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The fine tuning argument

FFor chemistry, presuming that an electron can have a definate location at all, the purpose of a wave function is to calculate the probability of where it might be because we cannot determine it for certain.

This is not, AFAIUI, the correct interpretation. The electron does not have a definite location at all. The wave function allows the probability of it having such a location when we look. At least that's the Copenhagen interpretation, as close as I can follow it as a layman.
 
Actually, the electron does not have a definite location at all--the waveform is entirely distinct from any of the possible places the electron can be. This is demonstrated by the fact that "exclusive" possibilities nevertheless affect each other--something that would be impossible if the electron actually had a location at all (canonically, the crests in the waveforms shown in the pattern produced by the double slit experiment, where no electrons (or whatever particle you're using) hit even when sent through one at a time--even though if you cover up either slit, the electrons suddenly appear there).

The purpose of the wave function is to model this, and how these "exclusive" possibilities as a whole effect each other. The wave function represents something more fundamental than the possibilities in this regards.

I'm not really sure what this has to do with the FT... perhaps I'm missing some context.

I think it's the idea that probability represents only our lack of knowledge about a deterministic system. But, as you've pointed out, reality is not deterministic. The location of the electron is genuinely random.
 
westprog said:
The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.
I agree with this, but you seem to contradict yourself:
One can't state absolute probabilities - but absolute probabilities are a fiction anyway. One can make assumptions, and calculate from those assumptions the likely outcomes.
We might make the assumption that since a coin has two sides then the probability of it landing on one side is 0.5. But of course this assumption could easily be mistaken.

And if an assumption about very simple probability on a very simple, easily observable object could be mistaken - then what use are the assumptions we make about a very complex event in the distant past, about which we know very little and which we have only observed to happen once?
 
And, again, that's not analogous to the case of the universe in the FTA-theory, is it? You found this universe the way it was, then "painted it red" and then asked "gee, what were the odds of it ending up on this red-painted one"?

Again, unless you were around before the creation of the universe and called the shot, all this discussion of "probability" is meaningless.

What the FTA is doing is spinning the wheel without any markers, then when it stops, painting a tiny "winner" sign opposite the pointer, standing back and saying "OMG, what were the odds of that!?"

That would be reasonable if all the different cases looked different. In the case of, say, the gravitational constant, that doesn't appear to be the case.

AFAIAA, there would be three types of universe -

  1. a very diffuse collection of evenly spaced hydrogen molecules
  2. a singularity (black hole)
  3. galaxies, nebulae etc.

The third option being just one slot on the wheel of fortune. In this case, the wheel has been spun once. Should we be considering why option 3 came up? It seems obvious to me that we should at least be looking at it.

There is also the possibility that there is just one slot on the wheel. We have to allow for that too.
 
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I agree with this, but you seem to contradict yourself:

We might make the assumption that since a coin has two sides then the probability of it landing on one side is 0.5. But of course this assumption could easily be mistaken.

And if an assumption about very simple probability on a very simple, easily observable object could be mistaken - then what use are the assumptions we make about a very complex event in the distant past, about which we know very little and which we have only observed to happen once?

If we make assumptions that we know to be assumptions, and which only relate to models, and if we avoid drawing conclusions in advance, then we are unlikely to fall into serious error. It's always necessary when considering the AP to avoid assuming the conclusion.
 
That would be reasonable if all the different cases looked different. In the case of, say, the gravitational constant, that doesn't appear to be the case.

AFAIAA, there would be three types of universe -

  1. a very diffuse collection of evenly spaced hydrogen molecules
  2. a singularity (black hole)
  3. galaxies, nebulae etc.

The third option being just one slot on the wheel of fortune. In this case, the wheel has been spun once. Should we be considering why option 3 came up? It seems obvious to me that we should at least be looking at it.

There is also the possibility that there is just one slot on the wheel. We have to allow for that too.


Why could the g not vary by smaller factors, like .000001?
 
If we make assumptions that we know to be assumptions, and which only relate to models, and if we avoid drawing conclusions in advance, then we are unlikely to fall into serious error.
You mean, as long as we acknowledge the vanishing improbability of those models relating in any way to reality?
 
Basically, if Malerin claimed he actually flipped a coin 55 times to get the first one, I wouldn't believe him.
Yes.

Is this based on not getting a run of 4 or more? That is not at all hard to do with 55 tosses (see screenshot).



However, of the two, ironically, the former one looks more like it implies intent than the latter, though I think I was supposed to come to the opposite conclusion.

HHTHTTHTHT
HHHTTHHTHT
HHTTHTHTTT
HTHHHTTHTH
THHTTHTHTH
THHTT

Looks more biased than

HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHHHHHHH
HHHHH

?

Seriously, you actually believe that? You will see runs of 3 or less on 55 tosses if you spend just a few minutes generating random numbers. You can spend your whole life flipping coins and likely never see 55 heads or tails in a row.




