The Hard Problem of Gravity

[yy2bggggs]

W00t! Hes back!

Never left.

By 'fundamental element' of perception I mean that there must be a basic level of reduction, beyond which, the emergent property no longer exists.

Naively, written words are sequences of letters. Letters are collections of shapes. Shapes are collections of... something like edges.

The first problem is that reading words is involuntary, but it's a conscious effort that I have to invest to pick out shapes, and edges are even harder. Letters themselves are a bit easier. As you can see, something odd is afoot with this pattern... it's backwards. Our brain has added layers to the processing, and pushed some of the tasks out.

The second problem is that I haven't found a really good psychic lowest level yet. I can easily find a lowest level, but only if I step outside of the psyche and start analyzing the process... then I get to, well, individual nerves in the eye.

The third problem is that logically speaking, it does not have to work that way. There does not have to be a fundamental piece of things--there could be loops of "fundamental"... in modern math, for example, we build things on axioms, but in science (as a discipline), we just have a bunch of facts, and there's no well defined set of most fundamental facts; you could call one set more fundamental, or the other, and you can derive the same facts both ways. You may be able to find, in certain sorts of perceptual entities, "fundamental" pieces--but in others, there may just simply be a "set of facts".

This is mind, let's keep going... and I'm just going to be speculative a bit (it's just an example). Edges are comprised of psychic pixels. But they have to stand out to be edges... so, psychic pixels are location plus color. But now, as you see, we start climbing back up the chain. Without color and location, however, there are no pixels. But there's also no percept of location alone that I'm aware of. On the other hand, if you combine color and location, it seems that you're tagging two completely different "sorts" of mental things. Still, color is never just color... it's color at a location. So here's a dilemma for you. Which is more fundamental--red, or a psychic pixel?

It looks, to me, like there's simply a bunch of layers, and they co-mingle, but it's hard to find the "most fundamental" ones. In a sense, they all look fundamental. I would argue that if "red" is a quale, "word" should be--if you want to break "word" down, I can break "red" down. But I don't think there's a genuine "more fundamental" direction--they look more like co-mingling layers to me. It looks more like what we have with science than math.

For instance, tangible matter no longer exists as such below the level of the atom, liquids no longer exist as such below a certain level of reduction, genes no longer exists as such -- and so on.

Right, but the problem here is that it's just an analogy. We should be cautious of tendencies to, say, think that there's something epistemically fundamental about atomic theory per se, simply because it works so well in one area. Breaking down matter into atoms is easy--smaller things are more fundamental. Doing the same with perception is not so easy... there are forks in the road I can chase, and there doesn't seem to be a compass direction of "more fundamental".

Simply put, words are unitary components but they are not fundamental.

The same is true with red then.

 

[Nick227]

Dude, if a dictionary definition is not formal then the term 'formal' is meaningless. I every single post I've used the term in a manner consistent with the definition -- THIS definition:

qua⋅le: a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object; a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.

As I've already said, qualia aren't just empirical phenomena; they are the very basis of empirical observation. The statement that they have no scientific meaning or value is probably the most absurd claim I have ever heard. Without qualia the IS no science. Period.

Then what you're really talking about is phenomenality...interiority...light. By this definition, if I understand you right, qualia are everything phenomenal, everything seen, everything sensed, everything conscious, everything interior.

Is this correct?

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

AkuManiMani - a dictionary definition is not a formal definition. Not even close.

Dictionaries are for general users of the language, not for technical use.

Anyway... Qualia are objects?!

 

[Nick227]

AkuManiMani - a dictionary definition is not a formal definition. Not even close.

Dictionaries are for general users of the language, not for technical use.

Yet, formal definitions may only be useful within a very limited field.

Materialism gives us one perspective on consciousness, but simply because it has travelled some distance in creating understanding does not mean that another perspective might not be useful. After all, all we consciously know, we know through phenomenality, from this experience of interiority, as your buddy Hof puts it. And all of it can validly be considered qualia.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Memes are also necessarily inferable because of the observable replication of behaviors and beliefs between individuals.

No, they're just a model.

Dude, if a dictionary definition is not formal then the term 'formal' is meaningless.

Non-sequitur. Also wrong.

