The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

Well, not really. In their day to day work, physicists might do engineering, engineers do physics, and both of them could be involved in chemistry and computing. The boundaries only matter when discussing philosophical matters on a forum like this.

Gotcha.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Yeah, I would have left long ago if not for the disgusting piece of **** that is UnrealEngine3.

I spend literally half my day waiting for it to build -- what else am I gonna do during that time, besides arguing with uneducated keyboard philosophers?

Boredom makes people do terrible things, things they're not proud of...lol

 

[dlorde]

Have a aspirins?

I'll just stop banging my head on your palaver.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's not my fault that your laughable definition is so imprecise that it's entirely impossible to define what is part of the system and what isn't. What parts of the computer are part of the system when it's doing computing? The electrons passing through the processor? The silicon itself? The silicon substrate? The circuit board? The memory? The disc drive? The box? The floor holding up the box? The monitor? The keyboard? The power supply? The electric circuit that powers the whole thing? The power station supplying the electricity that makes the program work? The man who monitors the dials at the power station? The lady who brings him his tea?

Any of these can be included or excluded from the definition of the computing process on an entirely arbitrary basis - because the definition is so flimsy that it doesn't include or exclude anything.

Compare this to a salt crystal sitting on a saucer. Is the air around the crystal part of the crystal? Is the saucer part of the crystal? Are the sodium atoms part of the crystal?

The answers to these questions are easy and obvious. It's possible then to produce fuzzy boundaries if we want. Dissolve the crystal, mix in impurities, whatever. The difference is that we still have a sound definition from which to proceed. In the case of computing, we have nothing. There's not one part of the "system" which we can clearly say is or isn't inside or outside. It's all fuzz. There's no "there" there.

Yes, the definition is laughable and imprecise.

The fact remains -- despite your numerous attempts at avoiding it -- that you can post a message on this forum using a working computer and you cannot post a message on this forum using a non functioning pile of parts.

I provided a very clear physical reason for that. A person of sufficient intelligence and/or education would be able to see how that physical definition I provided is the foundation for the behavior of an entire computer and not a bowl of soup.

So what if you don't think my definition is good enough? Are you now claiming that you can post messages on this forum using a pile of non functioning parts, because my "definition" of computing isn't easy for you to understand?

Do you honestly think that your inability to think of something is going to impact the behavior of reality? Why don't you post your response using a pile of computer parts, instead of a working computer, westprog, and prove us all wrong?

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, not really. In their day to day work, physicists might do engineering, engineers do physics, and both of them could be involved in chemistry and computing. The boundaries only matter when discussing philosophical matters on a forum like this.

The boundaries don't exist except in day to day work.

The known universe is made of particles. Lots of them. Nothing else.

The only differences between particles, or groups of particles, or groups of groups, or groups of groups of groups, is behavior.

That is why your argument that certain things are physical and others not physical -- despite the fact that everything is fundamentally the science of the behavior of particles -- is just wrong.

 

[westprog]

Yes, the definition is laughable and imprecise.

The fact remains -- despite your numerous attempts at avoiding it -- that you can post a message on this forum using a working computer and you cannot post a message on this forum using a non functioning pile of parts.

I provided a very clear physical reason for that. A person of sufficient intelligence and/or education would be able to see how that physical definition I provided is the foundation for the behavior of an entire computer and not a bowl of soup.

So what if you don't think my definition is good enough? Are you now claiming that you can post messages on this forum using a pile of non functioning parts, because my "definition" of computing isn't easy for you to understand?

Do you honestly think that your inability to think of something is going to impact the behavior of reality? Why don't you post your response using a pile of computer parts, instead of a working computer, westprog, and prove us all wrong?

So now the definition has gone from "behave in a predictable fashion" to "able to post a message on an internet forum". Which would of course exclude all kinds of computing devices.

I took Rocketdodger's definition of a system performing computation and applied it to the pile of unconnected computer parts. It fitted just fine. Now, apparently, the problem is not with the definition, but with me.

Note that I also gave the example of the crystal on a saucer, in which case it's entirely clear what is part of the crystal and what isn't. Simple definition. No ambiguity.

 

[westprog]

The boundaries don't exist except in day to day work.

The known universe is made of particles. Lots of them. Nothing else.

The only differences between particles, or groups of particles, or groups of groups, or groups of groups of groups, is behavior.

That is why your argument that certain things are physical and others not physical -- despite the fact that everything is fundamentally the science of the behavior of particles -- is just wrong.

If that were true - and it isn't - then everything we do and say would be part of physics. It isn't. Physics is science, and the rules for science are quite strict. Science is about definitions and predictions. If a definition can't be made, it isn't physics, whether it deals with the universe or not. One might as well say that journalism is physics.

