The fine tuning argument

[thaiboxerken]

The Anthropic Principle, which has four distinctive identities is in fact a fine tuning arguement. Quantum physics has much to say on the subject.

No, it doesn't.

 

[Malerin]

For a start, many of the fine tuning arguments suffer from the logical fallacy of Making Up Bull**** and Pulling It Out Of Your Ass. They almost never cite the source of the claims of "if such-and-such a parameter was more than one billion-trillionth different". And when they do, it's inevitably quote-mined and provided without context.

Secondly, the fine tuning argument states merely that "if things were different, they would be different", which is so pathetic that it can be easily countered by the equally pathetic Anthropic Principle: If the universe were not capable of producing life, life would not have been produced. The universe has to be the way it is, because otherwise we wouldn't be here.

Thirdly, many of these arguments involve tweaking a single parameter at a time while leaving all the others constant and demonstrating that the universe is not stable enough to produce life under those conditions. There are several solutions for stable universes where all or several of the parameters are changed, for example. We might have been living in one of those, if things were actually different.

Yeah. The Fine Tuning argument falls way short of being convincing.

Here's some interesting quotes. http://www.godandscience.org/apologetics/quotes.html

A more unbiased site:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/#4.1

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

For a start, many of the fine tuning arguments suffer from the logical fallacy of Making Up Bull**** and Pulling It Out Of Your Ass. They almost never cite the source of the claims of "if such-and-such a parameter was more than one billion-trillionth different". And when they do, it's inevitably quote-mined and provided without context.

Secondly, the fine tuning argument states merely that "if things were different, they would be different", which is so pathetic that it can be easily countered by the equally pathetic Anthropic Principle: If the universe were not capable of producing life, life would not have been produced. The universe has to be the way it is, because otherwise we wouldn't be here.

Thirdly, many of these arguments involve tweaking a single parameter at a time while leaving all the others constant and demonstrating that the universe is not stable enough to produce life under those conditions. There are several solutions for stable universes where all or several of the parameters are changed, for example. We might have been living in one of those, if things were actually different.

Yeah. The Fine Tuning argument falls way short of being convincing.

And finally, as Michael Shermer said (though I'm not sure if he was quoting someone), "The universe is not finely tuned for us. We are finely tuned for it". In other words, we had to evolve our way through life to become adapted to the conditions of our planet, and in a broader sense, the Universe. If we had not adapted, if our successful ancestors had not left any offspring, we wouldn't be here. That's not dependent on the Universe, but us.

 

[Malerin]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

1. The universe is contingent upon something - X
2. X is unique in all existence
3. X is capabable of producing only one universe
4. X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
5. Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
6. If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.

Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.​

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

The argument is usually formulated as a probabilistic argument where the evidence (the precise life-permitting values of the physical constants) is more likely given the existence of God than by random chance. The problem for the FT argument is the evidence is equally likely given the existence of a sufficiently large multiverse (or a single oscillating universe).

 

[Malerin]

And finally, as Michael Shermer said (though I'm not sure if he was quoting someone), "The universe is not finely tuned for us. We are finely tuned for it". In other words, we had to evolve our way through life to become adapted to the conditions of our planet, and in a broader sense, the Universe. If we had not adapted, if our successful ancestors had not left any offspring, we wouldn't be here. That's not dependent on the Universe, but us.

It's possible to counterfactually assign odds to an event (or evidence) you know has already happened. For example, one of the best confirming pieces of evidence for relativity was that it accurately predicted Mercury's eccentric orbit, even though Mercury's eccentric orbit had been known since Newton's time. If the probability of Mercury's orbit had been 1 (because it was already known), it could not have confirmed relativity theory. In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.

Indeed, and I never claimed the opposite.
Wondering about the likelihood of our existence is to be expected.

 

[Hokulele]

It's possible to counterfactually assign odds to an event (or evidence) you know has already happened. For example, one of the best confirming pieces of evidence for relativity was that it accurately predicted Mercury's eccentric orbit, even though Mercury's eccentric orbit had been known since Newton's time. If the probability of Mercury's orbit had been 1 (because it was already known), it could not have confirmed relativity theory. In the same way, the fact that we exist doesn't mean we can't counterfactually wonder about the likelihood of our existence.

This is not a good example of what you are claiming. Mercury's orbit was known, but could not be modeled by any theory known at the time. When Einstein came up with General Relativity, the model matched reality. No odds or probability needed to be calculated, so your point is basically a non sequitur.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Relativity explains why Mercury has the particular orbit that it has to high precision. God theory does not explain why Mercury has this particular orbit.

Furthermore, even without a multiverse, what you're left with in terms of FT is whether or not the parameters "just were" what they were, or whether or not there "just was" a god that made the parameters what they were. If you consider it highly unlikely for the parameters to be such that life exists in the first place, why would you not consider it even more unlikely that existence is such that there would be an infinite, omniscient entity in the first place?

