.
The existence of any number of betrayed "not-from-our-tribe" persons at Gitmo says that the agents couldn't detect the difference, although the tactic of having someone else eliminate your enemies is centuries old.
You misunderstand my point.
For example: We arrest suspected criminals all the time, and then apply a sorting method to determine which are actually innocent and which are truly guilty.
Very few people argue that because we let "any number" of suspects go free, we should abandon the practice of arresting anybody in the first place.
It seems to me that rather than holding soldiers to a higher standard when it comes to detaining POWs, we should recognize that the battlefield, which is much more chaotic, and upon which there is neither the time, nor the resources, nor the skills to conduct a meticulous and open-ended investigation of each suspect prior to detention, requires a different approach altogether.
Historically, this was much simpler: Enemy soldiers--even guerrilla insurgents, for the most part--wore identifying uniforms. You found them, and you detained them. No trial. No appeal. No parole. No time limit. They were POWs until the war was over, and their parent nation had agreed to your conditions for their return (or you had agreed to theirs, depending on who won).
Nowadays, insurgents go out of their way to appear as much as possible like innocent bystanders, and invest heavily in propaganda campaigns to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt in the minds of their enemies, about the efficacy of the POW process.
I, however, have not reached the conclusion that because the problem has gotten more difficult, we should give up altogether on trying to solve it. There are vigorous debates going on right now, at all levels of our society, about how we can improve our process rather than simply letting all our enemies go free.
But as you acknowledge further on, this question of methodology is actually irrelevant to you.
It IS the methodology that is faulty in these instances, but that is not the sole problem. A lack of knowledge of the cultures involved and failing to appreciate there are substantial differences show to me an ignorance in the entire chain of command.
To me, this is simply an extension of the methodology question. We know it's possible to train experts in a field, and we know it's possible to employ such experts. You're not the only person to whom these ideas have occurred. This is not an unsolvable problem.
But solving this problem is actually irrelevant to you, so we don't really need to discuss it here (although you're welcome to start another thread specifically about these methodological problems, if you like).
There is no conceivable excuse to inflict torture on prisoners. None at all, for any purpose whatsoever.
And now we get to the actual issue that I'm interested in. This is your true answer: Regardless of how reliable the methods of identifying terrorists among our detainees, "no conceivable" situation could possibly justify torturing them.
Alright, then. Fair enough.
I disagree, but before I go any further, may I ask: What is your position on "collateral damage"? Specifically, on the acceptance of civilian casualties during military operations? Do you believe that, like torture, "there is no conceivable excuse" for civilian casualties? Or do you believe that, unlike torture, there are in fact conceivable excuses?