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Science and free will

The highlighted words are where you trip up and create a (presumably) inadvertant strawman. Any interaction with physical reality is detectable in principle, not necessarily by current science.

Why?

ETA: All of the "what ifs" that you mention are real possibilities which real science deals with on a daily basis through proper research methodology and statistics.

Science can deal with phenomena which only happen once and only to one person?

Oh no it can't. If you can't repeat something under laboratory conditions then the scientist simply has to say "we have no evidence to support the claim, we see no reason to believe it is true." But that must not be mistaken for "therefore it isn't true and didn't happen."
 
It is random.

No it isn't, because it is an originatory act of will. You are doing the same thing Belz is doing - you are assuming that something has to be either random or determined. Sure, if you assume everything has to be either random or determined (or a combination of the two) then there can't be any free will. I don't assume this, therefore I don't arrive at the same conclusion.
 
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Why?



Science can deal with phenomena which only happen once and only to one person?

Oh no it can't. If you can't repeat something under laboratory conditions then the scientist simply has to say "we have no evidence to support the claim, we see no reason to believe it is true." But that must not be mistaken for "therefore it isn't true and didn't happen."

This is a common misconception of the way science works. Science is not limited to what is repeatable under laboratory conditions. If it were, we wouldn't know anything about cosmology. As for some hypothetical phenomenon which only happens once to one person, so what? If it only happens once then we don't have to worry about it ever happening again, so it's irrelevant.
 
This is a common misconception of the way science works. Science is not limited to what is repeatable under laboratory conditions. If it were, we wouldn't know anything about cosmology.

I realise that, and I don't think it makes any difference to my point.

This does though:

As for some hypothetical phenomenon which only happens once to one person, so what? If it only happens once then we don't have to worry about it ever happening again, so it's irrelevant.

It may be irrelevant to you and to science in general, but that doesn't mean it is irrelevant to the person it happened to. On the contrary, it would potentially be a life-changing experience.
 
I realise that, and I don't think it makes any difference to my point.

This does though:



It may be irrelevant to you and to science in general, but that doesn't mean it is irrelevant to the person it happened to. On the contrary, it would potentially be a life-changing experience.

Perhaps I've misunderstood what you're trying to say, as I came in late to this discussion. When I have some time later, I'll read back through the thread and get back to you. :)
 
It is random. The probability to jump or not may be biased toward either of the two possible outcomes, but no matter how you twist it or turn it, they are both greater than zero (p(j) > 0 and p(~j) > 0). Only when either of the two probabilites equals zero and the other one equals one this randomness is gone (p(j) = 1 and p(~j) = 0 for example). What you have then, is either fate (where one thing will happen no matter what) or strict causality where one thing will happen as a result, consequence, or whatever of prior states.

With your construction you don't have the luxury of being in a position to cast the act as a consequence of prior states any more. "[T]he "I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will" is a completely featureless entity with the exception that it introduces said randomness, or better yet is randomness - in person, and in your decision making process. Screwing with it, messing it up.

Fate's twin sister Etaf so to speak. And if "the contents of the mind" beg and plead enough then - maybe - Etaf follows that begging and pleading. Or - maybe - even if the begging and pleading is yet so loud, she doesn't, just esuaceb.

Let me try to move the debate on a bit.

I am starting from a subjective viewpoint and a non-materialistic metaphysical position. That is - I am positing there is some sort of agent of free will (contrary to both determinism and materialism). From my subjective perspective that thing is my "I" - the observer of the contents of my mind. It is both the observer and the actor. Materialists don't acknowledge any "observer", which is why they subsequently end up having serious problems explaining why they have a mind, and they don't acknowledge an actor, which is why they reject free will. From my subjective perspective, it seems like the process of making a decision is taken by my brain - by my cognitive processes which appear subjectively to me as a series of logically-connected thoughts - but that my acts are initiated by my "I", the same I which observed those logically-connected thoughts. The argument we are having is about whether or not it is logically possible for my subjective assessment to be correct - whether it is possible for this "I" to act in a way which is neither determined nor random. You are saying it is impossible. You aren't offering me a scientific argument for this. You are offering me an a-priori philosophical argument. From my perspective, that a-priori philosophical argument starts with the premise: "everything is either determined or random." I still don't understand how this premise is supposed to be being supported. I don't understand why my "I" can't be aware of all of my thoughts, but capable of acting without being determined by those thoughts. And I certainly don't know how this act of free will can be considered random. It's about as unrandom as possible, because it is an intentional act of will.
 