 

[Malerin]

This is not a good example of what you are claiming. Mercury's orbit was known, but could not be modeled by any theory known at the time. When Einstein came up with General Relativity, the model matched reality. No odds or probability needed to be calculated, so your point is basically a non sequitur.

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?

 

[Hokulele]

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?

Because none of the other models matched reality. General relativity was the only one that could (at the time).

It would be more like you knew your wife was in the house, but you only knew of people entering houses through door, and since you never saw her coming in a door, her presence was inexplicable. Once she showed you how to climb through a window, her sudden presence made sense.

In other words, your argument regarding Mercury and GR has absolutely nothing to do with fune tuning and probability. Yes, we knew what Mercury's orbit looked like, we just didn't know how to explain it.

 

[Malerin]

Relativity explains why Mercury has the particular orbit that it has to high precision. God theory does not explain why Mercury has this particular orbit.

God theory explains why the numbers have the values they do: God, so the story goes, is sympathetic towards life, and so fine-tuned a life-permitting universe.

Furthermore, even without a multiverse, what you're left with in terms of FT is whether or not the parameters "just were" what they were, or whether or not there "just was" a god that made the parameters what they were. If you consider it highly unlikely for the parameters to be such that life exists in the first place, why would you not consider it even more unlikely that existence is such that there would be an infinite, omniscient entity in the first place?

Why would I consider it? For one, you're comparing the odds of a natural physical process to the odds of the existence of a supernatural God. Such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way, as I think you're suggesting. The Big Bang and God are in two seperate ontological realms. You're implying (I think) that the long odds surrounding one (constants and their life-permitting values) lead to, or are suggestive, the long odds of another. Unless God is somehow inextricablly bound to life-permitting universes, the long odds of one have nothing to do with the odds of the other.

Another way to attack the FT argument is if you assign an extremely low probability to "God Exists". If the odds of all the constants having the right values was 1 in a trillion, and you think the liklihood of the existence of God is also 1 in a trillion (extreme strong atheism), the argument won't mean anything to you. The question would then be, why you have such an extremely strong atheistic position? Problem of evil, etc.

 

[arthwollipot]

In other words, the model predicted (matched) evidence that was already known to exist (and since it was known to exist, should have had a Pr of 1). I mean, if I have a "premonition" of my wife coming home after she's already walked through the door, that's not much good. Even though my clairvoyance "matched" reality, I did it after the fact. So why did relatavity theory get such a boost predicting (or matching) something that was already known to exist?

A model can "predict" data that is known to exist. Where some piece of data that appears arbitrary suddenly becomes derivable within a theory, then that theory is said to have "predicted" that data.

In other words, if we know that X is 4 by directly measuring it, that's data.

If we then come up with a theory that explains why X is 4 - or in other words if we do a calculation within the theory and the solution comes out as X = 4, then that gives us a reason to trust that our theory is accurate.

"Predicting" known values is an important test for a new theory. Take the standard model of particle physics as an example. The masses and force charges of the twelve fermions are known by measurement. Superstring (M) theory has the potential to predict these numbers - in other words, for these numbers to be the results of calculations done within the theory. One reason superstring theory isn't generally accepted yet is that these calculations have not yet been done. If one day the string theorists can say that their theory predicts that the electon should have a mass of 0.51 MeV, that will be strong evidence that the theory is accurate.

This is only an example. Please don't take this as a suggestion to derail the thread into a discussion of superstring theory.

 

[Malerin]

Because none of the other models matched reality. General relativity was the only one that could (at the time).

It would be more like you knew your wife was in the house, but you only knew of people entering houses through door, and since you never saw her coming in a door, her presence was inexplicable. Once she showed you how to climb through a window, her sudden presence made sense.

That's right. Relatavity theory wasn't "rigged" to predict Mercury's orbit. So it got confirmation from an already known piece of evidence.

n other words, your argument regarding Mercury and GR has absolutely nothing to do with fune tuning and probability. Yes, we knew what Mercury's orbit looked like, we just didn't know how to explain it.

You could say something similar: yes, we know life is here, we just don't know how to explain it. Part of explaining why there's life is accounting for the myriad of constants that all had to have just the right values for life to have a chance. Hawking and Davies talk about some kind of weird backwards quantum causation where the present is "informing" the universe's past (I don't get it). Multiverse theory is popular with lots of other physicists. A few are challenging the idea that the constants have to have precise values (Go to Victor Stenger's MonkeyGod program at his website and play around with it).

 

[Malerin]

A model can "predict" data that is known to exist.

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

 

[arthwollipot]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

Want to read my earlier post again? I covered this in my first point.

 

[Hokulele]

That's right. Relatavity theory wasn't "rigged" to predict Mercury's orbit. So it got confirmation from an already known piece of evidence.