If that is the case all he had to do was state "It is not possible for the EMF of the brain to be the carrier of consciousness".

You did not, at first, even state that you were referring to an electromagnetic field.

My argument was, and is, that consciousness may be carried by the EM field generated by the brain.

Which is completely impossible, a fact you appear to be studiously ignoring, no matter how many people point it out to you.

For him to simply state "no such field exists" when he meant "It is not possible for the EMF of the brain to be the carrier of consciousness" is not only lousy communication - but factually incorrect.

No. It's neither.

You referred initially to a "field". Unspecified.

I pointed out - entirely correctly and appropriately - that:

The mind doesn't behave that way.
The brain doesn't work that way.
There is no possible transmitter for such a field.
There is no possible receiver for such a field.
There is no such field.
It's physically impossible.

All of these remain completely true when you specify that you mean an electromagnetic field. Yes, there is an electromagnetic field, but there is no electromagnetic field with the properties you are arguing for. Nor can there be.

Perhaps is Pixy actually bothered to articulate himself instead of spewing out one liners and single word reposes we wouldn't have the problem right now.

No, we've already proven that even when I explain myself repeatedly you will simply ignore it and accuse me of random multiple perfidy.

And another thing. Pixy defined information processing as 'awareness' and self-referential processing as 'consciousness'.

Nope. Never said that, or anything like it. You are confused.

These are the same definitions he used a year ago, and hes still using them now.

Nope. Epic fail, I'm afraid.

At no point did I misrepresent his position.

In fact, you just did it again. I'm not saying it's deliberate; you appear to have genuinely failed utterly to grasp my position.

If you believe I did feel free to provide the exact post in which I did so.

That one right there, for starters.

I stated that the endogenous field of the brain is possible the carrier of consciousness. For him to claim that I'm arguing for a 'magical-faerie-field' is not only mocking but a direct misrepresentation of my argument -- i.e. a strawman.

Nope, I'm just mocking your absurd notions. An error of fifteen orders of magnitude is magic fairy territory.

We've looked at what an error of fifteen orders of magnitude means:

* That the Empire State Building weighs as much as the planet Mercury.
* That you can take Lake Michigan home in a bucket.
* That you can cover the US federal budget deficit with a penny and have money left over to buy IBM, Microsoft, Google, Exxon, GE, Wal-Mart, and Vermont.
* That the Milky Way Galaxy consists of one small brown dwarf star.

I think there were a couple of others that I've now forgotten. Oh yes:

* That you could eat an omelette made from all the eggs ever laid by all the chickens that have lived since they were first domesticated 10,000 years ago - and still be hungry.

Regardless of what you want to call it, it was still inappropriate; if he wanted to have a civil discussion with me he should have been civil.

Civil?

AkuManiMani, my dear chap, at no point have I been less than civil. I have been dismissive of your ideas, certainly, because your ideas deserve no more.

You, on the other hand...

Why should I be singled out for retaliating?

Take a look in the mirror, old bean.

If Pixy, or anyone else, doesn't want a caustic barrage of insults then they shouldn't pick a verbal fight with me.

Sorry, it simply doesn't work like that.

If you post nonsense, people will tell you that it is nonsense. If you respond with a caustic barrage of insults, you will likely find yourself getting suspended. I have never reported anyone for that, and don't plan to start; your arrows invariably fly wide of the mark and so cause no damage.

No damage to others, anyway.

I suspect that the only reason why you're focusing on me is that I'm more adept at wielding words as weapons than Pixy is.

No, merely more apt to attempt this.

I'm not here to "wield words as weapons". I'm here to deflate nonsensical arguments.

Anyway, I've already admitted that I'm basing my position off of logical inferences and circumstantial evidence.

You are basing your position off nonsense. Fifteen orders of magnitude, AkuManiMani. Fifteen orders of magnitude. I know it's hard to grasp, because we don't ordinarily deal with numbers that large, but let me illustrate with a few more errors of equal scope:

* The Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear weapon ever tested, had the explosive power of a single safety match.
* There is a world market for, at most, a few dozen transistors.
* The planet Earth is approximately half an hour old.
* The chance of winning first prize in the state lottery two weeks running is about 50/50.
* So is the chance of a fair coin coming up heads 50 times in a row.