No it isn't, because it is an originatory act of will.

You know what a euphemism is, don't you? A euphemism for semantic trickery.

0 < P( Originatory_Act_of_Will_"Jump") < 1
0 < P(~Originatory_Act_of_Will_"Jump") < 1

I am fine with conceiving of your "originatory acts of will" as random. Chance sounds fine as well. So does arbitrary.
 
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You know what a euphemism is, don't you? A euphemism for semantic trickery.

0 < P( Originatory_Act_of_Will_"Jump") < 1
0 < P(~Originatory_Act_of_Will_"Jump") < 1

I am fine with conceiving of your "originatory acts of will" as random. Chance sounds fine as well. So does arbitrary.

None of that makes sense. I didn't say originatory acts of will are random. I said they were anything but random.

You seem to believe that there is an a-priori logical argument which rules out the possiblity of free will. I am not aware of any prominent philosopher of the past 100 years who believed that this is true. In fact I'm having trouble thinking of any post-Kantian philosophers at all who thought it was true. Plenty of them didn't believe in free will. They're called "determinists". But people who think that free will can be ruled out a-priori? Can't think of any.

ETA: sorry, I can think of one: Galen Strawson. Apart from him and maybe one or two others, you have to go all the way back to Hobbes. It's a pretty obscure position (also, his argument bears no resemblance to yours). (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/strawsong/)

ETA: Many philosophers think that a theory of free will is impossible, but that's not the same as saying that free will is impossible. Kant believed in free will, but not because he actually had a theory of free will. He believed we could never conclusively answer the question "do we have free will?" and argued that we ought to believe that we do on moral grounds.
 
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Perhaps I've misunderstood what you're trying to say, as I came in late to this discussion. When I have some time later, I'll read back through the thread and get back to you. :)

I am making a connection between free will and apparent "paranormal anomalies" which isn't made explicit. I consider them to be related phenomena.
 
linusrichard said:
LFW doesn't violate logic.

It might violate the known laws of the universe. It might violate the actual laws of the universe. Or it might just not exist. Or it might exist. But it doesn't violate logic.

Either "random" is defined as "not determined," as was asserted earlier in the thread, in which case the set of "random" includes everything that is not determined, which logically might include anything not described by the definition of "determined," including things you wouldn't normally describe as "random" - including LFW;
If you can describe something that is neither determined nor not determined, please do so. You cannot simply assert that libertarian free will is one of those things.

the definition of "random" has some substance to it, other than being simply defined negatively against "determined," in which case there is a set outside of "determined" and "random," and logically there is room for LFW there.
Nope, random simply means "not determined."

Now, you can assert that, in the first case, all things that are not determined have something in common that makes LFW impossible.
What they have in common is that they are not determined, which means there are no precursors that determine their outcome. The outcomes are random. In particular, the outcomes are not dependent on your state of affairs.

And whichever way you go, that assertion might be right, and I might be wrong. But that's not the same as saying that LFW is logically impossible.
Yes, it is. Determined/not determined is a dichotomy.

~~ Paul
 
[...]From my subjective perspective, it seems like the process of making a decision is taken by my brain - by my cognitive processes which appear subjectively to me as a series of logically-connected thoughts - but that my acts are initiated by my "I", the same I which observed those logically-connected thoughts.

[...]

I don't understand why my "I" can't be aware of all of my thoughts, but capable of acting without being determined by those thoughts. And I certainly don't know how this act of free will can be considered random. It's about as unrandom as possible, because it is an intentional act of will.

You have no "because." All you have is "just so." You have an "I" that may be loaded somewhat towards one or the other outcome by your reasoning faculties (etc.), but ultimately can counteract these. Just so. No because.

You have these wonderful "logically-connected thoughts" that all yell "Don't jump" and along comes your "I" and kicks them into the trash, on a whim. Just so. You're dead.

Now rewind the clock ...

You have these wonderful "logically-connected thoughts" that all yell "Don't jump" and along comes your "I" and says " 'kay". Just so. You walk off the building.


None of that makes sense. I didn't say originatory acts of will are random. I said they were anything but random.

You have defined and described them in such a way that I must conceive of them as random. Your denial of randomness, or grounds for calling it such, matters little.

The originatory acts of will are somewhat similar to coin tosses (ideal, not real world). Could come up heads, but could come up tails just as well. Maybe we can ameliorate the situation by not calling the outcome of the coin toss "random" but an "intentional act of will" of the coin instead? No, I doubt we can. I also doubt that you would.