Yes, which helped lead to its larger acceptance in terms of applying to fields outside of pure orbital mechanics. I don't see how this helps any fine tuning argument.

You could say something similar: yes, we know life is here, we just don't know how to explain it.

This is in no way similar (other than by equivocating over the word "explain"). A fine tuning argument is trying to show that life cannot exist any other way, rather than trying to explain why life exists the way we see it. It is almost the exact opposite of Mercury and GR. It is only if life can exist in no other way can you slip in an argument for a fine tuner.

In other words, one of the main reasons a fine tuning argument is guaranteed to fail is because it is built on a premise of a proven negative.

Part of explaining why there's life is accounting for the myriad of constants that all had to have just the right values for life to have a chance. Hawking and Davies talk about some kind of weird backwards quantum causation where the present is "informing" the universe's past (I don't get it). Multiverse theory is popular with lots of other physicists. A few are challenging the idea that the constants have to have precise values (Go to Victor Stenger's MonkeyGod program at his website and play around with it).

That only works if you are assuming that life cannot exist any other way. The three examples you give can explain how universes could work (of course, I can't think of any way any of these can actually be proven), but do not touch on what life does or does not require.

Granted, we only know of one example of how life can happen, but that says nothing about how life cannot happen. And of course, this assumes that you know what is meant by the term "life" to begin with...

 

[yy2bggggs]

Why would I consider it? For one, you're comparing the odds of a natural physical process to the odds of the existence of a supernatural God. Such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way, as I think you're suggesting.

Can you derive that such a God's existence would not be contingent on a set of numbers being the right way?

The Big Bang and God are in two seperate ontological realms. You're implying (I think) that the long odds surrounding one (constants and their life-permitting values) lead to, or are suggestive, the long odds of another.

Can you derive that they are not?

Without such a derivation, the theory makes no sense, despite the odds you give to mortal life, because you're introducing an entity that is much grander than the one you're trying to explain.

Unless God is somehow inextricablly bound to life-permitting universes, the long odds of one have nothing to do with the odds of the other.

But wait... isn't that exactly what you are arguing--that the long odds of one does have to do with the long odds of the other? Isn't that the crux of the FT argument for God?

Another way to attack the FT argument is if you assign an extremely low probability to "God Exists".

A better way to phrase this is that the probability assigned to "God Exists" should be low a priori.

The question would then be, why you have such an extremely strong atheistic position? Problem of evil, etc.

Not quite. Problem of evil has its merit, but it can only argue against one of the tri-omni style gods. The major issue is that it's an extremely grand speculative entity that in itself has to be to be, just as we have to be to be. Said being isn't a great explanation for how we got here until your explanation actually incorporates how said being got here, or at least until you establish that said being is here.

The argument, essentially, is that it's much more likely for this much more grand being to have existed in the first place and then caused us to exist, than it is for us to simply exist. That's not too convincing of an argument without that grand being's presence in the first place.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Right. If you run the naturalistic model (no multiverse), you get a prediction of 1 in a very large number that life will exist. That begs the question: Did we just get lucky?

Yes, extremely lucky that we happen to have just the right type of God. A God with opinions and desires amazingly similar to our own. Just imagine that was not the case ...


Sorry, if there is a problem somewhere then the "theistic model" does not solve it. There is an infinite amount of things about God that could by just being slightly different prevent the creation of a universe that supports biological life. Fine tuned?

 

[Dancing David]

I have always regarded the fine tuning as the most intriguing and hardest to counter argument for the existence of God.

On the other hand I have never found it particularly convincing

One of the problems is that I have never seen it stated as an actual argument - I thought that I would try to put this in an argument form and see if I have got it right:

1. The universe is contingent upon something - X
2. X is unique in all existence
3. X is capabable of producing only one universe
4. X is capable of producing a universe in a vast number of different ways and might have produced any of these at random
5. Let i be the number of ways X has of producing a universe and j be the number of ways it has of producing a universe with the right conditions for life, then i > j by several orders of magnitude.
6. If 1,2,3,4 and 5 are true then the probability of there having been a universe capable of producing life is vanishingly small and therefore it is rational to accept that X has intelligence and intention.

Therefore it is rational to accept that the universe is contingent upon something which has intelligence and intention.​

Do I have it right, or at least is that the ball-park?

You got the argument right.

Well for one they usually get something basic totaly wrong.

 

[Dancing David]

Like here where Collins allegedly uses carter to make a point!

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Revised Version of Fine-tuning for anthology.doc

Of course, a billion-fold increase in the strength of gravity is large in absolute terms, but compared to the total range of strengths of the forces in nature (which span a range of 10⁴⁰ as we saw above), this still amounts to a fine-tuning of one part in 10³¹.

So a billion fold increase in gravity becomes 10^-30 because of what, he compares the strength of gravity to the strong force.

So in Collin's logic 1,000,000,000=1/10³⁰
Yeah that is fine tuning all right!