Iran Nuclear Agreement

[Dr Adequate]

Red herrings.

Oh, don't you start.

 

[Doctor Evil]

They give up the pretense to their people that the forces opposing their regime can't be dealt with. That would be a huge blow to the hardliner rhetoric. Also, with this deal they'd give up enough, and the important thing is that they won't be able to make sufficient fuel for a bomb.

I am not convinced on that. Such a deal can be presented as a getting help from outside, without giving any of their rights (to enrich Uranium).

And again, you repetition that they are giving up so much fuel so that they wont be able to make a bomb is at odds with the estimates I saw. All they give up is time, and only a year or two, at the expense of removing most of the external pressure.

You didn't, but I offered three possibilities with the hope that you could clarify what you do think is going to work? The "invasion regime change" has been a mixed bag, to say the least, and our "shake heads and cluck tongues" method (N. Korea) has done about jack toward stopping the bomb. If we're going to try diplomacy, it's going to lead inexorably to negotiations. This isn't going to be pleasant for those who equate negotiation with capitulation. Do you make such an equation?

You use both carrots (diplomacy) and sticks (sanctions). But you either go for one comprehensive deal or no deal at all. You do not suggest a half deal, which is not that substantial. That would only take away the pressure, without actually solving anything.

This is wrong on so many levels, and it seems you do make the equation that negotiation is capitulation and is out of the question. I would agree that the having the current regime out of power of ceasing its extremist support is the ultimate goal, but why does it all have to happen in one fell swoop?

No, I do not. But I do assume that if the Iranian regime has determined that certain policies, including the development of nuclear weapons and support of extremists abroad, are worth pursuing, they did not do so at the spur of the moment. Both are many-year projects which are expensive and carry a large political price abroad. From this I deduce that the Iranian leadership see these as very important, possibly crucial to their country.

Assuming they would give up long range, expensive, projects just because the rest of the world would play nice is embarrassingly naive. It is not impossible to change the course of a country, but the pressures and incentives should have more weight than the weight that the Iranian leadership gives these projects, which happen to be very high.

What I expect is that this deal will be approved, and that would be it. There will be further talks, but without a threat of sanctions there would be no further progress. And, after a year or two Iran would enrich enough Uranium to surpass the level it has now.

 

[Aggie Boy]

so Iran wants to buy urnaium that his higlyy enriched (higher than just used for electricity) Suspicious

 

[Aggie Boy]

If they truly wanted it for electrical purposes then this deal would have been fine.

 

[GreNME]

Fact: The US does not have a longstanding policy of talking crap about its neighbors. Iran does. Therefore it is not hubris to reject claims of such a policy as a basis for dismantling the US nuclear stockpile, while simultaneously considering such claims as a basis for prohibiting an Iranian nuclear stockpile.

Such claims might be weak for other reasons, but they're not actually hubris.

I'll confess to and repent of any hubris you convict me of. But first you have to actually convict me of hubris. And that means using it correctly in a sentence.

I think what you meant to use here was "hypocrisy", but since the US doesn't talk crap about its neighbors the way Iran does, there's nothing hypocritical in taking Iran to task for talking crap about its neighbors but not doing the same for the US.

Just because you wish to narrowly define the parameters of what I was talking about does not mean I have to play that silly game. You went for the low-hanging fruit, and now you're going to have to dig yourself out of it.

Since we're specifically comparing the US and Iran, why would you assume any different? But I'm glad to see that you agree with me regarding policy towards Iran.

I don't see where the current proposed deal with Iran only involves the US and Iran, especially considering Russia and France are being included as parameters of the deal.

Red herrings. This is a thread about policy towards Iran. You want to talk about Pakistan, India, Israel, or Russia, start your own thread.

You should really check the OP, because I started this thread. Don't try to hijack the thread I started. This thread is about the proposed deal with Iran and its implications. Just because you want this to be a head-butting match between the US and Iran only doesn't automagically make it so. Still think I'm using hubris incorrectly?

That said, I will make a few remarks. First, it's a lot harder to disarm a nuclear power than to prevent them from becoming one. Russia became a nuclear power during a period when nobody in the world was in a position to stop them. I wish it weren't so, but what's done is done. Having seen Russia slip through our grasp, why should we allow Iran to do the same, when we have the power to prevent it?

Second, if I were to make a list of nations that should not acquire nuclear weapons, or should give up the ones they already have, every nation on the world would be on it. And if I were to order the nations on the list by priority; putting those I believed required the most urgent attention, the most forceful action, and the greatest immediate expenditure of resources, I would rank Iran and North Korea much higher on the list than Pakistan, India, Russia, and Israel, and I would rank the US much lower.

Excuses, excuses. What do you think your attempts to qualify your statement are showing with regard to absolutism in policy? The reality is that saying "I don't want such-and-such to have nukes" just isn't good enough in the realm of world politics, and for a change the US is actually working toward a resolution-- reducing the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran-- by making use of less absolutist policy. All you're doing is complaining that this is so and using "they support turriss" as your justification. If the world were that simple and absolute this planet would have been a cinder decades ago.