 

[rocketdodger]

So now the definition has gone from "behave in a predictable fashion" to "able to post a message on an internet forum". Which would of course exclude all kinds of computing devices.

That wasn't the definition. Being able to categorize input was the definition.

And congratulations on avoiding the issue -- yet again. I take it, since you refuse to answer, that you are indeed using a working computer to make these posts.

Case closed.

I took Rocketdodger's definition of a system performing computation and applied it to the pile of unconnected computer parts. It fitted just fine. Now, apparently, the problem is not with the definition, but with me.

I took the definition of crystal and applied it to a drop of liquid water. It fitted just fine.

Yet, the entire drop is still not a crystal.

The problem is with you. Furthermore, I don't know why you are speaking as if you have an audience, because nobody with any credibility on this thread thinks you know what you are talking about.

Note that I also gave the example of the crystal on a saucer, in which case it's entirely clear what is part of the crystal and what isn't. Simple definition. No ambiguity.

Note that I also gave the example of a drop of water, in which case it is not clear at all what is part of the crystal and what isn't. Simple definition, lots of ambiguity.

Look, it is exceedingly simple.

Take a snowflake, take a computer.

Crush both of them into little pieces.

Do you still have a crystal? every piece is still crystalline, so why isn't the pile itself a crystal?

Do you still have a working computer? some pieces might still compute, so why isn't the pile itself a working computer

 

[rocketdodger]

If that were true - and it isn't - then everything we do and say would be part of physics. It isn't. Physics is science, and the rules for science are quite strict. Science is about definitions and predictions. If a definition can't be made, it isn't physics, whether it deals with the universe or not. One might as well say that journalism is physics.

Oh, how the tides have turned!

So now you are the one claiming a fundamental difference exists between things.

Alright, I'll bite -- what is the difference?

What is the fundamental difference, say, between an atom of hydrogen and a bacterium? They are made, fundamentally, of the same stuff. So what else is it? Is there any qualitative difference between the two?

 

[westprog]

Take a snowflake, take a computer.

Crush both of them into little pieces.

Do you still have a crystal? every piece is still crystalline, so why isn't the pile itself a crystal?

Because the definition of a crystal - a sound, complete, scientific definition - tells us how the atoms of a crystal have to interconnect. There have to be particular types of chemical bonds between all the atoms in a crystal.

That's how science works - precise, meaningful definitions. We know how to describe crystals.

Do you still have a working computer? some pieces might still compute, so why isn't the pile itself a working computer

Because the words "working computer" are an engineering term, and are meaningless in physics. Which point has been made very clear by the hamfisted attempts to provide a physical definition.

It's telling that when your definition fell apart, you reverted to the meaningful definition of a computer - in its affects on human consciousness, in its ability to send messages to this forum and effect people's minds.

 

[westprog]

Oh, how the tides have turned!

So now you are the one claiming a fundamental difference exists between things.

Aha! Something is different to something else, so Rocketdodger is vindicated!

Alright, I'll bite -- what is the difference?

What is the fundamental difference, say, between an atom of hydrogen and a bacterium? They are made, fundamentally, of the same stuff. So what else is it? Is there any qualitative difference between the two?

Differences between objects in science are a matter of physical definitions. So we can determine that crystalline matter is different from non-crystalline matter. We can determine that a liquid is different from a gas, or a proton is different from an electron, or that gravity is different from the strong force.

Not only is this true, I've never said or implied that it isn't true.

What is also true is that there is no physical difference between the class of objects called computers and other objects. This has been demonstrated on this forum by Rocketdodger's inability to provide such a definition. When he attempted it, as with switches, he either makes his definition too wide, or too narrow. He either makes it the ability to respond uniformly to multiple stimuli (which is almost anything) or the ability to post to JREF (which excludes a vast array of computing devices).

This should not be surprising. If computers were well defined in physics, then they'd be part of physics. They aren't. They are part of engineering, where it's quite legitimate to say a computer, or a car, or a wheel, or a chisel is whatever we define them to be.

 

[westprog]

It's not my fault that your laughable definition is so imprecise that it's entirely impossible to define what is part of the system and what isn't. What parts of the computer are part of the system when it's doing computing? The electrons passing through the processor? The silicon itself? The silicon substrate? The circuit board? The memory? The disc drive? The box? The floor holding up the box? The monitor? The keyboard? The power supply? The electric circuit that powers the whole thing? The power station supplying the electricity that makes the program work? The man who monitors the dials at the power station? The lady who brings him his tea?

Any of these can be included or excluded from the definition of the computing process on an entirely arbitrary basis - because the definition is so flimsy that it doesn't include or exclude anything.

