the suitcase and realises it is heavier than usual. He goes to the phone and makes a call.

“Then he takes the case and puts it on the trolley. All the phones were tapped, so I also had a tape of the phone call.

“O’Neill called the CIA guy at the embassy in Bonn. He said, ‘This is O’Neill, I have the suitcase but it is much heavier than usual’. The CIA guy says, ‘Yes, we know, let it go’.”

First it's highly dubious a bomb bag would weigh more than a heroin-filled one, probably less. Perhaps he's implying it was actually a different, heavier bomb than is officially promulgated. Whatever the case, it's presented next to the image him actually sitting in some room watching this hidden video, with the secret wiretap audio, and these two guys having just this revealing conversation. And he's the "take it to the media just don't bring proof" guy anyway, so hidden this crap would not be.

My opinion of Mr. Aviv just went up. He's being quite helpful with this new phase, being very up front and clear about his intentions so we can all just happily ignore and keep moving. However, since a guy was specifically named - unusual specificity - don't be surprised if he surfaces and 'verifies' that's just what happened. Also maybe that won't happen, I dunno.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm not discounting a loading in Frankfurt. It's just that Bedford's evidence is so difficult to ignore and that really places it at Heathrow.

However, if we try to set Bedford aside for a minute, then actually, the only sense I can make of the MST-13 timer (assuming it's genuine) involves a Frankfurt loading, one way or another.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

So we all agree there's plenty reason to believe Air Malta's findings that they had no spare bags on KM180 to give to PA103, terribly sorry. But i'm playing devil's advocate here and making sure the other side is covered. There is some kind of evidence for and possibility there WAS another bag, and it was transferred. As evidence this is A possibility, the investigation, prosecution, and conviction all took it as THE ONLY possibility.

It's a weak counter-point, I acknowledge. To explain it I'll give the floor to our good friend Vince C, speaking in 1997 to Frontline Scotland.

They [Air Malta] have vindicated themselves on paper in terms of the security procedures, but if their security personnel are suborned by hostile intelligence service, and they are completely vulnerable to whatever that hostile service would want to put on their aircraft, with baggage tags, without baggage tags. Once you have basically infiltrated the security apparatus there is no barrier to doing exactly what Fhimah and Megrahi did.

So sure they'll SAY there were only the 55 bags, but maybe they was SUBORNED by Libya to say that. Malta's close, you know, and Libya's evil. Just wait til you hear Jeeahkaaa!

Now, the reason they're so sure is that printout that clearly shows such a transfer of some extra bag from KM180 right through the system...

There are certainly problems with reading this just like this that have been pointed out. Most vividly that 1989 FBI telex where they SAW someone put another bag from another source in at statioon 206 without making any note, so it would appear connected to another flight's codng, or to no flight at all (depending).

we start out accepting Air Malta and Luqa Airport's word - at Frankfurt obviously things are different, but their overseer of baggage arrival at V3, Andreas Schreinrer, told the court, as they put it, coding “would generally begin three to five minutes after the arrival of the baggage at V3,” which lines up with the records - one wagon from 180 arrived at 1301 and started coding at 1304. He also told the judges that “luggage was always delivered from one flight only” at any given time.

Now we know this can't always be literally true, as the same station was witnessed no living up to the MO (FBI telex October 89) But according to this guy, it was their imperfect, partly reliable, standard MO and so the court felt comfortable accepting that station 206 at 1307 more than likely meant KM180 baggage, given other clues.

I'd really like to see the daily transcripts where they asked any questions about the broken chain of evidence around the printout on which this is all based. They felt it was acceptable and its clue was too much to be coincidence. I agree with the latter but not the former.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I'm not discounting a loading in Frankfurt. It's just that Bedford's evidence is so difficult to ignore and that really places it at Heathrow.

However, if we try to set Bedford aside for a minute, then actually, the only sense I can make of the MST-13 timer (assuming it's genuine) involves a Frankfurt loading, one way or another.

Rolfe.

I'm leaning towards Heathrow, with or without Bedford's story, OR the break-in, both of which are just stories to me so far. It's either a Khreesat bomb loaded there, or some fakery achieved from anywhere with a timer to fake that, or an unacceptable coincidence.

ETA: I know it's not really that simple, but I've been letting it all get too complicated for my limited human mind. Pulling back a little.