I'm not entirely sure how your own list would be ordered, but I get the impression that you would find the idea of such a list offensive, and that you would consider it "hubris" (for some definition of the word, YMMV), for anyone to place Iran higher on it than the US. Is this true?

You should stop building strawman versions of people holding opposing positions. I don't want Iran waving a nuclear weapon around.

I assure you I'm arguing in good faith, to the best of my knowledge.

And I'm quite serious: It seems like you desire to level the nuclear playing field between the US and Iran (i.e., that Iran should have more nukes and the US less). Is this true? If so, why?

If it's not true, could you clarify your preferred policy regarding a potential Iranian arsenal?

I've been sufficiently clear. Playing "why do you hate America" cards just makes you look like you have a severe lack of tools (and understanding) for addressing the topic.

 

[GreNME]

They give up the pretense to their people that the forces opposing their regime can't be dealt with. That would be a huge blow to the hardliner rhetoric. Also, with this deal they'd give up enough, and the important thing is that they won't be able to make sufficient fuel for a bomb.

I am not convinced on that. Such a deal can be presented as a getting help from outside, without giving any of their rights (to enrich Uranium).

And again, you repetition that they are giving up so much fuel so that they wont be able to make a bomb is at odds with the estimates I saw. All they give up is time, and only a year or two, at the expense of removing most of the external pressure.

Show me the source of your estimates, and if possible explain to me how those estimates aren't almost complete speculation. You see, "enriched uranium" isn't the fuel needed to make the bomb, it requires an especially highly-enriched specific type of uranium (or plutonium) to make a bomb. It's obviously not impossible to do, but it requires a level of resources that has yet to be displayed in Iran as of yet.

You use both carrots (diplomacy) and sticks (sanctions). But you either go for one comprehensive deal or no deal at all. You do not suggest a half deal, which is not that substantial. That would only take away the pressure, without actually solving anything.

That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.

This is wrong on so many levels, and it seems you do make the equation that negotiation is capitulation and is out of the question. I would agree that the having the current regime out of power of ceasing its extremist support is the ultimate goal, but why does it all have to happen in one fell swoop?

No, I do not. But I do assume that if the Iranian regime has determined that certain policies, including the development of nuclear weapons and support of extremists abroad, are worth pursuing, they did not do so at the spur of the moment. Both are many-year projects which are expensive and carry a large political price abroad. From this I deduce that the Iranian leadership see these as very important, possibly crucial to their country.

Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.

Assuming they would give up long range, expensive, projects just because the rest of the world would play nice is embarrassingly naive. It is not impossible to change the course of a country, but the pressures and incentives should have more weight than the weight that the Iranian leadership gives these projects, which happen to be very high.

I'm not disagreeing with the idea you're presenting here. In fact, believe it or not, this is how I feel as well. I'm simply of the opinion that moving forward with this agreement or one like it will bring us (outside of Iran) closer to achieving the goals of both keeping a nuke out of Iran and removing a huge political tool used by the hardline regime. I have a secondary hope that it would give the moderate factions in Iran leverage toward gathering more support.

What I expect is that this deal will be approved, and that would be it. There will be further talks, but without a threat of sanctions there would be no further progress. And, after a year or two Iran would enrich enough Uranium to surpass the level it has now.

I don't want to get into a scientific discussion of what it takes to make sufficient nuclear material to create a nuclear bomb, but again I have to point out that what is already shown to be known of the Iranian capabilities this just isn't so, and would actually be more achievable if Iran holds on to 100% of the material they have in their possession as opposed to having a large portion of it shipped off for manufacturing into power plant rods and medical materials (which can't be put into dual-use without obvious steps that would break the agreement).

 

[Doctor Evil]

Show me the source of your estimates, and if possible explain to me how those estimates aren't almost complete speculation. You see, "enriched uranium" isn't the fuel needed to make the bomb, it requires an especially highly-enriched specific type of uranium (or plutonium) to make a bomb. It's obviously not impossible to do, but it requires a level of resources that has yet to be displayed in Iran as of yet.

I gave a link to a bbc article earlier in this thread, and have seen it repeated in other places. I have no access to detailed information. In any case, any such estimate would be speculative, but not as much as more complicated estimates, such as the time it would take them to manufacture a bomb.

Saying that, I don't understand why you saw the need to include the discussion about enriched uranium here. Maybe you still do not follow what this estimate is about, so I will repeat this again. It is just an estimate for the time it would take Iran to enrich natural uranium, at a quantity equal to the one they give up, to the same (low) enrichment level. This is what they are giving up in this proposed deal. Now, this seems to me something that would be possible to estimate based on the knowledge on their current enrichment ability.

Again, I have no special knowledge, and have not seen any detailed analysis yet. But, this kind of estimate seems to be easy to do and reliable. I see no reason to doubt it that much.

That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.

It failed with North Korea, but worked with Libya. It may or may not work here, but this proposed deal would, in my opinion, turn out be worse, it would take out most of the incentives without solving anything.

Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.

I do not know what that's even supposed to mean. Lets try to make this more concrete. What steps to you think should be taken, by both sides, and why do you think the Iranian would go along? What exactly would convince Iran to abandon expensive projects which it sees as crucial interests?

I don't want to get into a scientific discussion of what it takes to make sufficient nuclear material to create a nuclear bomb, but again I have to point out that what is already shown to be known of the Iranian capabilities this just isn't so, and would actually be more achievable if Iran holds on to 100% of the material they have in their possession as opposed to having a large portion of it shipped off for manufacturing into power plant rods and medical materials (which can't be put into dual-use without obvious steps that would break the agreement).

Not much known, because the IAEA supervision has always been inefficient. We do know about one enrichment plant. Oh, make that two, with this new one a Qom (which is not operative yet.) This can serve as a basis for an estimate on their ability to enrich uranium and replace the one they would give away.

 

[GreNME]

I gave a link to a bbc article earlier in this thread, and have seen it repeated in other places. I have no access to detailed information. In any case, any such estimate would be speculative, but not as much as more complicated estimates, such as the time it would take them to manufacture a bomb.

Saying that, I don't understand why you saw the need to include the discussion about enriched uranium here. Maybe you still do not follow what this estimate is about, so I will repeat this again. It is just an estimate for the time it would take Iran to enrich natural uranium, at a quantity equal to the one they give up, to the same (low) enrichment level. This is what they are giving up in this proposed deal. Now, this seems to me something that would be possible to estimate based on the knowledge on their current enrichment ability.

Again, I have no special knowledge, and have not seen any detailed analysis yet. But, this kind of estimate seems to be easy to do and reliable. I see no reason to doubt it that much.

With all due respect, it's also an estimate that's easy to repeat over and over in order to inject it into the public discourse as if it were fact. That, in and of itself, makes it suspect to me and any time I attempt to get more quantification on the matter the available information as to its certainty goes around in circles. I'm not trying to put you specifically on the hot-seat on this point, but I'm underscoring the completely unverified nature of this claim that is often used as a fact.

That's preposterous, and in no way indicative of international diplomacy except for the obviously-failed attempt with North Korea-- who now has the bomb. If the goal is to keep the bomb out of Iran's grasp, then demonstrably a "everything or no deal" approach is the wrong way to go.

It failed with North Korea, but worked with Libya. It may or may not work here, but this proposed deal would, in my opinion, turn out be worse, it would take out most of the incentives without solving anything.

But it didn't work with Libya. Libya never had anything close to Iran's capabilities or resources, let alone those North Korea had-- which Iran does not, by the way... it's a simpler process to get plutonium up to a weaponized level, and Iran is dealing with uranium.

Do you not think that Iran hasn't given any consideration to the idea that the US, the UN, and much of the rest of the world has determined a set of goals they're pursuing toward Iran, and consider their goals at least equally as crucial as Iran considers their own? Come on, this is precisely what diplomacy is about-- creating a foundation on which to build as mutually beneficial an agreement as possible while each is still allowing the other to come away feeling they're ahead. It's not going to happen in a single set of negotiations, and the idea that it would or should sets itself up for disappointment.

I do not know what that's even supposed to mean. Lets try to make this more concrete. What steps to you think should be taken, by both sides, and why do you think the Iranian would go along? What exactly would convince Iran to abandon expensive projects which it sees as crucial interests?

I think that success isn't going to come by expecting both sides to follow a strict script of steps to take along the process. That's inviting failure from the outset. With a regime like Iran, the primary goal is to get them to the table first, then start working forward with getting agreements on steps toward a more amenable interaction between Iran and the rest of the world. As has been the case with Russia, this doesn't mean success on all factors, and not all at once.

Not much known, because the IAEA supervision has always been inefficient. We do know about one enrichment plant. Oh, make that two, with this new one a Qom (which is not operative yet.) This can serve as a basis for an estimate on their ability to enrich uranium and replace the one they would give away.

The Qom installation wasn't new news. It just hadn't come into play as a political tool yet until we heard about it. And when it came up it was used fairly effectively on the part of the US. And while by "effectively" I don't mean it stopped Iran from working on it, I do mean that it showed them that they're not dealing with Western powers who are just playing in blind rhetoric toward their own intentionally provocative nonsense. However, even both of the facilities in question wouldn't have been able to enrich the uranium to weapons-grade levels, this much is also known. I've heard rumblings that Iran may have shopped around for nations who could enrich the uranium to that quality for them, and while I wouldn't doubt that story (which, whether credible in fact or not is certainly credible in motivation for Iran's leadership) I do have reservations that any current nuclear power is willing to take that kind of gamble for as little return as Iran could offer, with the exception of North Korea (but I've pointed out their reliance on a plutonium-powered bomb).

