The fine tuning argument

[Robin]

Yes No. That I understand. I was asking why you wanted to the know the probability of getting at least one 6 out of twenty throws of the same dice or one throw of twenty dice. Those are the same.

So why do you have to stipulate that your opponent in the dice game throw only one die and throw it only once?

According to your argument you should only stipulate that he throw only one die or he throw it once in order to get 1 in 6.

All those two premisses in the argument I presented says you have to stipulate both.

I'd want to examine the die too.

Very true. The same goes for the universe - we should examine the die more closely before jumping to conclusions about it's origins.

What does your definition of contingent have to do with the probabilities you're talking about here?

Nothing - who ever said it did? You are confusing two separate arguments.

I asked you a question regarding that "Are you confident that there was time before time began?"

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Okay. So what do you mean by "contingent" then?

I thought you were meaning that the universe required X in order to come into being. If that's not what you mean, how is X involved in the fine-tuning argument? If that is what you meant, how does being contingent differ from being a precursor or a cause?

I'd say being contigent simply is broader than (strict) causation would be. X is necessary for a range of phenomena Y1-Yn, if none of Y1-Yn were possible without X; but X does not (necessarily) cause Yk.

There are also no temporal implications. It does not have to be "before"; "concurrency" suffices.

 

[Beth]

Oh, you're thinking of the anthropomorphic argument. That's not the argument I was discussing. I said that There is no tautology involved in noticing that our best models require fine-tuning by the humans who create them. There is nothing in there about observing fundamental constants in our universe. It's about setting them in the models. Why do our models require fine-tuning to match our observed universe? Some possible explanations are:

a) the universe is also fine-tuned (the designer hypothesis)
b) many universes exist, we exist in one of the few that will support creatures like us (the multiverse hypothesis)
c) our models are incomplete and when we know more, we will understand why those parameters have the values they do.

All are viable hypothesis. None are tautological IMO.

Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe.

Yes. That's how models get built. Do you have a problem with that?

What does this have to do with a, b or c??? They totally DO NOT FOLLOW from your reasoning with respect to modeling by humans.

Question: Why do the best models our physicists are able to build model to simulate the beginning of our universe requires that they specific parameters to very specific values?

I don't understand know the exact models nor do I understand all of the variables they are using in those models. What I do understand is that the best and brightest physicists working today are perplexed by the many different variables and are working hard to figure out a better model that doesn't require so many.

However, if we assume that our universe developed similarly to their models, then the possible reasons why can be grouped into the three general categories I listed above. I'm also willing to add Yoink's group D.

Examples a, b and c, are absolutely classic examples of reasoning drawn from the Anthropic Principle, which is tautological, and cannot be used as a reasoning tool. These are arguments made from fine-tuning. These are arguments made from an entirely circular premise.

No. I don't think so. What is the circular premise? Please cite a premise I've specified, not one you've made up and I don't agree with. The only one that comes close is the premise that our universe is like our models. That one's iffy, but it is kind of inherent in building models of the universe. We build the models to figure out what we don't know.

 

[Olowkow]

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. ... You found a universe that happened to have it's dice rolled in a certain way and then asked "what were the odds against that particular roll." Probability doesn't work that way.

Very nice post. Why can't or won't people understand this?

 

[arthwollipot]

How about we draw a line in the sand, on this thread, and refuse to move forward until this point is addressed?

Yes, cause that's always worked in the past...

What about John Barrow then? He co-authored the theory in the Anthropic Principle?

I'm not as familiar with his work. Suffice to say that I don't buy anything stronger than the Weak Anthropic Principle, and I find that to be so weak as to be utterly pathetic.

It's good enough to counter the equally pathetic fine tuning argument though.

 

[Robin]

There are also no temporal implications. It does not have to be "before"; "concurrency" suffices.

Which is what I said in the first place.

 

[Yoink]

Very nice post. Why can't or won't people understand this?

Because everyone wants to feel special.

 

[Malerin]

You're getting confused--perhaps because you're engaging with multiple interlocuters. The question of whether or not it is true that the universe "could have been otherwise" is not the point. The point is for the "fine tuning" argument to mean anything at all, it must be assumed to be possible. If the universe could not have been otherwise, then it wasn't "fine tuned."

That only moves the problem up a level: if the constants are "set" at certain values, we still know that the vast vast majority of these values result in inhospitable universes. Why should the values be set at the precise amounts needed to make life possible? Also, if the constants are set, than that would mean it was impossible for the universe to be anything other than life-permitting. A strange result, wouldn't you say? If there is a multiverse with the same set values that we observe, and you surveyed all the universes in it, they would all be life-permitting. That would be stronger evidence for a universe-designer than anything the FT argument can manage.