Oh, here's a good one:

* You can run all human activity on the planet for a year on a single AA alkaline battery.

That is the scale of the error you are making.

Is it possible I'm wrong? Of course.

Yes. Indeed, it is certain.

Am I going to concede just because there are a bunch of people who really, really, really disagree? Not a chance.

No, nor do we expect it. We know better than that.

That doesn't mean we will cease pointing out the absurdity of your claims, of course.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yet, formal definitions may only be useful within a very limited field.

Oh, certainly.

But when you want to make a precise point within that field, you need the formal definition.

"Work", "power", "energy", "force" - all of these have well-understood (albeit broad) meanings in the English language. But within physics, each is defined by an equation.

Materialism gives us one perspective on consciousness, but simply because it has travelled some distance in creating understanding does not mean that another perspective might not be useful.

You're right; that in itself doesn't tell us that other perspectives aren't useful.

What tells us that is the dismal track record of said other perspectives.

After all, all we consciously know, we know through phenomenality, from this experience of interiority, as your buddy Hof puts it. And all of it can validly be considered qualia.

I have little use for the term, as you know, because it has long been used to mean a specifically dualistic form of mental experience - incoherent gobbledegook, to put it bluntly.

Call them akualia or nickualia or something. Or experiences. Or thoughts.

 

[Nick227]

You're right; that in itself doesn't tell us that other perspectives aren't useful.

What tells us that is the dismal track record of said other perspectives.

Well, that a system has a certain level of internal consistency or logic is great. But we still don't really know about consciousness. The foremost researchers happily admit that we're just starting to scratch the surface.

Maybe consciousness is finally unfathomable objectively. It's possible. Maybe it has an inner logic and meaning that can only be grasped experientially through feeling it and living it subjectively. Mystics have claimed just this.

These things are to my mind eminently possible, not just random ideas to spew in the path of materialism. I think research is great and I wouldn't want to stand in the way of it. It's not my intention to mindlessly put up some kind of dubious metaphysical barricade. But we don't know yet so much really, depending of course on how you assess these things.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Frequency coding is what neurons in the brain do. There is no need to guess about frequency coding having an effect on synaptic potentials.

It's just like the old telephone system - a huge messy switched network based on pulse dialing that breaks down all the time and costs a fortune to maintain.

But it's still better than working for a living.

Just wanted to thank you and Dancing David for all the details you've added to the discussion.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, that a system has a certain level of internal consistency or logic is great. But we still don't really know about consciousness. The foremost researchers happily admit that we're just starting to scratch the surface.

There's a tendency for scientists talking to or writing for the popular audience to downplay the amount that is already known and play up the unknown - and often, the significance of a specific new discovery. That's certainly taking place here to some extent. We know a lot about how the brain works and how minds work. We are still learning, of course, and we have a lot yet to learn.

But saying "we still don't really know about consciousness" is at the same time so vague as to be meaningless and a poor characterisation of the current state of affairs.

Maybe consciousness is finally unfathomable objectively.

There's no reason to think so.

It's possible.

There's no reason to think that, either.

Maybe it has an inner logic and meaning that can only be grasped experientially through feeling it and living it subjectively.

Are, now you're on much firmer ground. This is complete nonsense.

Mystics have claimed just this.

Yes. Mystics have also claimed that they can fly to the Moon on dewdrops and talk to dead lizards. Mystics are stoned out of their minds most of the time - an occupational hazard - so they say a lot of stuff like this.

These things are to my mind eminently possible, not just random ideas to spew in the path of materialism.

Mmmmmmmmno.

I think research is great and I wouldn't want to stand in the way of it.

It's certainly more productive than just making stuff up. Particularly stuff you made up whilst higher than a winged monkey.

It's not my intention to mindlessly put up some kind of dubious metaphysical barricade. But we don't know yet so much really, depending of course on how you assess these things.

Hofstadter. Wolfe. Inter alia.

There are more things dreamt of in our philosophy, Nick, than there are in Heaven and Earth.

 

[Nick227]

Yes. Mystics have also claimed that they can fly to the Moon on dewdrops and talk to dead lizards. Mystics are stoned out of their minds most of the time - an occupational hazard - so they say a lot of stuff like this.

