Science and free will

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why? Why can't they be an act of free will which isn't determined by anything.

Because indeterminate free will is a silly idea.

There is a difference between "being aware of" and "being constrained by". Your thoughts are constrained by what your brain is doing. You can't have a thought which doesn't have some sort of neural correlate. So those thoughts are determined. But the agent isn't your thoughts at all - it is the thing which is aware of those thoughts. IT is not determined.

I have no idea how the agent is created, so I don't know if it's determined. But if the agent's will is also not determined, then my willfull actions are arbitrary.

We need to get the above sorted out before I address that question. At the moment you still think the agent is being constrained by things which it is aware of, but not constrained by.

As I just said, I don't understand what the agent is. I'm talking about the agent's decisions. I hope they are constrained by something or else I'm quite scared of these pesky agents.

~~ Paul

 

[paximperium]

There's no agreement because the materialists haven't got the first frickin' clue how to solve the problem.

Is there even a problem? That is the question.

All they are agreed on is that there definately must be a materialistic answer and that anyone who thinks differently is a deluded religious idiot.

Hey, we can come to an agreement here. Congrats.

Sounds a lot like creationism, doesn't it? The creationists are all agreed that evolution is wrong, but that's all they agree on.

No. You see, Creationist oppose something called facts. Materialist don't even know if they need to oppose something that may or may not even exist. Hence the debate.

The materialists are all agreed that there is no reason whatsoever to believe in anything they class as "woo",...

That statement is so stupid and is such a strawman, it deserves no response.

...but as soon as the discussion strays outside the boundaries of science, they've no idea what to say and each materialist ends up saying something different.

Yawn. Talk about False Analogies. When the discussion strays outside of REALITY, then the conversation goes all over the place since there is no basis for anything anymore but the oh so wonder opinion and semantic play that philosphers love so much.

It is a wonderful magical world where via word play they can magic things into their own reality.

Most of them can't even get their own version of it straight, let alone get it to agree with the versions of all the other materialists. But they don't make up BULLCRAP, oh no. Bullcrap? No, it's faecal matter from a male bovine.

Sorry, when you start to talk about things that may not exist and strays outside into fantasy land, conjecture and logic games rules the day. You don't win a war of fantasy just because you're consistently. You could well be consistently wrong.

I actually enjoy these mental acrobatics. I change my mind. I change my arguments. I learn new things.

I don't keep playing the apologetic shell games like you do. You repeat the argument again and again and again. When cornered you refuse to answer questions. Hey, be consistent all you want.

Where is your intellectual honesty, PaxImperium? Where is the internal bullcrap alarm?

You have no idea how loud it is sounding now as I hear your nonsense.

 

[paximperium]

Sorry, PaxImperium, but your position is wobbling all over the place. Trying to attack it is as pointless as trying to nail jelly to a wall.

Pssst...in the real world, it actually takes an actual example and counter argument to support your claim. Just stating it does not magic it into reality like your "metaphysics" claims.

PS: Did I mention your refusal to answer questions when cornered? I'm sure I just did.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

It is different because this thing is aware of the contents of your mind. It doesn't exist in isolation.

I suppose this is moot then. The awareness didn't look to be a significant factor, in any case.

It's a false analogy because it assumes that what the coin does is random

The coin 'does' as much as the soul does. It is unchanging. As such, the coin is not random, of course, in and of itself. The outcome of the coin toss, that is. Furthermore, it describes what I understand by random. And there is zero difference between free and random.

You do not happen to like the word. But that is all.

- why else would you have used a coin? Here's the analogy without inserting a random factor:

You have not removed what I see as the chance element. It is still there. Here is is again (Italics: analogy; Indent: a= my original, b= your changes):

To expound on this. This is not necessarily your normal, materialist

(a): coin
(b): WILL.​

The coin represents the soul, and not WILL. If you wish then the coin has (a) will, I am open here. It is not as if it meant anything. In fact, heads/tails can be this will. Or intention, or whatever.

As such it knows what the

(a): coin tosser
(b): brain​

wants, thinks, desires etc. But it is not affected by this. Hey, why not? It is also not constrained in its outcome by anything (physical forces, for instance).