Or loaded dice. If the loaded side comes up, you might call out "that was because it was loaded." But what if it doesn't come up? Just so. And again calling the outcome an "intentional act of will" of the dice doesn't really sound like it.

In fact, the loaded dice are a picture perfect analogy to your ""I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will:".

The answer is that it doesn't "decide", it just acts. It's a simple entity. It can't "decide" things because it doesn't have it's own brain. It does, on the other hand, have access to brains, because it is the observer of minds. Does that get any closer to answering your question? The agent of free will can act in a way which is neither determined nor random because it has access to the contents of mind but is not constrained by those contents​
(quoted from somewhere upthread)

A die doesn't decide either, it just acts.

It is also a simple entity.

It does not have a brain.

The only difference is that there is no immediate connection to a brain. But don't worry, we may introduce one in the shape of the guy who loaded the die to begin with. So, there is ultimately a connection to brains in the shape of the load being inserted, which of course could also be stated as the observation of the mind of our gambler.

The outcome of a roll of the dice not determined either.

I am not entirely sure what you mean by contrained. Merely a little limited, or ruled out entirely? The outcome of the dice roll is not constrained either, in the sense that any side could still come up, just with slightly altered probabilities.

But it still is a random event.



You seem to believe that there is an a-priori logical argument which rules out the possiblity of free will.

I believe that the best you can do is compatibilism. Of course, compatibilism has its limitations when it comes to assigning moral responsibility and so on. It may look a little ugly once you peek behind the scenes and consider it on its own, but in comparision to libertarian free will? A chance element called "originatory act of the will" may sound nice and profound, but ultimaltely it'd make things only worse. It is as if a person in a deterministic world based her actions on the only thing that is not determined: her* magic dice.



* Of course it still is her decision, choice, responsibility, because I said it is her dice. j/k


He believed we could never conclusively answer the question "do we have free will?" and argued that we ought to believe that we do on moral grounds.

We ought to believe in what? I could do compatibilism. I am not sure that would count, but what free will is exactly seems to be a matter of taste anyway.
 
Retrocausality is causal in the sense that something in the present is causing something in the past. It's acausal (at least in the case of free will) in the sense that the thing in the present which is causing something in the past is not itself being determined by anything else. The actor is an uncaused cause.
Uhm... no. It doesn't help. If C causes A, and A causes B, A is determined by C. You seem to be saying that T(B)<T(A) somehow has something to do with there being no C such that C causes A, but the latter has nothing to do with the former.

There's no relationship between A being uncaused (i.e., there is no C such that C causes A) and T(B) being less than T(A). There's nothing you gain from T(B)<T(A).
"Seems" is a "weasel word".
Weasel wordsWP aren't words per se--they are usages of words such that the thing they say is not supported by facts or is ambiguous. Pending any updates you have... and I'm all ears... what I'm specifically saying here--that an actual mechanism whereby information traveling faster than c has yet to be discovered--is true. So it's a bit disingenuous to say that I'm using weasel words (it's neither ambiguous nor unsupported, it seems).

If you're appealing to QM for something, there had better be something in QM to appeal to. If QM doesn't actually provide your mechanism, you don't get to use it.

Besides, I'm still not sure what problem you think you're solving with retrocausality in the first place. Please fill in the blank (or do the equivalent):

"I believe in retrocausality because that's the only way to explain the fact that ______, which we need to explain because ______."
 
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You have no "because." All you have is "just so." You have an "I" that may be loaded somewhat towards one or the other outcome by your reasoning faculties (etc.), but ultimately can counteract these. Just so. No because.

You have these wonderful "logically-connected thoughts" that all yell "Don't jump" and along comes your "I" and kicks them into the trash, on a whim. Just so. You're dead.

Now rewind the clock ...

You have these wonderful "logically-connected thoughts" that all yell "Don't jump" and along comes your "I" and says " 'kay". Just so. You walk off the building.




You have defined and described them in such a way that I must conceive of them as random. Your denial of randomness, or grounds for calling it such, matters little.

The originatory acts of will are somewhat similar to coin tosses (ideal, not real world). Could come up heads, but could come up tails just as well. Maybe we can ameliorate the situation by not calling the outcome of the coin toss "random" but an "intentional act of will" of the coin instead? No, I doubt we can. I also doubt that you would.