"Stoned" frequently equating to not having so many thoughts, or not being so identified with those thoughts.

It's certainly more productive than just making stuff up. Particularly stuff you made up whilst higher than a winged monkey.

I'm drinking a Bundaberg root beer. I don't know that it's so hallucinogenic.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm drinking a Bundaberg root beer. I don't know that it's so hallucinogenic.

No, we save the good stuff for domestic consumption.

 

[PixyMisa]

Speaking of which, my parents took the family to the ginger factory at Buderim (a couple of hours from Bundaberg) when I was young. The smell was so overpowering that thirty years later I still can't face ginger in any form.

 

[Dancing David]

I'm not entirely sure about this very specific scenario. In the more optically oriented sections of brain development and recognition of color, as I understand it, your particular Mary would probably be able to see red. I say that because I think this could very well be sufficient:

• Your particular Mary sees gray
• Your particular Mary sees green

That's enough to pump creation of the red-green opponent process ganglia, and to start developing recognition circuits along this direction. Red, in this sense, would be a suspiciously strong "non-green" stimulus that is so much stronger than the normal "level" grays that it may be subjectively detectable. This may even provide the ability to see "purples". In particular, there's probable precedent for seeing colors more saturated than you've been exposed to naturally (pure frequency light, for example), and also probable precedent for seeing and recognizing as distinct different sorts of colors than you could have been exposed to (the "reddish-green"/"bluish-yellow" percepts that can be produced in certain subjects using forced stimuli tied to eye tracking software).

It'd be an interesting experiment, though it probably would be difficult to set up ethically speaking for humans.

Anyone who knows better about this, especially with references, I'd be fascinated to hear about it.

I agree, I just wonder what level of stimulation during develpment would be needed. My daughters soon to be husband is color blind, he can't describe the difference with the one color he can perceive, red.

"It is just cool." says he.

 

[Nick227]

..... thirty years later I still can't face ginger in any form.

Aha. Now it's all starting to make sense. It's ginger that activates the qualia.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Reeaaallly ? So a working computer DOESN'T have electricity going through and DOESN'T actually compute ? Or are you instead arguing that a unconnected hard drive actually does stuff ?

Of course it does "stuff". It even has tiny electrical currents.

That sounds like philosophy. Philosophy is useless. I'm now asking you what scientific reason we have for assuming qualia exist.

Observation. Have you not observed them?

 

[dlorde]

Qualia aren't just observable; they are the fundamental basis for observation.

How does one observe qualia? Can I observe your qualia? Can you? IIUIC qualia are the the influences on the processing activity of the brain of particular types of sensory input - the particular 'resonances', if you like, they produce. In this sense, they are the process of observation.

Without observation -- without perception -- there is no knowledge, there is no science.

Without the senses there is no observation, perception, knowledge, or science, no exterior world... so?

While I was pointing out emergent properties my actual point is a good deal more radical than that. I'm saying that even what we think of as physical objects are just as virtual as any metaphysical abstraction.

Well QM is a very successful model of reality that has uncertainty and virtuality at its core - so in a sense everything is virtual... but that aside, you're talking ontology - which is fine, but the map is not the territory, and I don't see what you gain by asserting it is. Ultimately, it looks like a self-defeating argument. We separate our experience and our reflections on that experience into abstractions - categories and hierarchies, precisely so we can process that information more effectively - we distinguish between subjective and objective, science and woo, concepts and their referents, physical objects and metaphysical abstractions, because at a practical, empirical level they are experientially different, and establishing the relationships between them gives meaning to the world. E.g. once, natural philosophy accommodated alchemy and astrology, but we learned to distinguish crucial differences between them and the rest of natural philosophy in a constructive, empirical way - hence modern science, ostensibly via The Scientific Method (well, that's the official story).

I'm saying that there is no absolute division between what we consider physical and metaphysical. I'm saying they exist on the same continuum. Mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete' objects.

You can say that, but it doesn't make it objectively true. From where I stand it appears somewhat opaque. What do you mean by 'an absolute division'? What is this 'continuum'? Please explain, with examples, how mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete objects' (and please first define/explain what you mean by a 'mental object').

The purpose of science is the cumulative advance of knowledge within an ever evolving conceptual framework.... 'Matter' and 'physical' are just words used to describe a particular category of extant entities -- not the absolute measure and basis of reality.