But the sequences definitely do not look random, and they look non-random in a particularly interesting way that tends to point towards intent.

Definitely? This looks pretty random to me. No runs over 3 on 55 "tosses":




While you often get outcomes that have long runs, you can easily get outcomes like the screenshot I posted.

Edit:

Another screenshot of 55 "tosses" without any grouping higher than three. You have to read this one horizontally across (left to right), as that is how the numbers are technically generated:

 
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I think that gets right to the heart of the matter. A run of all heads or all tails looks significant to anyone, and immediately one starts thinking, "what are the odds of such a rare thing?" even if the odds, strictly speaking, are the same for every possible string of numbers or heads/tails.

However, in the example above, if you know that pi has great significance in mathematics, a typical reaction would be the same as seeing a coin getting all heads. But if you don't know pi, you'd think, eh, looks like a string of random numbers to me.

Right, this is analogous to the situation when the values of the physical constants weren't understood to be so finely balanced. No significance was attached to it. When we discovered the constants have to have very precise values for life to even have a chance, we became like the person who sees the Pi result and understands the mathematical significance. A lottery that gives a Pi result looks like a "put up" job.

The response depends on our subjective reaction to the significance of the results, and not on the actual probability of predicting the results, which is still one out of however many total possibilities.

Our universe is significant to us, because we're here to observe it. Doesn't change the actual probability of it, though.

The probablity is 1 because it alrady happened. But as Westprog points out, that doesn't mean /argument. Luckily, we can look at things counterfactually.
 
No, I'm doing exactly what you're doing. You're coming along after the universe is already created in this form and saying "wow, what were the odds of the universe being like this!" I'm coming along after I've spun the wheel of fortune" and finding that it ended up on 10,0045 (say) and saying "wow, what were the odds of the wheel ending up on this number.

Where's the difference?
The difference is, in the hypothetical question you asked:
Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.
That is, you specified that the probability of being a "winner" was one-in-a-million and the other 999,999 possible configurations that the universe could have had were not "winners". The hypothetical situation with the wheel of fortune is different because you are declaring all possible outcomes to be "winners". This difference drastically alters the way I compute the probabilities.
Yeah, but that's trivial. It's easy for the sake of analogy to say that ex hypothesi the wheel is a fair wheel and that its results are genuinely random. If it's not a fair wheel then that's the same thing as saying that the universe's parameters are not arbitrarily defined--in which case out goes both chance and "fine tuning" for the universe.

Okay, for the sake of analogy say that ex hypothesi the wheel is a fair wheel. Out of curiosity, how many spins that land on the single one-in-a-million "winner" without any other outcome coming up would it take before you would consider the possibility of divine intervention? What odds would it take before you would consider - not conclude, just consider - the possibility?
 
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I wonder if those who think that there's something to this "fine tuning" argument would answer a question for me: let us assume that we discover that our universe's parameters are in one possible configuration out of exactly one million equally possible configurations (I know this is unlikely, but for the sake of clarity, let's just assume it).

Let us further assume that we discover that this universe is the only universe that ever was or will be created. And, finally, let us also assume that we discover that in only one of these million possible sets of parameters could something like human life have evolved. So, we're the one-in-a-million shot.

Now, would such discoveries, in your view, strongly support the "fine tuning" hypothesis? And (and this is the really important part, for me, of my question): to what extent? In other words: if the odds against a universe in which anything like human life could emerge are 999,999-to-1, does that make the odds of there being a "Fine Tuner" also 999,000-to-1? How, exactly, do we derive the "probability" of a "tuner" from the "improbability" of the event?

You need to refine this just a bit. "human life" is not so special, because that implies that other universes could have produced intelligent non-human life. If 100,000 universes out of a million have intelligent creatures in them, then the existence of our paticular form of intelligent life is not significant.

If, instead of "human life", you mean "life in any form", then it would be very significant to have a one-time event create a universe suitable for life on a 1 in a million shot (that is, the other 999,999 ways the universe could have gone would have ended up lifeless). Without a multiverse or oscillating universe, you would have two viable explanations:

A) Chance
B) Fine-tuning

The existence of life would be much more probable on the existence of a fine-tuner, than on chance alone.
 
We shouldn't investigate something because we don't have enough data? What an odd approach to science.

For example, it might turn out that the gravitational constant is tied to the mass of the universe in some unexplained way that ensures that expansion is continuous but just on the balance. We have no way of knowing that now, but in the future we might. And the solution will start, as always, with the statement of the problem. Denying that there is anything to investigate will lead nowhere.

What kind of a response is this to my post?

Where did I say we shouldn't investigate something? Clearly, as a FT proponent, your primary method of argument is avoiding answering questions and twisting responses into strawmen.

I said that using the assumption in an argument that the universal constants can take on any values whatsoever is deliberate dishonsety unless one can provide evidence to support that assumption.