One factor that seems to rarely come into play when assessing the political approach toward Iran is that its power structure has been teetering on the edge of faltering since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad, which was followed by protests by citizens and political figures practically on the level of this year's re-election of the Ahmadi regime. Strategically, the rest of the world stands a better chance of seeing Ahmadi regime, which has been a huge boon to the hardliners in Iranian politics, get taken mostly out of power by taking their argument about wanting only nuclear power (and medical use) for their program to the negotiating table on its own face value. If they try to get out of that-- which it's predictable they will-- while the rest of the world is taking the stance that they (the world) are willing to accept a good faith gesture, then the Iranian regime's lack of acceptance of the good faith is going to backlash internally and cost them political capital domestically. This has already been the case with regard to the Iranian economy, which very nearly cost Ahmadi the election this year, and in the meantime between now and the next Iranian presidential election there will be parliamentary elections where hardliners stand a chance of defeat to the moderates if their stances continue to cost Iran as a nation the ability to improve itself domestically and attain some better standing on the world stage internationally. It's a long game, but it's one that's been played to pretty positive results with regard to China and despite a few hiccups has played fairly well with Russia. Going into talks with only a set of non-negotiable terms would not only hamper such a long game with Iran, it would guarantee its failure.

 

[Doctor Evil]

With all due respect, it's also an estimate that's easy to repeat over and over in order to inject it into the public discourse as if it were fact. That, in and of itself, makes it suspect to me and any time I attempt to get more quantification on the matter the available information as to its certainty goes around in circles. I'm not trying to put you specifically on the hot-seat on this point, but I'm underscoring the completely unverified nature of this claim that is often used as a fact.

Huh? It is not that hard to figure that it is in the correct ballpark. Iran has enriched its Uranium for how long? Say six years now. During this time, they added more and more centrifuges, and thus their capacity has risen considerably. Considering that, I do not find it surprising that it would take them a year or two to enrich 75% of their quantity to the same low level.

But it didn't work with Libya. Libya never had anything close to Iran's capabilities or resources, let alone those North Korea had-- which Iran does not, by the way... it's a simpler process to get plutonium up to a weaponized level, and Iran is dealing with uranium.

Libya gave up a nuclear program, meaning that the pressures worked. I do not see how the rest is relevant to the point.

I think that success isn't going to come by expecting both sides to follow a strict script of steps to take along the process. That's inviting failure from the outset. With a regime like Iran, the primary goal is to get them to the table first, then start working forward with getting agreements on steps toward a more amenable interaction between Iran and the rest of the world. As has been the case with Russia, this doesn't mean success on all factors, and not all at once.

I fail to see how are you suggesting to convince Iran that perusing nuclear weapons, a strategic goal which they have invested a lot of resources in, should be abandoned. Under your suggested approach they would just take what is offered and give away very little in return, without giving up that goal. In fact, your approach will effectively ensure that Iran do manage to make the last few technological steps needed for them to obtain nuclear weapons.

The Qom installation wasn't new news. It just hadn't come into play as a political tool yet until we heard about it. And when it came up it was used fairly effectively on the part of the US. And while by "effectively" I don't mean it stopped Iran from working on it, I do mean that it showed them that they're not dealing with Western powers who are just playing in blind rhetoric toward their own intentionally provocative nonsense. However, even both of the facilities in question wouldn't have been able to enrich the uranium to weapons-grade levels, this much is also known. I've heard rumblings that Iran may have shopped around for nations who could enrich the uranium to that quality for them, and while I wouldn't doubt that story (which, whether credible in fact or not is certainly credible in motivation for Iran's leadership) I do have reservations that any current nuclear power is willing to take that kind of gamble for as little return as Iran could offer, with the exception of North Korea (but I've pointed out their reliance on a plutonium-powered bomb).

The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.) This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)

One factor that seems to rarely come into play when assessing the political approach toward Iran is that its power structure has been teetering on the edge of faltering since the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad, which was followed by protests by citizens and political figures practically on the level of this year's re-election of the Ahmadi regime. Strategically, the rest of the world stands a better chance of seeing Ahmadi regime, which has been a huge boon to the hardliners in Iranian politics, get taken mostly out of power by taking their argument about wanting only nuclear power (and medical use) for their program to the negotiating table on its own face value. If they try to get out of that-- which it's predictable they will-- while the rest of the world is taking the stance that they (the world) are willing to accept a good faith gesture, then the Iranian regime's lack of acceptance of the good faith is going to backlash internally and cost them political capital domestically. This has already been the case with regard to the Iranian economy, which very nearly cost Ahmadi the election this year, and in the meantime between now and the next Iranian presidential election there will be parliamentary elections where hardliners stand a chance of defeat to the moderates if their stances continue to cost Iran as a nation the ability to improve itself domestically and attain some better standing on the world stage internationally. It's a long game, but it's one that's been played to pretty positive results with regard to China and despite a few hiccups has played fairly well with Russia. Going into talks with only a set of non-negotiable terms would not only hamper such a long game with Iran, it would guarantee its failure.

There is no such thing as the Ahmedinijad regime. There is a government headed by Ahmedinijad, which is a part of a larger system, headed by Khamenei. Getting rid of the regime meaning replacing the current theocracy with a different type of government.