On timers and altimeters. it's probably an irrelevant confusion of rporting, but an old NYT article says

Scottish and American investigators have concluded that the recovered portion is identical to 10 timers that were seized from two Libyan intelligence agents in the West African nation of Senegal in February 1988, 10 months before the Pan Am bombing.

According to accounts in the French press in 1988 that were confirmed by American officials, the Libyan detonators seized in Senegal differ fundamentally from those used by Mr. Jibril's Popular Front in West Germany.

The Popular Front detonators include both a timer and an altimeter, insuring that a bomb will not explode until after an aircraft has flown for a predetermined time at a specific altitude. The less sophisticated Libyan detonators have only a timer.

http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/10/world/libya-now-linked-to-pan-am-blast.html?pagewanted=all

Also a bit I just noticed there:

One American official said today that Mr. Marzouk and Mr. Saber apparently were freed after Libyan agents ''suborned'' unnamed Senegalese bureaucrats.

Wonder who said that?

 

[Rolfe]

Well, I think Bedford and the break-in go together. The break-in would be how the case got airside to be seen by Bedford. Both matters have been tested in court, so they're more than stories.

There's stuff somewhere about Hayes having said that he thought there was an altimeter as well as a timer on the Lockerbie bomb, but they just didn't find any surviving bits of altimeter. I can see why he thought that, the 7pm explosion is just insane without an altimeter in the system.

I wonder where that pervasive meme came from that the plane was late, and the explosion "should" have happened over the Atlantic? It wasn't late.

PA103A was late, and only got to Heathrow at 5.40pm. PA103 was supposed to leave at 6pm. This only allowed 20 minutes for turnround. The Frankfurt bags (which had been loose-loaded) were unloaded on a "rocket" to get them into AVE4041 ASAP and on to the Jumbo. I wonder if they would have been x-rayed as routine if the turnround hadn't been so fast? As it was, they just trusted to the Frankfurt security, and that nobody would be able to tamper with any of the luggage in that rushed 20-minute changeover.

In spite of all this, PA103 pushed off from the gate at a minute or so past six. That's on time, people! It was delayed for a little while on the tarmac, but it usually takes a little while from leaving the gate to getting airborne anyway. That plane was as near on time as makes no real difference - ten minutes behind, maybe.

So I suppose it was possible for a timer-only device to be set to mimic a Khreesat device, in the hope that the plane wasn't late. But first, what a ridiculous chance to take, that a plane wouldn't be later leaving Heathrow! And second, who knew about Khreesat's devices at that point? Hardly anyone, that's who.

Other "conicidence" theories seem far-fetched. The radio frequency from Air Traffic Control set something off - at exactly 38 minutes. The real target of the bomb was another plane that was way out over the Atlantic at 7pm - and it's pure coincidence that the bomb was mis-loaded onto a plane that just happened to take off 38 minutes before that time.

The only sense I can make of the MST-13 is that Jibril's group used it to prevent detonation on the PA103A leg, and for some reason they weren't interested in further refining the modus operandi to try for a mid-Atlantic explosion, preferring simply to let the original ice-cube device take over at Heathrow. Even there, though, the short fuse seems to be problematic. If PA103A had been half an hour later than it was, again a ground-level explosion might have been the result.

And if that's how it was done, how do you explain Bedford's story?

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm moving some of this post by Buncrana, because I think it fits better here.

It seems impossible to provide a plausible way for Megrahi, or anyone for that matter, to have introduced an unaccompanied bag at Luqa Airport on Dec 21 1988. Both the airport and the airline Air Malta would appear to have provided, and to those with expert knowledge on how these airline and baggage systems operate, irrefutable documentation showing it was virtually impossible for a bag to be inserted, and indeed the records of KM180 completely support this conclusion in respect of their passenger and baggage reconciliation on that day. Given this, if there are no arguments to what has been probed and concluded on these threads, then that puts Megrahi, although not necessarily Libya, out of the frame altogether in relation to the charges alleged by the US and UK authorities for his part in the bombing of flight 103.

There is some evidence that unaccompanied bag(s) were loaded onto PanAm 103a in Frankfurt, possible through various means, although it appears from the arguments of the prosecution that, the rogue bag that appears at the station assigned to collect baggage from the Malta flight, had to be the bomb bag. As has been demonstrated on here, that is simply not the case.

