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The fine tuning argument

Yes.

Linda

Considering alternative ways of sorting universes - which might make this one seem less unique - is certainly one of many possible approaches. I'd be very interested to hear about any such research. I'm far from being an expert on the matter.

However, for the moment, the existence of complex, long-lived structures seems like a good partitioning device to be going along with.
 
Personally, I think that it's quite unlikely that a universe that collapses on itself after an infinitesimal fraction of a second will generate something that will wonder about itself. Nor do I think that a family of such universes, differing only by the tiny difference in time before they collapse, would objectively be considered as different from each other as they are from our universe.

Of course it's difficult to come up with objective standards for classifying universes that only exist in physical/mathematical models, but it's certainly not impossible. To me, many of the hypothetical universes look like black or white marbles, not kittens or bananas.

But the only reasoning that could lead you to think such a thing is flawed -- induction can't be applied to unknowns.

That is, just because the only intelligent life you know of is humans, and neither humans nor anything remotely similar could evolve never mind exist in such a universe, does not imply that nothing in such a universe will wonder about itself. It doesn't even imply that it is unlikely for something in such a universe to wonder about itself.

When we know more about our own universe, and more about mathematics, and most of all more about the nature of intelligence, then maybe such an assumption would be logically valid. But right now you are just arguing from ignorance, and I am sure you know that is a logical fallacy.
 
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I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

Are you a politician?

That is a non-answer.

Possible answers are "yes" or "no."

From our history together I understand that you in particular are prone to avoiding answers, but cmon, this isn't a trick. I just want to know if you also take the next step and infer that such required precision implies a low likelihood of such precision occuring naturally.

If you don't, then I have no beef with you, and you are correct I need to take up the issue with Malerin (who never responds to me). But I have a feeling you do take that next step.
 
I agree. The fine-tuners are pretending that the bag is full of marbles with only one or a few differing in colour. In reality, the bag is full of a million marbles of different sizes and shapes, half a dozen kittens, a few hundred socks, several sets of house keys, an umbrella, 60,000 glass beads, 20 balls of crumpled paper and a used condom. They are wondering why a kitten was pulled out, considering that there were only a few grey things in the bag.

Linda

Now that is beautifully put.
 
I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

There's nothing strange about that. You have simply described a chaotic system. We have numerous examples in nature, Weather being the classic. Are you claiming that because imprecision leads to predicting smooth sailing in the Caribbean when we are really looking for a hurricane in Florida, it indicates the hand of God? Why would it be strange that the universe is chaotic rather than linear?

Linda
 
Considering alternative ways of sorting universes - which might make this one seem less unique - is certainly one of many possible approaches. I'd be very interested to hear about any such research. I'm far from being an expert on the matter.

However, for the moment, the existence of complex, long-lived structures seems like a good partitioning device to be going along with.

Oh great. Now you've introduced a length time bias.

Linda
 
Are you a politician?

That is a non-answer.

Possible answers are "yes" or "no."

From our history together I understand that you in particular are prone to avoiding answers, but cmon, this isn't a trick. I just want to know if you also take the next step and infer that such required precision implies a low likelihood of such precision occuring naturally.

If you don't, then I have no beef with you, and you are correct I need to take up the issue with Malerin (who never responds to me). But I have a feeling you do take that next step.

A probabilistic analysis is restricted by the possibility that the current values are the only ones that are possible. Any statement of probability is conditional on the assumption that all values of the constants are, or were, equally likely, which is of course not based on a belief that this is so.

Indeed, it's the possibility that the values of the constants are not equally likely that is interesting.
 
I think that's a fair summary.

If we have a bag full of a trillion numbered marbles, then the odds are against any particular number coming up. So to be astonished when we pull out a particular number at trillion to one odds is silly. However, if the bag has a trillion white marbles, a trillion black marbles, and one red marble, and we pull out the red marble on our one and only try, we can be astonished, and wonder how it happened.

One might claim that we only consider this universe special, out of all the other universes which we have modelled, just because we live in it. But if we can say, objectively, using reasonable criteria, that this universe lies in a very small subset of the different types that we model, then we are, I think, entitled to delve a bit deeper.


If you knew how many marbles there were, if you knew the types and no it does not matter what you get on one pull, a frequency of one does not a frequency distribution make.

For example if the bag has a narrow opening and you can only draw the one marbe because of the bag, then it is a biased sample to being with.
 
Personally, I think that it's quite unlikely that a universe that collapses on itself after an infinitesimal fraction of a second will generate something that will wonder about itself. Nor do I think that a family of such universes, differing only by the tiny difference in time before they collapse, would objectively be considered as different from each other as they are from our universe.
Considering that this is speculation and that it is counter to current observations, it is absolute speculation.
Of course it's difficult to come up with objective standards for classifying universes that only exist in physical/mathematical models, but it's certainly not impossible. To me, many of the hypothetical universes look like black or white marbles, not kittens or bananas.

But it is speculation, what value can g have. Collins makes his case by increasing g by a billion and calling it fine tuning.

It all about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin and how many wear red shoes.
 
I think that Beth expressed this quite well. When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision, the model doesn't work as a representation of what actually happens. That is the strange phenomenon that we're dealing with.

Except you haven't said what constants and what variation there is, the most quoted person on the net is Robin Collins, and he call 1,000,000,000 a 1/10^32 part.