(a) Now if this coin is tossed the outcome is free. Read, there is still a chance that either side could come up - P(Heads) > 0 and P(Tails) > 0.
(b) The soul can act freely. What it does has nothing to do with chance. It's not a coin.​

Here is where you have made the most significant changes.

One of this changes is a loud denial that what the soul does has something to do with chance. Call it what you will, I call it chance. If is has nothing to do with anything, then it is chance in my book. In fact, I could just as well assert that what the coin does has nothing to do with chance (uhhhhh), but it still can freely (read: P(heads) > 0 and P(tails) > 0) come up heads or tails.

Another of this changes is the assertion that it is not a coin. Of course it is not a coin. It is like a coin. It is like this special coin.

And like your soul, the coin can act freely. Coming up heads or tails. Constrained by nothing, aware of everything. An unchanging entity, on top of that.

The will has access to what the

(a) tosser
(b) brain​

(Emsworth, say) thinks, but is not contstrained by it. And in turn the outcome of the act of will is always open, free, call it what you will. But a specific outcome

(a) heads
(b)​

then affects the further actions of the

(a) tosser
(b) brain/body.​

Overall, I think the analogy is fair. You just don't like the words "chance" or "randomness." But even striking out the words doesn't help you.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Then stop insulting mine. No scientific instrument can determine what the word "headache" means. Science studies BRAINS, Ron. It studies neurons and chemicals and electrical signals. It doesn't study headaches. "Headache" is a word used by humans to describe some aspect of their subjective experience.

headache (hěd'āk')
Pain in the head, caused by stimulation of or pressure to any of various structures of the head, such as tissue covering the cranium, cranial nerves, or blood vessels. Headache can be a primary disorder, as in migraine or cluster headaches, or a common symptom associated with head injury or many illnesses such as acute infection, brain tumor or abscess, eye disorders such as glaucoma, dental disease, and hypertension. See also cluster headache, migraine.

Wake up to reality: Headaches are real complexions caused by real physical stimuli and they can and have been studied by science for quite a while. There's nothing metaphysical nor magical about them

And even in the supposed case that a headache was proven to be nothing but an illusion (which still doesn't qualify as metaphysical), science can also study that, since it can study the processes in the brain that causes illusions
And please, before you jump again and say "no, it can't" like a stubborn child, go read any book on biology and/or neuroscience cause I honestly can't do the work for you

(Besides, no serious argument relies purely on the "no it can't" reply. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence)

Human perception is often erroneous,

Good. So you do accept that human perception is erroneous. Thank you
If you accept this, then what serious objective criteria do you use to determine that what you perceive is real, as opposed to an illusion? (Other than "because I'm really really really sure that it is real. I'm positive")

but there are limits to the size of the error we can make. So there are certain things we can be mistaken about, and certain things we can't.

What are the limits to the size of the error we can make and how do you go on to determining this?
What are the certain things we can be mistaken about and what are the certain things we can't be mistaken about and what criteria do you use to differentiate them?

You make a lot of assertions and zero support behind them. You have got a lot of work now to back up your claims if you want people to take you seriously

Why do you think this causes my argument to collapse??? Please explain the chain of logic by which it collapses? Even if I'd said "yes, we could be mistaken about anything at all", it still wouldn't collapse, because I'm not asking anybody else to take my personal experiences into account.

Excuse me but yes you did. You may think we forget what you post, but we don't

In other words, I am not really introducing retrocausality as the solution to a problem at all. I'm introducing it because I think I've directly experienced it,

That to you is not asking us to take your personal experiences into account?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Because indeterminate free will is a silly idea.

That's not an argument, Paul. You have to explain why you think it is silly.

I have no idea how the agent is created, so I don't know if it's determined.

It isn't created. It exists necessarily.

But if the agent's will is also not determined, then my willfull actions are arbitrary.

The agent's will is not determined.

As I just said, I don't understand what the agent is. I'm talking about the agent's decisions. I hope they are constrained by something or else I'm quite scared of these pesky agents.

"They" (It) are (is) constrained only by the laws of logic, and possibily the laws of physics depending on what your view is of the origin/nature of the laws of physics.

What is scary about it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Emsworth,

Please define "random".

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Good. So you do accept that human perception is erroneous. Thank you
If you accept this, then what serious objective criteria do you use to determine that what you perceive is real, as opposed to an illusion? (Other than "because I'm really really really sure that it is real. I'm positive")



What are the limits to the size of the error we can make and how do you go on to determining this?
What are the certain things we can be mistaken about and what are the certain things we can't be mistaken about and what criteria do you use to differentiate them?

All of this is irrelevant, because I am not asking you to take my personal experiences into account.

In other words, I am not really introducing retrocausality as the solution to a problem at all. I'm introducing it because I think I've directly experienced it,

That to you is not asking us to take your personal experiences into account?

NO.

I earlier posted this, in response to you asking me what problem I was trying to solve:

What am I trying to explain?

Two things:

(1) how it is possible that the will can both be free and non-random.
(2) my own personal experiences.

(1) is of interest to anyone who thinks there is an a-priori argument against the existence of libertarian free will, because I am challenging their position. QM is only indirectly related to this, because it provides the possibility of a mechanism which doesn't contradict the laws of physics. From what you've said to me it seems that to make it more than a possibility we would need a new variant of the hidden variable interpretation of QM. [eta: even a new variant of HVT wouldn't make it more than a possibility, it would just clarify the connection between quantum mechanical and metaphysical versions of the idea]
(2) is of little or no interest/relevance to anyone who has a skeptical/materialist agenda and they are free to ignore it.

What isn't clear about that? You have stopped debating me about (1) and are asking me questions about (2). I have already said you are free to ignore (2), because it isn't justified by anything but my own personal experiences/beliefs. So (1) is all that should matter to you, and it is in fact what this thread is supposed to be about. (2) only even got mentioned because I was asked by various people to explain why I believe what I believe.

If you want to ignore (2) then ignore it. This thread is about (1).

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

All of this is irrelevant, because I am not asking you to take my personal experiences into account.

I wasn't asking you about your personal experiences. I'm simply asking you what criteria do you use to differ between perceptions of real phenomena and illusions. I didn't imply that you used your personal experiences as the only way to verify them. That's why I'm asking you

I'm specifically interested in the part where you say that "there are certain things we can't be mistaken about". What are the things we can never be mistaken about and how do you determine this?

NO.

I earlier posted this, in response to you asking me what problem I was trying to solve:



What isn't clear about that? You have stopped debating me about (1) and are asking me questions about (2). I have already said you are free to ignore (2), because it isn't justified by anything but my own personal experiences/beliefs. So (1) is all that should matter to you, and it is in fact what this thread is supposed to be about. (2) only even got mentioned because I was asked by various people to explain why I believe what I believe.

If you want to ignore (2) then ignore it. This thread is about (1).

Not at all, UE. The reason I've been asking you about (2) is because from the way you've been arguing, you seem to be basing all of your arguments on what we call the "First Person" type of analysis, as if it were an irrefutable source of information, when anyone with a little bit of common sense and skeptical mindset knows that their own senses alone are unreliable and subject to misperception and that thus it is necessary to have a Third Person type of analysis of anything we study, to verify that it holds water and that we're not fooling ourselves

And that this First Person approach seems to also be the building block to your belief that there's something inherently mysterious and unexplainable about consciousness that cannot be studied and understood scientifically

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Emsworth,

Please define "random".

Geoff

0 < P(x) < 1

If you look somewhere way upthred I think you dug out definitions of randomness that were based on lack of order, or lack of intent, purpose.

But that is fine as well, as this then makes it possible to describe cases where P(x) = 1 as random well. I am thinking of a random numbers generator, or maybe random mutation in the ToE. A computer is a determinist environment, as is chemistry.

In short, if there is no rhyme, or reason, no why, no because.


ETA: Here maybe you would like to have a look at the Wiktionary entry for randomness:
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/random

 

[UndercoverElephant]

0 < P(x) < 1

If you look somewhere way upthred I think you dug out definitions of randomness that were based on lack of order, or lack of intent, purpose.

But that is fine as well, as this then makes it possible to describe cases where P(x) = 1 as random well. I am thinking of a random numbers generator, or maybe random mutation in the ToE. A computer is a determinist environment, as is chemistry.

In short, if there is no rhyme, or reason, no why, no because.

I still don't know what "random" means to you.

This...

0 < P(x) < 1

includes almost everything.

This...

If you look somewhere way upthred I think you dug out definitions of randomness that were based on lack of order, or lack of intent, purpose.

..specifies three different things.

and this...

in short, if there is no rhyme, or reason, no why, no because.

...is poetry.

I have no idea what you mean by "random." It encompasses what I call "random", what I call "will" and other things as well.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I wasn't asking you about your personal experiences. I'm simply asking you what criteria do you use to differ between perceptions of real phenomena and illusions. I didn't imply that you used your personal experiences as the only way to verify them. That's why I'm asking you

I can't answer that question. In order for you to stand any chance of understanding my answer, you would have to have intimate knowledge of both my entire personal history and my understanding of religion/philosophy. In other words, you'd have to be me, or at the very least somebody who has a great deal in common with me.

I'm specifically interested in the part where you say that "there are certain things we can't be mistaken about". What are the things we can never be mistaken about and how do you determine this?

If somebody chops your leg off, can you be mistaken about it?

Not at all, UE. The reason I've been asking you about (2) is because from the way you've been arguing, you seem to be basing all of your arguments on what we call the "First Person" type of analysis, as if it were an irrefutable source of information...

No I'm not. If I was trying to prove that free will does exist, then this accusation would be true. But I'm not trying to prove that free will necessarily exists. I'm trying to prove that it doesn't necessarily not exist.

Put another way: I only have subjective/personal reasons for a positive belief in free will, but I have objective/collectively-justifiable reasons for believing that it is impossible to rule it out a-priori.

And that this First Person approach seems to also be the building block to your belief that there's something inherently mysterious and unexplainable about consciousness that cannot be studied and understood scientifically

Yes. If you ignore the "first person approach" then you might just as well be a materialist/determinist.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I still don't know what "random" means to you.

This...

includes almost everything.

Which is true, if followed to the letter. Although, I would not consider extremely small, or high likelyhoods to be significant. I am not pedantic, and if sth has a 99.999% chance of happening, then let it be certain.

This...

..specifies three different things.

It is very rare that there is the one true definition. Words tend to be used in different context and environments, with sometimes slightly different connotations.

and this...

...is poetry.

I mean it. Rhyme, reason, why, because all assert some sort of ordering principle, or intent/purpose. In the widest sense maybe, but still.

I have no idea what you mean by "random." It encompasses what I call "random", what I call "will" and other things as well.

Hmmm, if my understanding of "random" encompasses your understanding of "random" then there is some common ground already.


And did you see the link to the Wiktionary that I added to my last post? I doubt you did when you quoted it, so have a look at this:
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/random

 

[Beth]

We have to distinguish between the content of the mind and the observer of that content. They are different because the content of mind is dependent on the brain and the observer of the content is not. This doesn't mean we can have disembodied minds, because an observer with nothing to observe is indistinguishable from nothing at all. Being aware of absolutely nothing is no different to being dead, or under a general anasthetic.

If you could elaborate on what you mean by this, it would be appreciated.

I could do, but it would help if you explained what it is that isn't clear enough.

I do not think it possible to truly distinguish between the brain and the rest of the body. Our nervous system is integrated into every part of our physical being. When you say 'content' of the mind, I think you mean the thoughts we think, but I don't see how those thoughts can be separated from our physical brain/body. I am all too familiar with physical/hormonal changes that can alter my very thoughts. Further, I can make myself feel happy or sad by simply choosing an appropriate movie to watch. It seems to me that the subjective I' that consciously observes everything I do and think is very much dependent on both the physical system and the content on my thoughts. So what do you mean when you say the observer is not dependent on the content of the mind?

Because indeterminate free will is a silly idea.

UE is right. While that may be an argument for not believing in it, it isn't an argument against it not existing which is all he's arguing for.

0 < P(x) < 1

If you look somewhere way upthred I think you dug out definitions of randomness that were based on lack of order, or lack of intent, purpose.

But that is fine as well, as this then makes it possible to describe cases where P(x) = 1 as random well. I am thinking of a random numbers generator, or maybe random mutation in the ToE. A computer is a determinist environment, as is chemistry.

In short, if there is no rhyme, or reason, no why, no because.

Thanks, this exchange sparked a new thought for me. It seems to me that, if I am understanding UE correctly, LFW could be thought of the force(?) that sets the probability distribution of the random choice. The suicide jumper who pauses and reflects on the world around him has a non-zero probability of changing his mind and climbing down rather than leaping to his death.

If somebody chops your leg off, can you be mistaken about it?

Presumably that is possible. But I'd put the probability at below 0.001%, which I think Lord Emsworth would consider sufficiently close to zero.

No I'm not. If I was trying to prove that free will does exist, then this accusation would be true. But I'm not trying to prove that free will necessarily exists. I'm trying to prove that it doesn't necessarily not exist.

I think you're right. But you didn't convince me. I was agnostic from the start.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hi Beth

I do not think it possible to truly distinguish between the brain and the rest of the body. Our nervous system is integrated into every part of our physical being.

Absolutely. When people speak of "brain activity" the only reason I don't make the same sort of challenge you just made is that it doesn't usually make a whole load of difference to the argument. We should really be speaking about the whole nervous system instead.

When you say 'content' of the mind, I think you mean the thoughts we think, but I don't see how those thoughts can be separated from our physical brain/body. I am all too familiar with physical/hormonal changes that can alter my very thoughts. Further, I can make myself feel happy or sad by simply choosing an appropriate movie to watch. It seems to me that the subjective I' that consciously observes everything I do and think is very much dependent on both the physical system and the content on my thoughts. So what do you mean when you say the observer is not dependent on the content of the mind?

Yes, when I say "content of the mind" I am refering to all of your subjective experiences, and it is true to say that these experiences are utterly dependent on what is going on in your body. That's not to say the are your body. But they couldn't exist without your body.

This distinction between mind and body is not what I am primarily interested in at this point. I'm interested in the distinction between the mind and the metaphysical subject, which has been referred to in this thread as "I", "soul" or "agent of free will".

Here is a snippet of the Tractatus:

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a book called The World as l found it , I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.--

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things.

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world--not a part of it.

So Wittgenstein is comparing the system of metaphysical-subject/mind with the system of visual-field/eye. The metaphysical subject doesn't appear anywhere within the content of your mind because it is the observer of the content. The only reason we have to posit that it exists at all is because without it we would be zombies. It's bit like infering that a camera has to exist because of the existence of a photograph, even though the camera appears nowhere in the photograph.

What I am saying is that this metaphysical subject, unlike the content of your mind, does not depend on your body. It is a simple entity, unlike minds and neural systems which are both extremely complex entities. To extent the camera analogy, it is like saying that the content of the photograph is dependent on the content of the the bit of the physical world it is a photograph of, but that the camera is not dependent on that bit of the physical world. The camera can turn any view of the physical world into a photograph. The camera does not need to change during this process. It's always the same camera. The metaphysical subject can turn any configuration of brain/body into the content of a mind. The subject does not change. It's always the same subject. No matter how you change during your life, no matter if every cell in your body dies and is replaced, no matter how different your world-view or belief system or friends and family and hopes and dreams change, the metaphysical subject remains the same.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's not an argument, Paul. You have to explain why you think it is silly.

Because the idea of my will being indeterminate is an oxymoron.

The agent's will is not determined.

Then the agent's decisions are random.

UE is right. While that may be an argument for not believing in it, it isn't an argument against it not existing which is all he's arguing for.

Fine, then will exists and has random effects. Is that what anyone but possibly UndercoverElephant means by will? Of course not. That is why indeterminate free will does not exist. UcE is describing something else.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thanks, this exchange sparked a new thought for me. It seems to me that, if I am understanding UE correctly, LFW could be thought of the force(?) that sets the probability distribution of the random choice.

Then the choice is not random! It is at least partially determined by free will.

Come on folks. Random events follow a probability distribution, but not because someone set up the distribution. They follow a probability distribution because a probability distribution is the only way to describe events that have no determining factors. That includes no free will determiners.

~~ Paul

 

[Beth]

UE is right. While that may be an argument for not believing in it, it isn't an argument against it not existing which is all he's arguing for.

Fine, then will exists and has random effects. Is that what anyone but possibly UndercoverElephant means by will? Of course not. That is why indeterminate free will does not exist. UcE is describing something else.

Maybe. What different people mean by the term seems very amorphous. At any rate, the point I take that he's making is not that it exists, but that it's possible it exists. I agree. I don't think the concept is ruled out by any aspect of our current scientific knowledge.

Thanks, this exchange sparked a new thought for me. It seems to me that, if I am understanding UE correctly, LFW could be thought of the force(?) that sets the probability distribution of the random choice.

Then the choice is not random! It is at least partially determined by free will.

Come on folks. Random events follow a probability distribution, but not because someone set up the distribution. They follow a probability distribution because a probability distribution is the only way to describe events that have no determining factors. That includes no free will determiners.

~~ Paul

Actually, the loaded dice example earlier is an illustration of the fact that a probability distribution can be set by external factors even when the actual individual results cannot. There are, in fact, many ways to set up the parameters of a distribution of some random variables. Your statement here is not a valid argument against the concept of LFW put forward by UE.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Thanks, this exchange sparked a new thought for me. It seems to me that, if I am understanding UE correctly, LFW could be thought of the force(?) that sets the probability distribution of the random choice.

But the issue, Beth, isn't that things we do cannot have randomness. It's that if a thing we do is random, it can't be a choice.

Let's take an example. Let's say that P(B)=b₁ lacking A, and P(B)=b₂ in the presence of A. If b₁ is not equal to b₂, then A affects B. Suppose that b₁ is 1/6, and b₂ is 5/6. So if A occurs, P(B) is 5/6, and if it doesn't, P(B) is 1/6.

In this scenario, A controls B to an extent, in that A is able to influence whether or not B occurs--having A occur selects for B, not having A occur selects against it. This is a deterministic aspect. But at the same time, there's an indeterministic aspect--in the presence of A, it's entirely possible for B not to happen, and in its absence, it's entirely possible for B to happen anyway. The probability of each of these is 1/6.

So let's consider that scenario. Suppose A is present, and B does not in fact happen. One out of six times this is the case, so it's certainly possible. But now you cannot say that B happened as a result of A. This is the problem. In order to call it will, a particular subject had to have caused the particular outcome (willed it). If I am to be the proximate cause for an action, it must necessarily be the sort of thing whereby when A is present B occurs, and when A is absent B does not occur. The other two situations can definitely happen--B can occur if A is absent, and it can be that B does not occur if A is present--but in those cases, I cannot say that I meant to do that. I cannot call it will.

Controlling the distribution of the outcomes allows randomness to enter the equation, but there's no objection to randomness being in the equation. The objection is based on whether or not I get to call it something I intended to do when all is said and done. That requires my ability to control whatever it is you think I'm controlling--and that requires causation.

If I control, I cause. If I don't cause, I don't control. If there's no cause, I can't be the cause.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Maybe. What different people mean by the term seems very amorphous. At any rate, the point I take that he's making is not that it exists, but that it's possible it exists. I agree. I don't think the concept is ruled out by any aspect of our current scientific knowledge.

I agree. It's ruled out by logic.

Actually, the loaded dice example earlier is an illustration of the fact that a probability distribution can be set by external factors even when the actual individual results cannot. There are, in fact, many ways to set up the parameters of a distribution of some random variables. Your statement here is not a valid argument against the concept of LFW put forward by UE.

So if I load the dice and then throw them, you're willing to say that the results are entirely random? No, because that wouldn't be free will. So then you have to answer the following question: To the extent that the dice were loaded, what "determined" how the loading was done?

~~ Paul