The distinct, and lets be honest, questionable lack of official records for Frankfurt handling of baggage, by virtue leaves me highly suspicious of the Erac printout, the reasons for it's initial retainment, and it's subsequently major significance in somehow linking origination of the bomb with the Air Malta flight despite the far more incontrovertible evidence that was made available from the very beginning by Air Malta and Luqa airport authorities. The fact that if indeed the bomb suitcase was introduced either from the KM180 flight, or inserted at the coding station where the baggage arrived from Malta, also ignores the security measures that bag would need to negotiate through the Frankfurt system, where although discrepancies are found in their baggage reconciliation with passengers, their baggage system operators did x-ray all baggage loaded onto PA103a. In addition, the warnings that had been issued and the exposing of the PLFP cell just outside Frankfurt and their Toshiba bombs containing barometric timers, would surely have resulted in a step-up in security around German Airports, especially the baggage areas with the x-ray examiners forewarned about the possible Toshiba Radio disguise.

Perhaps, as has been suggested by a few, there were covert activities in operation at Frankfurt involving 'controlled drug deliveries' and therefore disclosure of all relevant records could have exposed illegal surreptitious operations which could be highly damaging to the US, UK and German governments. To expect that these kinds of covert activities are not operated at State level is unrealistic. The theory of the 'drugs for hostages' deals and the integral part played by Frankfurt and Heathrow put forward by Aviv, Coleman and Francovich is one which carries immeasurable rewards, but clearly also inherently very grave risks for all those involved. I would not completely rule out the possibility of ingestion of the suitcase containing the bomb at Frankfurt, but on the balance of what is known, I tend to think Heathrow the more likely.

The poor security and baggage reconciliation at Heathrow was ably shown by the story given to the court by Bedford and Kamboj, the baggage handlers at Heathrow loading luggage onto 103. Despite Bedfords claim of two suitcases, unknown to him, were placed in the container from which the bomb exploded, and that had been left unguarded at the PanAm gate, the judges then provided novel interpretations of how the bags Bedford viewed could not be the bomb simply because of extraneous positioning claims, when the most patent evidence that a rogue samsonite suitcase had been introduced at Heathrow was compelling.

The break-in at Heathrow, at the PanAm gate no-less, reported so soon after it occurred by Ray Manley, seems to have been simply cast aside by the police who recorded it. This despite a PanAm plane being blown out of the sky later that same day. Even more disturbingly, it seems there was a concerted effort to conceal this breach of security until it finally became known only at the first appeal by Megrahi in 2002. Why on earth would information like that be suppressed? It becomes even more perturbing given what we now know of the, in comparison, scant evidence pertaining to security at Luqa and with Air Malta. Great effort has seemingly been made to either conceal or divert any attention away from the more substantial and significant areas of evidence which exist at Heathrow and Frankfurt in favour of the more fanciful and indeed preposterous notions as laid out by the prosecution case that Luqa Airport, and therefore Megrahi, were instrumental in the bombing of flight 103.

Perhaps, if there was a 'controlled delivery' in operation incorporating the DEA (under the auspices of the CIA), the German BKA and British MI6 on 21 dec, using Frankfurt and Heathrow Airport, then we have good reason for those agencies to steer the investigation away from those areas. Better still, the loss of all records and any evidence which does come to light is either ignored, or if possible must point the investigators in another direction entirely? Perhaps the first assumption made was that the attack on 103 had utilised the controlled delivery to insert a bomb? My own thoughts have drifted towards two operations (the drug sting and the attack on 103) as entirely separate. The covert operation happening from Frankfurt, while the bomb suitcase was inserted at Heathrow. Perhaps with the knowledge of a covert drug operation, any group wanting to bring down an Airline, would know to inflict their attack during this operation would present any government or investigators with a real dilemma?

The loss of documentation from Frankfurt obscures any real conclusive evidence of anything untoward, or legitimate, taking place at that airport, while the suppression of the break-in and the apparent gaping holes in security at Heathrow together with the Bedford suitcase are just quietly (hopefully) and discreetly ignored as though not noteworthy far less worth further investigation? Given the intelligence on Khreesat's devices, and the public knowledge that the BKA had simply released the 'caught red-handed' bomb-maker Khreesat back to Jordan, it would be imperative that any evidence discovered and any investigation instigated, should not be allowed to dig too far into this - for it would be absolutely obvious to everyone that this would be the most likely course of inquiry and Khreesat the clear suspect - and would be the first focus of any investigation.