But now you're cheating (and revealing the cheat in your initial position). You are starting from the assumption that there's something particularly wonderful about a universe that ends up with us in it (your "all 6's" one). But, again, every single possible result of a cast of 20 dice is equally 'improbable.' That's simply a fact.

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

 

[Malerin]

No.

And we have been over this before. Multiple times.

Each time, you get trounced. Do you come back hoping people have forgotten you? Do you forget? Are you actively dishonest, or merely prone to fail to remember things?

You have zero evidence that the existence of life is "crushingly improbable."

You have never cited any.

You never will cite any.

So why do you keep at this game?

You seem to be taking this personally. Weren't you the one who started the ill-fated "Why Malerin is wrong" thread?

 

[Robin]

For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

Depends entirely on the numeric value of "a bunch of times" - if the value is in the ballpark of 65 then certainly the second coin. If the value is in the ball park of several trillion then I could not say one way or the other without seeing the result of the rest of the throws.

 

[fls]

I take it that the answer to my question is no, you are not aware of any any unexplained parameter settings in our current models for how lights move in the sky. Thank you.

It is my understanding that G is an unexplained parameter setting.

You are basically arguing that there are likely to be unknown constraints that require the parameter values to be fixed they way they are. Quite possible. It's one of the competing hypotheses for the apparent fine-tuning. It's a very reasonable hypothesis. Based on past history, such as that you gave regarding lights in the sky, it's quite possible there is a more unifying comprehensive way to model these things that won't require so many parameter values to be set arbitrarily. I'm no argument with that hypothesis. I think it is the most likely myself. But you can't claim to have knowledge that that one is correct and the 'designer' and the 'multiverse' hypotheses are not. All three are viable hypothesis to explain the situation with our current models. [Not to mention that none of them are mutually exclusive with any of the others.]

Two are viable hypotheses (i.e. they propose to explain). The 'designer' is not a hypotheses as it doesn't explain the setting of the parameter values.

Apparently so. My understanding is that Newton himself felt that way.

And doing so was fallacious which tells us that it was (and is) unreasonable.

I'm sorry. I though you were referring to me specifically with your previous comment. I see now you meant it in a more general way. At any rate, I don't agree with the sentiment that a designer, if one exists, must be interested in us. There's nothing to suggest that when hypothesizing a fine-tuner exists.

You keep using that word 'dishonest'. I do not think it is appropriate here.
The fine-tuning hypothesis does not lead to any further hypotheses about the nature or character of such a designer, but I do find a designer to be a reasonable consequence of hypothesizing about why such apparent fine-tuning is required in our best models. It is one of the three given in the wiki article reference earlier.

It is mentioned in the wiki article because the wiki article is about the use of fine-tuning to rationalize belief in God, not because the wiki article is about reasonable hypotheses as to the contingent conditions for the universe.

I think it does serve as an explanation as to why certain constants have the values they do. It doesn't constrain the designer to only choosing those parameter values, just

It does NOT require the assumption that such a designer would choose to form universes of interest to us. It only requires the assumption that a universe with the parameter values ours possess would be of interest to it. This doesn't seem an unreasonable assumption when you examine the universes that other parameter values lead to. Ours appears to be highly unusual.

Again, this assumption is not something one can derive a priori, and therefore doesn't serve to explain our universe. It is merely a description. To say that there is a force which moves object A from position 1,2,3 to position 1,2,4 does not explain that movement, it describes it.

Linda

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance.

No, it isn't hard to grasp at all. In fact it is quite easy, almost self-understood.

For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

The second one looks like a world where there is one and only one thing. Like a world where there is only sand, and nothing but sand. I mean, if you happen to like sand, why not? The first looks more varied, and might be likened to a possibly exciting landscape. This is paint-by-Coin-Toss, right?

The point is though, that there is nothing objectively marvellous about our universe - to come back to the FTA. There are no objective standards by which you could tell that a biological life supporting universe rates 'higher' than other possible universes or worlds. What you have is a collection of subjective (and very, very limited) opinions, and they all say "Biological Life - Good." Then you take these opinions and transfer them onto some FineTuningDevice, then you forget that you just did that, and totally surprised find out that the FineTuningDevice also thinks "Biological Life - Good."

And then you offer it as a solution to the possible, but (maybe!) unlikey world where "Biological Life" is true.

You probably cannot even begin to understand that to some FineTuningDevice a world, which to you looks as messy/undesirable/boring as trillions of others, might be the one and true masterpiece.

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

Second. Based on my perspective and experience. Something which you, in the case of unverses/possible worlds do not even have.