Compare this to a salt crystal sitting on a saucer. Is the air around the crystal part of the crystal? Is the saucer part of the crystal? Are the sodium atoms part of the crystal?

The answers to these questions are easy and obvious. It's possible then to produce fuzzy boundaries if we want. Dissolve the crystal, mix in impurities, whatever. The difference is that we still have a sound definition from which to proceed. In the case of computing, we have nothing. There's not one part of the "system" which we can clearly say is or isn't inside or outside. It's all fuzz. There's no "there" there.

Just mentioning that while Rocketdodger has been claiming that nobody is taking me seriously, he's not actually addressed the above points.

 

[rocketdodger]

Just mentioning that while Rocketdodger has been claiming that nobody is taking me seriously, he's not actually addressed the above points.

First -- wrong. It is quite clear exactly what the computer is. It is the thing that computes.

Second -- why are you addressing me via the third person? Are you familiar with the term "grandstanding?"

 

[westprog]

First -- wrong. It is quite clear exactly what the computer is. It is the thing that computes.

And computing is what a computer does. Neat.

Really, it would have been better to just ignore the question instead of to ignore it and pretend to answer it.

Here's the question again:

It's not my fault that your laughable definition is so imprecise that it's entirely impossible to define what is part of the system and what isn't. What parts of the computer are part of the system when it's doing computing? The electrons passing through the processor? The silicon itself? The silicon substrate? The circuit board? The memory? The disc drive? The box? The floor holding up the box? The monitor? The keyboard? The power supply? The electric circuit that powers the whole thing? The power station supplying the electricity that makes the program work? The man who monitors the dials at the power station? The lady who brings him his tea?

The fact that there is no answer to this question is in itself telling.

Second -- why are you addressing me via the third person? Are you familiar with the term "grandstanding?"

This is not a private conversation. We're addressing an audience. It's the audience who will evaluate this discussion.

 

[Belz...]

The point is that crystallisation is a well-defined property of matter. Where crystalline and non-crystalline matter are intermingled, we may be ignorant of the precise proportions, but that doesn't mean that the concept itself is imprecise.

But that is EXACTLY what we're saying about consciousness.

If the physical theory of consciousness were as well defined as the theory of crystals, then it would be in the physics books in its own chapter.

Irrelevant, again. You're jumping left and right, trying to avoid having to admit the obvious.

 

[Belz...]

I'm not saying that perceptions are not responses. When it comes down to it perception is a class of response. What I'm proposing is that there must be a specifiable media which is responding to stimuli by producing what we call perceptions. I'm not saying that experience is not a 'behavior' or response; I'm saying that there must be a very specific class of physical interaction that generates experience and that if we determine what this specific class of interaction is we will have found 'consciousness'.

Fair enough. I think, however, that we've been assuming this additional layer for far too long, and I don't think it's been warranted. This is based on my own experiences, mind you, but also on the direction that the relevant scientific fields seem to be taking.

But there is no absolute division between process and 'thing'. All objects have both a particulate and wave nature.

They're still things. Is a wave a process, or a thing ? I honestly don't know how physicists see that.

Not only that. Words, sounds, markings -- w/e -- have no meaning outside of what we give to them. If one decides to make a phoneme in reference to phonemes then it is so.

Not really. Words have arbitrary meaning but they do have meaning because we give meaning to them. Phonemes have no meaning in any language.

So you view science as being more a search for process rather than substance?

Indeed.

If even light and sound can be broken down into particulate quanta, what makes you think that 'private behaviors' would be exempt?

Again I 'd go with the "running" analogy. You can't talk about the act by refering to its sub-atomic constituents only. You have to describe their behaviour as well.

And even if I agreed, I'd simply answer that the quanta of private behaviours are the same quanta as those of other behaviours, so the term "qualia" is really a placeholder for something even more basic, anyway.

You don't need to be an 'authority' to apply your own critical thinking.

No, indeed. And such ways of thinking produce young-earth creationists, holocaust deniers, and global warming critics.

When you asked me how I knew that you were conscious I replied that I didn't. I said I could only infer from your responses and make a tentative guess. You then pointed out that outward behavior is not necessarily indicative of conscious perception:

Under YOUR definitions, not mine. I don't believe in qualia, remember ?

There is no contradiction. You can infer my consciousness from my behaviour but you do not observe ALL my behaviours.

The simple fact of the matter is that if one has perceptions of the world, they are conscious.

How do you determine if I'm more conscious than an 8mm camera, then ?

 

[Belz...]

Yes, subsets of the entire system can do computation.

Just like portions of a water droplet can crystallize.

That doesn't make the whole drop a crystal. Nor does it make the whole pile a computer.