Do you make that assumption? If you do, then please provide some evidence to support it, or I will have to accuse you of dishonesty as well.

It is dishonest because I know for a fact that people like you and Malerin have read -- and understood -- the arguments of others that explain why that assumption is not valid.

So why do you keep dodging the issue?
 
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The probablity is 1 because it alrady happened. But as Westprog points out, that doesn't mean /argument. Luckily, we can look at things counterfactually.

Oh, thats what you are doing, eh? Looking at things counterfactually, with your critical thinking cap on, eh?

Then I am sure you wouldn't mind answering the simple questions you have been asked time and time again for over a year...

...

...

...
 
Actually, the electron does not have a definite location at all--the waveform is entirely distinct from any of the possible places the electron can be. This is demonstrated by the fact that "exclusive" possibilities nevertheless affect each other--something that would be impossible if the electron actually had a location at all (canonically, the crests in the waveforms shown in the pattern produced by the double slit experiment, where no electrons (or whatever particle you're using) hit even when sent through one at a time--even though if you cover up either slit, the electrons suddenly appear there).

The purpose of the wave function is to model this, and how these "exclusive" possibilities as a whole effect each other. The wave function represents something more fundamental than the possibilities in this regards.

This stuff is difficult to talk about because in the chaos of imprecise and conflated language coupled with the fact that no one really knows what quantum mechanics represents in reality, any given statement can be picked apart. Suffice it to say that I meant to speak of things like electrons as having locations in so far as fields such as chemistry need to talk about the behavor of such entities, which are not dissimilar from another other bits of matter. If one wants to figure out the "shape" of hybridized bond orbitals, wave functions are what they'll use. (Obviously, most chemists don't need to perform such math, but work from short-cut methods that are known to agress with such an analysis.) Regardless, there is need speak of things like electrons as having something that best translates as a region of influence. Call it location, position, whatever -- point is, wave functions can be used to acurately determine where the action is and isn't. And those functions are based on probability out of necessity.

I don't think you disagree with any of that and I think you understand that I was only using it as an analogy anyway. Probably a bad analogy at that. My general point was and remains that in the case of things that have definate values (such as universal constants), any analysis based purely on probability can lose sight of the fact the value on the face of a tossed die or coin is the result the physical dynamics involved, that the ultimate result was in cards (to bring in more gambling devices) long before it landed.

I'm not really sure what this has to do with the FT... perhaps I'm missing some context.

Singularitarian invoked the "wave function of the universe" on a previous page and tried to use it to justify something to the effect of a superposition of all possible universes from which one emerged. This sort of thinking is ultimately (if not precisely) what gives credence to wondering why "of the possible universes" we have the one we have. I mean, we have pretty much zero idea why the universal constants we have are what they are, and here we are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilities to them. It's absurd.




My primary point in this thread is this: the most parsimonious answer to the question of the probability that the universe has the constant parameters it has is 100%, because those constants -- if the sum total of all previous observations of causation will hold -- are determined and therefore the only possibility under consideration. In a deterministic universe, if it isn't determined, it's not a possibility.

(I don't think there's any credible reason to suggest that we're in anything other than a deterministic universe. Rather than derail this thread with it, however, if anyone wants to discuss it, I'd love to see a thread dedicated to it in the Science section.)
 
I think it's the idea that probability represents only our lack of knowledge about a deterministic system. But, as you've pointed out, reality is not deterministic. The location of the electron is genuinely random.

Rather than derail this thread, I've created a new one under the Science section entitled "The Universe is Deterministic".

Ironically, after this is posted I'll be able to provide a link...
 
I mean, we have pretty much zero idea why the universal constants we have are what they are, and here we are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilities to them. It's absurd.

Correction: Here certain individuals are assuming that other ones are possible and assigning probabilties to them.

But I do agree that it is absurd.
 
Why could the g not vary by smaller factors, like .000001?

The "fine-tuning" issue is the amount by which the constants can be altered in the model without changing the outcome. I don't know how finely tuned the gravitational model must be.
 
What kind of a response is this to my post?

Where did I say we shouldn't investigate something? Clearly, as a FT proponent, your primary method of argument is avoiding answering questions and twisting responses into strawmen.

I said that using the assumption in an argument that the universal constants can take on any values whatsoever is deliberate dishonsety unless one can provide evidence to support that assumption.

Do you make that assumption? If you do, then please provide some evidence to support it, or I will have to accuse you of dishonesty as well.

It is dishonest because I know for a fact that people like you and Malerin have read -- and understood -- the arguments of others that explain why that assumption is not valid.

So why do you keep dodging the issue?

The use of assumptions in forming hypotheses is an essential element of science. That's why we call them assumptions - to distinguish them from claims.

In any case, if the physical constants could not have any other value, that still does not remove the question of why models of the universe need to be so precisely fine-tuned.
 

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