Science doesn't attempt to describe the absolute measure and basis of reality, but to further our understanding of its behaviour by modelling our observations of it. The better the model corresponds with our observations, and predicts new ones, the better the model...

As mentioned earlier, anything that has objective reality is, in principle, observable in some fashion. If it is observable it falls within the domain of scientific inquiry. Thoughts, and other mental objects, have objective reality.

In what sense? How can they be observed and measured?

We base our physical action off of the perception mental objects -- meaning they have veridical consequence upon the physical world and, by extension, physics.

Ideas are physical objects because we feel that they influence our actions and our actions are physical?

The same argument could have been put forward for the concept of 'hereditary elements' about a century ago. Memes are a protoscientific concept, atm, just as genes were.

I'm happy to accept the concept of memes as an interesting hypothesis that opens avenues of research to follow.

Memes are also necessarily inferable because of the observable replication of behaviors and beliefs between individuals. These, in turn, have physical consequences upon the world -- they are, in principle, veridical objects.

For special values of 'object'...

The thing is that mental constructs like memes cannot replicate or exist without the conscious perception of living subjects.

Unsupported speculation - Is this a partial definition of memes or a partial definition of consciousness? If a novel behaviour spreads through a population by imitation, does this imply the individuals in that population are conscious? - or should one say that if the individuals are not deemed conscious, behavioural imitation cannot occur, or perhaps, if it can occur, it can't be memetic?

People mentally perceive and incorporate physical behaviors into their repertoire. They perceive and accept beliefs and propositions which, in turn, shape their behaviors. Memes are mental [i.e. subjective] entities but they have objective consequence upon the world.

Circular argument, memes are defined as imitative behaviours, and behaviours are objective, external consequences of internal processes.

Dude, if a dictionary definition is not formal then the term 'formal' is meaningless.

Now don't start this selective misinterpretation straw-man stuff again - I explicitly mentioned a 'clear unambiguous formal definition rather than a dictionary definition', and went on to clarify that I meant 'formal' in the sense of scientific formalism.

As I've already said, qualia aren't just empirical phenomena; they are the very basis of empirical observation. The statement that they have no scientific meaning or value is probably the most absurd claim I have ever heard. Without qualia the IS no science. Period.

You keep saying this, but with no more evidence or explanation than the debatable theory that all objects are virtual, so concepts and objects are the same thing - and that without the process of perception there is no science, therefore the abstract concept of the process of perception is both scientific and the basis of science... - a multiplicity of non-seqiturs from where I stand. If I misunderstand or misrepresent your case, please clarify.

My argument was, and is, that consciousness may be carried by the EM field generated by the brain. For him to simply state "no such field exists" when he meant "It is not possible for the EMF of the brain to be the carrier of consciousness" is not only lousy communication - but factually incorrect.

Perhaps you didn't recognise the semantics of the qualifier 'such' in this instance... it was clear to me, which is why your response appeared almost deliberately obtuse.

Perhaps is Pixy actually bothered to articulate himself instead of spewing out one liners and single word reposes we wouldn't have the problem right now.

We? I don't think your problem with Pixy's responses is particularly his fault. ISTM he was trying to get you to frame your ideas in a formal scientific way, and, rather than recognise that these ideas are outside the direct purview of science, you appeared to suggest that science should be revised to encompass them...

And another thing. Pixy defined information processing as 'awareness' and self-referential processing as 'consciousness'. These are the same definitions he used a year ago, and hes still using them now. At no point did I misrepresent his position. If you believe I did feel free to provide the exact post in which I did so.

Another straw man - I didn't say that you misrepresented that aspect of his position... I said that you regularly misrepresented his statements, and I supplied a couple of examples.

Regardless of what you want to call it, it was still inappropriate; if he wanted to have a civil discussion with me he should have been civil. Why should I be singled out for retaliating? If Pixy, or anyone else, doesn't want a caustic barrage of insults then they shouldn't pick a verbal fight with me. I suspect that the only reason why you're focusing on me is that I'm more adept at wielding words as weapons than Pixy is.