 

[rocketdodger]

You seem to be taking this personally. Weren't you the one who started the ill-fated "Why Malerin is wrong" thread?

1) You still haven't cited evidence that life is "crushingly improbable."

2) The thread "Why Malerin is wrong" was not ill-fated according to any definition of "ill-fated" because:

a) I learned something about probability.

b) It was shown that you are indeed wrong in your naive application of Bayes rule.

 

[rocketdodger]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

What does this have to do with the FT argument?

Hint: Try providing a mathematical argument for either coin being more analagous to our universe.

Hint #2: Try providing a mathematical argument for why a device that produces a value of a binary variable is remotely similar to the device that produces universal constants.

 

[Hokulele]

Oddly enough, this is the hardest thing for some people to grasp. All results are equally likely, but not all results are best explained by chance. For example, suppose you toss coin A a bunch of times and get:
HHTHTTHTHTHHHTTHHTHTHHTTHTHTTTHTHHHTTHTHTHHTTHTHTHTHHTT

And you toss coin B and get:

HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

Both results are equally likely. But one of the coins is almost certainly biased. Care to guess which?

The answer depends on which result you were trying for originally. If you wanted the perfect mix of results, the first coin is biased in the direction you require. The second one, not so much.

 

[rocketdodger]

Why should the values be set at the precise amounts needed to make life possible?

Why shouldn't they be?

Are you ever going to even attempt to provide an argument for your position here, or are you going to continue merely repeating the assertion in the hopes that we will buy it eventually?

 

[rocketdodger]

The answer depends on which result you were trying for originally. If you wanted the perfect mix of results, the first coin is biased in the direction you require. The second one, not so much.

I think you can mathematically show that coin B is indeed more "biased."

The proof proceeds by setting up probabilities that a string of X tosses will have at least Y heads and Z tails. Do that enough times, for all combinations of X, Y, and Z that can fit in the given strings, and it should be clear that coin A satisfies more possible descriptions than B. And as far as probability is concerned that means it is more likely in a sense.

EDIT: More possible distinct descriptions, that is.

 

[Hokulele]

I think you can mathematically show that coin B is indeed more "biased."

The proof proceeds by setting up probabilities that a string of X tosses will have at least Y heads and Z tails. Do that enough times, for all combinations of X, Y, and Z that can fit in the given strings, and it should be clear that coin A satisfies more possible descriptions than B. And as far as probability is concerned that means it is more likely in a sense.

EDIT: More possible distinct descriptions, that is.

And as Robin noted, we can only go by what is already observed, which says nothing about "do that enough times" or "combinations of X, Y, and Z".

In the case described by Malerin, bias only exists when a particular outcome is desired, and to have the exact strings he listed are equally unlikely. In other words, in Malerin's example, bias can be claimed for either coin.

 

[rocketdodger]

And as Robin noted, we can only go by what is already observed, which says nothing about "do that enough times" or "combinations of X, Y, and Z".

In the case described by Malerin, bias only exists when a particular outcome is desired, and to have the exact strings he listed are equally unlikely. In other words, in Malerin's example, bias can be claimed for either coin.

No thats not what I meant.

Let me start the proof -- for each coin, add up all of these values:

a) The occurences of at least one H in a substring of 1
b) The occurences of at least one T in a substring of 1
c) The occurences of at least two H in a substring of 2
d) The occurences of at least two T in a substring of 2

.
.
.
n) The occurrences of at least Y H in a substring of Z
n+1) The occurences of at least Y T in a substring of Z
n+2) The occurences of at least one T AND one H in a substring of 2

.
.
.
m) The occurences of at least two T AND one H in a substring of 3
m+1) The occurences of at least two H AND one T in a substring of 3

.
.
.

o) <some permutation of T AND H> in a substring of <length of the original string>

As you can see, up until line n) coin B has accumulated a higher number. But the additional lines past that more than make up for it. By the time you get to line o), coin A has easily taken the lead.

And I think you can make a formal argument showing that, for instance, a string of all H with just a single T is less "biased" than the string of all H, and a string with 2 T is even less "biased," etc.

EDIT -- actually, I think you are correct - coin A is not less biased in a general sense. Because above I used the concept of "at least" instead of "exactly," and if you look for "exactly" a certain configuration (for example, occurences of exactly HHH in a substring of a given length) then coin B is indeed less biased than A.

Malerin, do you have anything to say about that? Care to give a formal argument against our conclusion?

 

[Hokulele]

OK, I can see where you are going with this (other than the fact that m comes before n ). I guess my main objection to Malerin's analogy is that is the universe that we observe a series of coin flips, or a whole bunch of coins flipped simultaneously?