The foreign policy of Iran is mostly determined by Khamenei and his advisers. This also holds for the nuclear program. I see no signs that he is willing to abandon that stance.

As for using such a deal to influence internal Iranian politics, I am doubtful. After the last elections the current regime have shown that they are willing to use violence to quell political unrest. They seem to have succeed. I do not see the nuclear issue ever leading to the same amount of unrest. Furthermore, I do not see people risking their lives again so soon after a failed previous attempt to protest. In short, nothing would come out of it for a good few years. It is a wain hope.

 

[FireGarden]

The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.)

Which countries, and for how many years?Did the USA know before the NIE was written in Dec 2007? And why did they not come forward with the accusation?

ie: what evidence is there that the USA knew anything about Qom before Iran told the IAEA?

This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)

I would think it is built in a mountain to make it harder to bomb. And it all depends on when Iran is supposed to inform the IAEA that it is building the plant. No uranium has been enriched at the plant.

If (and I do say if) the USA knew about this facility before Iran announced it, then they were probably hoping that Iran would move Uranium there before telling the world. Then the USA would have evidence to crow about. But this did not happen.

That's just opinion, of course. But at least it explains why the USA (desperate under Bush to portray Iran as a nuclear risk) would withhold "damning" evidence from the world.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran#September_2009_revelations

On September 21, 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was constructing a second enrichment facility.34°53′09″N 50°59′45″E / 34.8859°N 50.9958°E / 34.8859; 50.9958 The following day (September 22) IAEA Director General ElBaradei informed the United States, and two days later (September 24) the United States, United Kingdom and France briefed the IAEA on an enrichment facility under construction at an underground location near Qom.

That's the only order of events I've been able to find. Iran announced then the USA et al said "We've known for years."

 

[FireGarden]

On the "known about it for years" claim:

Iranian site prompts U.S. to rethink assessment
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/23/AR2009102303757_pf.html

The Qom site has undermined one of the U.S. intelligence community's key assessments of Iran's nuclear program: the assumption that Tehran had abandoned plans to enrich uranium in secret, according to two former senior U.S. officials involved in high-level discussions about Iran.

A landmark U.S. intelligence assessment in 2007 concluded that any secret uranium-processing activities "probably were halted" in 2003 and had not been restarted.

[...] "Qom changed a lot of people's thinking, especially about the possibility of secret military enrichment" of uranium, said one of the former officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the assessments remain classified.

[...] The officials acknowledged that the Qom complex is not yet operational and that no uranium had been enriched at the time the site was revealed last month. They also acknowledged there is no "smoking-gun" evidence that Iran plans to make bomb-grade uranium. But the officials said the Qom site was structurally suited for that purpose, and they concluded that there is no plausible role for the plant in Iran's civilian nuclear power infrastructure.

[...] Exactly when the order was issued to build the Qom facility is unclear, but intelligence officials say they have studied the site at least since 2004.

[...] By last year, a series of breakthroughs confirmed that Iran was building a secret uranium-enrichment plant, and also yielded precise details about how it would be operated, including the number of centrifuges Iran planned to use and how much electricity the facility would consume.

So they've known about the site for a few years, but only worked out the enrichment part of it last year.

Which leaves us with the quesiton: why didn't Bush reveal this data? Did he not want people to think that Iran has secret nuclear ambitions? Or was he waiting for Iran to move Uranium there, and thus be in clear breach of its obligations?

 

[Captain.Sassy]

The US is also a world leader in missile guidance systems and target acquisition systems, though. It can actually engage in warfare based on precision strikes against high-value strategic targets with minimal collateral damage.

Before these highly-advanced technologies--still largely unmatched by other advanced nations, let alone developing countries like Iraq--our strategy relied heavily on things like carpet-bombing (and, for a time, even considered battlefield nukes).

For a nation like Iran, which doesn't have precision guidance and targeting tech, and which doesn't really have the industrial base to launch a major strategic missile war, it's much more in their interest to cause as much devastation with as few warheads as possible. The big three--Nuclear, Biological, Chemical--are ideal for this.

tl;dr, long-range missiles with conventional warheads are almost useless in modern warfare.

I disagree.

I think that a place like Iran benefits from having long range conventional missiles. It enables it to retaliate against any hypothetical NATO intervention in a way that would be impossible by the Iranian airforce (which would likely be shot down if, for example, they tried to bomb Turkey or Israel in response to an airstrike). So it becomes something other regional states have to consider before any kind of military intervention in Iran. Having conventional missiles that could strike Israel wouldn't be the same deterrent as having nuclear missiles that could do this, but it would nonetheless be a cost that Israel would likely take into consideration when evaluating the costs and benefits of an intervention. Now it could very well be the case that Iran only wants missiles to be able to launch nukes, but there could still be a role for a conventional missile. Also, the C-802 that hezbollah used to explode the destroyer in 2006.

tl;dr conventional missiles allow a regional power to project force in a region where antagonists have air superiority

 

[Ziggurat]

I think that a place like Iran benefits from having long range conventional missiles. It enables it to retaliate against any hypothetical NATO intervention in a way that would be impossible by the Iranian airforce (which would likely be shot down if, for example, they tried to bomb Turkey or Israel in response to an airstrike).