Nice try, but as you know, since we haven't a clue how consciousness work and how computation work... er... that means your crystal argument is ... wrong... somehow.

So now the definition has gone from "behave in a predictable fashion" to "able to post a message on an internet forum". Which would of course exclude all kinds of computing devices.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'm not saying that perceptions are not responses. When it comes down to it perception is a class of response. What I'm proposing is that there must be a specifiable media which is responding to stimuli by producing what we call perceptions. I'm not saying that experience is not a 'behavior' or response; I'm saying that there must be a very specific class of physical interaction that generates experience and that if we determine what this specific class of interaction is we will have found 'consciousness'.

Fair enough. I think, however, that we've been assuming this additional layer for far too long, and I don't think it's been warranted. This is based on my own experiences, mind you, but also on the direction that the relevant scientific fields seem to be taking.

I think I'd tend to agree with you on that one. As much as my arguments sound like a case for dualism what I'm really seeking to do is propose a way to come upon a more satisfactory definition of consciousness w/o having to resort to Cartesian dualism.

They're still things. Is a wave a process, or a thing ? I honestly don't know how physicists see that.

I'm sure many of them don't worry about the question overly much and just do physics. For the most part, unless one is a purely theoretical scientist or philosopher, physics isn't in the business of metaphysical interpretation. They generally just go on the ontological terms already put in place and use them as best they can.

Personally, I'm a bit obsessive about trying to categorize and make sense of the world in my own way. Just as long as the schemes I'm going by are consistent with known facts and logically coherent I'm not too concerned with whether or not its a mainstream opinion. I guess a big part of why I like participating on these forums is that I get help from other people to make sure they actually are logically sound.

Not really. Words have arbitrary meaning but they do have meaning because we give meaning to them. Phonemes have no meaning in any language.

It seems like this is more of a to-may-to/to-mah-to issue. Even if we come to some kind of mutual agreement on this its probably not a worthwhile digression. We could probably start an entirely different discussion on this topic alone.

So you view science as being more a search for process rather than substance?

Indeed.

Okay

If even light and sound can be broken down into particulate quanta, what makes you think that 'private behaviors' would be exempt?

Again I 'd go with the "running" analogy. You can't talk about the act by refering to its sub-atomic constituents only. You have to describe their behaviour as well.

And even if I agreed, I'd simply answer that the quanta of private behaviours are the same quanta as those of other behaviours, so the term "qualia" is really a placeholder for something even more basic, anyway.

This is why I've come to the conclusion that what we call consciousness is probably a physical state and 'qualia' would be informational quanta within the context of such a state. I don't think there is some separate metaphysical reality for mental phenomena. In order for the mental to have any physical relevance it must have direct relation to the physical -- and our mental states and thoughts clearly do have physical relevance. It seems that before consciousness becomes reproducible by computer engineers and technicians it must be better understood by neuroscience and biophysics.

No, indeed. And such ways of thinking produce young-earth creationists, holocaust deniers, and global warming critics.

Which is why I try to base my opinions off of reliable sources. My conclusions and interpretations may be very different from your own but they are still in reference to the same body of established facts.

There is no contradiction. You can infer my consciousness from my behaviour but you do not observe ALL my behaviours.

[...]

How do you determine if I'm more conscious than an 8mm camera, then ?

The main reason why I'm convinced that consciousness is not the same as general information process [and why I distinguish perceptions from sensory input] is because such processes continue to go on even when we're not conscious. This strongly suggests that there must be very specific physical criteria for consciousness; its more specific than just receiving/processing sensory input.

As you and others have pointed out, we determine whether a subject is conscious by observing their external behaviors. What I'm proposing is that there must be some way to narrow down the diagnostic list of consciousness even further. It should be possible to find out what exact physical states and behaviors constitute being conscious. I suspect that once that has been determined scientists will be able to go about figuring out how to determine which 'public behaviors' necessarily correlate with particular 'private behaviors'. Once there is more sufficient scientific understanding of how this comes about, people like RD will be able to apply it to their field of work. Whether one wants to call such processes 'qualia', private behavior, or magical pixydust doesn't matter. The point is that they are well within the abilities of science to study but the expertise to do so has not been developed yet. There is a hard problem but it is solvable.

 

[Belz...]

The main reason why I'm convinced that consciousness is not the same as general information process [and why I distinguish perceptions from sensory input] is because such processes continue to go on even when we're not conscious.

I would rather suggest that they are not as conscious.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I would rather suggest that they are not as conscious.

That's a reasonable proposal, but I'm a bit leery of accepting it. It seems that going that route invokes panpsychism and that opens other philosophical doors I'm not ready to get into yet...