So what are these 'astonishing degree of precision', you haven't cited them, so fess up or stop saying that they are astonishing. Which values where and to what degree?
 
Any statement of probability is conditional on the assumption that all values of the constants are, or were, equally likely, which is of course not based on a belief that this is so.

Well I happen to think that if an individual knows such a statement is conditioned like that, and they go about using such a statement in an argument to forward their own view, then there is a high probability the individual believes that it is so.

Otherwise, why would they use such a statement in their own arguments?

Which also begs the question -- why are you avoiding providing a clear answer?
 
I think that's a fair summary.

If we have a bag full of a trillion numbered marbles, then the odds are against any particular number coming up. So to be astonished when we pull out a particular number at trillion to one odds is silly. However, if the bag has a trillion white marbles, a trillion black marbles, and one red marble, and we pull out the red marble on our one and only try, we can be astonished, and wonder how it happened.

One might claim that we only consider this universe special, out of all the other universes which we have modelled, just because we live in it. But if we can say, objectively, using reasonable criteria, that this universe lies in a very small subset of the different types that we model, then we are, I think, entitled to delve a bit deeper.

The problem is, once again, that you've only colored this marble red after drawing it out. Why do universes that yield beings like us seem special to us? Because we the ones defining the criteria of "specialness."

Let's go back to pulling the one marble out of a bag of a trillion, but now they're just numbered marbles again. Is there a single marble in there that isn't unique? Is there a single marble in there that can't be retroactively defined as part of a relatively small set ("all even numbers that are divisible by no fewer and no more than five prime numbers" or what have you).

The "OMG, but this universe supports LIFE!" argument is parallel to finding this week's lottery winner and constructing a narrative about how extraordinary their win was: they desperately needed the money for an operation, they prayed to the patron St. of Lotteries the night before the drawing, they normally never play the lottery, but some little voice in the back of the head told him to have a go this week...etc. etc. Dig far enough after the event and it will begin to seem wildly improbable (just like the "not a single one of my ancestors died childless" line of thought mentioned above).

Let's imagine for a second that we're all Gods and we're watching our fellow God create a universe on the great universe roulette-wheel (all fundamental physical constants get set at random). Should I be more startled at the "improbability" of the outcome in which physical objects are possible, or at the outcome in which all the physical constants are prime numbers, or the outcome in which the physical constants spell a sentence in our God-Language when the numbers are converted into letters by some basic algorithm, etc. etc. etc.

Every single possible outcome is 'unique' if it is discrete from all the others.
 
The problem is, once again, that you've only colored this marble red after drawing it out. Why do universes that yield beings like us seem special to us? Because we the ones defining the criteria of "specialness."

Let's go back to pulling the one marble out of a bag of a trillion, but now they're just numbered marbles again. Is there a single marble in there that isn't unique? Is there a single marble in there that can't be retroactively defined as part of a relatively small set ("all even numbers that are divisible by no fewer and no more than five prime numbers" or what have you).

The "OMG, but this universe supports LIFE!" argument is parallel to finding this week's lottery winner and constructing a narrative about how extraordinary their win was: they desperately needed the money for an operation, they prayed to the patron St. of Lotteries the night before the drawing, they normally never play the lottery, but some little voice in the back of the head told him to have a go this week...etc. etc. Dig far enough after the event and it will begin to seem wildly improbable (just like the "not a single one of my ancestors died childless" line of thought mentioned above).

Let's imagine for a second that we're all Gods and we're watching our fellow God create a universe on the great universe roulette-wheel (all fundamental physical constants get set at random). Should I be more startled at the "improbability" of the outcome in which physical objects are possible, or at the outcome in which all the physical constants are prime numbers, or the outcome in which the physical constants spell a sentence in our God-Language when the numbers are converted into letters by some basic algorithm, etc. etc. etc.

Every single possible outcome is 'unique' if it is discrete from all the others.

I would also like to point out that the metric for this "specialness" is typically life that can give rise to consciousness that can reason about its own existence.

Yet the very people who oppose things like the computational model of consciousness and assert how mysterious and unknowable consciousness is are the same individuals who are so sure of the conditions that might give rise to such a consciousness.

And that is a fundamental contradiction right there -- If you don't know much about the mechanics of consciousness, you are in no position to know under what conditions it might arise.
 
Any method of distinguishing between the models is valid. It's not a bias, it's a way to evaluate them.

Except that you are using the presence of this model as somehow significant when you've just introduced a bias which makes it more likely that this model will be present at any randomly chosen point in time.

Linda
 
Except you haven't said what constants and what variation there is, the most quoted person on the net is Robin Collins, and he call 1,000,000,000 a 1/10^32 part.

So what are these 'astonishing degree of precision', you haven't cited them, so fess up or stop saying that they are astonishing. Which values where and to what degree?

I suggest a referral to a physicist with no axe to grind. I could give you references but what's the point of that? You can find plenty of unbiased information.
 
I suggest a referral to a physicist with no axe to grind. I could give you references but what's the point of that? You can find plenty of unbiased information.

Excuse me, you are the one who made the claim, and you want ME to back it up. On the Jref ?

Seriously Westprog, that makes it seem you are just making these things up, now doesn't it.
When modelling the universe, cosmologists have found that if the values of the constants are not expressed to an astonishing degree of precision...

That is what you said, and I ask you again what constant and what degree of precision?
 

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