Hardly. Iran's long-range missiles do not have the precision required to hit small targets, and if you loaded them with conventional explosive warheads, they'd likely do very little damage, because they'd hit a parking lot as easily as a building.

So it becomes something other regional states have to consider before any kind of military intervention in Iran.

Other regional states remember how ineffective Saddam's SCUD missiles were. Iran does too, I'm sure.

Having conventional missiles that could strike Israel wouldn't be the same deterrent as having nuclear missiles that could do this, but it would nonetheless be a cost that Israel would likely take into consideration when evaluating the costs and benefits of an intervention.

Israel can take a few hits from conventional missiles rather easily. They have plenty of times in the past, and in fact Iran's Hezbollah proxies probably pose as much of a threat as Iran itself does in this regard, since they're so much closer. Israel isn't very worried about conventional warheads from Iran.

Also, the C-802 that hezbollah used to explode the destroyer in 2006.

The C-802 is a radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile. It is not a long-range ballistic missile. VERY different creatures, with very different capabilities and purposes. The usefulness of the C-802 to Hezbollah says nothing about the usefulness of ballistic missiles with conventional explosive warheads to Iran.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Hardly. Iran's long-range missiles do not have the precision required to hit small targets, and if you loaded them with conventional explosive warheads, they'd likely do very little damage, because they'd hit a parking lot as easily as a building.

I don't know about that. I think their more recent missiles are somewhat more accurate. And while the damage they do might be 'little' in comparison with the damage that a more capable state could exact, it represents nonetheless a retaliatory capability.

Other regional states remember how ineffective Saddam's SCUD missiles were. Iran does too, I'm sure.

Iran used scuds in 2001 agains the MKO in Iraq. This was a use of conventional ballistic missiles. Whether or not Saddam's SCUD attacks on Israel were effective or not is not does not diminish the fact that having a conventional missile capability is still a deterrent. It may not be an absolute deterrent in the way that a nuclear capability might be, but it is a cost that a state has to consider when deciding whether or not to attack Iran.

Israel can take a few hits from conventional missiles rather easily. They have plenty of times in the past, and in fact Iran's Hezbollah proxies probably pose as much of a threat as Iran itself does in this regard, since they're so much closer. Israel isn't very worried about conventional warheads from Iran.

You may be right, but there's a big difference between Hezbollah's katyusha rockets and estimates of the capabilities of Iran's conventional ballistic missiles.

The C-802 is a radar-guided anti-ship cruise missile. It is not a long-range ballistic missile. VERY different creatures, with very different capabilities and purposes. The usefulness of the C-802 to Hezbollah says nothing about the usefulness of ballistic missiles with conventional explosive warheads to Iran.

No duh.

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology. I read the same thing about the launching of the SCUDS at MKO.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

?

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Apparently I'm in good company:

""Missiles are for [Iranians] what both tactical and strategic air power are for the West," said Uzi Rubin, an Israeli engineer considered by U.S. intelligence analysts to be an expert on Middle East missile programs. The Iranians "are transparent. They want to deter any U.S. or Israeli attack [and] Iranian leaders openly wish for U.S. satellites to take pictures of their weapons sites and to see their capability," Rubin said in an interview Sept. 17 with Iran Watch, a Web site maintained by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/27/AR2009092703295.html

 

[GreNME]

Huh? It is not that hard to figure that it is in the correct ballpark. Iran has enriched its Uranium for how long? Say six years now. During this time, they added more and more centrifuges, and thus their capacity has risen considerably. Considering that, I do not find it surprising that it would take them a year or two to enrich 75% of their quantity to the same low level.

Why say six years? By all we've been allowed to know publicly, Iran suspended their program in 2003 and reinstated it in 2005. I will agree that the reinstatement was a pretty aggressive one, though. Still, again, the existence of centrifuges won't give the level of enrichment needed. It requires a number of centrifuges working together with high amounts of low-enriched uranium, to produce very small amounts of high-enriched uranium. This is actually another strong case to have the enrichment done elsewhere, for two reasons: 1) had they been spending all this time trying to highly-enrich uranium, the material sent out would show signs, and 2) Iran wouldn't have sufficient amounts of low-grade material to enrich weapons-grade material.

Libya gave up a nuclear program, meaning that the pressures worked. I do not see how the rest is relevant to the point.

Libya didn't have much of a choice to give up their nuke program-- no one would deal with them after the USSR fell. Any chance of Russia or China falling any time soon? If not, then Iran already has access to more international relations with nuclear powers than Libya did, not to mention the connections Iran has with Arab countries that Libya didn't enjoy due to their leader's lack of friendliness with pretty much everyone in the Mid-East. Many of the pressures that were present to Libya aren't present for Iran, so the relevance that should be questioned here is the example of Libya.