The way I read it, it's not a personal attack, it's your arguments that are being mocked, and it's not a retaliation, it's a last effort to elicit a realisation; AIUI, reason and logic having failed, mockery might literally give you pause for thought.

I'm spending entirely too long on this stuff - think I'll go back under my stone before the thread suffocates.

 

[PixyMisa]

You can say that, but it doesn't make it objectively true. From where I stand it appears somewhat opaque. What do you mean by 'an absolute division'? What is this 'continuum'? Please explain, with examples, how mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete objects' (and please first define/explain what you mean by a 'mental object').

I think what he's saying here is that there's one type of stuff, and that minds arise from the same stuff as shoes and ships and sealing wax. A simple rejection of dualism, in other words.

Which is entirely correct. The term "mental object" I have something of a problem with, because they're all processes... But so is everything, so that understood, go for it.

Ideas are physical objects because we feel that they influence our actions and our actions are physical?

If he'd said physical processes, would that make you happier. (It would me.)

The way I read it, it's not a personal attack, it's your arguments that are being mocked, and it's not a retaliation, it's a last effort to elicit a realisation; AIUI, reason and logic having failed, mockery might literally give you pause for thought.

Indeed, yes. I do that. I even have my own personal smiley:

 

[AkuManiMani]

Naively, written words are sequences of letters. Letters are collections of shapes. Shapes are collections of... something like edges.

The first problem is that reading words is involuntary, but it's a conscious effort that I have to invest to pick out shapes, and edges are even harder. Letters themselves are a bit easier. As you can see, something odd is afoot with this pattern... it's backwards. Our brain has added layers to the processing, and pushed some of the tasks out.

The second problem is that I haven't found a really good psychic lowest level yet. I can easily find a lowest level, but only if I step outside of the psyche and start analyzing the process... then I get to, well, individual nerves in the eye.

The third problem is that logically speaking, it does not have to work that way. There does not have to be a fundamental piece of things--there could be loops of "fundamental"... in modern math, for example, we build things on axioms, but in science (as a discipline), we just have a bunch of facts, and there's no well defined set of most fundamental facts; you could call one set more fundamental, or the other, and you can derive the same facts both ways. You may be able to find, in certain sorts of perceptual entities, "fundamental" pieces--but in others, there may just simply be a "set of facts".

This is mind, let's keep going... and I'm just going to be speculative a bit (it's just an example). Edges are comprised of psychic pixels. But they have to stand out to be edges... so, psychic pixels are location plus color. But now, as you see, we start climbing back up the chain. Without color and location, however, there are no pixels. But there's also no percept of location alone that I'm aware of. On the other hand, if you combine color and location, it seems that you're tagging two completely different "sorts" of mental things. Still, color is never just color... it's color at a location. So here's a dilemma for you. Which is more fundamental--red, or a psychic pixel?

It looks, to me, like there's simply a bunch of layers, and they co-mingle, but it's hard to find the "most fundamental" ones. In a sense, they all look fundamental. I would argue that if "red" is a quale, "word" should be--if you want to break "word" down, I can break "red" down. But I don't think there's a genuine "more fundamental" direction--they look more like co-mingling layers to me. It looks more like what we have with science than math.

[...]

Right, but the problem here is that it's just an analogy. We should be cautious of tendencies to, say, think that there's something epistemically fundamental about atomic theory per se, simply because it works so well in one area. Breaking down matter into atoms is easy--smaller things are more fundamental. Doing the same with perception is not so easy... there are forks in the road I can chase, and there doesn't seem to be a compass direction of "more fundamental".

Thanks very much for the input. Its definitely food for thought. It seems that the scheme I've been working on could use a 'lil more refining to take into account for the nuances you pointed out...

Simply put, words are unitary components but they are not fundamental.

The same is true with red then.

Stepping back a bit, I think I can agree with that. If one gets right down to it, once can continue to follow the reductive chain indefinitely. I guess it would be more appropriate to use the term 'basic' rather than 'fundamental' -- since the latter implies that one cannot reduce further.

Even so, there is still a reductive level at which the identity of a thing, as such, ceases to be. Earlier on, dlorde mentioned the Planck scale; the basic 'pixels' of space-time as we know it. It seems logical that there must be some reductive scale a which a perceptive elements cannot be reduced further and still remain elements of perception.