Thank you for this post, Buncrana. I'm tending very much to the same way of thinking.

The evidence is as conclusive as it can reasonably be that no rogue bag arrived on KM180. If the Erac printout really does show a rogue bag going through station 206, it would appear to have been introduced there. And even if that was the case, we have no certainty that it was the bomb bag. In fact, we have an indication that it wasn't, if I'm right in believing that Maier x-rayed that bag and saw no radio-cassette player.

Alternatively, the orphan bag on the printout could have been something quite innocuous that was mis-routed within the system. The clerk who coded the bags at station 206 was not called to give evidence, even to interpret his own handwriting, so could not be asked about the possibility of a bag or bags coming though from other flights while he was coding KM180. I don't know why the question of Hubbard's unaccompanied bag wasn't brought up in the trial - as far as I can see, that was found at Lockerbie and its route on to PA103 never established. Why wasn't that the orphan 206 bag?

The suspicions about the sanctioned drugs route through Frankfurt provide probably the most reasonable explanation for the vanishing Frankfurt luggage records that we're likely to get. This being true would also explain the attempts to suppress The Maltese Double Cross. Francovich doesn't have to be right about the route being hijacked to get the bomb on board for this to work. And indeed, smuggling a bomb on to a plane being used in this way by another route would be a very good way of confounding an official investigation. Anybody think Jibril didn't know about such drug smuggling if it was going on? And given that Khreesat was a CIA asset and working for Jordanian intelligence, if the drug route was officially sanctioned, he'd know that too, in all probability.

And finally, I'm coming round a little more to Caustic Logic's suspicion of Mrs. Erac and her printout. I have to confess I'm slightly influenced by Coleman here. Yes, it's possible she's genuine and it's pure coincidence that when she came forward, there happened to be a bag indicated that seemed to point to Malta. However, Coleman's take is interesting. He is suspicious of the printout, and also of Gauci's highly convenient memory of this extremely weird clothes purchase. He sees these two developments as being the inception of the switch to Libya as culprit.

His suspicions may be unfounded of course, but the way he described it got me thinking. If he's right, all that was given to the investigators by the Frankfurt police was the printout, and two worksheets.

What was needed to divert attention away from Frankfurt into politically safer channels was some 'new' evidence, preferably linked to the hard forensic evidence that had already been established and which, by association, would lend credibility to it. And as the police officers engaged in the field investigation could not be counted upon to cooperate in a political fix, that evidence had to be 'found' in a plausible way, even at the cost of further inter-agency bickering.

On 17 August 1989, eight months after the disaster, Chief Detective Superintendent John Orr received from the BKA what was said to be a computer print-out of the baggage-loading list for Pan Am Flight 103A from Frankfurt to London on the afternoon of 21 December 1988. Attached to this were two internal reports, dated 2 February 1989, describing the inquiries that BKA officers had made about the baggage-handling system at the airport. Also provided were two worksheets, one typewritten, the other handwritten, that were said to have been prepared on 21 December by airport workers at key points on the conveyor-belt network.

In the margin of the computer print-out, a penciled cross drew particular attention to bag number B8849 - that is the 8849th bag to be logged into the computerized system at Terminal B that day. By reference to the worksheets, B8849 could be shown to have arrived in Frankfurt by a scheduled Air Malta flight from Luqa airport and to have been 'interlined' through to Flight 103. But neither the Air Malta nor the Pan Am passenger lists showed anybody who had booked a through flight from Luqa to New York that day. In other words, bag B8849 had arrived from Malta unaccompanied but tagged for New York and had been loaded aboard Flight 103 without being matched with a passenger.

If that's all that has to fit together, surely it's not at all impossible to have fabricated the lot? Or to have secured the worksheets at the time, and fabricated the printout later? This account strongly implicates the Frankfurt police in this, which would be consistent with official sanction of a cover-up of a known illegal smuggling operation.

Originally, Mrs. Erac was anonymous, identity protected. Her story is odd, and it does seem to change from one telling to another. Who is she? How to the cops organise this sort of operation anyway? And this was an extraordinary time in Germany anyway. Surely everyone remembers what was going on there in the summer of 1989, culminating in the fall of the Wall at the end of the year. We're never going to find this one out for sure, but yes, it's possible.

I just wish I knew what to make of the timer fragment, if we're heading for a Heathrow introduction.

Rolfe.