I fail to see how are you suggesting to convince Iran that perusing nuclear weapons, a strategic goal which they have invested a lot of resources in, should be abandoned. Under your suggested approach they would just take what is offered and give away very little in return, without giving up that goal. In fact, your approach will effectively ensure that Iran do manage to make the last few technological steps needed for them to obtain nuclear weapons.

If I understand you correctly, you're questioning why a direct approach shouldn't be followed versus a slower, less-direct approach. From your other statements you seem to feel that the slower, less-direct approach will result in a negative outcome. My only answer is that insisting on the direct approach is setting itself up to not work, leaving us with choices that I think neither of us desire as our only available options once those fail. This government isn't going to play ball that way, because the US and other Western powers have as much credibility to use as political capital toward them as they have the other way around-- they have little to lose by cooperating. As such, they need to be given something to lose beyond "we're going to bomb the crap out of you" as an incentive. We keep it up with the "disarm or else" line of negotiation, and pretty soon we're going to have to follow through with the "or else" part.

The Qom installation was only reported to IAEA after Iran found out that other countries are aware of its existence. (Several countries were aware of it for a few years.) This is at a time where Iran is suspected of hiding details of their nuclear plans from the world. I can see only two interpretations for it, i) Iran is very stupid or ii) they have tried to keep this hidden and failed. I do not think that the current rulers of Iran are stupid.
(In addition, the Iranians clearly tried to hide this installation, building it in a mountain.)

There's no doubt that they tried to keep it hidden and it failed. Do you recall how the Iranian government reacted when we went public with the information we had and the IAEA was informed? This is germane to the issue of working toward keeping nukes out of Iran's hands.

There is no such thing as the Ahmedinijad regime. There is a government headed by Ahmedinijad, which is a part of a larger system, headed by Khamenei. Getting rid of the regime meaning replacing the current theocracy with a different type of government.

The foreign policy of Iran is mostly determined by Khamenei and his advisers. This also holds for the nuclear program. I see no signs that he is willing to abandon that stance.

That isn't completely false on the surface of things, especially concerning Khamenei's part in the overall governance. However, to suggest there is no "Ahmadinejad regime" is definitely false. There are factions of varying types in Iran, even among the hardliners. Ahmadi is one faction, and his connections in the IRGC run pretty deep. However, his connections don't extend to the Iranian Army, and Khamenei has jurisdiction over both. There is a power struggle going on in Iran, and it's not just between the moderates and the hardliners-- we could only be so lucky. Khamenei has definitely used Ahmadi as his attack dog, but to assume that there hasn't been any quid-pro-quo in the power-jockeying is naive or based on too little understanding about Iranian politics. You see, Khamenei has to at least appear to cater to some of the sensibilities of the more moderate and opposition politics, or else he will be taken out of power (his largest opponent heads the only council who can remove the Grand Ayatollah). Ahmadinejad doesn't have to do that as much, as long as he gets enough votes to keep himself and his appointees in office-- though, again, there have been arguments in Iran over political appointments in past years, and Khamenei has thrown out some of Ahmadi's appointments. Khamenei still has most control in Iran, but since 2005 that's been changing, and while Ahmadi still only maintains growing domestic control, he has unprecedented influence over the IRGC, and his antagonistic antics have been aimed at any opposition in the Iranian government as much as it's been toward the West or Israel.

As for using such a deal to influence internal Iranian politics, I am doubtful. After the last elections the current regime have shown that they are willing to use violence to quell political unrest. They seem to have succeed. I do not see the nuclear issue ever leading to the same amount of unrest. Furthermore, I do not see people risking their lives again so soon after a failed previous attempt to protest. In short, nothing would come out of it for a good few years. It is a wain hope.

You don't see people risking their lives, so it makes sense to assume they aren't? Do you understand that there's still protesting and even political figures speaking out against the past elections and the treatment of the protesters? Even during last month's Quds holiday there were protesters out there at the risk of their lives (link). There are people who are fighting for a stronger say in Iranian politics, and there's little that the outside world can do without legitimizing the current regime's claims of existing to protect Iran from threat. But what can be done is call them on their claims that we know aren't honest, particularly with regard to their nuclear program, and expect their government to show good faith by offering them precisely the type of deal that gives them what's needed for a peaceful program while blocking what's necessary for a weapons program.

The current agreement plan isn't a hope, it's part of a strategy. How this current agreement will determine how the Western groups will proceed, but the strategy is to use engagement to give the Iranian government the opportunity to succeed or fail at their promises of a peaceful program. If they fail to follow through and try to maintain these subversive behaviors, they're going to lose any possible support they can manage to get currently, primarily from China and Russia. Other world powers have worked with Iran so far because Iran can claim deniability about their subversion, and because it tweaked the US (I mean, let's be honest about that). The only way to undermine that is to put Iran in a position where it has to pull the stupid crap against their perceived allies that it pulls with impunity against those it has marginal to no relationship with. If they agree to this proposal, that puts their relationship with Russia (and France) under conditions. If an agreement can be had, then it wouldn't hurt to see if China can be included in the future, particularly since China buys oil from Iran. If Iran's key projects get tied to their international relations, then Iran is going to have a whole lot less wiggle room for sword-clanging.

Essentially, if the goal is security and not simply making an example of the Iranian government, then getting Iran's successes tied to other nations who aren't going to be amenable to troublemakers is a tenable option. Whether it plays out that way remains to be seen, and one can surely guess that the Iranian leadership has taken this into account (hence the putting off a decision and counter-proposal). At this point we need to wait and see if the risk assessment they make is either in favor of not having all the control of their own nuclear program. If so, then I expect another proposal from the West for a plan that still keeps full autonomy of their nuclear program off the table, and likely still includes one or more of the nations Iran has remained historically (relatively) friendly with.

 

[theprestige]

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology. I read the same thing about the launching of the SCUDS at MKO.

Guided anti-ship missiles and short-range tactical ballistic missiles are both 1950s-era technology, first successfully demonstrated in the previous decade during World War 2. Pretty impressive for guerrilla insurgents, and about what you'd expect from a developing nation, but hardly in the same category as JDAMs, ICBMs, and such like that.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

"You go to war with the army you have---not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

Besides, as a tactical ballistic missile, hundreds of SCUDs are an effetive deterrent against nearby enemy ground forces attempting a conventional assault. They're also an effective fire support option for a friendly ground forces attempting an assault on a nearby strongpoint.

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference. You could lob them at cities, maybe killing a few hundred people here and there, but each one you use in that way is one less you'll have available to use against those ground forces rolling towards you. SCUDs just aren't much of a strategic deterrent...

... Unless you arm them with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Imagine stockpiling four hundred SCUDs with conventional warheads, and then upgrading a score of them to nukes as soon as the warheads become available. That's enough tactical firepower for one or two large-scale conventional battles, plus a hundredfold increase in your strategic deterrent.

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

 

[GreNME]

"You go to war with the army you have---not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

Besides, as a tactical ballistic missile, hundreds of SCUDs are an effetive deterrent against nearby enemy ground forces attempting a conventional assault. They're also an effective fire support option for a friendly ground forces attempting an assault on a nearby strongpoint.

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference. You could lob them at cities, maybe killing a few hundred people here and there, but each one you use in that way is one less you'll have available to use against those ground forces rolling towards you. SCUDs just aren't much of a strategic deterrent...

... Unless you arm them with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Imagine stockpiling four hundred SCUDs with conventional warheads, and then upgrading a score of them to nukes as soon as the warheads become available. That's enough tactical firepower for one or two large-scale conventional battles, plus a hundredfold increase in your strategic deterrent.

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

Interesting how right at the ellipses you go off into la-la-land of un-quantified possibilities. Why not also imagine them stuffing a few dozen of the warheads with low-grade nuclear material to make dirty bombs as well while we're in Imagine-Land™?

There's no doubt that Iran wanting a nuke would be for a deterrent measure, but it's doubtful they'd be as asinine to stick them on the fronts of SCUDs.

 

[Captain.Sassy]

Seriously, it's like you have no idea what warfare is really about, or how it actually works.

lol

Okay there Von Clausewitz

If conventional ballistic missiles are useless as a deterrent then why don't you tell me why China has so many of them pointed at Taiwan?

What they're not, however, is an effective option against enemy command, control and logistics infrastructure at long ranges. The SCUD can't really hit enough bunkers, power junctions, antenna clusters, or major bridges to make a strategic difference.

You have strategy and tactics mixed up here Rommel.

The strategic logic behind a conventional ballistic missile capability is to force Israel or other regional powers to incur a cost for military action against Iran. "if/then"

 

[Ziggurat]

I don't know about that. I think their more recent missiles are somewhat more accurate. And while the damage they do might be 'little' in comparison with the damage that a more capable state could exact, it represents nonetheless a retaliatory capability.

But no more so than they already have via Hezbollah, but with severe strategic disadvantages.

It may not be an absolute deterrent in the way that a nuclear capability might be, but it is a cost that a state has to consider when deciding whether or not to attack Iran.

That is a cost Israel has already demonstrated itself willing to pay.

You may be right, but there's a big difference between Hezbollah's katyusha rockets and estimates of the capabilities of Iran's conventional ballistic missiles.

Quantity has a quality all its own.

That was more in response to the comment about Iran's lack of technical sophistication in general. As I recall, the launch of the anti-ship missile was interpreted by many analysts of a showcase of Iranian anti-ship technology.

The only interesting thing about that is that they gave it to Hezbollah. It was a Chinese-built missile, not an Iranian one. We know that Iran has access to such weapons, I doubt they could manufacture it themselves.

If Iran isn't planning to use conventional ballistic missiles and doesn't consider them a deterrent, then why would it stockpile hundreds of the things?

Perhaps because nuclear warheads aren't the only non-conventional warheads one could use. Perhaps it's a bluff. Or perhaps Israel isn't the only potential target.