This is, I suspect, exactly the reason why the C.A.T. included such strong, clear and unambiguous language that you may never justify torture by any such circumstances. . .not ever.
If you allow torture in some exceptional circumstances, you have effectively removed the ban on torture. What you think is sufficient to justify it, will certainly differ from what someone else (even those you consider to be the bad guys).
I'm going to address this point out of order, just to get it out of the way.
I'm perfectly willing to stipulate that as a matter of fact, torture (whatever the definition may be) is illegal under American law. I am
in this thread, wholly uninterested in this point. As far as I'm concerned, this thread is about whether or not torture is effective; and by extension whether or not it is, in principle, justifiable.
That current law holds that it is unjustifiable under any circumstances, regardless of its efficacy, is a claim I accept wholeheartedly and without reservation. I have no objection to you returning to this claim in future posts. I hope that in the same spirit, you will not take offense if I ignore it.
You're presenting a false dichotomy. That if you don't torture someone, you are doing nothing. That's false in itself. Believe it or not, the vast majority of crimes that are solved are solved without recourse to torture.
First, while I admit to indulging in a little hyperbole, I don't think the dichotomy is false
per se.
As I understand it, you're arguing that a certain course of action (in this case, "torture"), could reasonably not be taken, on the principle that some other course of action or event
might achieve the same result for a lesser cost. You give the example of the UNABOM case, where the FBI could have hypothetically refrained from torturing a suspect, since, a willing witness might call them at any time, thus removing the need for torture.
But this principle applies to
any expenditure of effort, to solve
any problem. The FBI could conceivably have not bothered to investigate the case at all, on the same principle that they could get a lucky break at any moment--thus saving substantial man-hours, tax dollars, and other resources that could have been more fruitfully expended elsewhere. Exactly where else, nobody knows, because as you point out, you can never know for sure what methods will work the best.
This doesn't cause a firefighter to refrain from rushing into a burning building to save someone trapped inside, on the principle that for all he knows, they could escape on their own at any moment, without exposing him to grave danger for no reason.
And it doesn't cause a general to refrain from putting his men in harm's way, on the principle that the political will to fight will slacken in one government or the other, and that the war could end at any moment. Which brings me to my second point.
Warfare is not criminal justice. And believe it or not, the vast majority of battles have been won by methods far worse than waterboarding--mass slaughter (of one's friends, as well as one's enemies), for example.
If the city of Dresden could have been neutralized as an Axis supply junction and manufacturing center, by waterboarding one Nazi officer, would that not have been preferable to the horrible firebombing that was undertaken instead?
If Imperial Japan could have been subjugated by shoving one Japanese admiral into a small box with an unspecified (but harmless) insect, would anyone have argued in favor of nuking two of their cities anyway, on the principle that we couldn't know for sure that the "torture" would work?
My point was a refutation of these absurd hypotheticals that claim you KNOW FOR CERTAIN that torturing someone is the only way to save lives. I'm pointing out that in fact you never can know this for certain--not even hypothetically.
I'm not sure anybody has made such a hypothetical. Certainly I haven't. As far as I'm concerned, it's a strawman, and thus eminently refutable. But by the same token, totally pointless to refute.
In almost all real-world situations, the decision to do anything, at whatever cost is entailed, is based not on absolute certainty, but on a weighing of options and likelihoods, and a weighing of consequences.
We don't send the Space Shuttle to the ISS because we KNOW FOR CERTAIN that it and its crew will complete their mission successfully and return safely to Earth.
We don't elect a president because we KNOW FOR CERTAIN that they are the best possible choice--or even a good choice.
We don't arrest a suspect and deprive them of their liberties because WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN that they are guilty, and we don't convict and sentence them because WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN that they are guilty.
We don't send rescue crews into a collapsed mine because we KNOW FOR CERTAIN that the trapped miners are still alive, and that the rescue crew won't be lost as well to the same dangers.
And we don't "torture" people because we know for certain that torture is the only method--or even the best method--for getting information.
We do all these things because, based on the information we already have about the situation, and what we already know about the methods available to us, is that one of these methods is more likely than the others to get the job done within the constraints of the scenario.
As a final example, let's take another look at the firefighter who rushes into a burning building to rescue someone, and dies in the fire while it turns out there was nothing they could have done anyway. When questioned, the Fire Chief says "at the time, we believed that sending Fireman Bob into the building was the best course of action, and we stand by that decision." Would you accuse the Chief of claiming to KNOW FOR CERTAIN what was necessary, and argue that he should have refrained from sending anybody into the building, because for all he knew the person inside could be already dead, or have escaped on their own?