 

[AkuManiMani]

How does one observe qualia? Can I observe your qualia? Can you? IIUIC qualia are the the influences on the processing activity of the brain of particular types of sensory input - the particular 'resonances', if you like, they produce. In this sense, they are the process of observation.

First I would like to apologize. There's a lot more rationale behind my apparently odd statements than I've elaborated on; I've a habit of taking them for grated and neglecting to sufficiently clarify.

Yes, qualia [perceptions, 'private behaviors' -- whatever one wants to call them] are processes. But, on further reflection, so are all entities -- including matter. Intuitively, people tend to consider entities that are relatively contiguous and stable thru time as 'objects' and their trajectories and evolution thru time a 'processes'. Its basically the philosophical distinction of noumena and phenomena. The reality is that the two have a fundamental equivalence. We distinguish the two as a matter of linguistic convenience, since it would be a bit cumbersome to try to speak in a language without distinction between verb and noun. To avoid this confusion [without making the naive assumption mentioned above] I prefer to consider the distinction as being context dependent. Depending on one's conceptual frame of reference one may consider a process as object, and vis versa.

In the context of one's perceptive field, mental percepts, and the qualia of which they are composed, are as stable and contiguous as the external objects they are correlated with. They are the mental models of the external world. Even relatively fleeting thoughts and feelings can be justifiably considered 'objects' in a sense. By comparison, there are particles in the 'external' world that are considered objects yet they hardly exist for even a fraction of a second. The designation of 'object' for even stabler mental constructs is even more justified, IMO.

Without the senses there is no observation, perception, knowledge, or science, no exterior world... so?

So, being as how they are the basis of world we experience, we should atleast attempt to better understand what they are.

While I was pointing out emergent properties my actual point is a good deal more radical than that. I'm saying that even what we think of as physical objects are just as virtual as any metaphysical abstraction.

Well QM is a very successful model of reality that has uncertainty and virtuality at its core - so in a sense everything is virtual... but that aside, you're talking ontology - which is fine, but the map is not the territory, and I don't see what you gain by asserting it is. Ultimately, it looks like a self-defeating argument. We separate our experience and our reflections on that experience into abstractions - categories and hierarchies, precisely so we can process that information more effectively - we distinguish between subjective and objective, science and woo, concepts and their referents, physical objects and metaphysical abstractions, because at a practical, empirical level they are experientially different, and establishing the relationships between them gives meaning to the world. E.g. once, natural philosophy accommodated alchemy and astrology, but we learned to distinguish crucial differences between them and the rest of natural philosophy in a constructive, empirical way - hence modern science, ostensibly via The Scientific Method (well, that's the official story).

Yes. We create categories, hierarchies, and other abstractions to help us make sense of the world [key word being 'create']. The point is that, in doing so, we necessarily bring entities into existence that have direct causal relevance to our actions. Even empirically incorrect conceptions have an objective reality, in and of themselves. Their objective reality -- as constructs -- is prior to the maladaptive consequences of believing them to reflect external reality.

I'm saying that there is no absolute division between what we consider physical and metaphysical. I'm saying they exist on the same continuum. Mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete' objects.

You can say that, but it doesn't make it objectively true. From where I stand it appears somewhat opaque. What do you mean by 'an absolute division'? What is this 'continuum'? Please explain, with examples, how mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete objects' (and please first define/explain what you mean by a 'mental object').

Again, my bad for not sufficiently qualifying my position and where I'm coming from. It would take quite a while and some pages of exposition to fully elaborate what I mean but I'll try to be brief.

I think we agree that, in some sense, reality can be considered virtual. Conventionally, people tend to think of external reality as being 'real' and the internal reality we construct in our minds as being 'unreal' in some sense. On the whole, there is some general practical benefit to this view. Those who cannot distinguish the internal world of their thoughts from the 'real' external world can get themselves removed from the gene pool. On top of that, we can logically infer that the 'objective' external world has existence prior to our existence and perception of it. However, we exist as part of the objective world and, by extension, so do our subjective impressions.

As I've stress before, we create, interact with, and base many of our physical actions upon the objects/processes of our subjective worlds. This means that our subjective perceptions and thoughts simultaneously have objective reality. This is the reason why I state that there is a necessarily relation of complementarity between subjective and objective [analogous to the complementary relations of QM]. They are are aspects of reality that, while co-substantial, are distinguishable from one another.