Or loaded dice. If the loaded side comes up, you might call out "that was because it was loaded." But what if it doesn't come up? Just so. And again calling the outcome an "intentional act of will" of the dice doesn't really sound like it.

In fact, the loaded dice are a picture perfect analogy to your ""I", "the soul", or whatever else you want to call the agent of free will:".

The answer is that it doesn't "decide", it just acts. It's a simple entity. It can't "decide" things because it doesn't have it's own brain. It does, on the other hand, have access to brains, because it is the observer of minds. Does that get any closer to answering your question? The agent of free will can act in a way which is neither determined nor random because it has access to the contents of mind but is not constrained by those contents​
(quoted from somewhere upthread)

A die doesn't decide either, it just acts.

It is also a simple entity.

It does not have a brain.

The only difference is that there is no immediate connection to a brain. But don't worry, we may introduce one in the shape of the guy who loaded the die to begin with. So, there is ultimately a connection to brains in the shape of the load being inserted, which of course could also be stated as the observation of the mind of our gambler.

The outcome of a roll of the dice not determined either.

I am not entirely sure what you mean by contrained. Merely a little limited, or ruled out entirely? The outcome of the dice roll is not constrained either, in the sense that any side could still come up, just with slightly altered probabilities.

But it still is a random event.





I believe that the best you can do is compatibilism. Of course, compatibilism has its limitations when it comes to assigning moral responsibility and so on. It may look a little ugly once you peek behind the scenes and consider it on its own, but in comparision to libertarian free will? A chance element called "originatory act of the will" may sound nice and profound, but ultimaltely it'd make things only worse. It is as if a person in a deterministic world based her actions on the only thing that is not determined: her* magic dice.



* Of course it still is her decision, choice, responsibility, because I said it is her dice. j/k




We ought to believe in what? I could do compatibilism. I am not sure that would count, but what free will is exactly seems to be a matter of taste anyway.

Lord Emsworth, your entire post continues to equate "not determined" with "random." Like Belz, and Paul, you appear to define "random" as "not determined." These terms are NOT synonymous.

Random: lacking any definite order or purpose

Non-random: having some sort of order or purpose

Determined (philosophy): a philosophical theory holding that all events are inevitable consequences of antecedent sufficient causes

Indetermined (philosophy): Indeterminism is the philosophical belief contradictory to determinism: that there are events which do not correspond with determinism (and therefore are uncaused in some sense).

Random/non-random is about whether there is ANY sort of order or (more importantly) purpose.

Determined/indetermined is about an event or act is inevitable due to antecedent causes.

How can someting be non-determined and non-random? It can be so if it is an originatory act of will. It's non-random because it was intentionally willed, NOT because it was made inevitable by antecedent causes, and it's non-determined because it was not inevitable.
 
Uhm... no. It doesn't help. If C causes A, and A causes B, A is determined by C. You seem to be saying that T(B)<T(A) somehow has something to do with there being no C such that C causes A, but the latter has nothing to do with the former.

There's no relationship between A being uncaused (i.e., there is no C such that C causes A) and T(B) being less than T(A). There's nothing you gain from T(B)<T(A).

I'm sorry, but you'll need to translate that into English for me, because I don't know what your symbols are supposed to mean.

Weasel wordsWP aren't words per se--they are usages of words such that the thing they say is not supported by facts or is ambiguous. Pending any updates you have... and I'm all ears... what I'm specifically saying here--that an actual mechanism whereby information traveling faster than c has yet to be discovered--is true. So it's a bit disingenuous to say that I'm using weasel words (it's neither ambiguous nor unsupported, it seems).

If you're appealing to QM for something, there had better be something in QM to appeal to. If QM doesn't actually provide your mechanism, you don't get to use it.

I don't need QM to provide the mechanism. I only need QM to not rule it out. You seem to be saying that no current interpretation of QM actually specifies a mechanism for free will, but that it's not impossible that some future version could.

Besides, I'm still not sure what problem you think you're solving with retrocausality in the first place. Please fill in the blank (or do the equivalent):

"I believe in retrocausality because that's the only way to explain the fact that ______, which we need to explain because ______."

I mentioned retrocausality because Paul asked me for a "clue" as to how it might work. The reason I gave this as a clue is not because I have some deep knowledge of QM which suggests to me that there is a connection between free will and retrocausality. I gave it as a clue because my own non-scientific, personal experiences have led me to associate free will and retrocausality.
 

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