Science doesn't attempt to describe the absolute measure and basis of reality, but to further our understanding of its behaviour by modelling our observations of it. The better the model corresponds with our observations, and predicts new ones, the better the model...

I agree. But, upon giving it some thought, it seems justified to qualify the designation a bit. Empirical science is solely about the acquisition of raw data while theoretical science is how we model the data. In turn, analytical philosophy [such as ontology and metaphysics] is the conceptual backdrop upon which we construct, interpret, and understand our theories.

As mentioned earlier, anything that has objective reality is, in principle, observable in some fashion. If it is observable it falls within the domain of scientific inquiry. Thoughts, and other mental objects, have objective reality.

In what sense? How can they be observed and measured?

As of now, there is no known means of doing so. The only way to observe them at this present time is via personal introspection. My point is that since they exist they must be observable in some sense via external means. The present limitations to doing so are practical and not in principle.

My guess is that we would need atleast 3 basic things; some viable model of how mental elements [such as memes and qualia] are produced and processed by the brain, the requisite technology for reading such elements from a living subject, and a robust method of decoding those elements externally.

Ideas are physical objects because we feel that they influence our actions and our actions are physical?

I prefer to consider them 'veridical' objects. I think the term 'physical' is a categorical title that may or may not be appropriate for the class of entities under consideration.

The thing is that mental constructs like memes cannot replicate or exist without the conscious perception of living subjects.

Unsupported speculation - Is this a partial definition of memes or a partial definition of consciousness? If a novel behaviour spreads through a population by imitation, does this imply the individuals in that population are conscious? - or should one say that if the individuals are not deemed conscious, behavioural imitation cannot occur, or perhaps, if it can occur, it can't be memetic?

Actually, that is a good point. In some sense, memes are comparable to instincts, in that they can take the form of unconscious habits. While some memes are deliberately and consciously acted upon, just as many [if not more] are unconscious behaviors. I suppose the thing that would distinguish them from instincts is that they are acquired consciously.

Now don't start this selective misinterpretation straw-man stuff again - I explicitly mentioned a 'clear unambiguous formal definition rather than a dictionary definition', and went on to clarify that I meant 'formal' in the sense of scientific formalism.

My entire point has been that qualia need a scientific definition. They are veridical processes/entities that require scientific investigation and explanation.

We? I don't think your problem with Pixy's responses is particularly his fault. ISTM he was trying to get you to frame your ideas in a formal scientific way, and, rather than recognise that these ideas are outside the direct purview of science, you appeared to suggest that science should be revised to encompass them...

Science itself need not be revised to encompass them. Depending on their veridical nature, we may be able to account for them by a simple revision of existing physical theory. In the more extreme scenario, and entirely new physical theory may need to be formulated from scratch ot adequately account for them. At present its impossible to tell.

Another straw man - I didn't say that you misrepresented that aspect of his position... I said that you regularly misrepresented his statements, and I supplied a couple of examples.

If thats the case, then it was a confusion of communication. As you pointed out earlier, up until very recently Pixy's response have been pretty spartan and not well articulated. If he'd articulated his responses as well as you have with yours there would be no confusion.

The way I read it, it's not a personal attack, it's your arguments that are being mocked, and it's not a retaliation, it's a last effort to elicit a realisation; AIUI, reason and logic having failed, mockery might literally give you pause for thought.

I find is definition of 'aware'/'conscious' as being just information processing to be logically absurd and asinine, for a number of reasons. If hes justified in using mockery to argue his opinion of my views I should be able to mock his as well. No double standards.

I'm spending entirely too long on this stuff - think I'll go back under my stone before the thread suffocates.

Aww, man. Just when the discussion was getting good...

 

[dlorde]

I think what he's saying here is that there's one type of stuff, and that minds arise from the same stuff as shoes and ships and sealing wax. A simple rejection of dualism, in other words.

OK, I can live with that.

If he'd said physical processes, would that make you happier. (It would me.)

It would, but he didn't, and I think there is an important distinction to be made between the two - which is why we have different words with different semantics for them.

I even have my own personal smiley: